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It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my necessary existence, a proof that generalizes
to everything whatsoever. (...) A ﬁrst reaction is that a ‘proof’ of such an outrageous conclusion
must contain some dreadful fallacy. Yet the proof does not collapse under scrutiny. Further
reﬂection suggests that, suitably interpreted, it may be sound. So interpreted, the conclusion is
not outrageous, although it may not be the view you ﬁrst thought of.
– Timothy Williamson, ‘Necessary Existents’
The lesson is that whether ‘we’ may take a philosopher at his word depends crucially on who ‘we’
are, and what philosophical premisses we ourselves argue from. That is distressing. It would
be nice to arrive at a non-partisan consensus about what the several parties say, before we go
on to take sides in the argument. And it would be nice to do this in our own words, translating
all parties into a common language, rather than by force of direct quotation. We can go some
distance by giving the utmost beneﬁt of doubt. We should be at least as generous as conscience
will allow in letting things bear names we think that they do not very well deserve, especially
when we report a position according to which there is no better deserver of the name to be had.
But there is a limit to generosity. When we must quietly go along with (what we take to be)
someone’s mis-speaking in order to give a non-partisan report of his position, the price is too
high. For then the advantage of common language is already forsaken.
– David Lewis, ‘Noneism or Allism?’

Abstract
Two main questions are addressed in this dissertation, namely:
1. What is the correct higher-order modal theory;
2. What does it take for theories to be equivalent.
The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the joint truth of two higher-
order modal theories, namely, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a higher-order necessitist theory
advocated by Plantinga (1974) and committed to the contingent being of some individuals, and
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Williamson (2013)
and committed to the necessary being of every possible individual.
The case for the truth of these two theories relies on defences of the following metaphysical
theses: i) Thorough Serious Actualism, according to which no things could have been related and yet
be nothing, ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, according to which necessarily, every higher-order entity is
necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism
are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories.
Prima facie, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are
jointly inconsistent. The argument for their joint truth thus relies also on showing i) their equivalence,
and ii) that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is merely verbal. The case for i)
and ii) relies on the Synonymy Account, an account of theory equivalence developed and defended
in the dissertation. According to the account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same
structure of entailments and commitments, and the occupiers of the places in that structure are the
same propositions. An immediate consequence of the Synonymy Account is that proponents of
synonymous theories are engaged in merely verbal disputes. The Synonymy Account is also applied to
the debate between noneists and Quineans, revealing that what is in question in that debate is what
are the expressive resources available to describe the world.
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1.1.1 What is the Correct Higher-Order Modal Theory?
The present dissertation lies on the intersection betweenmetaphysics and philosophical logic. Consider
a language containing only the propositional connectives, modal and actuality operators, ﬁrst- and
higher-order quantiﬁers, and identity. What is the true and most comprehensive theory formulated in
this language? What is the correct theory of higher-order quantiﬁcation, modality, identity and their
interaction? What is, in this sense, the correct higher-order modal logic? This is the question that is
directly addressed by the dissertation.1
The following are some of the relevant theses concerning the interaction between metaphysical
modality and quantiﬁcation:2
Necessitism. Necessarily, every individual is necessarily something.
Higher-Order Necessitism. Necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something.
Contingentism. Possibly, some individual is possibly nothing.
Higher-Order Contingentism. Possibly, some higher-order entity is possibly nothing.
Part of the interest in the interaction between metaphysical modality, quantiﬁcation and identity
stems from the fact that some theoretical considerations favour the truth of Necessitism and Higher-
Order Necessitism, despite the fact that: i) common-sense favours Contingentism and ii) theoretical
considerations of a different sort favour Higher-Order Contingentism.
1Here, what is meant with ‘correct’ may be cashed out as follows. A theory formulated in a language L is correct if and
only if the sentences to whose truth it is committed and arguments that it takes to be valid are all and only the true sentences
of the language and all and only the valid arguments of the language.
2An important caveat. The formulation of Higher-Order Necessitism here given presupposes a certain view on the
identity conditions of higher-order entities, namely, that necessarily, higher-order entities P and Q are the same if and only
if P and Q are necessarily coextensive. As will be explained below, identity, for the case of higher-order entities, is being
used as shorthand for necessary coextensiveness. That is, whenever it is said, for instance, that x is identical to y (with x
and y of type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉), what is meant is that necessarily, for all things z1, . . . , zn (of types, respectively, t1, . . . , tn),
x is true of z1 . . . zn if and only if y is also true of z1 . . . zn. Even though I have sympathy for the view that the identity
conditions for properties is given in terms of their necessary coextensiveness, this view will play no role in the arguments to
be presented in the dissertation, and so its truth is assumed nowhere.
1
Theories accounting for the interaction between metaphysical modality, quantiﬁcation and identity
are usefully grouped according to whether, according to them, Necessitism or Contingentism is
true, and whether Higher-Order Necessitism or Higher-Order Contingentism is true. The theories
of Adams (1981), Fine (1977), Plantinga (1976) and Stalnaker (2012), to name just a few, are all
contingentist, whereas the theories of Linsky & Zalta (1994) and Williamson (1998, 2013) are all
necessitist.
Williamson is not only a necessitist but also a higher-order necessitist. Moreover, even though
Linsky and Zalta are concerned only with the Necessitism–Contingentism debate (and not with
which one of Higher-Order Necessitism and Higher-Order Contingentist is true), it is reasonable to
think that their reasons for adopting Necessitism carry over as reasons for adopting Higher-Order
Necessitism.3
Among contingentists, Plantinga is, arguably, the most notable proponent of Higher-Order Ne-
cessitism. Adams, Fine and Stalnaker are all higher-order contingentists. The following groupings
emerge:4
Higher-order necessitism Higher-order contingentism
Necessitism
Thorough Necessitism: Moderate Necessitism:
Linsky and Zalta, Williamson ?
Contingentism
Moderate Contingentism: Thorough Contingentism:
Plantinga Adams, Fine, Stalnaker
I will call a theory thoroughly necessitist just in case it is committed to the truth of both ﬁrst- and
higher-order necessitism, and thoroughly contingentist just in case it is committed to the truth of both
ﬁrst- and higher-order contingentism. Moreover, I will say that a theory is moderately contingentist
just in case it is committed the joint truth of contingentism and higher-order necessitism. And I will
say that a theory is moderately necessitist just in case it is committed to the joint truth of necessitism
and higher-order contingentism.
The dissertation addresses the question whether thoroughly necessitist, moderately contingentist,
moderately necessitist or thoroughly contingentist theories, or variations thereof, are correct — or at
least are closer to the correct theory when compared to the existing rivals.
One quick caveat. Consider the following theses:
3Some of the reasons advocated by Linsky and Zalta in favour of Necessitism is that Necessitism is a theorem of the
logic that results from combining propositional modal logic and classical ﬁrst-order logic in the simplest way, the Simplest
Quantiﬁed Modal Logic. Similarly, Higher-Order Necessitism turns out to be a theorem of the system resulting from
combining propositional modal logic with classical higher-order logic in the simplest way.
4It is striking that there is an unoccupied camp, given how philosophers are prone to test the limits of different positions.
First-order necessitists advocating Aristotelian views on properties, such as the view that properties are something only
if instantiated, would occupy this camp, as long as they were committed to the plausible view that there could have been
instantiated properties that could have been uninstantiated. There are, of course, many other ways of being both a ﬁrst-order
necessitist and a higher-order contingentist. Arguably, one of the reasons why the camp is presently unoccupied is that the
current reasons for Necessitism, having to do with the simplicity and elegance of the resulting logics, are also present in the
higher-order case.
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Actualism. Every individual is actually something.
Higher-Order Actualism. Every higher-order entity is actually something.
Let Thorough Actualism consist in the conjunction of Actualism with Higher-Order Actualism.
Thorough Actualism is close to a truism (even though its necessitation is not). Yet, one of the most
famous theories in the metaphysics of modality, Lewis’s Extreme Realism, is committed to the falsity of
Actualism. Moreover, Lewis (1986, p. 97-101) has offered one important argument aimed at showing
that Actualism is anything but a truism.
Yet, in this dissertation the truth of Thorough Actualism will be presupposed. I will not offer a
careful defence of Thorough Actualism here. Suffice it to say that I ﬁnd very plausible a conception
of possible worlds, the Kripke-Stalnaker conception (Kripke, 1980), (Stalnaker, 1976), according
to which Thorough Actualism comes out as true. On this conception, possible worlds are (maximal)
possible states of the world, (maximal) ways things might have been. Of these ways things might have
been, only one obtains. The others could have obtained but do not.5
Let ‘Worldy’, stand for the way things might have been that obtains. On the Kripke-Stalnaker
conception, it is very natural to adopt the following take on the truth of sentences preﬁxed with
‘actually’, when this operator is given a rigid reading:
(1) Necessarily: actually, p if and only, if Worldy had obtained, then p.
Of course, ‘actually’ could be used differently. But given a commitment to the Kripke-Stalnaker
conception, (1) captures one way in which ‘actually’ may be used. This is thus the way that ‘actually’ is
presently being used.
Moreover, the following turns out to be true on the Kripke-Stalnaker conception:
(2) p if and only if, if Worldy had obtained, then p.
The reason why (2) is true on the Kripke-Stalnaker conception is simply that Worldy turns out to be
that possible world that obtains. This means that (2) is true, even if contingently.
From (1) and (2) together it follows that
(3) p if and only if actually, p.
So, take any entity x that is something. It follows from (3) that x is actually something. Thus, every
entity that is something is actually something. But every entity is something (i.e., every entity is some
entity). Therefore, every entity is actually something. Thorough Actualism is true.
1.1.2 What does it take for theories to be equivalent?
The dissertation also addresses a subsidiary question, namely, what does it take for theories to be
equivalent. The notion of theory equivalence in question is one concerned with what theories say,
5Arguably, this is the conception of possible worlds that is favoured by unreﬂective common sense, as argued in (Stalnaker,
1976).
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not with the means by which they say it. That is, it is a notion of equivalence concerned with the
relationship between theories and the world. On this notion, equivalent theories are theories whose
truth requires the same thing of reality.
The question what does it take for theories to be equivalent would already be worthy of a whole
dissertation addressing it. The reason why it is a subsidiary question in the present dissertation is that
it is addressed in the interest of answering the question what is the correct higher-order modal theory.
More precisely, it is argued in the dissertation that two theories currently on offer — theories that are,
arguably, the best higher-order modal theories currently available — commonly thought to be jointly
inconsistent turn out to be equivalent.
The two main views on the nature of theories, namely, the syntactic view, and the semantic view,
naturally give rise to two views on theory equivalence. According to the syntactic view on the nature
of theories, a theory consists in (or is adequately represented by) a set of sentences of some formal
language.6 The semantic view has it that a theory consists in nothing but a collection of models, where
these are understood as nonlinguistic entities.7
Regardless of whether the syntactic and semantic views are right qua views on the nature of
theories, they offer natural accounts of theory equivalence. According to the syntactic account two
theories are equivalent if and only if they consist in the same set of sentences of some formal language.
And according to the semantic account two theories are equivalent if and only if they consist in the
same set of models. Both the syntactic and semantic accounts are problematic, for reasons already
discussed in the literature.8 The dissertation thus offers a novel account of theory equivalence, the
Synonymy Account, and applies this account to the debate concerning the correct higher-order modal
theory.
6The received view, put forward by Carnap (1956), Feigl (1970) and Hempel (1965), imposes the stronger constraint
according to which theories contain only theoretical terms, which are connected to observational terms via correspondence
rules. These contain both theoretical and observational terms. Here, the interest is not in the received view but solely in the
weaker, syntactic view. For a recent defence of the received view and its history, see (Lutz, 2012).
7Different proponents of the semantic view are van Fraassen (1980), Giere (1988), Suppe (1989) and Suppes (2002).
Some of these take theories to be set-theoretic predicates, whereas others take theories to be collections of state spaces, and
even others allow models to consist of somewhat more concrete entities, such as planets and animals.
8According to the syntactic account there are no two theories that are both equivalent and (non-trivial) notational
variants of one another. However, this is not right. It is not because ‘¬’ is used for negation instead of ‘∼’ and ‘∧’ is used for
conjunction instead of ‘&’ that we thereby happen to have two non-equivalent theories. See fn. ??ch. 4]footnote:account-
notational-variant for the account of notational variant being presently used.
According to the second account there are no two theories that are both equivalent and yet consist in different collections
of models. But consider the collection of models consisting in all partially ordered sets such that every pair of elements has
both a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound and the collection of models consisting in all algebraic structures that
satisfy the commutative, associative and absortion laws. These are different collections and yet the theories that correspond
to the two collections of models are equivalent, corresponding to the theory of lattices. These considerations are spelled out
in a bit more detail in ch.4, p. 103.
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1.2 Main Theses
1.2.1 Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account
Four main theses are defended in the dissertation. The ﬁrst of these theses concerns a recent account
of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal logic, proposed in (Stalnaker, 2012).
Stalnaker proposes an account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal logic that I have dubbed the
Propositional Functions Account. The propositional functions account is proposed partly in order to
address a challenge facing theorists with thoroughly contingentist commitments. The challenge is to
provide a compositional semantics for ﬁrst-order modal languages consistent with the typical reasons
for endorsing Thorough Contingentism.
Thus, Stalnaker intends the Propositional Functions Account to play an important dialectical role
in the defence of his preferred higher-order modal theory. The existence of the account is intended
to show that there is a compositional semantics for ﬁrst-order modal predicate languages consistent
with the motivations for his higher-order modal theory. Pace Stalnaker, it is shown in the dissertation
that, from his own standpoint, the Propositional Functions Account overgenerates, in a sense to be
explained, and for this reason is inconsistent with Stalnaker’s higher-order modal theory.
Consider the following theses:
Thorough Serious Actualism. Necessarily, for every relation R, of any type, no things could have
been R-related and yet been nothing.
Necessity of Something. Necessarily, there is some individual.
Thorough Serious Actualism is defended in §3.3, and independently supported by thorough contin-
gentists such as Adams and Stalnaker (but not by Fine).
The thesis of the Necessity of Something is implied by claims to which many adhere. For instance,
it is implied by widely accepted claims such as i) at least one number is a necessary being, and ii) at
least one set is a necessary being (e.g., the empty set).
Say that a property is an haecceity of x if and only if it is the property of being x, and that it is
an haecceity just in case it is possible that it is the haecceity of some x. Also, say that a proposition
is an attribution of being to x just in case it is the proposition that x is something, and that it is an
attribution of being if and only if it is possible that there is some x such that the proposition is an
attribution of being to x. Consider the following theses:
Haecceity Necessitism. Necessarily, every haecceity is necessarily something.
Attributions of Being–Necessitism. Necessarily, every attribution of being is necessarily some-
thing.
The theses of Haecceity Necessitism and Attributions of Being–Necessitism are both consistent
with Higher-Order Contingentism. However, these theses are inconsistent with some of the main
motivations for adopting Higher-Order Contingentism. The reason is that haecceities and attributions
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of being are offered by higher-order contingentists as paradigmatic examples of higher-order entities
whose being is contingent, if the being of any higher-order entities is.
The ﬁrst of the main claims defended in the dissertation is the following:
Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account. The Propositional Functions Account,
together with Thorough Serious Actualism and the Necessity of Something, imply i) the Neces-
sary Being of Haecceities, and ii) Attributions of Being-Necessitism.
In addition, it is shown that natural ways of improving on the Propositional Functions Account all
lead to consequences that are undesirable from the standpoint of thorough contingentists committed
to Thorough Serious Actualism.
The Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account implies the inconsistency between
Stalnaker’s higher-order modal theory and the account, pace Stalnaker, since he his committed to the
falsity of both Haecceity Necessitism and Attributions of Being-Necessitism.
1.2.2 Higher-Order Necessitism
The overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account does not suffice to establish the truth
of Higher-Order Necessitism. Yet, it puts pressure on thoroughly contingentist higher-order modal
theories, such as Adams’s and Stalnaker’s, given the defence of Thorough Serious Actualism offered in
the dissertation. Higher-Order Contingentists are thus faced with the challenge of offering plausible
alternative compositional accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages, ones consistent
with their theories. The fact that such accounts have yet to be offered counts against thoroughly
contingentist higher-order modal theories, and so in favour of Higher-Order Necessitism.
Higher-Order Necessitism is the second of the main theses defended in the dissertation. Besides
the fact that the truth of the thesis is favoured by the absence of satisfactory semantic accounts of
ﬁrst-order modal languages consistent withHigher-Order Contingentism, a direct deductive arguments
in its defence are also offered in the dissertation, in §3.8. The arguments offered are analogous to the
arguments offered for a thesis that consists in an instance of Higher-Order Necessitism, namely, the
following:
Propositional Necessitism. Necessarily, every proposition is necessarily something.
Offering a defence of Propositional Necessitism is the main aim of chapter 3. Given the similarities
between the arguments for Propositional Necessitism and Higher-Order Necessitism, the defence
of Propositional Necessitism is easily transposed to a defence of Higher-Order Necessitism. Finally,
schematic versions of the arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism to be offered turn out to support
the following comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic:
Cˆomp. The relation that holds between entities x1, . . . , xn such that ϕ is necessarily something.
The result of preﬁxing any instance of Cˆomp with any sequence of universal quantiﬁers of any type
(binding parameters in ϕ) and necessity operators, in any order, is also an instance of Cˆomp. Principle
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Cˆomp is strictly stronger than Higher-Order Necessitism. A principle equivalent to Cˆomp is defended
in (Williamson, 2013, ch. 6). Whereas Williamson’s case for Cˆomp is abductive, the arguments for
Cˆomp presented in this dissertation are deductive.
Arguably, the arguments offered reveal that logics traditionally thought to be very weak are already
committed to the theses of Propositional Necessitism, Higher-Order Necessitism, and indeed Cˆomp.
1.2.3 Theory Equivalence is Theory Synonymy
The third of the main theses defended in the dissertation is a thesis on what it takes for two theories
to be equivalent. Roughly, say that formulations T1 and T2 of two theories, given in, respectively,
languages LT1 and LT2 have the same theoretical structure under functions f : LT1 → LT2 and
g : LT2 → LT1 if and only if f and g both preserve the structure of entailments and commitments of
the theories. Also, say that a translation f from LT1 to LT2 is deeply correct if and only if, for every
sentenceϕ ofLT1 , the proposition that is expressed byϕ according to the proponents of T1 is the same
as the proposition expressed by f(ϕ) according to the proponents of T2. Finally, say that formulations
T1 and T2 are synonymous just in case there are deeply correct translations f : LT1 → LT2 and
g : LT2 → LT1 such that formulations T1 and T2 have the same theoretical structure under f and g.
The following thesis is defended in the dissertation:
Theory Equivalence is Theory Synonymy. Two theories are equivalent if and only if they have
Synonymous formulations.
The Synonymy Account of theory equivalence is developed and defended in chapter 4. Part of the
case for the correctness of the Synonymy Account relies on showing that it enables a more nuanced
diagnostic of the debate between noneists and Quineans.
1.2.4 Equivalence
The last of the main thesis defended in the dissertation is the following:
Equivalence. Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism are
equivalent.
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism is a theory containing the main elements of the higher-order
modal theory defended by Williamson. Similarly, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism is a theory
containing the main elements of the higher-order modal theory defended by Plantinga. One corollary
of the equivalence between the theories is that there is a sense in which one need not decide between
them. Rather, proponents of both theories have the same commitments, even though they have chosen
different means to express them. Proponents of the two theories are involved in a verbal dispute.
Say that a theory is informally sound if and only if the arguments that are valid according to the
theory are indeed valid, and the sentences to whose truth the theory is committed are indeed true.
Also, say that a theory is informally complete if and only if the arguments that are valid in the language
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of the theory are valid according to the theory, and the sentences that are true in the language of the
theory are commitments of the theory.
Given the defences of Higher-Order Necessitism and Cˆomp, it is natural to conjecture that
one of Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism is informally
sound. Moreover, given the equivalence betweenWilliamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism, it is natural to conjecture that both are informally sound, provided that they
are understood according to how they are using their language.
The informal soundness of the theories does not imply that they are correct (according to how the
proponents of each theory uses that theory’s language), since Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism
and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism are informally incomplete. Yet, the truth of the conjectures
implies that Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism are equally
good approximations to the correct higher-order modal theory.
1.3 Higher-Order Quantiﬁcation
One major presupposition of the dissertation is that higher-order resources are legitimate. In this
section the higher-order modal language in which the theories under consideration are formulated is
presented. In the next section a brief defence of higher-order resources is offered.
1.3.1 The Language
The basic higher-order language for which the higher-order theories are formulated is the language
MLP, offered in (Gallin, 1975, ch. 3). This language is deﬁned in terms of a hierarchy of types, which
I will ﬁrst introduce this hierarchy, and then proceed to present language MLP.
This hierarchy contains just one basic type, e. The remaining types are deﬁned recursively. The
only rule is that, for every natural number (including 0) if t1, …, tn are all types, then 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 is
also a type. The type e, the basic type of the hierarchy, corresponds to the category of individuals (i.e.,
of particulars). Entities of this category, are things such as Obama and Mars. Propositions, properties
of individuals, relations between propositions and individuals, and the like do not belong to this
category. So, where t1, …, tn are types corresponding to the categories c(t1), . . . , c(tn) of entities, the
type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 corresponds to the category of relations between entities of categories c(t1), …, c(tn).
For instance, the type 〈e〉 corresponds to the category of properties of particulars, the type 〈e, e〉
corresponds to the category of binary relations between particulars, and the type 〈〈e〉〉 corresponds
to the category of properties of properties of particulars. Note that the type 〈〉 corresponds to the
category of propositions. The idea is that propositions are just one kind of relation, namely, 0-ary
relations. From now onwards I will be informally calling entities of category c(t) xentities of type tx.
So, individuals are entities of type e, properties are entities of type 〈e〉, propositions are entities of
type 〈〉, etc.
The language MLP contains the usual truth-functional connectives, x¬y, x∧y, x∨y, x→y and x↔y.
Besides these, MLT contains, for each type in Gallin’s hierarchy, a stock of variables xx1t y, xx2t y, . . . of
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type t, and constants xc1t y, xc2t y, . . . — except the set of constants of type 〈e, e〉, which also contains
the constant x=〈e,e〉y. The language also contains the quantiﬁers x∀y and x∃y, and the modal operators
x2y and x3y. The set of formulas of the language is deﬁned recursively. If s1, . . . , sn are expressions
of type t1, . . . , tn, and s0 is an expression of type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, then xs0s1 . . . sny is a formula. If ϕ
and ψ are both formulas, then x¬ϕy, x2ϕy and xϕ→ ψy are formulas. If v is a variable of type t, and
ϕ is a formula, then x∀vϕy and x∃vϕy are formulae. Nothing else is a formula. Mention of types will
be omitted whenever context allows. Also, I will typically appeal to xxx, xyy, xzy and xuy rather than
xx1y, xx2y, xx3y and xx4y.
Slight variations of MLP will also be considered. The addition of an actuality operator will prove
useful in several contexts. The languageML@P results from languageMLP by adding to it the clause that,
if ϕ is a formula, then x@ϕy is also a formula. The variable-binding operator, xˆy, will be used in chapter
3 in the context of arguments formulated in a higher-order modal language. The language that results
from adding xˆy to MLP is the language MLˆP. The addition of this operator to the language requires
that complex expressions be deﬁned simultaneously. If s is of type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, and s1, . . . , sn are
expressions of types t1, . . . , tn, then xss1 . . . sny is an expression of type 〈〉. If ϕ, ψ are expressions of
type 〈〉, then x¬ϕy, xϕ ∧ ψy, x2ϕy, x@ϕy and x∀vtϕy are expressions of type 〈〉. If ϕ is of type 〈〉 and
v1, . . . , vn are variables of types, respectively, t1, . . . , tn, then xvˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ)y is a complex expression
of type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉.
1.3.2 Identity Between Higher-Order Entities
The theses of Higher-Order Necessitism and Higher-Order Contingentism were formulated in terms
of identity and existential quantiﬁcation. What are the identity conditions for higher-order entities?
According to one proposed criterion, higher-order entities are the same if and only if they are i)
necessarily coextensive, and ii) something. That is, let P and Q be entities of type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉.
Then, according to the proposed criterion, necessarily, P and Q are identical if and only if both
i) 2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Px1 . . . xn ↔ Qx1 . . . xn) and ii) ∃X〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Px1 . . . xn ↔
Xx1 . . . xn).9
In what follows I remain neutral, for the most part, on what the identity conditions between
higher-order entities are.10 The identity symbol will be used as a mere shorthand for necessary
coextensiveness. That is, P〈t1,...,tn〉 = Q〈t1,...,tn〉 :=
9Let Higher-Order Serious Actualism be the thesis that necessarily, no higher-order entities could have been related in
circumstances in which one of them was nothing. The account of higher-order identity given here presupposes the truth of
Higher-Order Serious Actualism twice over. Clause i) presupposes the truth of Higher-Order Serious Actualism since
otherwise it could have been that 2∀xt1(Px↔ Qx) and yet P and Q differed in that there is at least one world w such
that it is true at w that x is a P and it is not true at w that x is a Q, where x is an individual that is nothing at w. Clause ii)
presupposes the truth of Higher-Order Serious Actualism in that it requires that for higher-order entities to be identical
they have to be something. A defence of Thorough Serious Actualism is offered in §3.3. That argument does not assume the
account of higher-order identity being presented. Instead, it treats higher-order identity as a primitive.
10The exception is the take on propositions adopted in chapters 4 and 5. The Synonymy Account, defended in chapter 4,
presupposes that propositions are the same if and only if they entail and are entailed by all the same propositions. Given
certain auxiliary assumptions, this implies that propositions are the same if and only if they are mutually entailing.
9
:= 2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Px1 . . . xn ↔ Qx1 . . . xn)∧
∧∃X〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Px1 . . . xn ↔ Xx1 . . . xn)
Thus, it turns out that ∃X〈t1,...,tn〉(P〈t1,...,tn〉 = X) is equivalent to:
∃X〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Px1 . . . xn ↔ Xx1 . . . xn)
Similarly, the English phrase xP is somethingy is itself used as shorthand for xthere is something
necessarily coextensive withP y. Thus, the higher-order modal theses presented so far are appropriately
regimented as follows:
Necessitism.
• 2∀xe2∃ye(xe = ye).
Higher-Order Necessitism.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2∃Y〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Xx1 . . . xn ↔ Y x1 . . . xn).
Contingentism.
• 3∃xe3∃ye¬(x = y).
Higher-Order Contingentism.
• 3∃X〈t1,...,tn〉3∀Y〈t1,...,tn〉3¬∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(Xx1 . . . xn ↔ Y x1 . . . xn).
Thorough Serious Actualism.
• 2∀Y〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . .2∀xntn2(Y x1 . . . xn → (∃zt1(x1 = zt1) ∧ . . . ∧ ∃ztn(x1 = ztn))).
Necessity of Something.
• 2∃xe∃ye(x = y).
Haecceity Necessitism.
• 2∀X〈e〉(3∃ze2∀ue(Xue ↔ u = z)→ 2∃Y〈e〉(X = Y )).
Attributions of Being–Necessitism.
• 2∀X〈〉(3∃ze2(X ↔ ∃ue(u = z))→ 2∃Y〈〉2(X ↔ Y )).
1.3.3 Neutral Higher-Order Modal Logic
The arguments that will be presented require an appeal to a logic neutral between the different
higher-order modal theories on offer. A model-theoretic characterisation of one such neutral logic is
offered in §1.6.
The logic given has as its modal propositional fragment the very weak logical systemK. In general,
the stronger modal logic S5 is presupposed in the dissertation. The exception is chapter 3, the
arguments presented there will rely on propositional modal logics weaker than S5, namely, the logics
K andKD.
In the dissertation’s appendix A several ﬁrst- and second-order modal logics incorporating the
assumption that (zero- and ﬁrst-order) constants are strongly Millian are offered, where a constant is
strongly Millian just in case it is guaranteed to have a semantic value in the actual world. It is shown
that once this metalinguistic presupposition is in place contingentists have available the full power of
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classical quantiﬁcation theory, in a sense made precise in the appendix. The logics are characterised
both axiomatically and model-theoretically, with proofs of soundness and completeness being given.
As mentioned, the dissertation presupposes the legitimacy of higher-order quantiﬁcation. In the
next section an objection to the legitimacy of higher-order quantiﬁcation is considered. The defence
is primarily of the legitimacy of propositional quantiﬁcation, even though it is extendable to remaining
forms of higher-order quantiﬁcation.
1.4 A Defence of Higher-Order Resources
One of the claims that will be discussed later on is the following:
(4) Necessarily, if Obama is a president, then it is true that Obama is a president.
This claim is clearly an instance of a general principle about truth. Without the resources of propo-
sitional quantiﬁcation, the principle in question cannot be appropriately captured. Without such
resources, one would have to appeal to a schematic presentation of the principle, such as the following:
(5) Necessarily, if ϕ, then it is true that ϕ.
Here, ϕ is a metalinguistic variable which may be substituted by sentences of the language in question.
A commitment to the truth of schema (5) is nothing but a commitment to the truth of every formula
that is the result of substituting ϕ by some sentence of English (or some sublanguage thereof).
The problem is that a schematic formulation of the principle does not have the required generality.
Some propositions are not expressible in English. Even if all propositions were expressible in English,
English might not contain sentences expressing every possible proposition. But the appropriate
generalisation of (5) needs to be applicable to every possible proposition, as we shall see in §3.4.
Once propositional quantiﬁcation is available, this problem vanishes. The appropriate general-
isation of (5) consists in the following claim (where ‘T ’ is a predicate of type 〈〈〉〉 standing for the
property of truth, as applicable to propositions):
Truth Introduction.
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, if p, then it is true that p.
2. 2∀p2(p→ Tp)
Yet, some ﬁnd the appeal to higher-order resources suspect.11 Consider the following thesis:
Meaningless Propositional Quantiﬁcation. If the propositional and higher-order quantiﬁers are
meaningful, then the meanings of propositional and higher-order quantiﬁcations are composi-
tionally speciﬁable in English or in some other natural language.
11Quine (1986) rejects the legitimacy of both propositional and higher-order quantiﬁcation, whereas Richard (2013)
argues against the legitimacy of propositional quantiﬁcation.
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Suppose that it is true, as it appears to be, that there is no compositional speciﬁcation, in any natural
language, of the meanings of propositional and higher-order quantiﬁcations. Assume that Meaningless
Propositional Quantiﬁcation is true. Then propositional and higher-order quantiﬁers have no meaning.
A fortiori, my appeal to the expressive resources of propositional and higher-order quantiﬁcation is
illegitimate. In what follows I will be focusing on the case of propositional quantiﬁcation. But what
will be said can easily be transposed to the case of other higher-order resources.
Meaningless Propositional Quantiﬁcation is motivated by the following view on how artiﬁcial
languages are endowed with meaning:
Meaningfulness for Artiﬁcial Languages. The sentences and subsentential expressions of any ar-
tiﬁcial language L are endowed with meaning partly via compositional speciﬁcations of their
meanings in some other meaningful language.
Arguably, Richard’s (2013, pp. 139-142) objection to the legitimacy of propositional quantiﬁcation is
based on something like Meaningfulness for Artiﬁcial Languages. Richard argues that Prior’s account
of propositional quantiﬁcation (an account similar to the one developed here) is mysterious on the
grounds that it ‘provides no hope of ﬁnding a systematic account of their truth-conditions’ (Richard,
2013, p. 140), and proposes that it be abandoned for this reason. But later on Richard does mention the
possibility of a compositional semantics for propositional quantiﬁcation, albeit one not ‘of a traditional
sort’ (Richard, 2013, p. 141). Given the direction of the discussion, it is reasonable to assume that
he disavows the legitimacy of such untraditional compositional semantics. But why is it illegitimate?
Note that the reason cannot just be that this semantics would have to employ the expressive resources
of propositional quantiﬁcation. After all, the typical compositional semantic accounts of objectual
quantiﬁcation themselves appeal to the expressive resources of objectual quantiﬁcation. It would
appear that the untraditional semantics is illegitimate because it outstrips, in a certain sense, the
expressive resources of natural language. The thesis of Meaningfulness for Artiﬁcial Languages makes
precise the sense in which this is so.
If Meaningfulness for Artiﬁcial Languages is true, then the sentence ‘∀x(x = x)’ has some
meaning only if it has been compositionally speciﬁed in some other meaningful language. Note that it
is not claimed that such speciﬁcation is sufficient for the sentence ‘∀x(x = x)’ to have its meaning.
Other conditions are certainly required.
Assume for the moment that Meaningfulness for Artiﬁcial Languages is true. In such case
speciﬁcations of the meanings of the sentences of an artiﬁcial language have to bottom out in some
natural language. Otherwise, there will be a vicious inﬁnite descent. That is, otherwise, an artiﬁcial
language L1 is meaningful only if the meanings of its sentences are speciﬁed in an artiﬁcial language
L2, and L2 is meaningful only if the meanings of its sentences are speciﬁed in an artiﬁcial language
L3, and so on. In such case none of the languages in the chain have been endowed with meaning.
Consider any meaning-conferring chain, and let L be its end language. The meanings of the
sentences of every language preceding Lmust be compositionally speciﬁable in L, since compositional
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speciﬁability is a transitive relation. So, the meanings of artiﬁcial languages with propositional
quantiﬁcation must be compositionally speciﬁable in some natural language. That is, if Meaningfulness
of Artiﬁcial Languages is true, then so is Meaningless Propositional Quantiﬁcation.
But why think that Meaningfulness of Artiﬁcial Languages is true? First, note that it is possible for
speakers of a natural language to augment the expressive resources of their language without any appeal
to other languages. That is, for instance, English speakers can augment English’s expressive resources
without resorting to other languages from which those resources are borrowed. So, likewise, it is
possible to augment the expressive resources of an already meaningful artiﬁcial language without those
resources being borrowed from any other language. For example, suppose that an artiﬁcial language L
is endowed with meaning via speciﬁcations of the meanings of its sentences in English. Just as it is
possible for English speakers to augment English’s expressive resources without resorting to any other
language, it is also possible for users of L to augment L’s expressive resources without those resources
being borrowed from any other language.
We have just seen that it is possible to endow sentences and subsentential expressions of extensions
of natural languages with meanings even when the sentences’ meanings cannot be speciﬁed in any
natural language. So, likewise, it should be possible to endow sentences and subsentential expressions
of artiﬁcial languages with meanings even when the meanings of some sentences cannot be speciﬁed
in any other natural language.
One way in which this can be done is by indicating the meanings of those sentences. Speciﬁcation
is a form of indication. That is, one way in which the meanings of sentences of a language may be
indicated is by specifying sentences of some other language having the samemeanings. But speciﬁcation
is not the only form of indication. Another way in which the meanings of sentences may be indicated
is by appealing to background common knowledge, use of contextually salient features, analogies, etc.
Suppose one indicates the meanings of sentences of a source language by specifying their meanings
in some already meaningful target language. Then mastery of the target language will guarantee at least
some grasp of these meanings. In other cases of indication one has to secure that one’s interlocutors
grasp those meanings and that these meanings get assigned to the right sentences of the source language.
As with other forms of sharing knowledge, some of the work in ﬁguring out the knowledge being
shared may be left to one’s interlocutor.
For instance, when imparting mathematical knowledge it is not uncommon to leave some facts
unsaid, letting the student do some of the work. And often one of the cues given to the student is that
there are certain structural similarities between his current topic of study and something else which
he as previously encountered. That is, the student is directed to the requisite piece of knowledge by
being made aware of the fact that his current topic of study is analogous to something else which he
has previously studied. Relatedly, the meanings of sentences of artiﬁcial languages can be indicated
also via analogy. Analogy may be used, for instance, in those cases in which one wants to indicate the
meanings of some sentences to those who do not yet have a grasp of their meanings.
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I am not claiming that one endows the sentences of propositionally quantiﬁed languages with
meanings simply by indicating them. Similarly, the proponent ofMeaningfulness of Artiﬁcial Languages
does not claim that the sentences of artiﬁcial languages are endowed with meanings solely in virtue of
speciﬁcations of these in some meaningful language. Use, in a broad sense, must play some additional
role. Furthermore, my claim is a conditional one. If speciﬁcations of meanings, together with use,
suffice to endow the sentences of artiﬁcial languages with meaning, then indications of meanings,
together with use, suffice to endow the sentences of artiﬁcial languages with meaning.
The meanings of sentences of artiﬁcial languages with propositional quantiﬁers can be indicated by
appealing to structural similarities between objectual and propositional quantiﬁcation. Quine (1960)
says that individual variables are best understood as ‘abstractive pronouns’. As he puts it (Quine,
1960, p. 343), an individual variable is ‘a device for marking positions in a sentence, with a view to
abstracting the rest of the sentence as predicate’. Quine is here alluding to two aspects of individual
variables that work together: i) an individual variable marks positions in a sentences; ii) by marking
positions in a sentence, the rest of the sentence can be abstracted as a predicate.
A propositional variable, just like an individual variable, marks positions in a sentence. But the
positions in a sentence that it can mark are not those that can be marked by an individual variable. An
individual variable can only mark the positions of individual constants. These positions correspond, in
English readings of formulas, to the positions occupied by pronouns.12 Whereas individual variables
can only mark the positions of individual constants, propositional variables can only mark the positions
of formulas. These positions correspond, in English readings, to the positions of sentences.
What does it take for an individual variable to play an abstractive role? Occurrences of an individual
variable ‘x’ in a formula S play an abstractive role because, if ‘x’ had a referent, then the truth of
S relative to a world would depend on what the referent of ‘x’ was. A formula S containing some
occurrences of an individual variable ‘x’ behaves as a predicate because the truth-value of S relative to
a world depends on the referent of ‘x’ (or would depend on the referent of ‘x’, if ‘x’ had a referent).
Likewise, propositional variables play an abstractive role. Occurrences of a propositional variable
‘p’ in a formula S play an abstractive role because, if ‘p’ had a meaning, then the truth of S relative
to a world would depend on what the meaning of ‘p’ was. By analogy with the case of individual
variables it can be seen that a formula containing some occurrences of a propositional variable behaves
as a predicate. A formula S containing some occurrences of a propositional variable ‘p’ behaves as a
predicate because the truth-value of S relative to a world depends on the meaning of ‘p’ (or would
depend on the meaning of p, if p had a meaning).
Before proceeding, let me note that when speaking of the meanings of sentences I seem to be
talking about something that could be referred to by a name, or by an individual constant. But my
talk of meanings has been mere façon de parler. Sentences, unlike names and individual constants, do
not refer to anything. At this point analogy is required. Propositional variables play an abstractive
12For instance, the formula ‘∀x(Nx→ (x+ 1 = x+ (3− 2)))’ has as one of its readings the sentence ‘for every thing,
if it is a number, then the result of adding 1 to it is identical to the result of adding 3− 2 to it’. The position occupied by ‘it’
in the English sentence corresponds to the position occupied by x in ‘Nx→ (x+ 1 = x+ (3− 2))’.
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role similar to that of individual variables. But this abstractive role cannot be fully stated (in English),
since English does not have the expressive resources to do so, precisely because it lacks propositional
quantiﬁers. Nonetheless, the structural similarities between the abstractive roles of individual variables
and of propositional variables are there, and can be appreciated. Still, the interlocutor has to do some
of the work.
What are, then, the meanings of propositional quantiﬁcations? Once more, the place to start is
objectual quantiﬁcation. Consider the formula ‘x = x ∨ ¬x = x’. When ‘m’, an individual constant
referring to Mars, replaces ‘x’ in ‘x = x∨¬x = x’, the result is the true formula ‘m = m∨¬m = m’.
The same holds for every individual constant of the language that has a referent. Even if one augmented
the language with a novel stock of individual constants, replacing ‘x’ with any individual constant c
would result in a true sentence, provided that c had a referent. Moreover, this would have been no
accident, since for every thing, if x had it as a referent, then ‘x = x ∨ ¬x = x’ would have been true.
‘∀x(x = x)’ is true if and only if for every thing, if x had it as a referent, then ‘x = x ∨ ¬x = x’
would have been true. More generally: x∀x(ϕ)y is true at a world w if and only if for every thing that
is something at w, if ‘x’ had it as a referent, then ϕ would have been true at w.
Consider now the formula ‘p ∨ ¬p’. When ‘m = m’ replaces ‘p’, then the resulting formula,
‘m = m∨¬m = m’ is true. The same holds for every other sentence that has a meaning. Furthermore,
consider any extension of the language, and any sentence S of this extension that has a meaning. The
result of replacing ‘p’ by S in ‘p∨¬p’ would result in a true sentence. Moreover, this would have been
no accident, since . . . . ‘∀p(p ∨ ¬p)’ is true if and only if . . . . More generally: x∀p(ϕ)y is true at a
world w if and only if . . . .
The dots cannot be appropriately ﬁlled by appealing only to ﬁrst-order resources. But my inter-
locutor should be able to ﬁgure out what I am getting at. The most that I can say is the following:
‘∀p(p∨¬p)’ is true if and only if for every proposition, if ‘p’ had it as its meaning, then ‘p∨¬p’ would
have been true; and x∀p(ϕ)y is true if and only if for every proposition, if p had it as its meaning, then
ϕ would have been true. But this is mere façon de parler. What I have literally said is false, since
meanings are in the range of ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers. Nonetheless, I will have communicated something
true, provided that my interlocutor understood the analogy between objectual and propositional
quantiﬁcation.
I have shown how the meanings of propositionally quantiﬁed sentences may be indicated. If
speciﬁcations of the meanings of propositionally quantiﬁed sentences, together with use, suffice to
endow them with meaning, then indications of the meanings of sentences, together with use, suffice
to endow them with meanings. Given the dialectically neutral assumption that speciﬁcations of the
meanings of propositionally quantiﬁed sentences, together with use, suffice to endow these sentences
with meaning, it follows that use, together with indications of meanings on the lines of the ones given,
suffice to endow propositionally quantiﬁed sentences with meaning.
To conclude, propositional quantiﬁcation is a legitimate form of quantiﬁcation. The meanings
of sentences exhibiting other forms of higher-order quantiﬁcation may be indicated in similar ways,
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and so these forms of quantiﬁcation are also legitimate. More complete defences of the legitimacy of
propositional quantiﬁcation are given in (Prior, 1971) and (Grover, 1972).13
The present defence of propositional quantiﬁcation adds to those discussions the observation
that one of the ways in which we can augment our expressive resources with propositional quantiﬁers
appeals to processes that are quite familiar, namely, reasoning by analogy. All the proponents of
propositional quantiﬁcation appeal to this form of reasoning at some point in their exposition of
propositional quantiﬁcation. My view is that reasoning by analogy plays an important role in a general
account of how the expressive resources of a language can be extended from within that language.
In what follows, I will, for the most part, continue to speak of propositions, as if sentences had as
their meanings things that are possible values of individual variables. But it should by now be clear
what is meant with such talk. Propositions are “higher-order entities”. Roughly, they are the entities in
the range of propositional variables.
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation
In chapter 2 the thesis of the Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account is defended. A
subsidiary aim of the chapter is to show that natural ways of improving on the Propositional Functions
Account all lead to consequences that are undesirable from the standpoint of thorough contingentists
committed to Thorough Serious Actualism.
The main aim of chapter 3 is to present a defence of Propositional Necessitism. The defence of
Propositional Necessitism crucially depends on the truth of Thorough Serious Actualism. For this
reason a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism is offered in chapter 3. A defence of Propositional
Necessitism is offered in this chapter, and it is also shown in chapter 3 that the main arguments offered
for Propositional Necessitism have analogue arguments establishing the truth of Property Necessitism
(the thesis that every property is necessarily something), Higher-Order Necessitism, and indeed of
the stronger comprehension principle Cˆomp.
At this point in the dissertation higher-order resources will have been vindicated. Moreover, it
will have been shown that the Propositional Functions Account is inconsistent with the intuitions
underlying thoroughly necessitist theories committed to Thorough Serious Actualism. The truth of
Thorough Serious Actualism will also have been defended, showing that the elegance and plausibility
of the Propositional Functions Account constitutes abductive evidence in favour of Thorough Higher-
Order Necessitism. Finally, besides such indirect evidence for Higher-Order Necessitism, a more
direct argument in its defence will have been presented.
In the fourth chapter the Synonymy Account of theory equivalence is presented and defended.
The defence of the account proceeds in three steps. Some desiderata on a correct theory of equivalence
are extracted from the literature on the debate between noneists and Quineans. Regardless of the
status of that debate, the literature reveals some desiderata that an account of theory equivalence
13The legitimacy of higher-order quantiﬁcation is recently defended in (Williamson, 2013, §5.9).
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should be able to satisfy. The ﬁrst step in the defence of the Synonymy Account consists in showing
that the account satisﬁes the desiderata. Afterwards, the account is applied to the debate between
Quineans and noneists, revealing that it leads to a deeper understanding of this and other debates.
Finally, some objections to the Synonymy Account are considered and replied to.
The Synonymy Account is then applied to the question what is the correct higher-order modal
theory. In previous chapters the truth of Higher-Order Necessitism was defended. In chapter 5 it is
argued that the two main candidate higher-order necessitist theories, namely, Williamsonian Thorough
Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, are equivalent. It is shown how sense can be
made of this result, and consequences of the equivalence between the two theories are drawn. One
particularly signiﬁcant consequence is that the dispute between the proponents of the two theories
is merely verbal. The chapter closes with a natural conjecture, namely, that the theories are both
informally sound when understood in the way intended by their proponents.
The conclusion sums up the ﬁndings of the dissertation. A salient direction for future research
consists in further developing the foundations of the Synonymy Account of Theory Equivalence, and
to apply it to debates in metaphysics and other areas.
Finally, in appendices 1.6 and A logical tools for engaging in the debate concerning what is the
correct higher-order modal theory are presented. In particular, logics for strongly Millian constants are
offered in appendix A, where a constant is strongly Millian just in case its semantic value is actually
something. Axiomatic and model-theoretic characterisations of several ﬁrst- and second-order modal
strongly Millian logics are offered, and accompanying completeness results are given. It is shown that
once the metalinguistic presupposition that the constants of the language are strongly Millian is in
place contingentists have available the full power of classical quantiﬁcation theory.
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1.6 Appendix
A model-theoretic characterisation of the neutral higher-order modal logic presupposed in the dis-
sertation is here given. The ﬁrst step of this characterisation is the notion of a K-neutral model
structure:
Deﬁnition (K-Neutral Model Structure.). AK-neutral model structure is a quintuple 〈W,, R, d,D〉,
where:
1. W is a non-empty set;
2. R is relation onW ×W (i.e., R ⊆W ×W );
3.  ∈W ;
4. R ⊆W ×W ;




6. Let T be the set of types, as these are deﬁned in 1.3.1 (and in (Gallin, 1975, ch. 3)). D is any
function with domainW × T and range the set-theoretic hierarchy such that:
(a) De(w) = d(w);
(b) D〈t1,...,tn〉(w) ⊆ (P(
⋃
w∈W








Dt(w) 6= ∅, for all t ∈ T .
According to the usual glosses,W is or represents the set of all possible worlds, is or represents
the actual world, R is or represents the relation that obtains between two worlds when the second is
possible from the standpoint of the ﬁrst,Dt(w) is or represents the domain of entities of type t that
are something at w.
Let me now turn toK-neutral models:
Deﬁnition (K-NeutralModel.). AK-neutral model based on aK-neutral model structure 〈W,, R, d,D〉
is a sextuple 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, where V is a function such that for any constant s of type t, V (s) ∈⋃
w∈W
Dt(w). In particular, V (=)(w) = {〈d, d〉 : d ∈ De(w)}.






Dt(w) such that, for each variable v of type t, g(v) ∈
⋃
w∈W
Dt(w). Where g is a
variable-assignment, g[v/f ] is a function just like g except that it assigns f to the variable v.
The function V al is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition (V al Function.).
1. V alg(s) = V (s) for all constants s of type e;
2. V algw(s) = V (s)(w) for all constants s of any type other than e;
3. V algw(v) = g(v)(w) for all variables v, of any type;
14Here and throughout the dissertation the expression xXW y is used to denote the collection of all functions with domain




t1 . . . s
n
tn) = {∅ : 〈V alg(s1) . . . V alg(sn)〉 ∈ V alg(s)(w)};
5. V algw(¬ϕ) = {∅} − V algw(ϕ);
6. V algw(ϕ ∧ χ) = V algw(ϕ) ∩ V algw(ψ);
7. V algw(2ϕ) = ⋂
w∈W
V algw(ϕ);
8. V algw(@ϕ) = V al
g
(ϕ);






10. V algw(vˆ1t1 . . . v
n
tn(ϕ)) =
= {〈f1, . . . , fn〉 ∈ ⋃
w∈W
Dt1(w)× . . .×
⋃
w∈W
Dtn(w) : V al
g[v1/f1,...,vn/fn]
w (ϕ)}.
Note that, for each expression ζ (of any type other than e), V alg(ζ) is used to denote a function
f with domainW and such that f(w) = V algw(ζ).
Deﬁnition (Truth). An expression ϕ of type 〈〉 is true in a K-neutral modelM relative to variable-
assignment g and world w,M,w, g (Kn ϕ, if and only if V algw(ϕ) = {∅}.
Deﬁnition (K-Neutral Validity). An argument with premises Γ and conclusion ϕ isK-neutrally valid,
Γ (Kn ϕ, if and only if there is noK-neutral modelM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, variable-assignment g
ofM and w ∈W such thatM,w, g (Kn γ for all γ ∈ Γ andM,w, g 6 (Kn ϕ.
Let aK-neutral inhabited model structureM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 be a S5-neutral inhabited
model structure if and only if R =W ×W . Also, let a S5-neutral model be anyK-neutral model
based on an S5-neutral inhabited model structure.
Deﬁnition (S5-Neutral Validity). An argument with premises Γ and conclusion ϕ is S5-neutrally valid,
Γ (S5n ϕ, if and only if there is no S5-neutral modelM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, variable-assignment g
ofM and w ∈W such thatM,w, g (Kn γ for all γ ∈ Γ andM,w, g 6 (Kn ϕ.
For the most part of the dissertation S5-neutral validity is the canon of validity underlying the
arguments given. The exception is chapter 3, where the canon of validity isK-neutral validity.
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2Thorough Contingentism and the
Propositional Functions Account
2.1 Introduction
The classic compositional accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages are inconsistent with
the conjunction of Thorough Actualism with common intuitions advanced in support of Thorough
Contingentism. A major challenge facing thorough contingentists is thus to offer a satisfactory,
compositional account of the semantics of these languages that is consistent with their commitments.
Recently, Stalnaker (2012) has offered an account, which I will be calling the ‘Propositional
Functions Account’, that he takes to meet this challenge. The present chapter has three aims. The ﬁrst
aim consists in offering a more detailed characterisation of the Propositional Functions Account. The
second aim is to present some unforeseen consequences of the Propositional Functions Account, and
to show that these consequences, in conjunction with Thorough Serious Actualism, are inconsistent
with the intuitions underlying higher-order contingentist theories (and a fortiori, these consequences
are also inconsistent with the intuitions underlying thoroughly contingentist theories). In particular,
the Propositional Functions Account turns out to be inconsistent with Stalnaker’s own higher-order
modal theory. The third and ﬁnal aim is to show that easy ﬁxes to the Propositional Functions Account
yield unsatisfactory accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
The inconsistency between i) the Propositional Functions Account, ii) Thorough Serious Actualism,
and iii) the intuitions underlying higher-order contingentist theories turns out to have important
consequences. Assuming the defence of Thorough Serious Actualism offered in chapter 3 is successful,
the Propositional Functions Account is inconsistent with the thoroughly contingentist theories worth
considering, namely, the thoroughly contingentist theories committed to Thorough Serious Actualism.
It thus remains to be seen whether proponents of thoroughly contingentist and thoroughly seriously
actualist theories are able to meet the challenge of offering a compositional semantics of ﬁrst-order
modal languages consistent with their commitments.
Moreover, the attractiveness of the Propositional Functions Account itself counts as a pro tanto
reason for higher-order necessitist theories, since the Propositional Functions Account is inconsistent
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with the intuitions for higher-order contingentism.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the second section the classic compositional semantics for
ﬁrst-order modal languages (inspired in the model-theory proposed in (Kripke, 1963)) are presented
and shown to be inconsistent with the conjunction of i) intuitions driving thorough contingentism
– namely, i.a) the thesis that there could have been something that is actually nothing, and i.b) the
thesis that there could have been something such that the property that would have been its haecceity
is actually nothing –, and ii) Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that every entity is actually
something.
Then, the Propositional Functions Account is characterised in some detail in §2.3. Firstly, a
rough sketch of the account is offered. Afterwards, a detailed presentation is provided. Finally, it is
shown how the Propositional Functions Account can be modelled via the Kripkean model-theory for
ﬁrst-order modal languages.
In §2.4 it is shown that, from the standpoint of thorough contingentists committed to Thor-
ough Serious Actualism, the Propositional Functions Account overgenerates, in the sense that it is
inconsistent with intuitions underlying support for thorough contingentism once it is considered in
conjunction with Thorough Serious Actualism. Finally, it is shown in §2.5 that different proposals for
ways of ﬁxing the Propositional Functions Account all turn out to yield unsatisfactory accounts of the
semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
2.2 Compositional Semantics and Thorough Contingentism
In the most common ﬁrst-order modal languages the quantiﬁers perform a double duty as devices
of generality and as variable-binding operators. A quantiﬁed formula ψ is obtained by attaching a
variable v to a quantiﬁer Q, thus obtaining a variable-binding expression Qv, and attaching to this
variable binding expression a formula ϕ, thus obtaining the quantiﬁed formula ψ = Qvϕ.
The focus of the present chapter will be on slightly different ﬁrst-order modal languages. In these
languages the the quantiﬁers are simply devices of generality. Each quantiﬁer Q attaches directly to a
unary (simple or complex) predicate P to form a quantiﬁed formula QP . In addition, the languages
contain a variable-binding operator, ,ˆ with vˆ being a variable-binding expression which attaches to a
formula ϕ to form a complex unary predicate vˆ(ϕ), intended to express the property of being a v such
that ϕ.1 The reason for focusing on such languages is that these are the ﬁrst-order modal languages
for which Stalnaker has originally proposed the account. The focus on these languages should be
unproblematic. The distinction between quantiﬁcation and variable-binding is both syntactically and
semantically perspicuous.
Brieﬂy, besides the universal quantiﬁer and the variable-binding operator, ,ˆ the ﬁrst-order modal
languages considered contain a stock of denumerably many individual variables, at most denumerably
many individual constants and at most denumerably many (atomic) n-ary predicates, with =2 a binary
1(Stalnaker, 1977) is a relevant discussion of the advantages of distinguishing between variable-binding and quantiﬁcation.
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(atomic) predicate. The languages under consideration also contain the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧,
and the modal operators 2 and @ (the remaining boolean connectives and the possibility operator are
all deﬁned in the usual manner). The set of formulae and unary predicates are the smallest sets such
that:
1. If s1, . . . , sn are terms (i.e., individual constant or variable) and ζn is an n-ary predicate, then
ζns
1, . . . sn is a formula;
2. If ϕ is a formula, then ¬ϕ is a formula;
3. If ϕ and ψ are formulae, then ϕ ∧ χ is a formula;
4. If ϕ is a formula, then 2ϕ is a formula;
5. If ϕ is a formula, then @ϕ is a formula;
6. If ζ is a unary predicate, then ∀ζ is a formula;
7. Atomic unary predicates are unary predicates;
8. If ϕ is a formula, then vˆ(ϕ) is a (complex) unary predicate.
I will call any such language a MLˆ-language. The standard accounts of the compositional semantics
for MLˆ-languages are directly inspired on the Kripkean model-theoretic semantics for these lan-
guages. I will thus begin by offering a brief description of the Kripkean model-theoretic semantics for
MLˆ-languages.
An inhabited model structure (‘model structure’, for short) consists of a triple IS = 〈W,, D〉,
where  ∈W andD is a function with domainW and range some set in the set-theoretic hierarchy




A model is a pairM = 〈IS, V 〉, where IS is an inhabited model structure, the inhabited model
structure ofM , and V , the valuation function ofM , is a function such that:
1. For each individual constant s, V (s) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
D(w);
2. For each n-ary predicate ζ , V (ζ) ∈ (P(( ⋃
w∈W
D(w))n))W , for each natural number other
than zero;




3. For each 0-ary predicate ζ , V (ζ) ⊆W .
The function V (·) is, or represents, a function assigning, to the individual constants and simple n-ary
predicates of the language entities which are, or represent, their semantic values.
Let a variable-assignment g over an inhabited model structure IS be a function mapping each
2In (Kripke, 1963) quantiﬁcational model structures (here called inhabited model structures) also contain an accessibility
relation between the elements inW . Here, only the simplest case is considered, the one where inhabited model structures
possess no accessibility relation. The class of models based on these inhabited model structures determines the propositional
modal logic S5.
Even though the system S5 is not uncontroversial (see, e.g., (Salmon, 1989)), according to Williamson (2013, p. 44),
‘(...) most metaphysicians accept S5 as the propositional modal logic of metaphysical modality (...)’. The assumption of S5






D(w). Given a variable-assignment g, let g[v/d] be a function just like g except that
it assigns to the variable v the object d ∈ ⋃
w∈W
D(w).
Where V is the valuation function ofM and g is a variable-assignment over the inhabited model
structure ofM , the function V g is deﬁned as follows:
1. V g(s) = V (s)
2. V g(v) = g(v)
3. V g(ζ) = V (ζ)
4. V g(ζt1 . . . tn) = {w ∈W : 〈V g(t1), . . . , V g(tn)〉 ∈ V g(ζ)(w)}
5. V g(¬ψ) =W − V g(ψ)
6. V g(ψ ∧ χ) = V g(ψ) ∩ V g(χ)
7. V g(2ψ) =W if V g(ψ) =W ; otherwise, V g(2ψ) = ∅
8. V g(@ψ) =W if  ∈ V g(ψ); otherwise, V g(@ψ) = ∅
9. V g(vˆ(ψ))(w) = {d ∈ ⋃
w∈W
D(w) : V g[v/d](ψ)(w) = ∅}
10. V g(∀vˆ(ψ)) = {w ∈W : V g(vˆ(ψ))(w) = d(w)}
A formula ϕ is true in a modelM relative to a variable-assignment g if and only if  ∈ V g(ϕ). A
formula is true inM if and only if for every variable-assignment g ofM ,  ∈ V g(ϕ)().
2.2.1 The Literal Account
According to the usual gloss on the Kripkean model-theory, the setW is, or represents, the set of
all possible worlds, and  is, or represents, the actual world. Also, for each w ∈ W , D(w) is, or
represents, the set of all individuals that are something atw, and the value of an expression ϕ relative to
a variable-assignment g, V g(ϕ), is, or represents, the semantic value of ϕ relative to g. The ﬁrst classic
account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages, to which I will be calling the ‘Literal Account’,
arises by taking this gloss on the Kripkean model-theory somewhat literally. According to the Literal
Account, there is a model structure that is the intended model structure for the language. Moreover, on
the Literal Account, what it is for a model structure IS to be the intended model structure, is for IS
to be such that:3
1. W is in fact the set of all possible worlds;
2. For each world w ∈W ,D(w) is in fact the set of individuals that are something at w;
3.  is the actual world;
3In general, theorists committed to the existence of an intended model structure and to a literal conception of what
it is for a model structure to be intended are faced with an immediate problem, since no set contains everything, by
Cantor’s theorem. These problems are widely discussed in the literature on absolute generality. Modal theorists with these
commitments have the option to appeal to the solutions discussed in the absolute generality literature. The natural option is
to rework the model-theory for modal logic, substituting quantiﬁcation over sets by plural quantiﬁcation, or alternatively by
higher-order quantiﬁcation.
Note that the modal theorist adopting the stance on the model-theory for modal logic described in §2.3 is faced with no
such problem. Once this stance is adopted, it is natural to regard all the model structures and models described in §2.2 as
elements of the von Neumann hierarchy of sets, with these elements playing a purely instrumental role.
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Also, there is a modelM based on the intended model structure IS that is the intended model. On the
Literal Account the semantic value of an expression ϕ relative to a variable-assignment g is obtained
from the value of ϕ relative to g in the intended model as follows:
1. The semantic value of an individual constant relative to a variable-assignment g is its value




2. The semantic value of an n-ary predicate ζ relative to g is a relation that obtains, at each world
w, of all and only those n-tuples of individuals that belong to the value of ζ , relative to g, at w.
3. The semantic value of a sentence ϕ is a proposition that is true at a world w relative to g if and
only if w belongs to the value of ϕ relative to g.
Finally, on the Literal Account, a sentence (i.e., a closed formula) is true if and only if its semantic
value is true at the actual world relative to any variable-assignment. That is, a sentence is true if and
only if the actual world belongs to the value of the sentence in the intended model relative to any
variable-assignment.
The recursive clauses in the deﬁnition of the value function of the intended model directly yield
a compositional account of the semantic values of all the expressions of the language. For instance,
the semantic value, relative to a variable-assignment g of x = a is true at a world w if and only if x is
mapped to an individual o that bears to the semantic value of a, at world w, the relation that is the
semantic value of =, and so if and only if o is identical to the semantic value of a at world w. The
semantic value relative to variable-assignment g of the complex predicate xˆ(x = a) consists in the
property that is instantiated at a world w by individual d if and only if the semantic value relative to
the variable-assignment g[x/d] of x = a is true at w.
The semantic value relative to a variable-assignment g of ∃xˆ(x = a) is a proposition true at a
world w if and only if the property that is the semantic value relative to g of xˆ(x = a) is instantiated
at w. Note that, according to the Literal Account, this is so if and only if if there is some individual d
such that the semantic value relative to g[x/d] of x = a is true at w.
2.2.2 Thorough Contingentism, Thorough Actualism and the Literal Account
Consider the following thesis:
Aliens. There could have been some individual that actually is nothing.
The thesis of Aliens enjoys support from unreﬂective common sense. For instance, there could have
been something that would have been a seventh son of Kripke even though, actually, it is nothing.
Also, note that contingentists who reject the truth of Aliens incur the burden of spelling out why it is
that there could have been some thing that is nothing in other possibilities, even though there could
not have been some thing that is nothing in the actual world. It is clear that the actual world is special,
in that it is the world that obtains. But this observation does not suffice to show why one should think
that the actual world is special in that there could not have been something that is nothing in the
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actual world. Consequently, many thorough contingentists take Aliens to be one of the underlying
motivations for Contingentism.
Recall the thesis of Actualism, according to which every individual is actually something. The
conjunction of the Literal Account, Aliens and Actualism turns out to be inconsistent. Suppose that
Aliens is true. Then, there could have been an individual, call it o, such that actually, o is nothing. So,
the thesis of Aliens is true only if the following sentence is true:
(1) 3∃xˆ(x = o)
According to the Literal Account, (1) is true if and only if there is some individual, namely, o, that
belongs to the domain of some possible world. From Actualism it follows that actually, o is something.
But this contradicts the claim that actually o is nothing. So, Aliens, the Literal Account and Actualism
together imply a contradiction, namely, that actually, o is something and o is nothing. That is, Aliens,
the Literal Account and Actualism are jointly inconsistent.
Arguably, a thoroughly contingentist theory committed to the truth of Aliens is, all things being
equal, preferable to a thoroughly contingentist theory committed to the falsehood of Aliens. Thus, the
fact that the Literal Account implies, in conjunction with Actualism, the falsehood of Aliens makes it
unattractive from the standpoint of thoroughly contingentist actualists.
2.2.3 The Haecceities Account
The other classic account of the semantics of MLˆ-languages is what I will be calling the Haecceities
Account. This account has been proposed by Plantinga (1974) and developed by Jager (1982). Just as
the Literal Account, the Haecceities Account is based on the Kripkean model-theoretic semantics, and
it also appeals to the idea that there is a distinguished, ‘intended’ model structure and a distinguished,
‘intended’ model. However, proponents of the Literal Account and of the Haecceities Account turn
out to mean different things by ‘intended’.
Say that a property is an haecceity of an individual x if and only if it is the property of being x,
and that a property is an haecceity if and only if it could have been the haecceity of some individual.
According to the Haecceities Account, the intended model structure is one in which:
1. The setW is the set of all possible worlds;
2. The functionD assigns to each world w the setD(w) of all haecceities that are instantiated at
w;
3.  is the actual world.
Moreover, according to the Haecceities Account, the semantic value of an expression ϕ relative to g is
obtained from the value of ϕ relative to g in the intended model as follows:






2. The semantic value relative to g of an n-ary predicate ζ is a relation that is jointly instantiated,
at each world w, with all and only those n-tuples of haecceities that belong to the value of ζ ,
relative to g, at w.
3. The semantic value of a sentence ϕ is a proposition that is true at a world w relative to g if and
only if w belongs to the value of ϕ relative to g.
Finally, on the Haecceities Account, a sentence is true if and only if its semantic value is true at the
actual world relative to any variable-assignment. That is, a sentence is true if and only if the actual
world belongs to the value of the sentence in the intended model relative to any variable-assignment.
The recursive clauses in the deﬁnition of the value function of the intended model directly yield
a compositional account of the semantic values of all the expressions of the language. For instance,
the semantic value, relative to a variable-assignment g of x = a is true at a world w if and only if x is
mapped to an haecceity h and the identity relation is jointly instantiated atw with the pair consisting of
h and the haecceity that is the semantic value of a. The semantic value relative to variable-assignment
g of the complex predicate xˆ(x = a) consists in the property that is coinstantiated at a world w with
haecceity h if and only if the proposition that is the semantic value relative to the variable-assignment
g[x/h] of x = a is true at w.
The semantic value relative to a variable-assignment g of ∃xˆ(x = a) is a proposition true at a
world w if and only if the property that is the semantic value relative to g of xˆ(x = a) is instantiated
at w. Note that, according to the Haecceities Account, this is so if and only if there is some haecceity
h such that the proposition that is the semantic value relative to g[x/h] of x = a is true at w.
The main difference between the Literal and the Haecceities accounts is the following. Whereas
the domain of each world of the Literal Account’s intended model structure consists of individuals, the
domain of each world of the Haecceities Account’s intended model structure consists of haecceities.
Since the domains of the Haecceities Account’s intended model structure consist of haecceities rather
than individuals, the thesis of Aliens turns out not to be inconsistent with the conjunction of the
Haecceities Account and Actualism, contrary to what was seen to be the case with the Literal Account.
2.2.4 Thorough Contingentism, Thorough Actualism and the Haecceities Account
Consider the following thesis:
No Actual Haecceity. There could have been something such that actually nothing is possibly its
haecceity.
Arguably, contrary to what was the case with the thesis of Aliens, No Actual Haecceity is not supported
by unreﬂective common sense (it is not that unreﬂective common sense is opposed to its truth; rather,
it has no particular stance towards the truth of No Actual Haecceity). Yet, the thesis is a consequence
of theses supported by different contingentists, when these theses are conjoined with the thesis of
Aliens.
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To begin with, on an Aristotelian view on properties, according to which properties are something
only if they are instantiated, the thesis of No Actual Haecceity is an immediate consequence of Aliens.
If there could be some x that actually is nothing, then actually the property of being x is uninstantiated.
Therefore, according to the Aristotelian view, actually there is no property of being x.
The classic theoretical commitments adduced by thorough contingentists unsympathetic to an
Aristotelian view of properties also turn out to imply the truth of No Actual Haecceity. One such
commitment is to the view that some higher-order entities bear particularly strong links to their
instances, and so ontologically depend on them. Haecceities are pointed out as paradigmatic cases
of higher-order entities of this kind, since i) they are instantiated whenever the things that they are
haecceities of are something, and ii) they are uninstantiated if the things that they are haecceities of are
nothing. In conjunction with Aliens, the view that Haecceities ontologically depend on their instances
implies No Actual Haecceity.
A different theoretical commitment of (some) thorough contingentists is to the claim that neces-
sarily, if P is a nonqualitative property, then necessarily, P is something if and only if P ’s application
conditions are speciﬁable solely in terms of individuals and qualitative properties (that are all some-
thing).4 To proponents of the thesis of Aliens, it is intuitively plausible that there could be some x
such that the application conditions of the property of being x actually are not speciﬁable in terms
of individuals and qualitative properties that are all something. For instance, according to typical
thorough contingentists there could have been many seventh sons of Kripke, all of which are actually
nothing.
These thorough contingentists ﬁnd it plausible to think that the application conditions of the
haecceities of the merely possible seventh sons of Kripke actually are not speciﬁable in terms of
individuals and qualitative properties that are all something. According to them, one cannot distinguish
one of the possible seventh sons of Kripke from all the other possible ones solely in terms of the
individuals and qualitative properties that are actually something. Since the application conditions of
the possible haecceity of at least one of the possible seventh sons of Kripke is not speciﬁable solely in
terms of the individuals and qualitative properties that are actually something, then its haecceity is
actually nothing, and so No Actual Haecceity is true.
Finally, even without delving into the particulars of the theoretical commitments of thorough
contingentists, haecceities of merely possibles are some of the typical examples given by them of
higher-order entities that could have been something despite actually being nothing, and thus of
higher-order entities witnessing the truth of thorough contingentism. Therefore, to most thorough
contingentists a compositional semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages will be satisfactory only if it is
consistent with the thesis of No Actual Haecceity.
Now, suppose that No Actual Haecceity is true. Then, there is or could have been some individual,
call it o, such that actually o’s haecceity is nothing. So, the thesis of No Actual Haecceity is true only
if the following sentence is:
4A view on the being of nonqualitative properties such as the one just offered can be found in Fine (1985, p. 189-191).
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(2) 3∃xˆ(x = o)
According to the Haecceities Account, (2) is true only if there is some haecceity h such that h is
coinstantiated with o’s haecceity at some possible world. But if some haecceity is coinstantiated with
another one, then the two hacceities are the same. That is, necessarily, if the property of being x is
coinstantiated with the property of being y, then x is identical to y, and so the property of being x is
identical to the property of being y. Therefore, according to the Haecceities Account, the haecceity
of o is something.
Finally, recall the thesis of Thorough Actualism, according to which every entity is actually
something. It follows from Thorough Actualism and the thesis that the haecceity of o is something
that the haecceity of o is actually something. But this contradicts the claim that actually o’s haecceity
is nothing. So, No Actual Haecceity, the Haecceities Account and Thorough Actualism together imply
a contradiction, namely that actually, o’s haecceity is something and o’s haecceity is nothing. That is,
No Actual Haecceity, the Haecceities Account and Thorough Actualism are jointly inconsistent.
In this section the two classic accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages were
presented, namely, the Literal and the Haecceities Accounts. It was shown that typical contingentists
accept the truth of Aliens and No Actual Haecceity. It was also shown that the Literal Account, Aliens
and Actualism are jointly inconsistent, and that the Haecceities Account, No Actual Haecceities and
Thorough Actualism are jointly inconsistent.
This presents typical thorough contingentists with a dilemma, namely, to reject both of the classic
accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages, or else to reject Thorough Actualism. The
challenge facing proponents of both Thorough Actualism and Thorough Contingentism is thus that of
offering a satisfactory alternative account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
2.3 The Propositional Functions Account
Stalnaker (2012) proposes the Propositional Functions Account with an eye towards meeting the
challenge of offering a compositional semantics for ﬁrst-order modal languages consistent with his own
thoroughly actualist and thoroughly contingentist higher-order modal theory. He offers the following
remark on the Propositional Functions Account (Stalnaker, 2012, p. 147):
‘We can talk with a clear conscience, in the metalanguage, about a domain of possible
individuals because we have shown how to reconcile that talk withmore austere ontological
commitments and how to do the compositional semantics in a way that assigns as values
only properties, relations, and functions that actually exist, according to the metaphysics
that is presupposed.’
The quote refers to two related aspects in which the success of the Kripkean model-theory for
ﬁrst-order modal languages has been taken to pose a challenge to thorough contingentists committed
to thorough actualism.
29
The ﬁrst aspect has to do with what Fine (1985) has called ‘possibilist discourse’. As previously
seen, the classic account that is more naturally extracted from the Kripkean model-theoretic semantics
for ﬁrst-order modal languages, the Literal account, is consistent with the thesis of Aliens only if
possibilism is true, where possibilism is the negation of actualism, i.e., possibilism is the thesis that
there are individuals that are actually nothing. Thus, a contingentist understanding of the Literal
Account requires regarding it as quantifying over merely possible individuals.
Brieﬂy, Stalnaker presents a different picture of how to understand the Kripkean model-theory
for ﬁrst-order modal languages and in particular the notion of an intended model. According to this
picture, for a model to be intended is not for it to consist of ‘modal reality’. Instead, an intended model
is understood as a representation of certain features of reality that the theorist is trying to capture (and
so, more than one model may be intended, if the theorist is using more than one model to represent
the phenomena in which he is interested).
In the present case, the interest is in models that represent the semantic values of the different
expressions of the language, as well as the relationships that obtain between them. Not every element








those in d()) are representationally insigniﬁcant. These elements are required to give structure
to the set-theoretic constructs representing higher-order entities such as propositions, properties,
relations, etc., and to represent the relations that obtain between these entities.




d(w) as values. When two functions f and f ′ that represent properties are such that,
for every w ∈W , f(w) ⊆ f(w′), this represents the fact that necessarily, whatever has the property
represented by f also has the property represented by f ′. Given such an account of what it takes for
a model to be intended, apparent quantiﬁcation over merely possible individuals is unproblematic,
since it is merely apparent.5
The second aspect in which the success of the model-theory for ﬁrst-order modal languages
has been taken to pose a challenge to thorough contingentists committed to thorough actualism is
related to the ﬁrst. Whereas the Literal Account is committed to there being mere possibilia, if
consistent with the truth of Aliens, the other account based on the Kripkean model-theory, the
Haecceities Account, is itself committed to ‘ontologically extravagant’ entities, namely, haecceities of
merely possible individuals. Thus, the ‘metaphysics that is presupposed’ is a thoroughly contingentist
metaphysics.
Stalnaker claims to have shown ‘how to do the compositional semantics in a way that assigns as
values only properties, relations, and functions that actually exist, according to the metaphysics that
is presupposed’ since he takes the Propositional Functions Account, proposed in (Stalnaker, 2012,
5Stalnaker also proposes the addition of certain classes of functions to models for ﬁrst-order modal languages. The
purpose of these functions is that of distinguishing the elements of the model that are representationally signiﬁcant from the
elements of the model that are not representationally signiﬁcant. See (Stalnaker, 2012, chs. 1-3 and Appendices A and C).
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appendix B), to assign as semantic values only entities that are actually something according to a
thoroughly contingentist metaphysics. In this section Stalnaker’s Propositional Functions Account is
presented in some detail. In the next section some results delivered by the Propositional Functions
Account are presented. These results show that, pace Stalnaker, the Propositional Functions Account
is, ‘ontologically extravagant’, in the sense of Stalnaker, favouring Higher-Order Necessitism (when
conjoined with Thorough Serious Actualism, as shall be seen).
2.3.1 A Sketch of the Propositional Functions Account
Unsurprisingly, according to the Propositional Functions Account individuals are the semantic values
of individual constants and n-ary relations are the semantic value of n-ary predicate letters. Roughly,
closed complex predicates also have properties as their semantic values, and closed formulas have
propositions as their semantic values.6
A distinctive feature of the Propositional Functions Account is its take on the semantic values of
open formulas and open complex predicates. According to the account, the semantic value of an open
formula is a nth-level propositional function, for some natural number n, and the semantic value of an
open complex predicate is a nth-level property function, for some natural number n. The notions of a
nth-level propositional function and property function are deﬁned recursively:7
• A 0th-level propositional function is just a proposition;
• A 0th-level property function is just a property;
• A (n + 1)th-level propositional function f is a relation between individuals and nth-level
propositional functions such that necessarily, for every individual x, there is one and only one
nth-level propositional function g such that f relates x to g (i.e., f(x) = g);
• A (n+1)th-level property function is a relation f between individuals x and nth-level property
functions such that necessarily, for every individual x, there is one and only one nth-level
property function g such that f relates x to g (i.e., f(x) = g).
The assumption of Thorough Serious Actualism agrees with Stalnaker’s own presentation of the
Propositional Functions Account. Moreover, the thesis is explicitly endorsed by Stalnaker. The main
aim of the present chapter is that of showing that the Propositional Functions Account, in conjunction
with Thorough Serious Actualism, has consequences that favour Higher-Order Necessitism.
I will now turn to some examples. Let a be an individual constant, P be a unary predicate letter
and Q be a binary predicate letter, with semantics values, respectively, Michael Jordan (the basketball
6This is not, strictly speaking, correct. As will be shown later on, certain closed complex predicates do not have properties
as their semantic values, and certain closed formulas do not have propositions as their semantic values.
7Recall the thesis of Thorough Serious Actualism, presented in chapter 1, according to which necessarily, if (0th- or
higher-order) entities are related, then they are all something. The characterisation of nth-level propositional functions
offered in the text presupposes the truth of Thorough Serious Actualism. On a characterisation independent of this
assumption, a (n + 1)th-level propositional function f is a relation between individuals and nth-level propositional
functions such that necessarily, for every individual x, it is possible that there is a nth-level propositional function g such
that necessarily f(x) = g. A (n+ 1)th-level property function f is a relation between individuals and nth-level property
functions such that necessarily, for every individual x, it is possible that there is a nth-level property function g such that
necessarily f(x) = g.
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player), the property being tall, and the relation being a father of. Then, according to the Propositional
Functions Account:
• The semantic value of the open formula Px, JPxK, is a 1st-level propositional function:
– It is that 1st-level propositional function which necessarily, for every individual x, maps x
to the proposition that x is tall.
• JQaxK is a 1st-level propositional function:
– Necessarily, for every x, JQaxK maps x to the proposition that Jordan is a father of x.
• J∧K is a function from nth-level propositional functions to nth-level propositional functions:
– J∧K maps JPxK and JQaxK to JPx ∧ QaxK, a 1st-level propositional function, which
necessarily, for every x, maps x to the proposition that x is tall and Jordan is a father of x.
• JxˆK is a function from (n+ 1)th-level propositional functions to nth-level property functions:
– JxˆK maps JPx ∧ QaxK to Jxˆ(Px ∧ Qax)K, a property which necessarily, for every x,
holds of x if and only if x is mapped by JPx ∧QaxK to a true proposition.
• J∀K is a function which maps nth-level property functions to nth-level propositional functions:
– J∀K maps Jxˆ(Px∧Qax)K to J∀xˆ(Px∧Qax)K, a proposition which, necessarily, obtains
if and only if the property Jxˆ(Px ∧Qax)K is instantiated by everything.
• J2K is a function from nth-level propositional functions to nth-level propositional functions:
– J2K maps J∀xˆ(Px ∧ Qax)K to J2∀xˆ(Px ∧ Qax)K, a proposition which, necessarily,
obtains if and only if the proposition J∀xˆ(Px ∧Qax)K necessarily obtains.
2.3.2 Ambiguities and Types
If the Propositional Functions Account turns out to be the correct semantic account of ﬁrst-order
modal languages, then these languages happen to be ambiguous in unexpected ways. Consider the
formula Pa. Taken on its own, this expression has as its semantic value a proposition, namely, the
proposition that Jordan is tall. However, in the context of the formula ∀xˆ(Pa), the expression Pa
has as its semantic value a 1st-level propositional function, namely, that propositional function which
necessarily, for every x, maps x to the proposition that Jordan is tall.
Moreover, in the context of the formula ∀xˆ(∃yˆ(Pa ∧Qxy)) the semantic value of Pa turns out
to be a 2nd-level propositional function. Namely, it is that 2nd-level propositional function f which
necessarily, for every y, maps y to that propositional function g which necessarily, for every x, maps x
to the proposition that Jordan is tall.
A second kind of ambiguity is illustrated by considering the open formulaQxy when embedded in,
respectively, the formulas ∃yˆ(∃xˆ(Qxy)) and ∃xˆ(∃yˆ(Qxy)). In the context of the ﬁrst closed formula,
∃yˆ(∃xˆ(Qxy)), the formula Qxy has as its semantic value that 2nd-level propositional function f
which necessarily, for every x, maps x to that propositional function g which necessarily, for every
y, maps y to the proposition that y is a father of x. In the context of the second closed formula,
∃xˆ(∃yˆ(Qxy)), the formula Qxy has as its semantic value that 2nd-level propositional function f
which necessarily, for every x, maps x to that propositional function g which necessarily, for every y,
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maps y, to the proposition that x (not y) is a father of y (not of x).
Thus, in an extended sense of ‘open formula’, according to which open formulas are those expres-
sions of the language that have as semantic values propositional functions, the formula ‘Pa’ may itself
be considered an open formula. When in the context of a formula such as ‘∀xˆ(Pa)’, the formula ‘Pa’
does not have as its semantic value a proposition. Instead, its semantic value is a 1st-level propositional
function.
On Stalnaker’s own account, the ambiguities just noted are resolved in situ. The same expression
has different semantic values depending on the larger linguistic context in which it occurs. Here,
instead of adopting the in situ strategy, the Propositional Functions Account is given for languages
stripped of ambiguities of the kind in question. By focusing on languages without these ambiguities the
consequences of the Propositional Functions Account become clearer.8 To the languages for which
the Propositional Functions Account is here given I will call TMLˆ-languages. The ambiguities noted
in MLˆ-languages are resolved in two ways.
In order to account for the fact that expressions such as Qxy can express different propositional
functions, the ordering of the variables of the language will be exploited. The two propositional
functions that were the possible semantic values of Qxy in the context of, respectively, the formulas
∃yˆ(∃xˆ(Qxy)) and ∃xˆ(∃yˆ(Qxy)), are the semantic values of, respectively, the formulas Qx1x2 and
Qx2x1.
In order to account for the fact that an expression such as Pa may express propositional functions
of different levels, types are added to the language. The type-hierarchy adopted is the one presented
in (Gallin, 1975, p. 68). The variables of the language are typed with e, the type of individuals. The
variables of the language are thus x1e, x
2
e, . . .. Similarly, the individual constants of the language are
typed with the type e, and the n-ary predicates of the language are typed with the type 〈e1, . . . , en〉,
the type of n-ary relations. So, whereas before a was an individual constant, now ae is an individual
constant, and whereas before P and Q were, respectively, a unary predicate and a binary predicate,
now P〈e〉 and Q〈e,e〉 are, respectively, a unary predicate and a binary predicate.
Let U and S be the following subsets of the set P of all types:
• U is the smallest set such that 〈〉 belongs to U , and if τ belongs to U , then 〈e, τ〉 belongs to U ;
• S is the smallest set such that 〈e〉 belongs to S, and if τ belongs to S, then 〈e, τ〉 belongs to S.
The sets U and S are, respectively, the sets of types of propositional functions and of property
functions. Thus, 〈〉 is the type of propositions, 〈e, 〈〉〉 is the type of 1st-level propositional functions,
〈e, 〈e, 〈〉〉〉 is the type of 2nd-level propositional functions, and so on. Moreover, 〈e〉 is the type of
properties, 〈e, 〈e〉〉 is the type of 1st-level property functions, 〈e, 〈e, 〈e〉〉〉 is the type of 2nd-level
property functions, and so on.
Each one of the types in, respectively, U and S, is abbreviated as follows:
1. For each natural number n, 〈n, 0〉 is an abbreviation of the type of nth-level propositional
8This is not to say that there are no reasons to prefer the in situ strategy. On the contrary, the in situ strategy is
conservative with respect to the present usage of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
33
functions;
2. For each natural number n, 〈n, 1〉 is an abbreviation of the type of nth-level property functions.
This means that 〈0, 0〉 is the type of propositions, 〈0, 1〉, and in general, 〈0, n〉 is the type of n-ary
relations. Furthermore, 〈n, 0〉 is the type of nth-level propositional functions, and 〈n, 1〉 is the type
of nth-level property functions.
The set of complex expressions of TMLˆ-languages is now deﬁned:
1. Every variable of type τ is a term of type τ ;
2. Every constant of type τ is a term of type τ ;
3. If s is a term of type 〈i, n〉, s1, . . . sn are terms of type e, and k is the highest index of all the vari-
ables occurring free in s, s1, . . . , sn, then, for each natural numberm, (ss1 . . . sn)〈max(i,k)+m,0〉
is a term of type 〈max(i, k) +m, 0〉;
4. ϕ is a term of type 〈n, 0〉, then (¬ϕ)〈n,0〉, (@ϕ)〈n,0〉, (2ϕ)〈n,0〉 are terms of type 〈n, 0〉;
5. If ϕ,ψ are terms of type 〈n, 0〉, then (ϕ ∧ ψ)〈n,0〉 is a term of type 〈n, 0〉;
6. If ϕ is a term of type 〈n+ 1, 0〉, then xˆn+1e (ϕ)〈n,1〉 is a term of type 〈n, 1〉;
7. If s is a term of type 〈n, 1〉, then (∀s)〈n,0〉 is a term of type 〈n, 0〉.
For instance:
• (Q〈0,2〉x1eae)〈1,0〉 is a formula whose type is that of a 1st-level propositional function;
• (Q〈0,2〉x1eae)〈2,0〉 is a formula whose type is that of a 2nd-level propositional function;
• xˆ2e((Q〈0,2〉x1ex2e)〈2,0〉)〈1,1〉 is a term with the type of a 1st-level property function;
• (∃xˆ2e((Q〈0,2〉x1ex2e)〈2,0〉)〈1,1〉)〈1,0〉 is a term whose type is that of a 1st-level propositional
function.
Note that there is no formula corresponding to the string (Q〈0,2〉x2eae)〈1,0〉. That is, if the variable
with the highest index occurring in the formula is the variable xne , then the formula has at least the
type of a nth-level propositional function. The string (Q〈0,2〉x2eae)〈1,0〉 violates this constraint, since
the variable with the highest index occurring in it is x2e , whereas this string is labelled with the type
〈1, 0〉. In order to count as a formula, the string would have to be labelled with a type 〈n, 0〉, for
n > 1. Note also that xˆ2e((Q〈0,2〉x1ex3e)〈3,0〉)〈2,1〉 is not a term, since the variable being bound is not
x3e , contrary to what is required by clause 7.
To those interested in the minutiae of the Propositional Functions Account, in the remainder
of §2.3 the Propositional Functions Account is presented in more detail and it is shown how the
Kripkean model-theory may be used to model the account. Others may want to skip ahead to §2.4.
2.3.3 The Propositional Functions Account
The semantic value of an expression of type e is an individual (that is actually something), and the
semantic value of a constant of type 〈0, n〉 is a n-ary relation. In particular, the semantic value of
=〈0,2〉 is, as expected, the identity relation. Let J·K〈z1,...,zn〉 denote a function which, when applied to
an expression ϕ of a TMLˆ-language, maps ϕ to its semantic value, except that if ϕ is a variable xie,
34
1 ≤ i ≤ n, JϕK〈z1,...,zn〉 is zi, where n is any natural number. Here is a speciﬁcation of the semantic
values of the remaining terms of the language (except for the variables, which have no semantic value
whatsoever):9
1. J(ss1 . . . sn)〈max(i,k)+m,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that (max(i, k) + m)th-level propositional
function which is such that, necessarily, for every y1, for every ((max(i, k) +m)− 1)th-level
propositional function f1 and every (i− 1)th-level property function f∗1 , f0(y1) = f1 if and
only if JsK(y1) = f∗1 and, necessarily, for every y2, for every ((max(i, k) +m)− 2)th-level
propositional function f2 and every (i−2)th-level property function f∗2 , f1(y2) = f2 if and only
if f∗1 (y2) = f∗2 and, necessarily, . . . and, necessarily, for every yi, for every ((max(i, k)+m)−
i)th-level propositional function fi, for every 0th-level property function f∗i , f(i−1)(yi) = fi
if and only if f∗(i−1)(yi) = f
∗
i and, necessarily, for y(i+1), for every ((max(i, k) + m) −
(i + 1))th-level propositional function f(i+1), fi(y(i+1)) = f(i+1) if and only if necessarily,
for every y(i+2), for every ((max(i, k) +m)− (i+ 2))th-level propositional function fi+2,
f(i+1)(y(i+2)) = f(i+2) and . . . and necessarily, for every y(max(i,k)+m), for every 0
th-level
propositional function f(max(i,k)+m), f(max(i,k)+m) obtains if and only if f
∗
i holds betweenJs1K〈y1,...,y(max(i,k)+m)〉 and . . . and JsnK〈y1,...,y(max(i,k)+m)〉.
2. J(¬ϕ)〈n,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level propositional function which is such that, neces-
sarily, for every y1, for every (n−1)th-level propositional function f1, for every (n−1)th-level
propositional function f∗1 , f0(y1) = f1 if and only if JϕK(y1) = f∗1 and, necessarily, . . . and,
necessarily, for every yn, necessarily, for every 0th-level propositional function fn, necessar-
ily, for every 0th-level propositional function f∗n, necessarily, f(n−1)(yn) = fn if and only if
f∗n−1(yn) = f∗n and, necessarily, fn obtains if and only if it is not the case that f∗n obtains;
3. J(2ϕ)〈n,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level propositional function which is such that, neces-
sarily, for every y1, for every (n−1)th-level propositional function f1, for every (n−1)th-level
propositional function f∗1 , f0(y1) = f1 if and only if JϕK(y1) = f∗1 and . . . and, necessarily,
for every yn, for every 0th-level propositional function fn, for every 0th-level propositional
function f∗n , f(n−1)(yn) = fn if and only if f∗n−1(yn) = f∗n and, necessarily, fn obtains if and
only if necessarily, f∗n obtains;
4. J(@ϕ)〈n,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level propositional function which is such that, neces-
sarily, for every y1, for every (n−1)th-level propositional function f1, for every (n−1)th-level
propositional function f∗1 , f0(y1) = f1 if and only if JϕK(y1) = f∗1 and . . . and, necessarily,
for every yn, for every 0th-level propositional function fn, for every 0th-level propositional
function f∗n , f(n−1)(yn) = fn if and only if f∗n−1(yn) = f∗n and, necessarily, fn obtains if and
only if actually, f∗n obtains;
5. J(ϕ∧ψ)〈n,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level propositional function which is such that, neces-
9Hopefully, it will be clear that the Propositional Functions Account could have been offered in the higher-order modal
language MLP (enriched with some extra primitives) presented in chapter 1, even if it was there given in what might be
called ‘logical English’.
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sarily, for every y1, for every (n−1)th-level propositional function f1, for every (n−1)th-level
propositional function f∗1 , for every (n− 1)th-level propositional function f
′
1, f0(y1) = f1 if
and only if JϕK(y1) = f∗1 and JψK(y1) = f ′1 and, necessarily, . . . and, necessarily, for every
yn, necessarily, for every 0th-level propositional function fn, necessarily, for every 0th-level
propositional function f∗n , necessarily, for every 0th-level propositional function f
′
n, necessarily,






n and, necessarily, fn
obtains if and only if f∗n and f
′
n both obtain;
6. Jxˆn+1e (ϕ)〈n,1〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level property function such that, necessarily, for
every y1, for every (n − 1)th-level property function f1, for every nth-level propositional
function f∗1 , f0(y1) = f1 if and only if JϕK(y1) = f∗1 and . . . and, necessarily, for every
yn, for every 0th-level property function fn, for every 1st-level propositional function f∗n ,
fn−1(yn) = fn if and only if f∗n−1(yn) = f∗n and, necessarily, for every yn+1, for every 0th-level
propositional function f∗n+1, necessarily, fn holds of yn+1 if and only if f∗n(yn+1) = f∗n+1 and
f∗n+1 obtains.
7. J(∀s)〈n,0〉K = f0, where f0 is that nth-level propositional function such that, necessarily, for
every y1, for every (n− 1)th-level propositional function f1, for every (n− 1)th-level property
function f∗1 , f0(x1) = f1 if and only if JsK(y1) = f∗1 and, . . . and, necessarily, for every yn, for
every 0th-level propositional function fn, for every 0th-level property function f∗n , necessarily,
f(n−1)(yn) = fn and f∗(n−1)(yn) = f
∗




Contrary to the Literal account, the Propositional Functions Account is consistent with the conjunction
of Aliens and Actualism. Prima facie, the account is also consistent with the conjunction of No Actual
Haecceity and Thorough Actualism. However, this is not so. As shall be seen, the Propositional
Functions Account is committed to claims that imply the falsehood of No Actual Haecceity, for
instance, the claim that necessarily every haecceity is necessarily something. Before presenting these
problematic consequences of the Propositional Functions Account, it will be shown how the Kripkean
model-theory may be used to provide a model (i.e., a representation) of what is, according to the
account, the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
2.3.4 Modelling the Account
Recall Stalnaker’s views of what it takes for a model to be intended. The intended model does not
consist of ‘modal reality’. Instead, it is a representation of certain features of reality that the theorist
aims to capture. For the purposes of the Propositional Functions Account, the relevant features are the
semantic values of the different expressions of the language, and the relationships between these. This
representational use of the model-theoretic semantics requires that a particular class of set-theoretic
entities be singled out to do the job of representing the semantic values of the different expressions of
the language.
The admissible semantic values of the constants of type e of the language are represented by
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elements in d(). The admissible semantic values of expressions of type 〈e1, . . . , en〉, for each natural
number n, consist of elements of the set of functions f with domainW and such that for everyw ∈W ,
f(w) ⊆ (d(w))n. Contrary to what was the case in the model-theoretic semantics speciﬁed in §2.2,
only elements in this set are considered, since otherwise certain formulas contradicting Thorough
Serious Actualism would be true in the models for the language. The sets of entities that represent
the semantic values of the remaining expressions of types 〈n, 0〉 and 〈n, 1〉 are deﬁned in a similar
fashion, as we shall see.
The relevant class of models is now deﬁned in more detail.
Deﬁnition 1 (PF-Models). A PF-model based on an inhabited model structure IS = 〈W,, D〉 is a
pairM = 〈IS, V 〉, where V is a valuation function assigning a value to each individual constant and
n-ary relation letter in the following way:
1. For every (atomic) expression s of type e, V (s) ∈ D()
2. For every atomic expression s of type 〈0, n〉, for every natural number n, V (s), is a function with
domainW and such that, for every w ∈W , V (s)(w) ⊆ (d(w))n.
The next step is to extend the deﬁnition of value to the remaining expressions of the language. In
order to do so, it is useful to ﬁrst deﬁne a hierarchy of ‘domains’ of n-ary relation functions:
Deﬁnition 2 (Domains of n-ary Relation Functions).
• D〈0,n〉 = {f ∈ ((
⋃
w∈W
D(w))n)W : f(w) ⊆ (D(w))n}
• D〈m+1,n〉 = {f ∈ (
⋃
w∈W
D(w)×D〈m,n〉)W : f(w) = {〈o, g〉 : o ∈ D(w)}}
The values of expressions of type 〈n, 0〉 and 〈n, 1〉— that is, of expressions whose type is, respectively,
that of n-ary propositional functions and that of n-ary property functions — belong, respectively, to
the setsD〈n,0〉 andD〈n,1〉.
Now, let ~on be shorthand for the sequence o1, . . . , on of meta-variables. Also, let V (o1/o1,...,on/on)




S(w), where oi is not in language. Let~on be shorthand for the sequence o1, . . . , on
and V (~on/~on) be shorthand for V (o1/o1,...,on/on). Finally, let stt′ be the result of substituting t




be the result of substituting t′1 for t1, . . ., t′n for tn in term s.
The value of the typed formulas and complex predicate of the language is deﬁned as follows —
note that the deﬁnition of value is not the usual one, since it does not appeal to variable-assignments:
Deﬁnition 3 (Value of a typed formula and complex predicate).
1. V ((ss1 . . . sn)〈u,0〉) = f ∈ D〈u,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ d(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ u : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wu)(ou) = h
such that:
h = {w ∈W : 〈V (~ou/~ou)((s1)~xu~ou ), . . . , V
(~ou/~ou)((sn)~xu~ou
)〉 ∈ V (s)(w1)(o1) . . . (wi)(oi)(w)}
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2. V ((¬ϕ)〈n,0〉) = f ∈ D〈n,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ d(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that:
h =W − V (ϕ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on)
3. V ((2ϕ)〈n,0〉) = f ∈ D〈n,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ d(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that,
h = {w ∈W : V (ϕ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) =W}
4. V ((@ϕ)〈n,0〉) = f ∈ D〈n,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ d(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that
h = {w ∈W :  ∈ V (ϕ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on)}
5. V ((ϕ ∧ ψ)〈n,0〉) = f ∈ D〈n,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ d(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that:
h = V (ϕ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) ∩ V (ψ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on)
6. V (xˆn+1e (ϕ)〈n,1〉) = f ∈ D〈n,1〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ D(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that, for every w ∈W :
h(w) = {o ∈ D(w) : w ∈ V (ϕ)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on)(w)(o)}
7. V ((∀s)〈n,0〉) = f ∈ D〈n,0〉 such that,
for every wj ∈W, oj ∈ D(wj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n : f(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on) = h
such that:
h = {w ∈W : V (s)(w1)(o1) . . . (wn)(on)(w) = d(w)}
Finally, a term ϕ of type 〈〉 is true in a model if and only if  ∈ V (ϕ).
This concludes the exposition of the Propositional Functions Account. We are now in a position
to show why the account is not austere, pace Stalnaker, instead favouring higher-order necessitism.
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2.4 Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account
Before turning to the case for the Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account, I will brieﬂy
offer some comments on its virtues. The Propositional Functions Account is an elegant account of the
semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages. Not only is the account consistent with the conjunction
of Aliens and Contingentism — contrary to what was the case with the Literal Account — it also
avoids certain somewhat puzzling features of the Haecceities Account. Whereas according to the
Haecceities Account the semantic value of an individual constant consists of an haecceity, according
to the Propositional Functions Account the semantic value of an individual constant consists of an
individual (that is actually something). The latter is, arguably, a more natural view.
These are advantages of the Propositional Functions Account from the standpoint of Thorough
Contingentists committed to Thorough Actualism. There is yet another advantage of the Propositional
Functions Account over the classic accounts that is orthogonal to the question whether any of these
theses is true. Contrary to the other accounts, the Propositional Functions Account does not require
an appeal to a notion of semantic value relativised to variable-assignments. Variable-assignments turn
out to be, on the Propositional Functions Account, relics of the model-theoretic formalism used to
model the semantics of quantiﬁed expressions. These relics should not be reﬂected in an account of
the real semantics of quantiﬁed expressions. Arguably, these features of the Propositional Functions
Account make it more attractive in comparison to the classic accounts. Arguably, the availability of the
Propositional Functions Account reveals that the classical accounts confuse the elements of models
with the things that they represent.
In this section it will be shown that, despite the advantages of the Propositional Functions Account
over the classic accounts, the Propositional Functions Account overgenerates from the standpoint of
Higher-Order Contingentists committed to Thorough Serious Actualism. To explain what precisely is
meant with the overgeneration claim, let me introduce some notions and theses. Say that a proposition
is an attribution of being to x just in case it is the proposition that x is something, and that it is
an attribution of being (simpliciter) just in case it is possible that there is some x such that it is an
attribution of being to x. Consider the following theses:
Necessity of Being. Necessarily, there is some individual.
Haecceity Necessitism. Necessarily, every haecceity is necessarily something.
Attributions of Being–Necessitism. Necessarily, every attribution of being is necessarily some-
thing.
The Propositional Functions Account overgenerates from the standpoint of proponents of Higher-
Order Contingentism committed to Thorough Serious Actualism in the following sense:
Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account. The Propositional Functions Account,
together with Thorough Serious Actualism and Necessity of Being, implies both i) Haecceity
Necessitism, and ii) Attributions of Being–Necessitism.
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Let me start by showing that the Propositional Functions Account, Thorough Serious Actualism
and Necessity of Being together imply that Jordan’s haecceity is necessarily something, and that the
attribution of being to Jordan is necessarily something.
Consider the following expressions:
(3) yˆe(a = y)〈1,1〉
(4) (∃yˆe(a = y))〈1,0〉.
Note that the expressions yˆe(a = y)〈1,1〉 and (∃yˆe(a = y))〈1,0〉 are used, for instance, in formulating
the claim that (2∀xˆe(2(Qax→ (∃yˆe(a = y) ∧ ∃yˆe(x = y)))))〈0,0〉, i.e., the claim that necessarily,
for every individual x, necessarily, if Michael Jordan is a father of x, then Michael Jordan is something
and x is something. Here, x is being used for the variable x1e , y is being used for the expression x
2
e ,
and z for x3e .
According to the Propositional Functions Account the semantic values of (3) and (4) are, respec-
tively, i) a ﬁrst-level property function which necessarily, for every individual y, maps y to the property
of being Jordan, and ii) a propositional function which necessarily, for every individual y, maps y to
the proposition that Jordan is something. From the thesis of Necessary Being and i) it follows that a)
necessarily, some individual is mapped to the property of being Jordan — and so, necessarily, some
individual is related to the property of being Jordan; and from the thesis of Necessary being and ii) it
follows that b) Necessarily, some individual is mapped to the proposition that Jordan is something —
and so necessarily, some individual is related to the proposition that Jordan is something.
Finally Thorough Serious Serious Actualism and a) together imply that necessarily, the property
of being Jordan is something. Moreover, Thorough Serious Actualism and b) together imply that the
proposition that Jordan is something is something.
These consequences are generalisable. Consider the following expression:
(5) zˆe(z = xe)〈2,1〉.
According to the Propositional Functions Account, the semantic value of zˆe(z = xe)〈2,1〉 is that
2nd-level property function f which necessarily, for every x, maps x to that 1st-level property function
which necessarily, for every y, maps y to the property of being x.
From the thesis of Thorough Serious Actualism it follows that necessarily, for every x, there is a
1st-level property function g which necessarily, for every y, maps y to the property of being x. From
the thesis of Necessity of Being it follows that i) necessarily, for every x, there is a 1st-level property
function g which necessarily, maps some y to the property of being x. Thorough Serious Actualism
and i) together imply that necessarily, for every x, necessarily, the property of being x is something.
That is, Thorough Serious Actualism and i) together imply Haecceity Necessitism.
Similarly, consider the expression
(6) (∃zˆe(z = xe))〈2,0〉
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According to the Propositional Functions Account, the semantic value of (∃zˆe(z = xe))〈2,0〉 is that
2nd-level propositional function f which necessarily, for every x, maps x to that 1st-level propositional
function which necessarily, for every y, maps y to the proposition that x is something.
From the thesis of Thorough Serious Actualism it follows that necessarily, for every x, there is a
1st-level propositional function which necessarily, for every y, maps y to the proposition that x is
something. From the thesis of Necessity of Being it follows that ii) necessarily, for every x, there
is a 1st-level propositional function which necessarily, maps some y to the proposition that x is
something. Thorough Serious Actualism and ii) together imply that necessarily, for every x, necessarily,
the proposition that x is something is itself something. That is, Thorough Actualism and ii) together
imply Attributions of Being–Necessitism.
Hence, the Propositional Functions Account overgenerates from the standpoint of proponents of
Higher-Order Contingentism.
How signiﬁcant is this result? To begin with, Stalnaker’s own higher-order modal theory is
committed to Thorough Serious Actualism, as well as to the negation of Haecceity Necessitism and of
Attributions of Being–Necessitism. Arguably, Stalnaker is also committed to the necessary being of at
least some entities, such as mathematical entities and other abstract objects. Thus, the Overgeneration
of the Propositional Functions Account reveals that Stalnaker’s own higher-order modal theory is
inconsistent with the Propositional Functions Account. Thus, he cannot hope to appeal to it in order to
address the challenge of offering a satisfactory account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages
consistent with his higher-order modal theory.
The signiﬁcance of the overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account goes beyond
Stalnaker’s own higher-order modal theory. First, note that typical higher-order contingentists should
be at least as opposed to the truth of Haecceity Necessitism as they are to the truth of the negation of
No Actual Haecceity, since Haecceity Necessitism implies the falsehood of No Actual Haecceity.
Indeed, higher-order contingentists such as Adams, Fine, Prior and Stalnaker all reject the truth
of the conjunction of Haecceity Necessitism and Attributions of Being–Necessitism. Moreover, it is
difficult to see how some higher-order entities may fail to be something, while at the same time it is
necessary that all haecceities are necessarily something, and that all attributions of being are necessarily
something. Arguably, the conjunction of Haecceity Necessitism and Attributions of Being–Necessitism
is true only if Higher-Order Necessitism is itself true.
Second, the thesis of Necessity of Being is rather plausible. For instance, the thesis is a direct
consequence of the view that there is at least one necessary being. But according to many, things such
as the empty set, the number one, and other mathematical entities are all necessary beings.
Finally, in chapter 3 a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism is offered, a defence that I will
assume here to be successful.
Given this information, the plausible higher-order contingentist theories are committed to the
Necessity of Being and to Thorough Serious Actualism, and to the falsehood of Haecceity Necessitism
and Attributions of Being–Necessitism. The Overgeneration of the Propositional Functions Account
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shows that proponents of plausible higher-order contingentist theories will not ﬁnd in the Propositional
Functions Account an account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages consistent with their
commitments.
Now, the Propositional Functions Account appears to be independently attractive, as was previously
shown, in the ﬁrst paragraphs of the present section. Assuming the truth of Thorough Serious
Actualism and of Necessity of Being, the independent attractiveness of the Propositional Functions
Account constitutes a pro tanto reason in favour of Haecceity Necessitism and Attributions of
Being–Necessitism. So, the attractiveness of the Propositional Functions Account constitutes a pro
tanto reason in favour of Higher-Order Necessitism.10
2.5 Overgeneration of Alternative Proposals
An obvious way of defeating the support for Higher-Order Necessitism given by the attractiveness
of the Propositional Functions account consists in ﬁnding an alternative account of the semantics of
ﬁrst-order modal languages as attractive as the Propositional Functions Account, and which does not
imply theses favouring the truth of Higher-Order Necessitism.
In this section I consider some natural ways of ‘tweaking’ the Propositional Functions Account
with the aim of avoiding a commitment to these theses. It is shown that all of the ways considered
turn out to be unsatisfactory, assigning the wrong semantic values to some of the expressions of the
language.
2.5.1 No Middle Men
The ﬁrst proposal for ‘amending’ the Propositional Functions Account consists in adopting the view
that complex expressions whose semantic values are properties are determined as a function not of
propositional functions, but instead of other properties. According to the present proposal, associated
with each expression is a construction tree. The initial nodes of a construction tree contain primitive
expressions of the language. The other nodes of the tree are the result of applying syntactic operations
to its earlier nodes. Each of these syntactic operations have as their semantic values operations on
relations (the semantic values of predicates).
10One route to this conclusion is via the assumption, abductively grounded, that the conjunction of Haecceity Necessitism
and Attributions of Being–Necessitism is true only if Higher-Order Necessitism is itself true.
A different route for the same conclusion is the following. Note that, for any formula ϕ〈2,0〉, xˆe(ϕ)〈1,1〉 is a well-formed
complex predicate. Together, Thorough Serious Actualism, the Necessity of Being and the Propositional Functions Account
imply that, for any formulaϕ〈2,0〉, the property that is the semantic value of xˆe(ϕ)〈1,1〉 is necessarily something. That is, every
expressible property (of individuals) is necessarily something. Moreover, consider the result of extending TMLˆ-languages
with higher-order resources, and in particular the ability to bind sequences of variables of different types. Together, Thorough
Serious Actualism, the Necessity of Being and the natural extension of the Propositional Functions Account to such languages
imply that, for any expression of type ϕ〈t1,...,〈tn,〈e,0〉〉〉, the semantic value of xˆ
1
t1 . . . x
n
tn(ϕ)〈1,t〉 is necessarily something,
where t1, . . . , tn are any types in Gallin’s type-hierarchy, and t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉. That is, every expressible relation of any
type is necessarily something. This result does not imply Higher-Order Necessitism. Yet, it strongly favours it. Arguably,
the best explanation for the fact that every expressible relation of any type is necessarily something is that necessarily, every
higher-order entity is necessarily something.
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The overall aim of the present proposal is to avoid the need to appeal to propositional and property
functions in providing an account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages. By having an account
that does not predict the being of such functions the route by which the problematic consequences of
the Propositional Functions Account were reached is blocked. Call this proposal the ‘no middle men’
proposal.
The no middle men proposal is modelled on the semantics for complex predicates proposed
in (Swoyer, 1998) and (Zalta, 1983). The languages that are the focus of these authors are slightly
different from FLˆ-languages. In particular, the languages that they consider allow for strings of
the form vˆ1 . . . vˆn(ϕ) to count as n-ary (complex) predicates of the language. Note that these are
not well-formed expressions of the languages here considered: in these languages the preﬁx vˆ is
only allowed to be preﬁxed to formulas. Let us then consider instead slightly different languages,
CFLˆ-languages. These languages are just like MLˆ-languages (and thus, a ﬁrst-order language), except
that instead of clause 8. (in page 23) of the deﬁnition of a term of the language we have the following
8′. If ϕ is a term of type 〈〉, v1, . . . vn are variables of type e, then vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ) is a term of type
〈e1, . . . , en〉.
The construction tree of each expression is computed by applying a series of syntactic tests to
the expression. Here the details of these tests are omitted.11 Assume, as before, that the semantic
value of P is the property of being tall. Assume also that the semantic value of R is the property of
being a basketball player. Consider an example of a syntactic tree, the syntactic tree for the expression
xˆ(2(Px→ Rx)), where both P andR are of type 〈0, 1〉. The construction tree of xˆ(2(Px→ Rx))
is the following:
(7) nec(xˆ(Px→ Rx))) = xˆ(2(Px→ Rx))
refl1,2(xˆyˆ(Px→ Ry)) = xˆ(Px→ Rx)
cond(xˆ(Px), yˆ(Ry)) = xˆy(Px→ Ry)
pred1(P, x) = xˆ(Px)
P x
pred1(R, y) = yˆ(Ry)
R y
Here, pred1(·), refl1,2(·), cond(·) and nec(·) are syntactic operations. The operation pred1(·)
is an operation that maps a 1-ary predicate letter s and a variable v to the 1-ary predicate vˆ(sv).
The operation cond(·) maps an n-ary predicate vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ) and am-ary predicate vˆ′1 . . . v′m(ψ) to
the (n +m)-ary predicate vˆ1 . . . vnv
′1 . . . v
′m(ϕ → ψ), where vj 6= v′i, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The operation refl1,2(·) maps a n+ 1-ary predicate vˆ1v2 . . . vn(ϕ) to vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ′), where ϕ′ is the
result of replacing v2 with v1 in ϕ. Finally, the operation nec(·) maps an n-ary predicate vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ)
to the n-ary predicate vˆ1 . . . vn(2(ϕ)).
11Their formulation would follow closely the formulation of the tests given in (Zalta, 1983, pp. 24-26).
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These syntactic operations have operations on relations as their semantic values. To the syntactic
operation pred1 corresponds the operation Pred1(·) which takes as an argument the semantic value
of the 1-ary predicate letter s (the ﬁrst argument of the operation pred1), and maps it to itself. Thus,
the semantic values of xˆ(Px) and yˆ(Ry) are, respectively, the properties of being tall and being a
basketball player.
To the operation cond(·) corresponds an operation,Cond(·), which maps the n-ary relation that is
the semantic value of vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ) and them-ary relation that is the semantic value of vˆ
′1 . . . v
′m(ψ),
and maps them to the semantic value of cond(vˆ1 . . . vn(ϕ), v
′1 . . . v
′m(ψ)). This is the (n+m)-ary
relation that holds of v1, . . . vn, v
′1, . . . v
′m if and only if ϕ → ψ. Thus, the semantic value of
xˆy(Px → Qy) is the relation that holds of x and y if and only if, if x is tall, then y is a basketball
player.
To the operation refl1,2(·) corresponds the function Refl1,2(·). This function maps the relation
that holds of x and y if and only if, if x is tall, then y is a basketball player to the property of being an
x such that, if x is tall, then x is a basketball player.
Finally, to the operation nec(·) corresponds the function Nec(·). This functions maps the
property of being an x such that, if x is tall, then x is a basketball player to the property of being an x
such that necessarily, if x is tall, then x is a basketball player. This property is the semantic value of
xˆ(2(Px→ Rx)).
One of the uses of complex predicates has been in regimenting essentialist theses. For instance, by
appealing to quantiﬁed ﬁrst-order modal languages containing devices for forming complex predicates
it is possible to have predicates corresponding to the natural language predicates such as expressing
properties such as the property of being essentially a man, assuming that to be essentially a man is to
be an individual x such that necessarily, x is a man if x is something. LetM express the property of
being a man, and E express the property of being something. The property of being essentially a man
is the semantic value of the complex predicate xˆ(2(Ex→Mx)).
One problem for the no middle men proposal, the one in which we will be focusing here, is that
the complex predicates xˆ(2(Ex → Mx)) and of xˆ(2(Mx)) — intended to express, respectively,
the property of being essentially a man and the property of being necessarily a man — turn out to
have the same satisfaction conditions according to the no middle men proposal, despite the fact that
they have different satisfaction conditions, assuming that some men could have been nothing. If some
men could have been nothing, then there is at least one x such that i) x has the property of being
necessarily a man if something (assuming that no men could have been something and not a man), and
yet ii) x does not have the property of being necessarily a man, since being necessarily a man implies
being necessarily something, and x could have been nothing.
Consider the syntactic construction trees for these two expressions:
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(8) nec(xˆ(Ex→Mx))) = xˆ(2(Ex→Mx))
refl1,2(xˆyˆ(Ex→My)) = xˆ(Ex→Mx)
cond(xˆ(Ex), yˆ(My)) = xˆy(Ex→My)







Say that two 1-ary (closed) predicates s and s′ have the same satisfaction conditions if and only if
necessarily, for every individual y, necessarily, y satisﬁes the property that is the semantic value of
s, if and only if y satisﬁes the property that is the semantic value of s′. The crucial assumptions on
the argument for the claim that the expressions xˆ(2(Ex → Mx)) and xˆ(2(Mx)) have the same
satisfaction conditions are the claims that i) the semantic values of xˆ(Mx) and xˆ(Ex→Mx) have
the same satisfaction conditions, and ii) if two predicates s and s′ have the same satisfaction conditions,
then nec(s) and nec(s′) have the same satisfaction conditions.
I take assumption ii) to be justiﬁed by the conception of Nec(·) as an intensional operator. On
this conception, the operation Nec(·) on an arbitrary property P maps property P to the property
Nec(P ) such that, necessarily, for every x, x has Nec(P ) if and only if it is necessarily the case that
x has P . Let s and s′ be 1-ary closed predicates with the same satisfaction conditions, and having
as semantic values the properties P and P ′. In such a case we have that necessarily, for every x,
necessarily, x has P if and only if x has P ′. The semantic value of nec(s) isNec(P ), and the semantic
value of nec(s′) is Nec(P ′). By the intensional conception of Nec(·), it follows that necessarily, for
every x, necessarily, x has Nec(P ) if and only if x has Nec(P ′). But then, nec(s) and nec(s′) have
the same satisfaction conditions.
The justiﬁcation for assumption i) makes use of Thorough Serious Actualism. Given that the
present interest is on an account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages that is compatible
with Thorough Serious Actualism, in this context the appeal to the thesis is unproblematic. Here is
the argument.
From Thorough Serious Actualism it follows that a) necessarily, for every individual y, necessarily,
if y instantiates the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ex→Mx), then y is something, and
that b) necessarily, for every individual y, necessarily, if y instantiates the property that is the semantic
value of xˆ(Ex→Mx), then if y something, then y is a man.
From claims a) and b) it follows that necessarily, for every individual y, necessarily, if y instantiates
the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ex→Mx), then y is a man. Furthermore, necessarily,
for every individual y, necessarily, if y has the property of being a man, then y has the property of being
such that, if y is something, then y is a man, and thus y instantiates the property that is the semantic
value of xˆ(Ex→Mx). Therefore, necessarily, for every individual y, necessarily, y instantiates the
property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ex → Mx) if and only if y has the property of being a
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man. But the property of being a man is the semantic value of xˆ(Mx). Hence, necessarily, for every
individual y, necessarily, y instantiates the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ex → Mx) if
and only if y instantiates the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Mx).
Thus, given the assumption of Thorough Serious Actualism, the predicates xˆ(Ex→Mx) and
xˆ(Mx) have the same satisfaction conditions. But then, it follows from claims i) and ii) that the
complex predicates xˆ(2(Ex→Mx)) and xˆ(2(Mx)) have the same satisfaction conditions.
Insofar as the properties of being necessarily a man and being essentially a man are different, the
no middle men proposal has the troublesome consequence of removing the ability to use the language
of complex predication to deﬁne one of these properties in terms of the other in the natural way.
From the standpoint of the Propositional Functions Account, the problem with the no middle men
proposal is that it generates the semantic values of xˆ(2(Ex → Mx)) and xˆ(2(Mx)) in terms of
the semantic values of xˆ(Ex→Mx) and xˆ(Mx), predicates with the same satisfaction conditions.
Instead, according to the Propositional Functions Account, the semantic values of the two predi-
cates are generated in terms of the propositional functions that are the semantic values of (Ex→Mx)
and (Mx). Crucially, these propositional functions are not necessarily coextensive. The propositional
function JEx → MxK maps every possible individual x to the proposition that if x is something,
then x is a man, whereas the propositional function JMxK maps every possible individual x to the
proposition that x is a man. The propositions that if x is something, then it is a man, and the proposi-
tion that x is a man are true at different possibilities. Whereas the former proposition is true at those
possible worlds in which x is nothing, the latter proposition is false at any such possible world.
The upshot is that the no middle men proposal does violence to the intended interpretation of
ﬁrst-order modal languages with complex predicates, and so is unsatisfactory.
2.5.2 Partial Functions
A different route available to thorough contingentists consists in thinking that the mistake with the
Propositional Functions Account has been that of thinking that propositional functions must be total.
An alternative option is to take propositional functions to be partial, deﬁned only for some individuals.
For instance, according to this proposal the second-level propositional function f that is the
semantic value of (a = x)〈1,0〉 is a relation that necessarily, for every individual x, obtains between x
and a proposition h if and only if h is the proposition that x is identical to a. Thus, if the proposition
that x is identical to a does not exist, then the propositional function f does not relate x to any
proposition whatsoever. The property that is the semantic value of xˆ(a = x)〈0,1〉 is determined in the
same way, as a function of the propositional function that is the semantic value of (a = x)〈1,0〉. If f
does not relate an individual x to any proposition, then x is not in the extension of the property that
is the semantic value of xˆ(a = x)〈0,1〉. Call this proposal the partial functions proposal.
The partial functions proposal comes with its own problems. As will be shown, the fact that it
is possible that there are some individuals for which a propositional function is undeﬁned has the
consequence that the recursive clauses of the account of semantic value do not assign semantic values
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to expressions that ought to have a semantic value.
Higher-order contingentists are sympathetic to the view that Attributions of Being–Necessitism is
false, and in particular that there are some individuals x such that the proposition that x is something
is itself something only contingently. As in the previous section, let E〈0,1〉 be a 1-ary predicate letter
whose semantic value is the property of being something. Consider the expression (Ea)〈1,0〉, and
let f be the propositional function that is the semantic value of this expression. Let w be some
counterfactual possibility such that the proposition that Michael Jordan is something is nothing at w,
and at which the empty set is something. Since the proposition that Jordan is something is nothing
at w, it is not the case that the propositional function f relates the empty set to a proposition at the
relevant counterfactual possibility.
How is the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ea)〈0,1〉 determined in terms of the propo-
sitional function f? The two natural options available are: i) necessarily, for every individual x, x
has the property if and only if f maps x to a proposition and that proposition is true; ii) necessarily,
for every individual x, x has the property if and only if either f maps x to a proposition and that
proposition is true, or f maps x to no proposition whatsoever.
If option i) is adopted, then it is not the case that the empty set has the property that is the
semantic value of xˆ(Ea)〈0,1〉 at w, since the function f that is the semantic value of (Ea)〈1,0〉 does
not relate the empty set to any proposition whatsoever at w. If option ii) is adopted, then the empty
set does have, at w, the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(Ea)〈0,1〉. Option i) is the one that
delivers the right result in the present case. The intended semantic value of xˆ(Ea)〈0,1〉 is the property
of being such that Michael Jordan is something, that property that necessarily, for every individual
holds of that individual if and only if Michael Jordan is something. Since Jordan is nothing at w, the
empty set does not have the property of being such that Jordan is something.
Let us thus adopt option i). Consider now the propositional function (¬(Ea))〈1,0〉. By the
recursive clause for negated expressions, the propositional function g that is the semantic value of the
expression (¬Ea)〈1,0〉 also does not relate the empty set to any proposition whatsoever. But then
the empty set also does not have, at w, the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉. This,
however, is the wrong result. The intended semantic value of xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉 is the property of being
such that Jordan is nothing. Insofar as Jordan is nothing at w, the empty set has, at w, the property of
being such that Jordan is nothing at w. Since the empty set does not have, at w, the property that is
the semantic value of xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉 according to the the partial functions proposal, the semantic value
of xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉 according to the partial functions proposal is not its real semantic value.
Note also that if option i) is adopted then the semantic values of xˆ(Ea)〈0,1〉 and xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉
turn out not to be exhaustive properties. In addition, the adoption of option i) forces the rejection of
certain plausible principles of ﬁrst-order modal logic. Let b have as its semantic value the empty set.
For instance, the adoption of option i) requires the rejection of the following claim:
(9) 2(xˆ(¬(Ea))b↔ (¬Ea ∧ Eb))〈0,0〉
47
Even though it is the case that the empty set is something at w and Michael Jordan is nothing at w (let
us assume, since the proposition that Michael Jordan is something is itself nothing at w), it is not the
case that, at w, the empty set has the property that is the semantic value of xˆ(¬(Ea). But (9) is a
principle valid in fairly minimal ﬁrst-order modal logics, such as the one offered in Stalnaker (1994).
Before proceeding, it is important to make it clear that this result is not intended to show that
the partial functions proposal is contradictory. Instead, the argument shows that the property that is
delivered by the partial functions account as the semantic value of xˆ(¬Ea)〈0,1〉 is not the property
that in fact is the semantic value of this expression. Since the partial functions account is unable to
deliver the right semantic values of some of the expressions of the language, it is unsatisfactory.
2.5.3 Other Proposals
Let me quickly mention two other proposals. The ﬁrst of these proposals consists in adopting the
view that the semantic value of expressions of the type of (n+ 1)th-level propositional functions to
consist in (n+ 1)th-level coarse-grained propositional functions. Brieﬂy, a 0th-level coarse-grained
propositional function consists in either the necessary proposition (say, in the proposition that ∅ = ∅)
or in the impossible proposition (say, in the proposition that ∅ 6= ∅). A (n+ 1)th-level coarse-grained
propositional function is a relation between individuals and nth-level coarse-grained propositional
functions such that each (n+ 1)th-level propositional function f is such that necessarily, for every
individual x, there is one and only one nth-level coarse-grained propositional function g such that f
relates x to g (i.e., f(x) = g). Call this proposal the coarse-grained propositional functions proposal.
Consider once more the expression (∃zˆ(z = x))〈2,0〉. As seen in §2.4, the semantic value of this
expression is, according to the Propositional Functions Account, a second-level propositional function
f which necessarily, for every x, maps x to the ﬁrst-level propositional function g which necessarily,
for every y, maps y to the proposition that x is something.
Furthermore, as also seen in §2.4, the existence of such propositional function implies that
necessarily, for every individual x, the proposition that x is something is necessarily something. The
‘coarse-grained propositional functions’ proposal is designed to avoid consequences such as this one.
According to this proposal, the semantic value of (∃zˆ(z = x))〈2,0〉 is not the second-level propo-
sitional function previously described. It is, instead, the second-level coarse-grained propositional
function f∗ which necessarily, for every x, maps x to that ﬁrst-level coarse-grained propositional
function g∗ which necessarily, for every y, maps y to the necessary proposition if and only if x is
something, and otherwise maps y to the impossible proposition.
This solution blocks the problematic consequence of the Propositional Functions Account. What
is concluded is that either the necessary proposition is something in circumstances in which x is some-
thing, or else the impossible proposition is something in circumstances in which x is nothing. Since
it is plausible to think that the necessary and the impossible propositions are necessarily something
anyway, this consequence of the coarse-grained propositional functions proposal is unproblematic.
Still, the coarse-grained propositional functions proposal leads to problematic consequences of its
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own. In a nutshell, the coarse-grained propositional functions proposal makes propositional functions
‘too coarse-grained’. Consider the expressions (∃yˆ(y = x))〈1,0〉 and (2(∃yˆ(y = x)))〈1,0〉. Let h be
the ﬁrst-level coarse-grained propositional function that is the semantic value of (∃yˆ(y = x))〈1,0〉 and
h∗ be the ﬁrst-level coarse-grained propositional function that is the semantic value of (2(∃yˆ(y =
x)))〈1,0〉.
According to the coarse-grained propositional functions proposal, the ﬁrst-level coarse-grained
propositional function h is that ﬁrst-level coarse-grained propositional function which necessarily, for
every x, maps x to the necessary proposition if and only if x is something. Thus, h (actually) maps
Michael Jordan to the necessary proposition, since Michael Jordan (actually) is something.
According to the semantic clause for necessitated expressions, h∗ is that ﬁrst-level coarse-grained
propositional function which necessarily, for every x, maps x to the proposition that obtains if and only
if the proposition to which x is mapped to by h necessarily obtains. Thus, h∗ also maps Michael Jordan
to the necessary proposition. Therefore, Michael Jordan instantiates the property that is the semantic
value of xˆ(2(∃yˆ(y = x)))〈0,1〉, since the semantic value of xˆ(2(∃yˆ(y = x)))〈0,1〉 is that property
which necessarily, for every individual x, holds of x if and only if h∗ maps x to a true proposition.
This means that the semantic value of xˆ(2(∃yˆ(y = x)))〈0,1〉 is not the one that is intended,
namely, the property of being necessarily something, since it is not the case that Michael Jordan is
necessarily something (from the standpont of thorough contingentists), even though he instantiates the
property that is the semantic value of xˆ(2(∃yˆ(y = x)))〈0,1〉 according to the propositional functions
account.
More generally, the problem with the coarse-grained propositional functions account is that by
having one of the necessary or the impossible propositions as 0-ary propositional functions, it is these
propositions, rather than more ﬁne-grained proposition, that contain the information to be used in
the semantic composition. Since Jordan is something, the propositional function h maps him to the
necessary proposition. But then, h∗ also maps him to the necessary proposition — independently
of whether he is in fact necessarily something. The upshot is that the coarse-grained propositional
functions proposal is also unsatisfactory, assigning the wrong semantic values to some of the expressions
of the language.
The second proposal consists in resorting to more familiar ﬁrst-order languages without any
dedicated variable-binding operators, and in which the quantiﬁer ∃ attaches directly to variables v
in order to form an expression ∃v which maps (n+ 1)th-level propositional functions to nth-level
propositional functions.
The problem with this proposal is that it does not really solve one of the problems noted in §2.4,
namely, the one involving the expression (Ey)〈2,0〉. This expression still turns out to have as its
semantic value a second-level propositional function whose being implies that necessarily, for every
individual x, the proposition that x is something is necessarily something. That is, the resulting account
is still committed to Attributions of Being–Necessitism. Thus, from the standpoint of higher-order
contingentists, this proposal is also unsatisfactory.
49
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter a detailed presentation of the Propositional Functions Account of the semantics of
ﬁrst-order modal languages, proposed in (Stalnaker, 2012), has been offered. It was shown that the
Propositional Functions Account, together with Thorough Serious Actualism and Necessity of Being,
implies both Haecceity Necessitism, and Attributions of Being–Necessitism.
This result reveals that i) the Propositional Functions Account is inconsistent with Stalnaker’s
higher-order modal theory, contrary to Stalnaker’s own views on the matter; and ii) the attractiveness
of the Propositional Functions Account constitutes a reason in favour of higher-order necessitism.
Finally, some natural ways of amending the Propositional Functions Account were surveyed with
the aim of ﬁnding a satisfactory account of ﬁrst-order modal languages not opposed to Thorough
Contingentism. All of these alternative proposals were seen to lead to problems of their own, assigning
incorrect semantic values to some of the expressions of ﬁrst-order modal languages.
The overall conclusion is that Thorough Contingentists are still faced with the challenge of offering
a satisfactory account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages. The Propositional Functions
Account is not satisfactory from their standpoint.
In the next chapter I will continue to look at the prospects of Higher-Order Necessitism. I will
offer a principled defence of Propositional Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every proposition is
necessarily something. Moreover, I will show that this defence extends to a defence of Higher-Order
Necessitism.
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3Propositions as Necessary Beings
3.1 Introduction
Different theorists take propositions to fulﬁl different, albeit related job descriptions. In this chapter
the focus is on propositions understood as follows: i) higher-order entities — roughly, the semantic
values of 0-ary predicates — entities of type 〈〉, on the type hierarchy presented in chapter 1 ; ii)
shareable objects of the attitudes, i.e., of mental states such as believing, desiring, asserting, doubting,
assuming, etc.; iii) bearers of truth, falsity and of alethic modalities, iv) relata of logical consequence.1
Recall Propositional Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every proposition is necessarily some-
thing. The main aim of the present chapter is to defend Propositional Necessitism. Recent proponents
of Propositional Necessitism are Plantinga (1976) and Williamson (2013), whereas Propositional
Contingentism, its contradictory, has been advocated by, among others, Adams (1981), Fine (1977),
Prior (1957) and Stalnaker (2012).
The defence of Propositional Necessitism to be offered may be divided in two steps. One of these
steps consists in providing positive arguments for the truth of Propositional Necessitism. An interesting
feature of these arguments is that their weakest assumption consists in the claim that the very weak
propositional modal logicKD is sound for metaphysical modality. Thus, the positive arguments show
that very weak propositional modal logics are already committed to Propositional Necessitism. Another
interesting feature of the defence concerns the more general thesis of Higher-Order Necessitism. Not
only is it the case that the truth of Higher-Order Necessitism is favoured by the truth of Propositional
Necessitism, the defence of Propositional Necessitism to be offered is extendable to a defence of
Higher-Order Necessitism.
The other step consists in a defence of Propositional Necessitism against a well-known objection.
Brieﬂy, the objection departs from the fact that, given plausible auxiliary assumptions, Propositional
Necessitism is inconsistent with the conjunction of Contingentism and the Classical Conception of
1The present way of understanding propositions is thus close to the one present in (McGrath, 2014). The differences
are the following: i) McGrath does not ﬁx the meaning of ‘proposition’ by reference to alethic modalities and entailment. He
does, however, acknowledge that ‘If there are propositions, they would appear to be good candidates for being the bearers of
alethic modal properties (necessary and possible truth), as well as the relata of entailment’; ii) McGrath takes propositions
to be the primary bearers of truth and falsity, whereas I am leaving it open whether this is so. See §3.7.
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propositions (a view on the nature of propositions that will be presented in section §3.2). Since
Contingentism is supported by unreﬂective common sense and the Classical Account is the received
view on the nature of propositions, the joint inconsistency of Propositional Necessitism, Contingentism
and the Classical Conception poses a challenge to any defence of Propositional Necessitism. According
to proponents of the objection, the inconsistency shows the falsehood of Propositional Necessitism.
I will argue that, independently of the truth of Contingentism, the objection is unsuccessful
because the Classical Conception of propositions is false. Moreover, it will be shown that a much
attacked commitment of the Classical Conception, one driving many theorists, including myself, to
reject it, is the commitment responsible for the joint inconsistency of Propositional Necessitism,
Contingentism and the Classical Conception.
The chapter has two subsidiary aims. The ﬁrst of these has already been mentioned, namely,
to extend the positive arguments for Propositional Necessitism to arguments for Higher-Order
Necessitism. The other subsidiary aim is to offer a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism. The
reason for such a defence is that the truth of this thesis is one of the assumptions common to the
different arguments for Propositional Necessitism.
The chapter is structured as follows. In §2 the Classical Conception of propositions is pre-
sented, and it is shown to be inconsistent with the conjunction of Propositional Necessitism and
Contingentism.
Afterwards, in §3.3, a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism is offered. Serious Actualism is a
special case of Thorough Serious Actualism, one applying only to ﬁrst-order relations (i.e., relations
between individuals):
Serious Actualism Necessarily, for every relation R between individuals, no individuals could have
been R-related and yet have been nothing.
I begin by addressing an objection to Serious Actualism put forward by Salmon (1987). A positive
argument for the truth of Thorough Serious Actualism is then offered, one which depends on very
minimal assumptions.
Then, I offer some arguments for Propositional Necessitism. All the arguments appeal to generali-
sations of fairly weak principles of propositional modal logic and to the assumption that the modal
operators have as semantic values properties of propositions.
Some objections to the positive arguments for Propositional Necessitism are discussed in §5.
One interesting aspect of the arguments plays central stage in some of the discussion in this section,
namely, the fact that the arguments are very similar to the argument offered by Plantinga (1983) against
Existentialism — where Existentialism is the thesis that no proposition about a thing could have been
something while the thing that it was about was nothing.
Plantinga’s argument has been rejected on the grounds that it conﬂates two notions of truth relative
to a world. One of the things shown in §5 is that the distinction between these two notions, by itself,
does not afford the resources required to resist the arguments for Propositional Necessitism.
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Then, in §6 it is argued that the Classical Conception of propositions is false, and so that the fact
that the account is inconsistent with the conjunction of Contingentism and Propositional Necessitism
does not support the conclusion that Propositional Necessitism is false.
In §7 I take a look back at the arguments for Propositional Necessitism that have been offered,
and make a case for the claim that the lesson to take from them is that propositional modal logic is
already committed to the truth of Propositional Necessitism.
Finally, in §8 I show how the arguments for Propositional Necessitism are extendible to arguments
for Higher-Order Necessitism.
3.2 The Classical Conception of Propositions
King and Soames have characterised as the Classical Conception of propositions the view, common to
the theories of Frege, the early Russell and more recent possible worlds’ semantics that propositions are
mind-independent, abstract entities that are intrinsically and essentially representational and thus are
the primary bearers of truth and falsity.2 Relevant for the present purposes is the fact that according
to the Classical Conception of propositions these are intrinsically and essentially representational.
Pictures, sculptures and sentences represent things as being one way or another. In this sense,
pictures, sculptures and sentences may be said to be ‘about’ things. According to the Classical
Conception propositions are also about things, representing them as being one way or another. In
effect, according to the Classical Conception pictures, sculptures and sentences are representational
in virtue of having intrinsically and essentially representational entities — propositions — as their
contents.
Moreover, according to the Classical Conception propositions are intrinsically and essentially
representational. To represent things as being a certain way is part of the nature of propositions.
Propositions contrast with pictures, sculptures and sentences in this respect. Since pictures, sculptures
and sentences represent things as being a certain way in virtue of the cognitive activities of agents, they
are not intrinsically representational. They are also not essentially representational, since the cognitive
activities of agents may fail to endow them with representational powers.
The following are commitments of the Classical Conception of propositions:3
Aboutness. Some propositions are about individuals.
2See, e.g., the texts in (King et al., 2014) for a presentation of the classical conception (in particular ch.3).
3One may want to distinguish between direct representation and indirect representation. A direct representation of an
object as being a certain way is a representation of an object as being a certain way but not qua holder of a certain property,
whereas an indirect representation of an object is representation of an object as being a certain way qua holder of a certain
property. For instance, if things are represented as being such that there is a thing that is the president of the United States
and a politician, the representation is about Obama, but only indirectly. On the other hand, if things are represented as
being such that Obama is a politician then, the representation in question is directly aboutObama. Correspondingly, two
notions of aboutness may be distinguished, namely, direct aboutness and indirect aboutness. The proposition that Obama is a
politician is directly about Obama, whereas the proposition that the president of the United States is a politician in indirectly
about Obama. The intended notion of aboutness is that of direct aboutness. See (Glick, Forthcoming) for a discussion and
account of singular propositions appealing to the distinction between direct and indirect aboutness.
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Essential Aboutness. Necessarily, if a proposition is about something, then it is essential to the
proposition that it be (intrinsically) about the things that it is (intrinsically) about.
Now, consider the following claims:
About Contingents. There could have been some proposition that could have been about an indi-
vidual that could have been nothing.
Thorough Serious Actualism. Necessarily, no things could have been related and yet have been
nothing.
Together, Thorough Serious Actualism and Essential Aboutness imply a thesis which Plantinga has
called Existentialism:4
Existentialism. There could not have been a proposition p about some x such that p could have
been something and yet x was nothing.
The argument from Essential Aboutness and Thorough Serious Actualism to Existentialism goes
as follows. Suppose p is about x. Then, it is essential to p that it be about x, and so necessarily, if p is
something then p is about x. Moreover, by Thorough Serious Actualism, necessarily, if p and x are
related, then both of them are something. Since it is essential to p that it be about x, it follows that
necessarily, if p is something then x is something. A fortiori, there could not have been a proposition
p about some x such that p could have been something and yet x was nothing. That is, Existentialism
is true.
The theses of Existentialism and About Contingents together imply that there could have been a
proposition that could have been nothing. So, Essential Aboutness, About Contingents and Thorough
Serious Actualism together imply the falsehood of Propositional Necessitism.
As just seen, Essential Aboutness is a commitment of the Classical Conception. In addition,
About Contingents is a typical commitment of those theorists endorsing both Contingentism and the
Classical Conception of propositions. One way to see this is by noting that Contingentism implies
About Contingents when conjoined with the following thesis:
Plenitudinous Aboutness. Necessarily, for every individual there could have been a proposition
about it.
Recall the notions of an attribution of being to an individual and the notion of an attribution of being,
introduced in chapter 2. An attribution of being to an individual x consists in the proposition that x
is something, and an attribution of being consists in a proposition that is possibly an attribution of
being to something.
Plenitudinous Aboutness is a consequence of the following claims: i) an attribution of being to
x is a proposition about x; and ii) necessarily, for every individual x, the attribution of being to x is
something. Claim i) seems intuitively true, provided that there are propositions about individuals.
4See (Plantinga, 1983).
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That is, if there are propositions about individuals, then, certainly, attributions of being are about the
things that they attribute being to. Moreover, it is also intuitively plausible that things could not have
been in such a way that there was an individual and yet there was no attribution of being to x.
Other routes for Plenitudinous Aboutness are also available. If there are any propositions about
individuals, then propositions attributing properties to individuals are about individuals, being about
the individuals that they attribute properties to. And it is intuitively plausible that necessarily, for
every individual, there could have been a proposition that consists in the attribution of some property
to it.
Thus, the Classical Conception of propositions, together with Contingentism, Plenitudinous
Aboutness and Thorough Serious Actualism, implies the falsehood of Propositional Necessitism. This
poses a challenge to any defence of Propositional Necessitism, since the Classical Conception is the
received view on the nature of propositions, Contingentism is supported by unreﬂective common
sense, Plenitudinous Aboutness is very plausible on the assumption that the Classical Conception of
propositions is true, and Thorough Serious Actualism is intuitively appealing, and there is a compelling
case to be made for its truth, as shown in §3.3
The challenge posed to the truth of Propositional Necessitism by the conjunction of Contingentism
with the Classical Conception of Propositions will be answered in §3.7, after the presentation and
discussion of the arguments for Propositional Necessitism. The answer offered there consists in
showing that Essential Aboutness is false (and so, that the Classical Conception is itself false).5 I will
sketch how I think the Classical Conception should be revised in §3.7
The Classical Conception thus conﬂicts with Propositional Necessitism. The main aim of this
chapter is to present a defence of this thesis. Before doing so a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism
is offered. Thorough Serious Actualism turns out to be an assumption common to all the arguments
for Propositional Necessitism that will be offered.
3.3 A Defence of Thorough Serious Actualism
Thorough Serious Actualism enjoys support from unreﬂective common sense. After all, how could
things have been related while at least one of them was nothing? Yet, there are objections to the truth
of Serious Actualism, and so, a fortiori, to the truth of Thorough Serious Actualism.
The section begins with the presentation and discussion of a worry with any defence of Serious
Actualism, namely, that such defence will exclude noneist theories from the outset, despite the fact
that some take noneist theories to offer the appropriate solutions to several philosophical puzzles.
Afterwards, an inﬂuential objection by Salmon (1987) to Serious Actualism is presented, and replies
to the objection on behalf of Serious Actualism are offered. Then, a positive argument for Thorough
Serious Actualism is presented. Finally, the positive argument for Serious Actualism is shown to reveal
5This makes the points in this chapter part of the recent criticisms that have been offered to the Classical Conception.
For instance, (King et al., 2014) is motivated by dissatisfaction with the Classical Conception of propositions.
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a tension in Salmon’s views: he appears to accept the truth of all the premises of the argument for
Thorough Serious Actualism and yet rejects the arguments’ conclusion.
3.3.1 Serious Actualism and Noneism
Noneism consists in the following metaphysical thesis:
Noneism. Some things do not exist.
According to noneists, appropriate solutions to puzzles concerning the intentionality of thought,
ﬁctional discourse, discourse about time, what there could have been and there could not have been,
etc. all imply the truth of Noneism.
Noneists advocate the Principle of Independence of Being from So-Being. According to this principle,
the nature of a thing is independent of its existence.6 Even though it is not completely clear what is
meant with ‘independence’, and so what is the exact content of the Principle of Independence, it is
commonly taken to imply the following claim:7
Accidental Existence. There could have been some things that could have had properties while not
existing.
Not only is Accidental Existence a consequence of the Principle of Independence, it is a consequence
of noneist theories.
Prima facie, Accidental Existence consists in the negation of Serious Actualism, in which case
Noneism (or the bulk of noneist theories) are inconsistent with Serious Actualism. This would mean
that an appropriate defence of Serious Actualism would require taking a stance on the Noneism-Allism
debate, and offering a defence of Allism (where Allism is the contradictory of Noneism, i.e., Allism is
the thesis that everything exists). Reasonable considerations in favour of Noneism would turn out to
count against Serious Actualism.
However, Accidental Existence is not inconsistent with Serious Actualism, and thus a defence of
Serious Actualism does not require taking a stance on the Noneism-Allism debate. Let me brieﬂy
explain why.
Noneists distinguish between neutral and loaded quantiﬁcation. Neutral quantiﬁcation is quan-
tiﬁcation over everything, unrestrictedly. Loaded quantiﬁcation is quantiﬁcation restricted to what
exists. As mentioned in chapter 1 , the quantiﬁers are here being understood as being unrestricted.
This means that Serious Actualism, as the principle is here understood, is a principle concerned with
what holds of everything.
Let ‘E’ be a ﬁrst-order predicate of type 〈e〉 standing for the property of existence. Consider the
following two claims:
6The Principle of Independence was borrowed by Meinong from Mally, his student. See (Meinong, 1960, fn. 7).
7Lambert (1983) ﬂeshes out independence in terms of the invalidity of a certain argument. According to him, the
principle of independence states that the argument ‘there are nuclear properties P1, P2, . . . such that the set of P1, P2, . . .
attaches to s; So, s has being’ is invalid. From this reading of the Principle of Independence it follows that there could have
been some things that could have had properties while not existing if it is assumed that an argument is invalid only if it is
possible for its premises to be true and its conclusion to be false.
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(1) a. Possibly there is some property P and possibly there is some thing x such that possibly x
is a P and x is nothing.
b. 3∃P3∃x3(Px ∧ ¬∃y(y = x)).
(2) a. Possibly there is some property P and possibly there is some thing x such that possibly x
is a P and x does not exist.
b. 3∃P3∃x3(Px ∧ ¬Ex).
Claim (1) is inconsistent with Serious Actualism, whereas claim (2) is consistent with Serious Actualism.
But it is (2) that is a consequence of the Principle of Independence. The Principle of Independence
does not imply (1). So, the Principle of Independence is not inconsistent with Serious Actualism.
Thus, there is no objection to Serious Actualism from the assumption of the truth of the Principle of
Independence.
Does an unrestricted understanding of the quantiﬁers imply that Propositional Necessitism is
trivially true? No, since the fact that quantiﬁcation is unrestricted does not mean that there could not
have been propositions that there actually aren’t.
A comparison with noneist theories may be helpful. Some noneists are committed to Necessitism,
i.e., they hold that necessarily every thing is necessarily something.8 One may think that, since the
quantiﬁers are unrestricted, the view that necessarily every thing is necessarily something is trivial.
But it isn’t.
For instance, noneists committed to Necessitism are troubled with objections that do not trouble
other noneists. One problem for noneists endorsing Necessitism is that they cannot make sense of
the fact that ﬁctional characters are created. The intuition that ﬁctional characters are created could
be respected by endorsing the view that ﬁctional characters are nothing in at least some circumstances
in which their creators are nothing. Note that such view would not require a rejection of the claim that
necessarily, every ﬁctional character is such that it does not exist. What would be required by this
view would be a commitment to the claim that there could be ﬁctional characters that could have been
nothing in some of the circumstances in which they to do not exist.
Similarly, suppose that every proposition is such that it does not exist. Still, to some it will
seem reasonable to think that if the things that propositions are about had been nothing, then the
propositions would themselves be nothing. For instance, in circumstances in which Sherlock Holmes is
nothing any proposition about Sherlock Holmes is itself nothing. Propositional Necessitism excludes
cases such as this. Hence, regardless of whether Propositional Necessitism is true or not, the thesis is
not trivial even when the quantiﬁers are understood unrestrictedly.
To reiterate, Serious Actualism is not inconsistent with Accidental Existence. Thus, a defence of
Serious Actualism does not require a defence of Allism. Which of Noneism-Allism is true? In chapter
4 I query whether some noneist theories turn out to be equivalent to some allist theories, and thus,
8See, e.g., (Priest, 2005, §§1-2). Necessitism turns out to be a logical validity on the semantics for identity and necessity
offered by Priest.
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whether proponents of these theories are involved in a verbal dispute.
3.3.2 Serious Actualism and Noman
A more troublesome objection to Serious Actualism has been put forward by Salmon (1987). The
objection relies on the description of a scenario that Salmon takes to witness some claims concerning
naming and reference, claims which, if true, establish the falsehood of Serious Actualism.
On Salmon’s scenario, ‘Ovum’ and ‘Sperm’ are names for, respectively, a particular ovum of
Salmon’s mother, and a particular sperm of his father. Moreover, on Salmon’s scenario Ovum and
Sperm have not and will not unite, even though they might. Salmon assumes that the following speech
act would succeed in ﬁxing the reference of ‘Noman’: let ‘Noman’ be the thing that could have resulted
from the union of Ovum and Sperm.
Salmon assumes that there could have been something resulting from the union of Ovum and
Sperm and that there could not have been more than one thing resulting from the union of Ovum
with Sperm. He takes his naming act to successfully ﬁx the referent of ‘Noman’ insofar as only one
possible thing could have resulted from the union of Ovum and Sperm
Given the description of the scenario, Salmon holds that ‘Noman’ has a referent, namely Noman,
and so that Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’. Since Ovum and Sperm have not
actually united, Noman is actually nothing. And since Ovum and Sperm could have united, Noman
could have been something. So, Salmon holds that he has successfully described a case, a possible
case, in which something, namely, Noman, has a property, namely, the property of being the referent
of Noman, despite the fact that actually, Noman is nothing. If Salmon is right and the scenario he has
described is possible, then it constitutes a counterexample to Serious Actualism.
There are two lines of reply available to serious actualists. The ﬁrst of these consists in accepting
that, in Salmon’s scenario, Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’. Yet, the fact
that Noman has a property in Salmon’s scenario is unproblematic because, in the scenario, Noman is
something. Even though he has not resulted from the union of Ovum and Sperm, he still could have
resulted from the union of Ovum and Sperm.
Linsky and Zalta’s and Williamson’s Necessitism would ﬁt appropriately with this reply. Noman
would, according to their necessitist theories, be something that is neither concrete nor abstract, and
would have been concrete had he resulted from the union of Ovum and Sperm. In those possibilities
in which Noman is nonconcrete, most of his properties are modal properties, such as the property of
possibly resulting from the union of Ovum and Sperm.
The second line of reply rejects that Noman is something in the scenario described by Salmon.
This line of reply implies contingentism, and ﬁts with unreﬂective common sense. I see two reasonable
strategies for developing this line.
The ﬁrst strategy consists in rejecting the claim that ‘Noman’ is a genuine proper name. According
to this option, ‘Noman’ is shorthand for the deﬁnite description ‘the thing that results from the union
of Ovum and Sperm. Those following this line incur the burden of spelling out why it is that Salmon
58
has not succeeded in introducing the proper name ‘Noman’ into our language. That is, why is it that,
instead, ‘Noman’ must be understood as nothing but a shorthand for a deﬁnite description.
I am more attracted to a different (albeit related) strategy. Recently, some compelling linguistic
evidence has been gathered in support of Predicativism, the view according to which what we tend to
call proper names are really predicates.9 More precisely, according to Predicativism, the semantic value
of a name is the same kind of thing that is the semantic value of a predicate. On the view in question,
names are count nouns. More relevant to the present discussion is the predicativists’ commitment to
the view that names do not have referents. Instead, names are true of their bearers.
This is not the place to offer a defence of Predicativism. Let me just point out that among the
data to which predicativists appeal is the fact that names sometimes do occur as count nouns. Some
examples are the following:10
(3) Every Sarah I’ve met sometimes works as a babysitter.
(4) Sarahs from Alaska are usually scary.
(5) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.
Predicativists incur the burden of explaining how names can compose with predicates to yield
truth-values, since predicates in general are unable to do so on their own – for instance, ‘dog is an animal’
is ill-formed to begin with, and the meanings of “dog” and ‘is an animal’ do not compose to yield a
truth-value. My preferred view on these matters is The-Predicativism. According to The-Predicativism,
names, when occurring in subject position, are accompanied by an unpronounced deﬁnite article. So,
the following sentences pairs have the same syntactic form:11
(6) a. The table is tall.
b. ∅the Maria is tall.
(7) a. Bears from the North of Alaska are usually scary.
b. Sarahs from ∅the Alaska are usually scary.
Hopefully, this suffices as an explanation of Predicativism. If Predicativism is true, then it is false
that names refer. Thus, it is false that things have the property of being referred to by names, and so it
is false that there is anything that has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’.
I ﬁnd this line of reply to Salmon’s objection to Serious Actualism preferable to the others that
have been discussed. Whereas the other replies are guided by an attempt to make Serious Actualism
compatible with at least some aspects of the scenario described by Salmon, the present reply to
Salmon’s objection appeals to independent evidence, of a linguistic nature. Arguably, the evidence
favours a theory on the syntax and semantics of names, Predicativism, that implies that names do not
9Predicativism is defended by, among others, Burge (1973), Elugardo (2002), Fara (2015) and Sawyer (2009).
10These examples are directly taken from (Fara, 2015, p. 61)
11These examples are again taken directly from (Fara, 2015, p. 71).
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refer. A fortiori, ‘Noman’ has no referent, and there is nothing that has the property of being the
referent of ‘Noman’.
It might be thought that this is a problematic reply. Since the thing that is the result of the union
of Ovum and Sperm is called Noman, does it not instantiate the property of being Noman? The
correct predicativist reply from the standpoint of contingentists is, I think, that it doesn’t. At most,
in Salmon’s scenario the semantic value of ‘Noman’ is successfully ﬁxed as being a certain property,
a property that nothing has in the scenario, even though one thing could have had it. Nothing is ∅a
Noman. Rather, there could have been something that was ∅the Noman, which would then have been
the result of the union of Ovum and Sperm.12
Some ways of rejecting Salmon’s objection to Serious Actualism have been surveyed. In what
follows a positive argument for Thorough Serious Actualism will be offered. Afterwards, it will be
shown that the argument reveals some tensions in Salmon’s thought.
3.3.3 The Argument for Thorough Serious Actualism
I will call the argument for Thorough Serious Actualism that will be offered the instantiation argument.
The Instantiation Argument relies on the following assumptions:13
Premises of the Argument for Thorough Serious Actualism
Relatedness Implies Identity.
1. Necessarily, for every relationX , it is impossible that some things possibly stand inX and one
of them is not identical to itself.
2. 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . .2∀xntn2(Xx1 . . . xn → (x1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = xn)).
Identity Implies Being Identical.
1. Necessarily, if a thing is identical to itself, then it has the property of being identical to itself.
2. 2∀xt2(x = x→ yˆ(y = x)〈t〉x).
Being Identical Implies Instantiation.
1. Necessarily, if a thing has the property of being identical to itself, then the property of being
identical to it is instantiated.
12From the standpoint of necessitist predicativists, the correct reply is that Noman does instantiate the property of being
Noman. Thus, from their standpoint, the property of being Noman is instantiated, and so, contra Salmon, something is ∅a
Noman (by the thesis of Instantiation is Equivalent to Being Something, one of the premises of the argument for Thorough
Serious Actualism – an argument offered in §3.3.3).
13The arguments given throughout this chapter are appropriately regimented in the language MLˆP, presented in §1.3.1.
One important caveat concerning the argument for Thorough Serious Actualism is that the notion of higher-order identity
that it appeals to is a primitive notion, not the deﬁned notion introduced in §1.3.1. The reason for this is that the deﬁned
notion presupposes the truth of Higher-Order Serious Actualism (see fn. 9 of chapter 1). The thesis that if a higher-order
entity is something, then there is some higher-order entity necessarily coextensive with it is very plausible, if not a truism.
This claim and the version of Thorough Serious Actualism having identity as an undeﬁned primitive together imply the
version of Thorough Serious Actualism in which identity is a deﬁned notion, deﬁned in terms of necessary coextensiveness.
Note that there is an ambiguity here. The expression for identity qua primitive notion is also being used for the deﬁned
notion. But this is unproblematic. The only case in which the identity symbol will stand for the primitive notion is in the
Instantiation Argument for Thorough Serious Actualism. Of course, if identity between higher-order entities does boil
down to necessary coextensiveness, then there turns out to be no ambiguity. In the dissertation I remain open with respect
to whether identity between higher-order entities consists in nothing but necessary coextensiveness.
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2. 2∀xt2(yˆ(y = x)〈t〉x→ I〈〈t〉〉yˆ(y = x)).
Instantiation is Equivalent to Being Something.
1. Necessarily, the property of being identical to a thing is instantiated if and only if something is
identical to that thing.
2. 2∀xt2(∃y(y = x)↔ Iyˆ(y = x)).
The argument goes as follows. Take any two (possible) things, say, Obama and Mars, and any
relation between individuals, say, the relation of being 24× 10−6 light years distant. By Relatedness
Implies Identity, necessarily, if Obama is 24 × 10−6 light years distant from Mars, then Obama is
identical to Obama and Mars is identical to Mars. By Identity Implies Being Identical, necessarily, if
Obama is 24× 10−6 light years distant from Mars, then Obama has the property of being identical
to Obama and Mars has the property of being identical to Mars. From the Being identical Implies
Instantiation assumption, it follows that necessarily, if Obama is 24× 10−6 light years distant from
Mars, then the property of being identical to Obama is instantiated, and that the property of being
identical to Mars is instantiated. Finally, by Instantiation is Equivalent to Being Something, necessarily,
if Obama is 24× 10−6 light years distant from Mars, then Obama is (identical to) something and that
Mars is (identical to) something. But Obama, Mars and the relation of being 24× 10−6 light years
distant were picked arbitrarily. So, Serious Actualism follows.
No doubt there will be theorists rejecting one or more premises of the above argument. Still, the
availability of the argument burdens opponents of Thorough Serious Actualism with identifying the
premises that they reject and arguing for their falsity in a non ad hoc manner. I will now consider what
premises of the argument for Thorough Serious Actualism would be rejected by Salmon, and why.
The discussion will reveal some of the considerations underlying support for each of the premises.
It will also reveal an inconsistency in Salmon’s thought.
3.3.4 Noman and the Argument for Thorough Serious Actualism
Salmon infers that Noman has the property of being referred to by ‘Noman’ from the (putative) fact
that ‘Noman’ refers to Noman. So, arguably, he would also not be averse to inferring that if a thing is
identical to itself, then it has the property of being identical to itself. It is thus reasonable to think that
Salmon would accept the thesis of Identity Implies Being Identical. This is a charitable interpretation
of Salmon, since otherwise Salmon would be in the difficult position of having to explain why it is that
from the fact that ‘Noman’ refers to Noman it follows that Noman has the property of being referred
to, even though from the fact that a thing is identical to itself it does not follow that it has the property
of being identical to itself.
It is also reasonable to think that Salmon would accept the premises Being Identical Implies
Instantiation and Instantiation Is Equivalent to Being Something. In (Salmon, 1987, p. 64) he says
the following:
‘The sense or content of the second-order predicate (quantiﬁer) ‘something’ is the prop-
erty of classes of individuals of not being empty, the property of having at least one
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element.’
Arguably, this shows that Salmon acknowledges that there is such a thing as the second-order property
of being instantiated, and that Salmon takes this second-order property to be the one captured by the
quantiﬁer ‘∃’.
Since Salmon takes the second-order property of being instantiated to be the one captured by the
quantiﬁer ‘∃’, he is committed to Instantiation is Equivalent to Being Something.
Moreover, suppose that x is identical to itself. By the thesis Identity Implies Being Identical, it
follows that x has the the property of being identical to itself. Since Salmon takes the second-order
property of being instantiated to be the one captured by the quantiﬁer ‘∃’, he is committed to the
being of this higher-order property. But then, the property of being identical to x has the higher-order
property of being instantiated, since x has the property of being identical to x. Thus, necessarily, if x
is identical to itself, then the property of being identical to x has the property of being instantiated.
Therefore, Salmon is committed to Being Identical Implies Instantiation.
So, Salmon must reject the thesis of Relatedness Implies Identity, or else be committed to the
truth of Serious Actualism. A rejection by Salmon of Relatedness Implies Identity would require
Salmon to understand the scenario concerning ‘Noman’ as one in which it is not the case that Noman
is identical to Noman, despite the fact that Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’.
As just seen, Salmon is committed to Instantiation is Equivalent to Being Something. Moreover,
he accepts that Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’. Therefore, Salmon is
committed to the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’ being instantiated. That is, Salmon is
committed to something being the referent of ‘Noman’.
Since Salmon refers approvingly to free quantiﬁed logic, it is reasonable to assume that he accepts
the following theorems of free quantiﬁed logic:14
(8) ∀x(x = x)
(9) (∀x(x = x) ∧ ∃x(ϕ))→ ∃x(ϕ ∧ x = x)
From (8), (9) and the claim that something is the referent of ‘Noman’ it follows that something is the
referent of ‘Noman’ and it is self-identical.
So, Salmon is committed to there being something that is the referent of ‘Noman’ and that thing
being identical to itself. Given how Salmon’s scenario is described, it is clear that he accepts that if
anything is the referent of ‘Noman’, then Noman is the referent of Noman. Thus, Salmon is committed
to Noman being identical to Noman after all.
Hence, Salmon appears to be committed to all the premises of the argument for Thorough Serious
Actualism. Since Salmon rejects the truth of Serious Actualism, he has inconsistent commitments.
It is worth pointing out that Salmon explicitly disavows any commitment to the claim that something
14See (Salmon, 1987, p. 92).
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is the referent of ‘Noman’.15 But the fact that he disavows any such commitment does not suffice for
this claim not to be a commitment of his. After all, according to Salmon, Noman has the property of
being the referent of ‘Noman’, and he takes ‘∃’ to consist in the property of being instantiated. Surely,
if Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’, the property of being the referent of
‘Noman’ is instantiated.
It might be helpful to compare Salmon’s views to those of noneists, since Salmon talks mostly
in terms of ‘exists’ (instead of appealing to the existential quantiﬁer). Noneists do not account for
the property of existence in terms of the existential (particular) quantiﬁer. According to them, the
property of existence is not necessarily coextensive with the property of being something. Thus,
noneists are free to hold that the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’ is instantiated — and thus
that something is the referent of ‘Noman —, while simultaneously rejecting the claim that the referent
of ‘Noman’ exists.
This option is unavailable to Salmon because he explicitly takes ‘exists’ to be deﬁnable in terms
of the existential quantiﬁer, and understands the existential quantiﬁer as the second-order property
of not being empty (as previously mentioned). Since Salmon accepts that Noman has the property
of being the referent of ‘Noman’, he is committed to the nonemptyness of the property of being the
referent of ‘Noman’. A fortiori, something is the referent of ‘Noman’.
Arguably, Salmon’s intuitions concerning the nonbeing of the referent of ‘Noman’ are guided by
the view that Noman does not exist. He takes Noman to be nothing because i) he takes Noman not
to exist, and ii) he takes existence to be captured in terms of the existential quantiﬁer (and identity).
On the other hand, he is committed to something being the referent of ‘Noman’ because he accepts
the claim that iii) Noman has the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’, and thus is committed
to the claim that the property of being the referent of ‘Noman’ is instantiated. Consistency can be
achieved by revising one of i)-iii). None of the revisions would, by itself, lead to a theory inconsistent
with Serious Actualism.
Summing up, in this section I began by showing that, despite appearances, Noneism and the
Principle of Independence are consistent with Serious Actualism. Properly understood, Serious
Actualism turns out to be advocated by the generality of noneists.
Afterwards, Salmon’s objection to Serious Actualism was considered. Possible replies to the
objection on behalf of serious actualists were pointed out. My preferred reply consists in rejecting
the view that ‘Noman’ has any referent whatsoever, because Predicativism about names, a view for
which there is much independent support, and which I endorse, does not support the view that, in
general, names refer. I noted that from the standpoint of contingentist predicativists endorsing serious
actualism the correct verdict is that the property that is the semantic value of ‘Noman’ is not true of
anything, even though it could have been true of something.
Then, I offered a positive argument in defence of Serious Actualism. Finally, I discussed how
15See (Salmon, 1987, p. 94).
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Salmon might try to reject the argument’s cogency. It was shown that Salmon appears to be committed
to the truth of all the premises of the argument, and thus that he has inconsistent commitments.
3.4 Arguments for Propositional Necessitism
One strategy for arguing for Propositional Necessitism starts with a defence of a particular conception
of propositions, their nature and identity conditions, presenting a case for view that entities whose
nature and identity conditions are in accordance with the conception of propositions in question are
necessary beings.
A different strategy relies on an appeal to features that propositions are accepted to have, showing
that well established theories about those features imply that the things that have them are necessary
beings. The arguments that I will be advancing here in defence of Propositional Necessitism fall under
the second strategy. Thus, they do not rely on more controversial assumptions such as the assumption
that propositions are structured complexes, or sets of possible worlds, or what not.
Assuming that the arguments for Propositional Necessitism that I will be presenting are sound,
the truth of this thesis imposes constraints on the correctness of accounts of the nature and identity
conditions of propositions. If those accounts are inconsistent with the necessary being of propositions,
then they should be rejected.
3.4.1 A Blocked Route?
As I mentioned in the previous section, the view that propositions are abstract is part of the Classical
Conception of propositions. Assuming that propositions are indeed abstract, there appears to be a
route available for the truth of Propositional Necessitism. Abstract entities are typically assumed to
have necessary being. After all, the main examples (if not the only examples) available of necessary
beings, if indeed there are any necessary beings, consist of abstract entities, namely, numbers, sets and
other mathematical entities. Since Propositional Necessitism follows from the claims that propositions
are abstract and that abstract entities have necessary being, this is an easy route to the necessary being
of propositions.
The view that all abstract entities have necessary being has been resisted. One common objection
is that some impure sets are abstract, and yet have contingent being. The objection is based on the
view that the members of sets are essential to them: necessarily, a set could not have been something
and failed to have had some of its members.16
Consider the unit set {x : x is Obama}. According to the objection, it is an essential property of
this set that Obama belongs to it. That is, necessarily, if the set is something, then Obama belongs
to it. This implies that necessarily, if this set is something, then Obama stands in the membership
relation to it. By Serious Actualism it follows that necessarily, if {x : x is Obama} is something, then
Obama is also something. Since Obama could have been nothing, it follows that {x : x is Obama}
16An argument close to the one to be given for the contingency of sets on their members is articulated in (Fine, 1977, pp.
141-142).
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could also have been nothing. So, some abstract things could have been nothing, for instance, the set
{x : x is Obama}.
Even though I ﬁnd the essentiality of membership plausible, this is not the place to offer a defence
of its truth. After all, the main aim of the present chapter is to offer a defence of Propositional
Necessitism, and the essentiality of membership has been mentioned because it is an assumption of
an argument for Propositional Necessitism.17
For the present purposes, what is relevant is that there is good reason to question the soundness
of the argument from the abstractness of propositions to their necessary being. The arguments for
Propositional Necessitism to be offered do not appeal to the claim that abstract entities are necessary
beings.
3.4.2 The Truth-Values Argument
The ﬁrst argument for Propositional Necessitism that will be offered is the Truth-Values Argument.
This argument is not the main argument for Propositional Necessitism to be presented. The reason
is that, on its own, its cogency can be resisted. The reason for presenting it anyway is that it has
strong similarities to the stronger arguments for Propositional Necessitism yet to be offered, and to an
argument of Plantinga’s that will be discussed in §3.5.
I will begin by offering an argument for an instance of Propositional Necessitism. The argument’s
conclusion is the claim that the proposition that Obama is a president is necessarily something. The
proposition that Obama is a president thus takes the role of an arbitrary proposition that is possibly
something (note that if necessarily there are no propositions, then Propositional Necessitism is true; a
counterexample to the truth of Propositional Necessitism requires that there could have been some
proposition that could have been nothing).
Afterwards the premises of the argument for the necessary being of the proposition that Obama
is a president will be generalised to the premises of the Truth-Values Argument for Propositional
Necessitism.
17The thesis that the members of a set are essential to it does not follows from the axioms of ZFC. Yet, those axioms do
preclude some natural alternative conceptions of sets on which the members of a set are not essential to it.
One such conception is an intensional conception of set. According to this conception, it is of the nature of sets to be the
extension of (at least some) properties. For instance, according to this conception the set {x : x is a man} could have had
more members than it actually has, since there could have been more men than the ones there actually are.
On the intensional conception of set the argument for the nonbeing of the set {x : x is Obama} in circumstances in
which Obama is nothing would fail. Since in such circumstances nothing is Obama, the set {x : x is Obama} is empty at
that world. Yet, the set is still something.
Let me offer an argument against the intensional conception. Suppose, absurdely, that the set {x : x is a man} could have
had more members than the ones it actually has. Let h be an enumeration of all the men, and suppose that the cardinality
of {x : x is a man} is n. Thus, {x : x is a man} = {x : x = h(1) or x = h(2) or . . . or x = h(n)}, by the axiom of
extensionality. Consider now a circumstance w at which {x : x is a man} has more members than it actually has. Since
{x : x is a man} = {x : x = h(1) or x = h(2) or . . . or x = h(n)}, it follows that, at w, {x : x = h(1) or x = h(2) or
. . . or x = h(n)} has more members than it actually has. Thus, at w, there is some o ∈ {x : x = h(1) or x = h(2) or . . .
or x = h(n)} such that o 6= h(i), for all i such 1 ≤ i ≤ n. But in such case, o does not satisfy the condition of being an x
such that x = h(1) or x = h(2) or . . . or x = h(n). So o does not belong to the set {x : x = h(1) or x = h(2) or . . .
or x = h(n)}. Contradiction. Hence, it is not the case that {x : x is a man} could have had more members than the ones
it actually has.
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Let p stand for the proposition that Obama is a president, assuming that this proposition is possibly
something. It will be argued that the following claim is true:
(NecPropObama)
1. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is a president is something.
2. 2(∃q(p = q)).
The premises of the argument for the necessary being of the proposition that Obama is a president
are the following:
(P1-TVAi)
1. Necessarily, Obama is a president or Obama is not a president..
2. 2(p ∨ ¬p).
(P2-TVAi)
1. Necessarily, if Obama is a president, then it is true that Obama is a president.
2. 2(p→ Tp).
(P3-TVAi)
1. Necessarily, if Obama is not a president, then it is false that Obama is a president.
2. 2(¬p→ Fp)
(P4-TVAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is true that Obama is a president, then the proposition that Obama is a president
is something.
2. 2(Tp→ ∃q(p = q))
(P5-TVAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is false that Obama is a president, then the proposition that Obama is a president
is something.
2. 2(Fp→ ∃q(p = q)).
One important remark is that ‘it is true that’ and ‘it is false that’ are here understood as properties
of propositions, i.e., as standing for entities of type 〈〈〉〉. Thus, they do not stand for properties of
sentences, nor of any other individuals. That is, they do not stand for entities of type 〈e〉, since on
the typology of entities being presupposed, propositions are not individuals, but instead higher-order
entities. 18 The argument from (P1-TVAi)-(P5-TVAi) to (NecPropObama) goes as follows.
Premises (P1-TVAi), (P2-TVAi) and (P3-TVAi) together imply:
(10) 1. Necessarily, it is true that Obama is a president or it is false that Obama is a president.
2. 2(Tp ∨ Fp)
18A defence of higher-order resources has been offered in chapter1.
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Moreover, (10), (P4-TVAi) and (P5-TVAi) together imply (NecPropObama).
The premises of the Truth-Values Argument are the following:19
Premises of the Truth-Values Argument
(P1-TVA) Excluded Middle .
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, p or ¬p.
2. 2∀p2(p ∨ ¬p)
(P2-TVA) Truth Introduction.
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, if p, then it is true that p.
2. 2∀p2(p→ Tp)
(P3-TVA) Falsity Introduction .
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, if ¬p then p has the property of being false.
2. 2∀p2(¬p→ Fp)
(P4-TVA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
Premise (P1-TVAi) is an instance of Excluded Middle, (P2-TVAi) is an instance of Truth Introduction,
(P3-TVAi) is an instance of Falsity Introduction. Finally, (P4-TVAi) and (P5-TVAi) are both instances
of Thorough Serious Actualism. It should be clear that the truth of Propositional Necessitism
follows from (P1-TVA) - (P4-TVA), given the reasoning presented in the argument for the truth of
(NecPropObama).
The weakest assumption of the Truth-Values Argument, in the sense of being the least controversial,
is Excluded Middle. Every instance of the schema ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is a propositional tautology, and thus
every instance of the schema 2(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) is a theorem of the very weak propositional modal logicK.
Moreover, the fact that every instance of2(ϕ∨¬ϕ) is a theorem ofK is no accident owing to the lack
of expressive resources ofK. Instances of the schema are true no matter what possible proposition
turns out to be the semantic value of ϕ. This means that necessarily, for every p, necessarily, p or ¬p.
That is, Excluded Middle is true.
Thorough Serious Actualism was defended in §3.3. Discussion of Truth Introduction and Falsity
Introduction will be left for §3.5. Suffice it to say for now that I think that propositional contingentists
19The argument does not require the full strength of Thorough Serious Actualism. Rather, the following thesis would
suffice:
Serious Actualism〈〈〉〉
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX of propositions, necessarily, for every proposition p, necessarily, if p hasX , then p
is something.
2. 2∀X2∀p2(Xp→ ∃q(p = q)).
The same remark applies to the remaining arguments to be considered in this section.
The reason for appealing to the full strength of Thorough Serious Actualism concerns the fact that later it will be
queried what would the status be if modal expressions were seen as being analysable in terms of truth at a world, instead of
constituting themselves predications of properties to propositions. It will be shown that the Possibility Argument, yet to be
presented, is still valid under such understanding of modal expressions. Yet, this would not be so if the Possibility Argument
were formulated in terms of Serious Actualism〈〈〉〉 instead of being formulated in terms of Thorough Serious Actualism.
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have interesting objections to Truth Introduction and Falsity Introduction. Given the other arguments
for Propositional Necessitism, these objections only have a local impact, since they are not applicable
to the remaining arguments.
3.4.3 The Possibility Or Impossibility Argument
Whereas the previous argument appealed to principles governing truth and falsity, the argument to be
presented, the Possibility Or Impossibility Argument, appeals to principles governing alethic modalities.
As before, I will start by presenting an argument for the necessary being of the proposition that Obama
is a president. Afterwards, this argument will be generalised to the premises of the Possibility Or
Impossibility Argument for Propositional Necessitism.
The premises of the argument for the necessary being of the proposition that Obama is a president
are the following:
(P1-PIAi)
1. Necessarily, it is possible that Obama is a president or it is impossible that Obama is a president.
2. 2(3p ∨p)
(P2-PIAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is possible that Obama is a president, then the proposition that Obama is a
president is something.
2. 2(3p→ ∃q(p = q))
(P3-PIAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is impossible that Obama is a president, then the proposition that Obama is a
president is something.
2. 2(p→ ∃q(p = q))
The symbol ‘’ is the formal language analogue of ‘it is impossible that’. One important remark is that
‘it is possible that’, ‘it is impossible that’ and ‘it is necessary that’ are here understood as properties
of propositions, i.e., as standing for entities of type 〈〈〉〉. Thus, they do not stand for properties of
sentences, nor of any other individuals.
The truth of (NecPropObama) is an immediate consequence of premises (P1-PIAi), (P2-PIAi)
and (P3-PIAi). The Possibility Or Impossibility Argument has two premises, namely:
Premises of the Possibility Or Impossibility Argument:
(P1-PIA) Possibility Or Impossibility.
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, it is possible that p or it is impossible that p.
2. 2∀p2(3p ∨p)
(P2-PIA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
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Premise (P1-PIAi) is an instance of Possibility Or Impossibility. Premises (P2-PIAi) and (P3-PIAi)
are both instances of Thorough Serious Actualism.
It should be clear that Propositional Necessitism follows from Possibility Or Impossibility together
with Thorough Serious Actualism, given the reasoning of the argument from (P1-PIAi), (P2-PIAi) and
(P3-PIAi) to (NecPropObama).
Thorough Serious Actualism was defended in §3.3. Let me turn to the thesis of Possibility Or
Impossibility.
Propositional modal logic contains no operator for impossibility. But it is not difficult to see how
one may be added to it. The following axiom-schema is added to whatever system one is interested on:
Axiom Schema I. ϕ↔ ¬3ϕ.
Adding axiom schema I to the propositional modal logicK yields the systemK+I. All instances
of the schema 2(3ϕ ∨ϕ) are theorems ofK+I. To see why, note that every instance Excluded
Middle, and thus of the schema 2(3ϕ ∨ ¬3ϕ), is a theorem ofK. From 2(3ϕ ∨ ¬3ϕ) and I it
straightforwardly follows that 2(3ϕ ∨ϕ), by reasoning valid inK.
As in the discussion of Excluded Middle, the truth of every instance of the schema 2(3ϕ ∨ϕ)
is not a result of a poverty of expressive resources. So, necessarily, for every p, it is possible that p or
it is impossible that p. That is, Possibility Or Impossibility is true.
Arguably, this is the simplest of the arguments to be offered from facts concerning metaphysical
modalities and Thorough Serious Actualism to Propositional Necessitism, in that it does not appeal to
considerations of any other nature. It will be helpful to see two other arguments from facts concerning
metaphysical modalities and Thorough Serious Actualism to Propositional Necessitism. The distinctive
feature of these arguments is that they appeal to an extra assumption about propositions, namely,
that if a proposition is something, then its contradictory is also something. This extra assumption
also enables the formulation of an alternative to the Truth-Values Argument. The alternatives to the
Truth-Values and the Possibility or Impossibility arguments are presented in what follows.
3.4.4 Alternative Arguments: The Truth Argument
Some will ﬁnd the Truth-Values Argument and the Possibility or Impossibility Argument objectionable
on the grounds that there are no properties of falsity or impossibility. To say that a proposition p is
false is not really to attribute a property to it. Rather it is to say that it is not true that p. Similarly, to
say that a proposition p is impossible is not really to attribute a property to it. Rather, it is to say that
it is not possible that p.
Alternative arguments will now offered. These arguments do not appeal to theses about the




1. Necessarily, for every proposition p, ¬p is something.
2. 2∀p∃q(¬p = q).
The alternative to the Truth-Values Argument is the Truth Argument. Its premises are the following:
Premises of the Truth Argument
(P1-TA) Excluded Middle.
(P2-TA) Truth Introduction.
(P3-TA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
(P4-TA) Contradictoriness.
As before, I will focus on showing that instances of these premises imply (NecPropObama). It will
be clear from the argument offered that (P1-TA), (P2-TA), (P3-TA) and (P4-TA) together imply
Propositional Necessitism.
The instances of (P1-TA) - (P4-TA) required to establish the truth of (NecPropObama) are the
following:
(P1-TAi)
1. Necessarily, Obama is a president or Obama is not a president.
2. 2(p ∨ ¬p).
(P2-TAi)
1. Necessarily, if Obama is a president, then it is true that Obama is a president.
2. 2(p→ Tp).
(P3-TAi)
1. Necessarily, if Obama is not a president, then it is true that that Obama is not a president.
2. 2(¬p→ T¬p).
(P4-TAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is true that Obama is a president, then the proposition that Obama is a president
is something.
2. 2(Tp→ ∃q(p = q)).
(P5-TAi)
1. Necessarily, if it is true that Obama is not a president, then the proposition that Obama is not a
president is something.
2. 2(T¬p→ ∃q(¬p = q)).
(P6-TAi)
1. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is not a president is something only if the proposition
that it is not the case that Obama is not a president is something.
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2. 2(∃q(¬p = q)→ ∃q(¬¬p = q)).
Premise (P1-TAi) is an instance of Excluded Middle, and (P2-TAi) is an instance of Truth Intro-
duction. Premise (P3-TAi) is an instance of Truth Introduction only if the proposition that Obama is
not a president is possibly something. But this follows from i) the assumption that the proposition
that Obama is a president is possibly something, and ii) Contradictoriness. Premise (P4-TAi) is an
instance of Thorough Serious Actualism. Premise (P5-TAi) turns out to also be an instance of Serious
Actualism, since the proposition that Obama is not a president is possibly something. Finally, premise
(P6-TAi) is a consequence of Contradictoriness.
The argument for (NecPropObama) goes as follows. From (P1-TAi) and (P2-TAi) it follows that:
(11) a. Necessarily, it is true that Obama is a president or Obama is not a president.
b. 2(Tp ∨ ¬p).
Moreover, (11) and (P4-TAi) together imply
(12) a. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is a president is something or Obama is not a
president.
b. 2(∃q(p = q) ∨ ¬p).
From (12) and (P3-TAi) it follows that:
(13) a. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is a president is something or it is true that
Obama is not a president.
b. 2(∃q(p = q) ∨ T¬p).
Claim (13) together with (P5-TAi) implies
(14) a. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is a president is something or the proposition
that Obama is not a president is something.
b. 2(∃q(p = q) ∨ ∃q(¬p = q))
A relevant remark at this point is that the following claim is a consequence of using the identity symbol
as shorthand for their necessary coextensiveness:
(15) a. Necessarily, if the proposition that it is not the case that Obama is not a president is
something, then the proposition that Obama is a president is something.
b. 2∃q(¬¬p = q)→ ∃q(p = q)
From (P6-TAi) and (15) it it follows that
(16) a. Necessarily, if the proposition that Obama is not a president is something, then the
proposition that Obama is a president is something.
b. 2(∃q(¬p = q)→ ∃q(p = q)).
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Finally, (14) and (16) together imply (17):
(17) a. Necessarily, the proposition that Obama is a president is something or the proposition
that Obama is a president is something.
b. 2(∃q(p = q) ∨ ∃q(p = q)).
Since (17) is equivalent to (NecPropObama), (NecPropObama) follows from (P1-TAi) - (P6-TAi).
It should be clear that Propositional Necessitism follows from the premises of the Truth Argument,
given the argument from (P1-TAi) - (P6-TAi) to Propositional Necessitism just presented.
3.4.5 Alternative Arguments: The Possibility Or Necessity Argument
Two alternatives to the Possibility Or Impossibility Argument are considered. The ﬁrst alternative to
be considered, the Possibility Or Necessity Argument, has the following thesis as one of its assumptions:
Possibility Or Necessity.
1. Necessarily, for every proposition p, necessarily, p is possible or ¬p is necessary.
2. 2∀p2(3p ∨2¬p).
The premises of the argument are the following:
Premises of the Possibility Or Necessity Argument
(P1-PNA) Possibility Or Necessity.
(P2-PNA) Serious Actualism.
(P3-PNA) Contradictoriness.
The Possibility Or Necessity Argument proceeds in a fashion similar to the Truth Argument, and so
the details will be left out.
The thesis of Possibility Or Necessity is supported on grounds similar to the ones advanced in
defence of Excluded Middle. Every instance of the schema
(18) 2(3ϕ ∨2¬ϕ)
is a theorem ofK. Moreover, this is no accident due to the lack of expressive resources ofK. Instances
of the schema are true no matter what possible proposition turns out to be the semantic value of ϕ.
Hence, Possibility Or Necessity is true.
Despite the fact that every instance of (18) is an instance ofK, some may be opposed to there
being a property of necessity, perhaps on the grounds that if there were such a property, it would not
be a natural property, since it would be deﬁned in terms of the property of possibility. If ﬁnd this
objection to the Possibility or Necessity argument unappealing. For instance, proponents of such view
would be faced with the burden of explaining what decides in favour of possibility to the detriment of
necessity (or vice-versa). But even if they could make good sense of the objection, they would still
be faced with an argument formulated solely in terms of the property of possibility, the Possibility
Argument, to which I will now turn.
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3.4.6 Alternative Arguments: The Possibility Argument
The only difference between the Possibility and the Possibility Or Necessity Argument is that the
Possibility Argument has as a premise the thesis of Seriality instead of the thesis of Possibility Or
Necessity.
Seriality.
1. Necessarily, for every p, necessarily, it is possible that p or it is possible that ¬p.
2. 2∀p2(3p ∨3¬p).
The premises of the Possibility Argument are thus the following:




The Possibility Argument proceeds in a fashion somewhat similar to the Truth Argument, and so
the details will be left out. Contrary to the theses of Possibility Or Impossibility and Possibility Or
Necessity, the thesis of Seriality is not supported by systemK. Rather, it is supported by the very
weak normal modal propositional logicKD. This logic results from adding toK all instances of the
following schema:
Axiom schema D. 2ϕ→ 3ϕ
In the context ofK, each instance 2ψ → 3ψ of axiom schema D turns out to be equivalent to an
instance of the following schema:
(19) 3ϕ ∨3¬ϕ
This means thatKD is also the system that results from adding toK the schema (19).
The truth of each instance of (19) is extremely plausible given the interpretation of ‘3’ as meta-
physical possibility. All that is required for each instance of (19) to be true is that necessarily, things
could have been some way or another. Take any possible circumstance w. If, at w, things could had
been some way w′, then ϕ would have been true at w′ or ¬ϕ would have been true at w′, by Excluded
Middle. Thus, at w, it is possible that ϕ or it is possible that ¬ϕ.
Is it the case that, for each possible circumstance w, things could have been some way or another?
Yes, since at each possibility w, things could at least have been as they are in w (this just consists in
the observation that, necessarily, p→ 3p). Let me now turn to the justiﬁcation for the assumption of
Contradictoriness.
Consider the following schema:
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(20) If you are consistent and believe that ϕ, then there is something that you do not believe,
namely, that ¬ϕ.
Arguably, the truth of every instance of this schema is supported by unreﬂective common sense. The
truth of every instance of this schema presupposes the truth of its universal generalisation:
(21) For every proposition p, if you are consistent and believe that p, then there is something that
you do not believe, namely, you do not believe that ¬p.
If (21) codiﬁes a constraint on what it is to be consistent, as it appears to do, then its necessitation is
true. Since the necessitation of (21) implies Contradictoriness, then, arguably, Contradictoriness is
one of the commitments of unreﬂective common sense.
This argument presupposes that propositional quantiﬁcation is appropriate in this context, rather
than quantiﬁcation over propositions understood as individuals, i.e., as entities of type e. Such
understanding of propositions is a presupposition of this chapter. As mentioned in §3.1, propositions
are here understood as entities of type 〈〉, and as the objects of the attitudes. If it turns out that there
could be no propositions as these are here understood, then Propositional Necessitism is vacuously
true.
I suspect that there are many other commitments of unreﬂective common sense supporting
Contradictoriness. Anyway, the commitment to Contradictoriness is, on its own, independent of
Propositional Necessitism. For instance, the Russellian theory of propositions, one of the theories
falling under the Classical Conception, appears to imply Contradictoriness, given natural auxiliary
assumptions.
According to the Russellian theory, propositions are structured entities, containing other entities
as their constituents. For instance, according to standard Russellians, the proposition that Obama is a
president is composed of Obama and the property of being a president.
An argument from the Russellian theory to Contradictoriness appeals to the plausible assumption
that if the constituents of a structured proposition are all something, then the proposition itself is
something. It is also plausible to think that the operation of negation is necessarily something. So,
if a proposition p is something, then any proposition that has p and the operation of negation as its
only constituents is also something. On the structured accounts of propositions, one such proposition
is the proposition that ¬p. Thus, necessarily, for every proposition p, if p is something then ¬p is
something.
Thus, arguably, Contradictoriness is supported by unreﬂective common sense, and it is implied by
some of the theories committed to the falsity of the Classical Conception of propositions. Contradic-
toriness is thus an assumption shared with at least some propositional contingentists.
Finally, independently of what positive support there is for Contradictoriness, the fact that the
thesis is independent of Propositional Necessitism, would make it a surprising result if the best line of
reply to an argument for Propositional Necessitism consisted in rejecting the truth of Contradictoriness.
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This concludes the presentation of the arguments for Propositional Necessitism. In the next
section objections to the arguments are considered, and replies to these objections are offered. I will
be referring to the Possibility Or Impossibility Argument, Possibility Or Necessity Argument and
Possibility Argument as the modal arguments for Propositional Necessitism.
3.5 Objections To The Arguments
3.5.1 Plantinga’s Argument and the Truth-Values Argument
The Truth-Values Argument is quite similar to an argument for the falsity of Existentialism put forward
by Plantinga (1983). If Plantinga’s argument is cogent, then it happens to have important consequences
for the status of the Classical Conception of propositions. As shown in §3.2, Existentialism is a
straightforward consequence of Essential Aboutness and Thorough Serious Actualism. This means
that, together, Plantinga’s argument and the defence of Thorough Serious Actualism offered in this
chapter constitute an argument for the falsity of the Classical Conception of Propositions.
The similarity between the Truth-Values Argument and Plantinga’s argument reveals a weakness
in the Truth-Values Argument. Plantinga’s argument for the falsity of Existentialism has been objected
to on the grounds that it ambiguates between two senses of the modalities, weak and strong senses,
otherwise relying on an assumption that is not common ground between him andmany existentialists.20
The same objection turns out to apply to the Truth-Values Argument. For this reason it will be helpful
to consider Plantinga’s argument for the falsity of Existentialism, and the ambiguity objection to that
argument.21
The premises of Plantinga’s argument against Existentialism are the following:
Premises of Plantinga’s Argument
(P1-PlA) Obama could have been nothing.
(P2-PlA) The proposition that Obama is nothing is about Obama.
(P3-PlA) Necessarily, if Obama is nothing, then it is true that Obama is nothing.
(P4-PlA) Necessarily, if it is true that Obama is nothing, then the proposition that Obama is nothing
is something.
Premise (P1-PlA) is supported by unreﬂective common sense. Premise (P2-PlA) is intended to
witness the claim that some propositions are about contingent beings, a claim that Plantinga takes
to be common ground between him and many supporters of Existentialism. Premise (P3-PlA) is an
instance of Truth Introduction, and premise (P4-PlA) is an instance of Thorough Serious Actualism.
20Defences of Existentialism against Plantinga’s argument similar to the one to be presented are adopted by, among others,
Adams (1981), Fine (1977) , Fine (1977), Speaks (2012), Stalnaker (2012).
21Actually, the argument to be considered is a slight reconstruction of Plantinga’s. The main difference is that the
argument to be presented contains Truth Introduction as one of its premises, whereas Truth Introduction is not a premise of
Plantinga’s Argument. Instead, a consequence of Truth Introduction plays the role of Truth Introduction in Plantinga’s
Argument. This formulation of the argument has been chosen to make clearer the similarities between Plantinga’s Argument
and the Truth-Values Argument.
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Brieﬂy, Plantinga’s Argument proceeds as follows. Premises (P1-PlA) and (P3-PlA) jointly imply
(22):
(22) It could have been that both Obama was nothing and the proposition that Obama is nothing
was true.
Moreover, (22) and (P4-PlA) imply (23):
(23) It could have been that both Obama was nothing and the proposition that Obama is nothing
was something.
Also, (23) and (P2-PlA) imply (24):
(24) There could have been a proposition p about some x such that it could have been that p was
something and x was nothing.
Thus, (P1-PlA) - (P4-PlA) jointly imply the falsity of Existentialism. According to the objection to
Plantinga’s Argument to be considered there is no reading of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ such that: i)
premises (P1-PlA) and (P3-PlA) are both true, and ii) Plantinga’s Argument is valid.
The two senses of the modalities are distinguishable via two notions of truth relative to a world,
namely, truth in a world and truth at (or of) a world.22 As will be seen, virtually the same objection can
be applied to the cogency of the Truth-Values Argument. Let me call this objection to both Plantinga’s
Argument and the Truth-Values Argument the Truth In-Truth At Objection. I will begin by introducing
the distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world. Then, I will show how the distinction
affords the resources to object to the cogency of Plantinga’s argument. I will also show that, for exactly
the same reasons, the distinction affords the resources to object to the cogency of the Truth-Values
Argument.
One instructive way to understand the difference between the two notions is as follows. It is true
at a possible world w that, say, Obama is a president only if a certain relation actually holds between
the possible world w and the proposition thatObama is a president. However, it is true in a possible
world w that, say, Obama is a president only if the proposition that Obama is a president would have
had a certain property had world w been realised, namely, the property of being true.23
The important difference is thus that for a proposition p to be true in a world w, p is required to
have a property at w, namely, the property of being true, whereas for a proposition to be true at a
world w, it is not required that p has any property at w. Put it another way, if p is true in w, then not
only is it the case that proposition p is true at w. It is also the case that the proposition that p is true is
22The truth in-truth at distinction ﬁrst appears in the ﬁrst and second sophisms in (Buridan, 2001, ch. 8), the basis for
Prior (1969)’s distinction between possibility and possible truth.
23Some will prefer to use ‘actual’ instead of ‘realised’, since it does not beg any questions with respect to the nature of
possible worlds. On the other hand, this use of ‘actual’ seems to require a reading of ‘actual’ which is neither indexical nor
rigid, whereas ‘actual’ is used in the dissertation mostly with its rigid sense. Since, as I see it, the relevant reading of ‘actual’
is, in this context, the one captured by ‘is realised’, I will be using ‘realised’ instead of ‘actual’ to capture this nonindexical
and nonrigid reading of ‘actual’.
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also true at w. The following is perhaps a helpful image. If an actual proposition p is true at a world
w, then p characterises w from the standpoint of the actual world. If a proposition p is true in w, then
p characterises w from the standpoint of w.
Brieﬂy, proponents of the truth in-truth at distinction have available an account of what it is for
the proposition that p is true to be true at a world w. If the proposition that p is true is true at w, then
it is also the case that it is true at w that p. And if p is true at w and the proposition that p is something
is true at w, then the proposition that p is true is true at w. That is, the proposition that p is true is
true at w if and only if it is true at w that i) p and ii) p is something. Thus, p is true in w if and only if
it is true at w that i) p and ii) p is something.
Accompanying the distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world is a distinction
between weak modalities and strong modalities. A proposition p is weakly necessary if and only if, for
every world w, p is true at w. A proposition is strongly necessary if and only if, for every world w, p
is true in w. A proposition is weakly possible if and only if, there is some world w such that p is true
at w. A proposition p is strongly possible if and only if there is some world w such that p is true in w.
The Truth In-Truth At Objection relies on the thought that some propositions are true at w
even though they are not true in w. These propositions are not true in w because if w were realised,
then they would have been nothing. This would have been so despite the fact these propositions
appropriately characterise w from the standpoint of the actual world.
Suppose, for the purposes of the example, that there could have been no proposition whatsoever,
even though there actually are some propositions — and in particular the proposition that there are
no propositions is actually something. Assuming that there could have been no propositions, there
is a possible world w such that the proposition that there are no propositions is true at w. Yet, the
proposition that there are no propositions is not true in w, since it is not the case that it is true at w
that the proposition that there are no proposition is something.
The distinction between weak and strong modalities enables proponents of the Truth In-Truth At
Objection to account for the intuition that all of the assumptions of Plantinga’s Argument are true,
while at the same contesting the argument’s cogency. There are two readings of premise (P1-PlA),
namely:
(25) a. There is some possible world w such that it is true at w that Obama is nothing.
b. There is some possible world w such that it is true in w that Obama is nothing.
The intuition that (P1-PlA) is true arises from the fact that (25-a) is indeed true, since the actual
proposition that Obama is nothing is true at, or of, some possible world w. It correctly characterises
some world w. Yet, it is false that there is some possible world w such that it is true in w that Obama
is nothing, since, according to them, there is no possible world w such that both i) it is true at w that
Obama is nothing and ii) it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is nothing is something.
Consider the following readings of (P3-PlA):
(26) a. For every worldw, if it is true inw that Obama is nothing, then it is true atw that Obama
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is nothing.
b. For every worldw, if it is true inw that Obama is nothing, then it is true inw that Obama
is nothing.
c. For every world w, if it is true at w that Obama is nothing, then it is true at w (and in w)
that the proposition that Obama is nothing is true.
The intuition that (P3-PlA) is true arises from the fact that (26-a) and (26-b) are indeed true. Yet,
(26-c) is false. The fact that, as characterised from our world, w is a world at which Obama is nothing,
does not imply that w is a world in which the proposition that Obama is nothing is itself something at
it.
Since the only true reading of (P1-PlA) is, according to the objection, (25-a), consider how the
argument proceeds on this reading of (P1-PlA). Premises (P1-PlA) and (P3-PlA) together imply (22).
The only reading of (P3-PlA) and (22) on which the argument from (25-a) and (P3-PlA) to (22) is
valid is when (P3-PlA) is understood as (26-c) and (22) is understood as follows:
(27) There is some possible world w such that it is true at w that Obama is nothing and it is true
at w (and in w) that the proposition that Obama is nothing is true.
But, according to the proponents of the Truth In-Truth At Objection, (26-c) is false. Thus, according
to the objection, Plantinga’s Argument is valid only if one of the premises is false. A fortiori, Plantinga’s
Argument is not cogent.
It is important to bear in mind that the Truth In-Truth At Objection is not aimed to establish the
truth of Existentialism. Rather, it is aimed to show that the argument is successful only if claims that
are not common ground between Plantinga and many Existentialists are assumed to be true, namely,
at least one of (25-b) and (26-c). Let me now brieﬂy show how the distinction between weak and
strong modalities enables the formulation of a reply to the Truth-Values Argument accounting for the
intuitions in favour of the truth of each premise, and yet on which the argument is not cogent.
The distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world shows that Excluded Middle, Truth
Introduction and Falsity Introduction have four possible readings each. I will begin by focusing only
on one particular instance of Excluded Middle and Truth Introduction, namely, claims (P1-TVAi) and
(P2-TVAi). Claim (P1-TVAi) may be understood in one of the following ways:
(28) Every world w is such that it is true relative to w that Obama is a president or it is true relative
w that Obama is not a president.
a. Every world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is a president or it is true at w that
Obama is not a president.
b. Every world w is such that it is true in w that Obama is a president or it is true in w that
Obama is not a president.
c. Every world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is a president or it is true in w that
Obama is not a president.
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d. Every world w is such that it is true in w that Obama is a president or it is true at w that
Obama is not a president.
Of these readings, the objector takes (28-b) to be immediately false. After all, it requires that every
possible world be such that it is true at it that the proposition that Obama is a president has the
property of being true, or it is true at it that the proposition that Obama is not a president has the
property of being true. Hence, by Thorough Serious Actualism, it requires that every possible world
w be such that it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is something, or it is true
at w that the proposition that Obama is not a president is something. But the objector rejects this.
Since both propositions are about Obama, none of them is something if Obama is nothing.
Moreover, according to the objector there are possible worlds w such that it is true at w that
Obama is nothing. It is true at no such possible world that Obama is a president, and it is true at no
such possible world that the proposition that Obama is a president is true (if it were true at w that the
proposition that Obama is a president is true, then it would be true at w that the proposition that
Obama is a president is something, in which case Obama would have been something and yet the
proposition that Obama is a president, a proposition about Obama, would have been nothing, thus
contradicting Existentialism). So, there are possible worlds w such that it is not true at w that Obama
is a president and it is not true in w that Obama is not a president. So, according to the objection,
(28-c) is also false. This means that the only options available are (28-a) and (28-d).
Claim (P2-TVAi) has the following readings:
(29) a. Every world w is such that if it is true at w that Obama is a president, then it is true at w
that the proposition that Obama is a president is true.
b. Every world w is such that if it is true at w that Obama is a president, then it is true in
w that the proposition that Obama is a president is true.
c. Every world w is such that if it is true in w that Obama is a president, then it is true at
w that the proposition that Obama is a president is true.
d. Every world w is such that if it is true in w that Obama is a president, then it is true in
w that the proposition that Obama is a president is true.
The objector rejects the truth of reading (29-a) because a proposition p may be true at a world w
without it being true at w that p has the property of being true, since p may be nothing at w. Since
(29-b) implies (29-a), the objector also rejects (29-b).
The options available are thus (29-c) and (29-d). From (28-a) and either (29-c) or (29-d) it does
not follow that every world w is such that it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president
is true or it is true at w that Obama is not a president. Thus, the reading of (P1-TVAi) as (28-a)
renders the Truth-Values Argument invalid (on the assumption that (P2-TVAi) is given a true reading,
i.e., either (29-c) or (29-d)). When (P1-TVAi) is understood as (28-a) and (P2-TVAi) is understood
as either (29-c) or (29-d), (10) does not follow from (P1-TVAi),(P2-TVAi) and (P3-TVAi), contrary
to what is required for the validity of the Truth-Values Argument.
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So, the only option available is to adopt (28-d) as the true reading of Excluded Middle, and to
take as true readings of Truth Introduction (29-c) or (29-d).
Finally, (P3-TVAi) has the following readings:
(30) a. Every world w is such that if it is true at w that Obama is not a president, then it is true
at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is false.
b. Every world w is such that if it is true at w that Obama is not a president, then it is true
in w that the proposition that Obama is a president is false.
c. Every world w is such that if it is true in w that Obama is not a president, then it is true
at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is false.
d. Every world w is such that if it is true in w that Obama is not a president, then it is true
in w that the proposition that Obama is a president is false.
By reasoning similar to the one applied with respect to the readings of (P2-TVAi) it is easy to see that,
according to the objector, the only available readings of (P3-TVAi) are (30-c) and (30-d).
But from (28-d), either one of (30-c) and (30-d), and either one of (29-c) and (29-d) it does not
follow that every world w is such that it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is
true or it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is false. The most one can get
is that it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is true or it is true at w that the
Obama is not a president.
This claim is innocuous from the standpoint of propositional contingentists. What follows from it
is just that every world w is such that it is true at w that the proposition that Obama is a president is
something, or it is true atw that Obama is not a president. This last claim does not imply the necessary
being of the proposition that Obama is a president. Moreover, it does not conﬂict with the truth of
Existentialism.
It should be clear that the truth in-truth at distinction affords the resources for a similar objection
to the Truth Argument. The overall conclusion is that the truth in-truth at distinction offers a promising
way to resist the cogency of both the Truth-Values Argument and the Truth Argument, in the same
way that it enables Existentialists to resist the cogency of Plantinga’s Argument. In what follows I will
show that, on its own, the truth in-truth at distinction does not afford propositional contingentists
with the resources to resist the modal arguments for Propositional Necessitism.
3.5.2 The Truth In-Truth At Distinction and the Modal Arguments
In what follows it will be shown that one of the arguments for Propositional Necessitism previously
presented, the Possibility Argument, is unscathed by the common way of understanding the modal
operators in terms of the common account of truth relative to a world. This will be shown by
considering, without loss of generality, particular instances of each one of the assumptions of the
Possibility Argument, namely, assumptions from which (NecPropObama) follows.
Readings of the premises of this argument for (NecPropObama) will be presented in terms of
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the notion of truth at a world. More speciﬁcally, only weak readings of modal expressions will be
considered, ones giving rise to the following semantic account of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’, to which
I will be calling the ‘Truth At Account’:
Truth At Account
1. Possibility
• Jx3ϕyK is the proposition that JϕK is true at some world w.
• Jx3ϕyK is true at a world w if and only if JϕK is true at some world w’ accessible from w.
2. Necessity
• Jx2ϕyK is the proposition that JϕK is true at every world w.
• Jx2ϕyK is true at a world w if and only if JϕK is true at every world w’ accessible from w.
The initial modal occurring in the readings of the instances of the premises of the argument for
(NecPropObama), ‘it is necessary that’, will be left unanalysed, since analysing it would add extra
complexity to the statements without any gains. Let ‘T..._’ be a binary predicate standing for the
relation being true at, and thus which obtains between worlds and propositions. Also, let ‘∃w(ϕ)’ be
used as shorthand for ‘∃x(Wx ∧ ϕ)’.24
(P1-PAi) It is necessary that it is possible that Obama is a president or it is possible that Obama is
not a president.
(P1-PAi-TrAt) Truth At Reading:
1. It is necessary that some possible world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is a
president or some possible world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is not a president.
2. 2(∃w(Twp) ∨ ∃w(Tw¬p)).
(P2-PAi) It is necessary that if it is possible that Obama is a president then the proposition that
Obama is a president is something.
(P2-PAi-TrAt) Truth At Reading:
1. It is necessary that if some possible world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is a
president, then the proposition that Obama is a president is something.
2. 2(∃w(Twp)→ ∃q(p = q)).
(P3-PAi) It is necessary that if it is possible that Obama is not a president then the proposition that
Obama is not a president is something.
(P3-PAi-TrAt) Truth At Reading:
1. It is necessary that if some possible world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is not a
president, then the proposition that Obama is not a president is something.
2. 2(∃w(Tw¬p)→ ∃q(¬p = q)).
24I remain neutral here on the question what is the type of possible worlds, even though I am sympathetic to the view
that possible worlds themselves are propositions.
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(P4-PAi) It is necessary that the proposition that Obama is a president is something if and only if
the proposition that Obama is not a president is something.
Brieﬂy, (P1-PAi) is an instance of Seriality, (P2-PAi) and (P3-PAi) are instances of Thorough
Serious Actualism, and (P3-PAi) is an immediate consequence of Contradictoriness.
Starting with (P1-PAi), this is a theorem of propositional modal logic, and so it seems reasonable
to think that (P1-PAi-TrAt) is true, since this reading of (P1-PAi) is given in terms of the weaker
understanding of the modals available, i.e., in terms of truth at a world.
As previously mentioned, all that the truth at a world w of a proposition p requires is that w and
p be related, not that p would have had the property of being true had w been realised. Now, if p and
w are related, then it follows that p is something (and that w is something as well) by an application of
Thorough Serious Actualism, regardless of whether p would have been something had w been realised.
But this means that necessarily, if p is true at some world w, then p is something, since the truth of p
at some world w requires that p and some world w be related. Similarly, if ¬p is true at some world
w, this requires that ¬p be related to some world w, and so, that ¬p is something. What this shows is
thus that (P2-PAi-TrAt) and (P3-PAi-TrAt) are both true.
There is also no risk of an ambiguous reading of the modalities as they occur in (P4-PAi). The
only modality present in each one of the premises, the expression ‘it is necessary that’, may itself be
given a univocal weak reading, in terms of truth at every world.
Thus, the distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world gives no reason to reject
the truth of any of the premises of the argument. Moreover, the argument from (P1-PAi-TrAt) -
(P4-PAi-TrAt) to (NecPropObama) may be seen to be valid straightforwardly. Thus, the Possibility
Argument is itself valid, and the truth of its premises is not called into question by the availability
of the distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world. So, the distinction does not afford
propositional contingentists with the resources to reject the Possibility Argument.
The current state of the dialectic is the following. The distinction between truth in a world
and truth at a world gives propositional contingentists the resources enabling them to resist the
cogency of Plantinga’s Argument and of the Truth-Values Argument. It was shown that the distinction
does not, in and of itself, offer the resources to resist the cogency of the Possibility Argument for
Propositional Necessitism. On the contrary, the cogency of the Possibility Argument is left unscathed
by an understanding of the modalities in terms of truth at a world.
This seems to pose a dilemma to propositional contingentists. If the Truth In-Truth At Objection
is pursued, then it seems that the Possibility Argument turns out to be congent. And if the Truth
In-Truth At Objection is abandoned, then a promising line of objection to Plantinga’s argument and to
the Truth-Values Argument is lost. Let me call this dilemma for propositional contingentists the Truth
At Dilemma.
In what follows I will explore the prospects of a possible way out of the Truth At Dilemma. The
Truth In-Truth At Objection presupposed the Truth At Account of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’. One
option available to propositional contingentists is to reject the Truth At Account while still maintaining
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the view that modal expressions can be accounted for in terms of truth at a world. Pursuing this line
requires offering a different account of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’. A different account is presented in
what follows, and its prospects are investigated.
3.5.3 Actual Truth At a World
The account of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ that will be investigated, the Actual Truth At Account, is
closely related to the Truth At Account. The account is the following:
Actual Truth At Account
1. Possibility
• Jx3ϕyK is the proposition that actually, JϕK is true at some world w.
• Jx3ϕyK is true at a world w if and only if JϕK is true at some world w’ accessible from the
actual world.
2. Necessity
• Jx2ϕyK is the proposition that actually, JϕK is true at every world w.
• Jx2ϕyK is true at a world w if and only if JϕK is true at every world w′ accessible from the
actual world.
Note that the expression ‘actually’ is used in its rigid sense, not in an indexical sense. Let α name the
actual world. Then, it is the case that actually, p if and only if it is true at α that p. The Possibility
Argument turns out not to be cogent given the assumption that the Actual Truth At Account is true,
as dialectically required by propositional contingentists.
Consider the reading of (P2-PAi) according to the account:
(P2-PAi-AcTrAt)
1. It is necessary that if actually some possible world w is such that it is true at w that Obama is a
president, then the proposition that Obama is a president is something;
2. 2(@∃w(Twp)→ ∃q(p = q))
Contrary to what was the case with the reading of (P2-PAi-TrAt), (P2-PAi-AcTrAt) is not an instance
of Thorough Serious Actualism. Suppose that it is possible that Obama is a president at an actual or
counterfactual circumstance w. According to the Actual Truth At Account this means that actually,
the proposition that Obama is a president is true at some world w′. If actually, the proposition that
Obama is a president is true at some worldw′, then actually, the proposition that Obama is a president
bears the being true at relation to w′. So, by Thorough Serious Actualism, it follows that actually, w′
and the proposition that Obama is a president are both something. However, from the fact that, at w,
actually, the proposition that Obama is a president is something it does not follow that if w had been
realised, then the proposition that Obama is a president would have been something. It only follows
that the proposition that Obama is a president is something at the actual world.
So, once possibility is understood according to the Actual Truth At Account, there is no longer
reason to hold that (P2-PAi) is true. And similarly with respect to (P3-PAi). Moreover, the objections
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to Plantinga’s Argument and the Truth-Values argument will still go through. In particular, truth in a
world may still be deﬁned in terms of truth at a world. Thus, the Actual Truth At Account promises
to provide propositional contingentists with a way out of the Truth At Dilemma.
In what follows I will show that this is not so. But ﬁrst I will quickly show that propositional
contingentists have the resources required to reject the claim that the Actual Truth At Account has as
an unwanted consequence the claim that it is necessary that every proposition is actually something.
To see how this worry arises, recall that from the assumption that at some worldw, it is possible that
Obama is a president, it follows that actually, the proposition that Obama is a president is something.
Similarly, from the assumption that, at some world w, it is possible that Obama is not a president it
follows that the proposition that Obama is not a president is actually something. So, the proposition
that Obama is a president is actually something, or the proposition that Obama is not a president is
actually something. In such case it follows, by Boolean Structure, that actually, the proposition that
Obama is a president is something.
Since the proposition that Obama is a president plays, in the above argument, the role of an
arbitrary proposition, it would appear that from the claim that actually, the proposition that Obama is
a president is something it could be legitimately inferred that it is necessary that, for every proposition
p, actually p is something. But the conclusion that it is necessary that, for every proposition p, actually,
p is something is problematic for propositional contingentists.
On the one hand, the claim that it is necessary that, for every proposition p, actually p is something
conﬂicts with the conjunction of the following claims: i) there could have been some things that
actually are nothing; ii) there could have been propositions directly about those things; iii) the thesis
of Existentialism. Suppose that Noman is a merely possible individual, and that the proposition that
Noman is a human is about him. Since it is necessary that every proposition actually is something, it
follows that the proposition that Noman is a human is actually something. But then, by Existentialism,
Noman is also something, contrary to the assumption.
On the other hand, suppose that it is indeed true that it is necessary that every proposition
actually is something. Then, it seems plausible to think that it is necessary that every proposition is
necessarily something. Why should the actual world be special in this respect? For these reasons, if
the Actual Truth At Account implies that it is necessary that every proposition actually is something,
then propositional contingentists may prefer to avoid a commitment to its truth.
Proponents of the Actual Truth At Account have the resources to reject the legitimacy of the
inference from the claim that actually p is something, for an arbitrary proposition p, to the claim that
it is necessary that, for every proposition p, actually p is something.
The legitimacy of the inference can be resisted by adopting the view that the functions that are
the semantic values of ‘3’ and ‘2’ have an empty extension at other worlds. They relate nothing
whatsoever in worlds other than the actual world.
Once this view is adopted, the inference is illegitimate. Since actually p is something, for an
arbitrary proposition p, it may be legitimately inferred that for every proposition p, actually p is
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something. But necessitation is illegitimate. The inference of the claim that for every proposition p,
actually p is something was legitimate due to a fact that holds only of actual propositions: only these
are arguments of the semantic values of the modal expressions.25
Call this objection to the Possibility Argument the Truth At Objection. I turn now to the problems
with the Truth At Objection. An important initial observation is that the Truth At and the Actual
Truth At accounts are mutually consistent. Thus, the Actual Truth At Objection is successful only if
the following claim is true:
(31) There is some possible proposition p and possible world w such that i) it is true at w that
there is some world w′ accessible from the actual world such that p is true at w′ (and so it is
true at w that3p according to the Actual Truth At Account) and yet ii) it is not true at w that
there is some world w′ accessible from w such that p is true at w′.
The truth of (31) is presupposed by the Actual Truth At Objection because otherwise it would follow
that if it is true at a world w that3p, then p is something at w, and so the Possibility Argument would
indeed be valid.
The main problem with the Actual Truth At Objection is simply that (31) is false. Assuming that
propositions are true at worlds, (31) is false because:
(32) Any case in which p is not true at a world w′ accessible from w is a case in which it is not true
at w that 3p.
My argument for (32) will be based on showing that a certain debate on the correct logic for meta-
physical modality presupposes that 3p is judged to be false at w on those scenarios in which p is not
true at a world w′ accessible from w, regardless of whether p is true at a world w′ accessible from the
actual world. The example should make it obvious that this is a general feature, and so that (32) is true.
This will reveal that the Actual Truth At Account is based on a erroneous view of the semantics of
modal expressions. I will focus on one such scenario, inspired by the arguments for the claim that
axiom schema 4 of propositional modal logic, according to which if it is possible that it is possible
that ϕ, then it is possible that ϕ (i.e., 33ϕ→ 3ϕ) has false instances.
25I ultimately think that such move is unsuccessful, for reasons related to the case against the partial functions account of
the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages presented in §2.5.
In general, the problem with this strategy is that it does not have the resources to make sense of the semantic values of
open formulas and what their contribution is to the semantic values of the sentences in which they occur is. For instance,
what is the semantic value of 3p in the context of the formula 3∃p(3p ∧@¬∃q(p = q))?
The view that the semantic value of ‘3’ has no extension in worlds other than the actual world leaves it mysterious what the
semantic value of ‘3p’ is. The reason is that whatever possible proposition witnesses the truth of ‘3∃p(3p∧@¬∃q(p = q))’,
this proposition is nothing in the actual world. The problem, from the standpoint of many propositional contingentists, is
that they accept the truth of the sentence. That is, they accept that there could have been true propositions that are actually
nothing.
These propositional contingentists appear to be left with no satisfactory account of the semantic value of ‘3p’ if they
indeed endorse the view that the semantic value of ‘3’ has an extension only in the actual world.
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A putative counterexample to axiom schema 4 starts by assuming the truth of the following two
principles about bicycles:26 i) Tolerance, according to which necessarily, any bicycle could have been
constituted by any two thirds of its original constitution; ii) Restriction, according to which necessarily,
no bicycle could have been constituted by one third of its original constitution.
Let me describe a scenario, the Bicla Scenario, of the sort envisaged by proponents of the claim
that axiom schema 4 has false instances. In this scenario, Bicla is a bicycle. At the actual world, α,
Bicla is constituted by frame α-Frame and wheels α-FrontWheel and α-BackWheel.
Suppose that w1-FrontWheel is one of the wheels of which Bicla could have been constituted,
according to Tolerance. Let w1 be a possible world witnessing the fact that Bicla could have been just
as it is, except for having w1-FrontWheel as its front wheel.
Let w2-Frame be a frame that is something at w1. According to proponents of the view that
axiom schema 4 has false instances there is a possible world w2 accessible from w1 such that Bicla is
constituted at w2 by w2-Frame, w1-FrontWheel and α-BackWheel. World w2 is taken to witness the
truth of Tolerance.
LetBiclalternate stand for the claim that Bicla is constituted byw2-Frame, w1-FrontWheel and
α-BackWheel. Biclalternate is true atw2. The fact thatw2 is accessible fromw1 andBiclalternate
is true at w2 is taken by proponents of the view that axiom schema 4 has false instances to suffice for
it to be true at w1 that 3Biclalternate.
World w2 is not accessible from α. If it were, then Bicla would have been constituted by one
third of its original constitution, which would violate Restriction. Thus, according to Restriction,
3Biclalternate is false at α. Since w1 is accessible from α and 3Biclalternate is true at w1,
33Biclalternate is true at α. Thus, proponents of the view that axiom schema 4 has false instances
take the Bicla Scenario to show that 33Biclalternate→ 3Biclalternate is false at α.
If the Actual Truth At Objection were successful, then the thought that scenarios such as the
Bicla Scenario constitute counterexamples to axiom schema 4 would be deeply misguided. For
instance, according to the Actual Truth At Account the fact that Biclalternate it is true at w2 and
w2 is accessible from w1 is irrelevant to whether 3Biclalternate is true at w1. Moreover, since
3Biclalternate is false at α, there is no possible worldw accessible fromα such thatBiclalternate
is true at w. Hence, according to the Actual Truth At Account, 3Biclalternate is false at w1, and
indeed at every worlds w such that w is accessible to α. A fortiori, 33Biclalternate is false at w0.
Thus, if the Actual Truth At Objection were true, then even if the Bicla Scenario were metaphysically
possible, this would provide no counterexample to the truth of every instance axiom schema 4.
Importantly for the present purposes, proponents and opponents of the view that there are false
instances of axiom schema 4 agree that if scenarios such as the Bicla Scenario are metaphysically
possible, then axiom schema 4 has false instances. To repeat, such widespread agreement makes no
sense from the standpoint of proponents of the Actual Truth At Objection. After all, the Actual Truth
26The example in the text is close the one offered in (Chandler, 1976). Besides Chandler, Salmon (2005) has defended
forcefully the failure of axiom-schema 4.
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At Account implies the truth of every instance of axiom-schema 4.
Suppose that it is true that it is possible that it is possible that p, for an arbitrary proposition p. In
such case, according to the Actual Truth At Account, there is some possible world w such that w is
accessible from α and 3p is true at w. So, there is some possible world w such that w is accessible
from α and there is some possible world w′ such that w′ is accessible from α and p is true at w′. This
is so if and only if there is some possible world w accessible from α such that p is true at w. So, if
33p, then 3p.27
The discussion concerning the Bicla Scenario shows that the Actual Truth At Account yields the
wrong semantics for ‘3’. If p is not true at a world w′ accessible from w, then 3p is not true at w,
independently of what happens in the actual world. That is, the Actual Truth At Objection is wrongly
committed to the truth of (31).
I ﬁnd the predicament of proponents of the Actual Truth At Objection to be similar to that of
a biologist, say, Bio, that endorses the view that all living things are composed of carbon partly on
the grounds that he takes ‘all’ to mean all things on Earth. Just as it may be that all living things tout
court are composed of carbon, it may very well be that all instances of axiom schema 4 are true. But
just as Bio supports the claim that all livings things are composed of carbon on the basis of a faulty
semantics for ‘all’, proponents of the Actual Truth At Account support the truth of every instance of
axiom schema 4 on the basis of a faulty semantics for ‘3’.
Read (2005, p. 321) captures the present point when referring to the contrapositive of axiom
schema 4, saying that ‘even when ... there is equivalence, it is misleading to say that nothing is added
by preﬁxing ‘it is necessary that’. It is a substantive thesis that necessity is idempotent (that 22p is
equivalent to 2p)’. If the Actual Truth At Objection were successful, then the truth of every instance
of axiom schema 4 would turn out to be non-substantive. The truth of every instance of axiom schema
4 would be consistent with scenarios like the Bicla Scenario. This reveals that the Actual Truth At
Objection is unsuccessful.
3.6 The Commitments of Propositional Modal Logic
3.6.1 Modalities as Properties
The distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world was thought to offer the resources
enabling the rejection of the cogency of the Possibility Argument insofar as the distinction enables
a take on modal expressions as something other than properties of propositions. In the previous
section it was shown that the Possibility Argument stands even once the Truth At Account of modal
expressions is assumed to be true and propositions are not understood in such way.
In addition, the view that modal expressions are properties of propositions is intuitively appealing.
For instance, just as being a president is one of the ways that Obama is, being possible is one of the
ways that the proposition that Obama is a president is.
27For the same reason, every instance of axiom-schema 5 is true, this axiom-schema stating that if it is possible that ϕ,
then it is necessary that it is possible that ϕ — 3ϕ→ 23ϕ.
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Moreover, Kripke models for propositional modal logic have increased our understanding of
modality partly because they treat ‘3’ and ‘2’ as standing for properties of propositions. It is customarily
said that Kripke models have increased our understanding of modality partly by taking possibility to be
relative to possible worlds. But this just means that Kripke models have increased our understanding of
modality partly by treating ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ as properties (with Kripke models also offering
a model of the modal proﬁles of properties and their relationships in terms of truth at a world). For
instance, the extension of the property of possibility at each worldw consists in the set of propositions
that is true at some world accessible to w.
In general, in Kripke models properties are treated as being true of things relative to worlds. For
instance, the property of existence is treated in Kripke models in such a way that it has an extension
only relative to a world. Such treatment of properties increases our understanding of the relationship
between properties. Are properties P and Q mutually exclusive? They are if there is no possible
world in which they are coinstantiated. Otherwise, they aren’t.
A classic view on metaphysical modality is that its logic is given by S5. This may lead to the
thought that metaphysical possibility is distinguished from other kinds of possibility in that it is not
relative. Such thought may be guided by the observation that models for S5 are often given without
explicit mention of an accessibility relation (as done in this dissertation). This is a mistaken thought.
The accessibility relation is there even when it is not explicitly mentioned. It is a universal accessibility
relation, in that every world is accessible to every world. This means that these models treat necessity
and possibility as having constant extensions at all possible worlds. It does not mean that necessity
and possibility have no modal proﬁle. Compare the case with that of the haecceity of the empty set.
Just as the haecceity of the empty set is clearly a property, one that has a constant extension at all
possible worlds, necessity and possibility are also properties, even if their extensions do not vary from
world to world.
3.6.2 Logic is the ‘Culprit’
The option left to those wishing to resist the modal arguments for Propositional Necessitism consists
in rejecting systems of propositional modal logic as weak asKD andK. For instance, Adams (1981)
and Prior (1957) have both argued that the normal propositional modal logics all contain unwanted
commitments.
The thought is that these systems appeal to principles, namely, the interdeﬁnability of ‘2’ and
‘3’ and the rule of necessitation, which jointly lead to falsehoods. Let me take a detailed look at the
derivation of 2(3p ∨2¬p) inK.
The ﬁrst principle required is the following propositional tautology:
(33) 3p ∨ ¬3p.
Principle (33) may be assumed to be true at every world whatsoever unproblematically. On the face of
it, even if (33) is true at every world, this does not imply that p is something at every world.
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By the interdeﬁnability of ‘2’ and ‘3’, it follows that:
(34) 3p ∨2¬p.
Thorough Serious Actualism together with (34) implies that ∃q(p = q) ∨ ∃q(¬p = q). Moreover,
∃q(p = q) ∨ ∃q(¬p = q) together with Contradictoriness implies that ∃q(p = q). Thus, the
inference from (33) to (34) may be regarded as unproblematic from the standpoint of propositional
contingentists provided that p is actually something. That is, if p is actually nothing, then, the transition
from (33) to (34) is not truth-preserving from the standpoint of propositional contingentists.
Thus, from the standpoint of propositional contingentists the problem at this point is that K
sanctions the rule of necessitation, and so permits the inference of (35) from (34)
(35) 2(3p ∨2¬p).
It was seen that the inference of (34) from (33) is truth-preserving only if p was actually something.
Necessitation is truth-preserving only if p is something in every possible world. Since, in general, p is
not something in every possible world, the inference of (35) from (34) is not truth-preserving from
the standpoint of propositional contingentists.
Consider now a derivation of 2(3p ∨3¬p) inKT. It starts with the following tautology, which
may be assumed to hold of necessity.
(36) p ∨ ¬p
Now, two axioms ofKT are
(37) p→ 3p
(38) ¬p→ 3¬p
As in the case of the interdeﬁnability of ‘2’ and ‘3’, whether (37) is true at a world w depends on
whether p is something at w. If p is nothing at w, then it is false that p has the property of being
possible. Similarly for (38) and ¬p.
From (37) and (38) it follows that
(39) 3p ∨3¬p
by nonmodal reasoning. Whether (39) is true at a world w depends on whether (37) and (38) are
both true at w, which in turn depends on whether p is something at w.
This means that the move to
(40) 2(3p ∨3¬p)
is illegitimate if p is or could have been nothing.
Ultimately, I think that this is where propositional contingentists should mount their defence. That
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is, I think that the the modal logicsK andKD do presuppose the truth of Propositional Necessitism.
From the standpoint of propositional contingentists, some of the principles and inference rules of
these logics are, respectively, false and not truth-preserving.
Let me call propositional contingentists that rejectK andKT ultra propositional contingentists.
The problem for ultra propositional contingentists is a lack of expressive resources for talking about
what might have been. Consider, for instance, the following example:
(41) If my parents had never met and I had been nothing, then I would have been something had
my mother and father met in circumstances just like the ones in which they actually met. So,
even if my parents had never met and I had been nothing, it would still have been possible
that I was something.
Argument (41) strikes me as a valid argument, with perhaps a true premise. But ultra propositional
contingentists must reject that this is so. If my parents had never met and I had been nothing, then the
proposition that I am something would have been nothing, and so it could not have had the property
of being possible. This means that contingentists must reject the conclusion of (41).
Ultra propositional contingentists should also reject the truth of the premise of (41), given the
appeal to a counterfactual. The truth of the premise of (41) would require that the proposition that my
parents meet in the circumstances in which they actually met and the proposition that I am something
be related in at least one counterfactual circumstance in which my parents have never met and I was
nothing. But, according ultra propositional contingentists, the proposition that I am something cannot
be related to any other proposition in a circumstance in which I am nothing. If the proposition that I
am something is related to some other proposition in a circumstancew in which I am nothing, then the
proposition is something. But, according to most ultra propositional contingentists it is not possible
that I am nothing and the proposition that I am something is something.
The problem for ultra propositional contingentists is that unreﬂective common sense supports
the soundness of argument (41). This is a valid argument with a true premise. Ultra propositional
contingentists must reject this, while at the same time accounting for the intuition that (41) is sound.
Arguably, they lack the resources to do so. Some of the ways that they have appealed do not to work.
For instance, the true in-true at distinction does not offer ultra propositional contingentists with
acceptable resources. It still leads to the conclusion that (41) is a sound argument.
All this shows that propositions allow us to talk and think about what might have been sub specie
aeternitatis. That is, propositions allow us to describe possibilities for things not only in actual but also
in counterfactual circumstances. They allow us to describe possibilities for things in counterfactual
circumstances without being bound by whether those things are something in those counterfactual
circumstances. Insofar as propositions enable us to do so, they are necessary beings.
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3.7 Propositions Are About Nothing
There is still one puzzle to be addressed. I presented in §3.2 an argument from the Classical Conception
of propositions to Propositional Contingentism. Should the Classical Conception then be rejected?
The short answer is: yes. Unsurprisingly, the problem with the Classical Conception is that it is
false that propositions are intrinsically and essentially representational. Several theorists have voiced
their rejection of this claim. For instance, Speaks (King et al., 2014, p. 147) characterises as follows
the belief on the alleged representational character of propositions that he, King and Soames all reject:
‘Here’s one thing that the three of us have in common: we all dislike the idea that
propositions could be entities that are intrinsically representational — in the sense that
they both are representational and would exist and be representational, even if there were
no subjects around to do any representing.’
The problem for the Classical Conception is thus that it requires that there be entities that are
representational without its representational properties being explained in terms of the activities of
subjects doing the representing. But it is difficult to see how this can be. My view is the same as that
of King, Soames, Speaks and others, namely, that there could not be any entities that were intrinsically
representational. Since there could not be any entities that were intrinsically representational, the
Classical Conception is false.
Moreover, I side with theorists such as Speaks and Stalnaker in thinking that propositions not
only aren’t intrinsically representational, but also aren’t essentially representational. The thought that
propositions are essentially representational creates, as Stalnaker (2012, p. 10) puts it, an ‘illusion
of a problem’. What needs to be explained is not why propositions are essentially representational,
since they are not. Rather ‘What needs to be explained is how things that express propositions — that
represent the world as being some way — can express the propositions that they express’ (Stalnaker,
2012, p. 10).
Arguably, the main challenge to the position on the representational character of propositions that
I am advocating is to explain how it can be that propositions have truth-conditions intrinsically and
essentially, despite the fact that they are not intrinsically nor essentially about things.
Let us consider the case of properties. Just as propositions are true and false, properties are
intrinsically and essentially true and false of things. But properties are not essentially representational
entities. They are not about anything. For instance, the property of being red does not represent
anything, and is not about anything.
Of course, there is a different sense of ‘being about’, according to which a property is indeed
about things. In this sense, the property of being red is about roses, poppies, tomatoes and the other
red things. But, in general, properties are not essentially ‘about’ the things that they are true of. For
instance, if things had been otherwise, then redness would not have been true of the things that are
actually red. More importantly, properties are not ‘about’ the things that they are true of insofar as
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they represent them. They are ‘about’ the things that they are true of insofar as they are true of these
things. Properties represent nothing, at least not intrinsically nor essentially.
If properties are true of things, and yet do not represent things, there is room to reject the view
that propositions, insofar as they are true, represent the world. The analogy with the case of properties
is especially ﬁtting in the present context. The reason is that propositions are here being assumed to
be 0-ary relations, i.e., things that are true or false, but not of anything. Thus, 0-ary relations are in
this respect just like other relations. They are true or false despite the fact that they do not represent
the world.
The objection to the view that propositions are not essentially representational can be made more
precise. It is typically thought that truth depends on two things, namely on the way the world is
represented to be, and on the world being that way. But then, if propositions are not essentially
representational, they cannot have their truth-conditions essentially. This is quite bizarre.
I do not think that the view that propositions are not essentially representational requires giving
up the view that propositions have their truth-conditions essentially. Again, the view that propositions
are 0-ary relations can be helpful to disentangle these issues. Insofar as propositions are 0-ary relations,
to say that a proposition p is true — i.e., to say that it is true that p — is to attribute a higher-order
property to p. On the other hand, to say that a sentence is true is to attribute a ﬁrst-order property
to the sentence. It is indeed correct that an individual has the ﬁrst-order property of being true if
and only if that individual represents the world as being a certain way, and the world is that way. But
it can be resisted that a proposition has the higher-order property of being true that just in case it
represents the world as being a certain way and the world is that way. The ﬁrst-order property and the
higher-order property are different properties, even though they are obviously closely connected.
On my view it is incorrect to say, for instance, that for an entity to represent the world as being a
certain way and the world to be that way just is for the entity to have some proposition p as its content
and for p to represent the world as being that way. Rather, for an entity to represent the world as
being a certain way just is for the entity to have some proposition p as its content, and for the world to
be that way just is for it to be true that p.28
It is often said that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. I think that talk of
priority may also lead to the illusion of a problem. If sentences and the like are true or false derivatively,
i.e., only insofar as their contents are intrinsically and essentially true or false, it is somewhat natural
to assume that sentences and the like represent derivatively, only insofar as their contents intrinsically
and essentially represent. This thought is already in tension with the view that representation is
something that agents do. Moreover, I do not think that there is any interesting sense of priority here.
For instance, I think that it is at best misguided to think that the truth of a sentence is, for instance,
inherited in some way from the truth of the proposition that is its content. Rather, for the sentence to
be true just is for there to be some proposition p such that the sentence has p as its content and for it
28See (King et al., 2014, ch. 11) for similar considerations in defence of the view that propositions are neither intrinsically
nor essentially representational.
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to be true that p.
This concludes the defence of Propositional Necessitism. In the next section I will show how the
arguments for Propositional Necessitism may be extended to arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism.
3.8 From Propositional Necessitism to Higher-Order Necessitism
I will begin by presenting arguments, analogous to the modal arguments, for the following thesis:
Property Necessitism.
1. Necessarily, every property of things of any type is necessarily something.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2∃Y〈t〉(X = Y )).
The main presupposition of the arguments to be presented is that the quantiﬁers stand for higher-order
properties. Let ‘Ix’ be the none quantiﬁer, to be read as ‘no thing x’. The argument to be given
presupposes the following: i) necessarily, ∃xtϕ if and only if the property of being a ϕ has the property
I〈〈t〉〉 of being instantiated; ii) necessarily, Ixtϕ if and only if the property of being a ϕ has the
propertyN〈〈t〉〉 of not being instantiated; and iii) ∀xtϕ if and only if the property of being a ϕ has the
property A〈〈t〉〉 of being coextensive with the property of identity.
The thought that the quantiﬁers correspond to properties of properties has been given to us at
our fathers’ knees. Frege (1980a,b) held the view that quantiﬁers stands for concepts of concepts,
and Russell (1905) that quantiﬁers stand for properties of propositional functions. The view that
quantiﬁers are higher-order entities is also the one presupposed by generalised quantiﬁcation theory,
with generalised quantiﬁers being understood as relations between relations.29
The premises of the Something Or Nothing Argument, an argument analogous to the Possibility Or
Impossibility Argument, are the following:
Premises of the Something Or Nothing Argument
(P1-SNA) Something Or Nothing.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, something is anX〈t〉 or nothing is anX〈t〉.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xtXx ∨IxtXx).
(P2-SNA) Existential Quantiﬁer.
1. Necessarily, for every property X〈t〉, necessarily, if something is an X〈t〉, then X〈t〉 has the
property of being instantiated.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xtXx→ I〈〈t〉〉X).
(P3-SNA) None Quantiﬁer.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, if nothing is anX〈t〉, thenX〈t〉 has the property
of being empty.
29Of course, the view that quantiﬁers are higher-order entities presupposes that there are, or could have been, higher-order
entities. But, on its own, it does not imply that higher-order entities are necessary beings. Moreover, note that if there could
not have been any higher-order entities, then Higher-Order Necessitism is trivially true. Thus, Nominalism — understood




(P4-SNA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
It should be clear how the argument proceeds, and so I will not go through it. The justiﬁcation
for the thesis of Something Or Nothing is analogous to the justiﬁcation for the thesis of Possibility
Or Impossibility. Even though higher-order modal languages do not typically contain the quantiﬁer
‘I’, this quantiﬁer may be added unproblematically. The logic governing it is easily obtained from
that of the existential quantiﬁer. All instances of the schema 2(Ixϕ ↔ ¬∃xϕ) are added as
axioms. All instances of the schema 2(∃xϕ ∨ ¬∃xϕ) are instances of Excluded Middle, and so all
instances of 2(∃xϕ ∨ ¬∃xϕ) are theorems of very weak and uncontroversial higher-order modal
logics. From 2(Ixϕ↔ ¬∃xϕ) and 2(∃xϕ ∨ ¬∃xϕ) it follows that 2(∃xϕ ∨Ixϕ). The truth of
every instance of this schema reﬂects the fact that it holds for all possible properties. Thus, it is true
that 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xtXx ∨IxtXx).
The theses of Existential Quantiﬁer and None Quantiﬁer are justiﬁed by the view that quantiﬁers
are to be understood in terms of higher-order properties. Finally, Thorough Serious Actualism has
been defended in §3.3.
I will brieﬂy present the premises of the Something or Everything Argument and of the Something
Argument. These are arguments for Property Necessitism analogous to, respectively, the Possibility or
Necessity Argument and the Possibility Argument:
Premises of the Something Or Everything Argument
(P1-SEA) Something Or Everything.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, something is anX〈t〉 or everything is not an
X〈t〉.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xtXx ∨ ∀xt¬Xx).
(P2-SEA) Existential Quantiﬁer.
(P3-SEA) Universal Quantiﬁer.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, if everything is not anX〈t〉, then xˆ(¬X〈t〉x)
has the property of being coextensive with the property of identity.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∀xt¬Xx→ A〈〈t〉〉xˆt(¬Xx)).
(P4-SEA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
(P5-SEA) Contradictoriness for Properties.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, its contradictory xˆ(¬Xx) is something.
2. 2∀X〈t〉∃Y〈t〉(xˆt(¬Xx) = Y ).
The following are the premises of the Something Argument:
Premises of the Something Argument
(P1-SA) Something.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, something is anX〈t〉 or something is not an
X〈t〉.
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2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xtXx ∨ ∃xt¬Xx).
(P2-SA) Existential Quantiﬁer.
(P3-SA) Existential Quantiﬁer 2.
1. Necessarily, for every propertyX〈t〉, necessarily, if something is not anX〈t〉, then xˆ(¬X〈t〉x)
has the property of instantiated.
2. 2∀X〈t〉2(∃xt¬Xx→ I〈〈t〉〉xˆt(¬Xx)).
(P4-SA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
(P5-SA) Contradictoriness for Properties.
Both arguments proceed as expected. Note that the thesis of Something implies that, for every type t,
it is necessary that, there is some entity of type t. As mentioned in §3.3, theorists committed to prima
facie innocuous theses, such as the necessary being of the empty set, are immediately committed to
the claim that it is necessary that there is some individual. What about the remaining types? Arguably,
for every type t, it is the case that relation R is something, where R is that relation which is such
that necessarily, things are R-related if and only if they are self-identical and are not self-identical.
There is also that relation S that is such that necessarily, things are S-related if and only if they are
self-identical. Arguably, this shows that the claim that for every type t it is necessary that there is some
thing of that type is not an unpalatable consequence of the thesis of Something.
The arguments just presented may be extended to the case of relations. Let ∃∃ be a quantiﬁer
just like the existential quantiﬁer, except that it binds n variables at a time. Similarly for II and
∀∀, with the appropriate changes.30 Moreover, let ‘I〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉’ stand for the property of relations of
type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 of being instantiated by a n-ary sequence of entities. Similarly for N〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉 and
A〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉, with the appropriate changes.
According to the intendedmeaning of the quantiﬁer expression ∃∃, the following holds: necessarily,
∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnϕ if and only if the relation holding between x1t1 , . . . , xntn such that ϕ is such that it has
property I〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉. Similarly forII and ∀∀, with the appropriate changes.
The following argument establishes the truth of (every instance of) Higher-Order Necessitism:
Premises of the Sometimes Or Never Argument
(P1-SsNA) Sometimes Or Never.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn ∨IIx1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn)
(P2-SsNrA) Sometimes Quantiﬁer.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn → I〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉X).
(P3-SsNrA) Never Quantiﬁer.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(IIx1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn → N〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉X).
(P4-SsNrA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
30These quantiﬁers are close to Lewis’s unselective quantiﬁers which, according to Lewis (1998, p. 9-10), may ‘show up’
as the adverbs of quantiﬁcation ‘sometimes’, ‘never’ and ‘always’. The main difference is that Lewis’s unselective quantiﬁers
simply bind all the variables in a formula ϕ. For instance, Lewis (1998, p. 10) offers the following semantic account of his
unselective quantiﬁer ‘∃’: ‘∃Φ is true iff Φ is true under some admissible assignment of values to all variables free in Φ’.
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Let ‘xˆ1t1 . . . , x
n
tn(ϕ)’ stand for the relation holding between x
1
t1 , . . . , x
n
tn such that ϕ. The follow-
ing arguments are the analogues of, respectively, the Something Or Everything Argument and the
Something Argument:
Premises of the Sometimes Or Always Argument
(P1-SsAA) Sometimes or Always.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn ∨ ∀∀x1t1 . . . xntn¬Xx1 . . . xn).
(P2-SsAA) Sometimes Quantiﬁer.
(P3-SsAA) Always Quantiﬁer.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∀∀x1t1 . . . xntn¬Xx1 . . . xn → A〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉xˆ1t1 . . . xntn(¬Xx1 . . . xn)).
(P4-SsAA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
(P5-SsAA) Contradictoriness for Relations.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉∃Y〈t1,...,tn〉(xˆ1t1 . . . xntn(¬Xx1 . . . xn) = Y ).
Premises of the Sometimes Argument
(P1-SsA) Sometimes.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn ∨ ∃∃x1t1 . . . xntn¬Xx1 . . . xn).
(P2-SsA) Sometimes Quantiﬁer.
(P3-SsA) Sometimes Quantiﬁer 2.
• 2∀X〈t1,...,tn〉2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntn¬Xx1 . . . xn → I〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉xˆ1t1 . . . xntn(¬Xx1 . . . xn)).
(P4-SsA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
(P5-SsA) Contradictoriness for Relations.
The defence of the cogency of the modal arguments should give an idea of how the cogency of the
arguments for Property Necessitism and Higher-Order Necessitism may be defended of criticism. I
will now turn to arguments for a related higher-order modal principle.
Schematic versions of the premises of the arguments offered so far in this section enable the
formulation of an argument for a principle stronger than Higher-Order Necessitism, namely, the
following (quite strong) comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic:
Cˆomp. 2∃X〈t1,...,tn〉(xˆ1t1 , . . . , xntn(ϕ) = X)
In Cˆomp,X is not free inϕ and the result of preﬁxing Cˆomp with any sequence of universal quantiﬁers
of any type (binding parameters in ϕ) and necessity operators, in any order, is an instance of Cˆomp.
Principle Cˆomp has every instance of the following schema as one of its instances:
2∀Y〈t1,...,tn〉2∃X〈t1,...,tn〉(xˆ1t1 , . . . , xntn(Y x1t1 . . . xntn) = X).
This schema is equivalent to Higher-Order Necessitism, and so higher-order contingentists must
reject Cˆomp on pain of contradiction.
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Principle Cˆomp is not only at least as strong as Higher-Order Necessitism but also strictly stronger
since Higher-Order Necessitism is consistent with the falsity of some instances of Cˆomp. For instance,
Higher-Order Necessitism does not imply that for any properties P and Q there is the property of
being both a P and a Q, even though this is a consequence of Cˆomp.
A principle equivalent to Cˆomp has been recently defended in (Williamson, 2013, §6). Whereas
Williamson offers abductive considerations in favour of that principle, schematic versions of the
premises of the arguments given above for higher-order necessitism enable the formulation of deductive
arguments for Cˆomp.
For instance, the following schematic version of the premises of the Sometimes Or Never argument
imply Cˆomp:
Premises of the Schematic Sometimes Or Never Argument
(P1-SSsNeA) Sometimes Or Never Schema.
• 2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnϕ ∨IIx1t1 . . . xntnϕ),
where the result of preﬁxing (P1-SSsNeA) with any sequence of universal quantiﬁers of any type
(binding parameters in ϕ) and necessity operators, in any order, is an instance of (P1-SSsNeA).
(P2-SSsNeA) Sometimes Quantiﬁer Schema.
• 2(∃∃x1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn → I〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉xˆ1t1 . . . xntn(ϕ)),
where the result of preﬁxing (P2-SSsNeA) with any sequence of universal quantiﬁers of any type
(binding parameters in ϕ) and necessity operators, in any order, is an instance of (P2-SSsNeA).
(P3-SSsNeA) Never Quantiﬁer Schema.
• 2(IIx1t1 . . . xntnXx1 . . . xn → N〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉xˆ1t1 . . . xntn(ϕ)),
where the result of preﬁxing (P3-SSsNeA) with any sequence of universal quantiﬁers of any type
(binding parameters in ϕ) and necessity operators, in any order, is an instance of (P3-SSsNeA).
(P4-SSsNeA) Thorough Serious Actualism.
It should be clear that (P1-SSsNeA) - (P4-SSsNeA) together imply Cˆomp, and that this principle is
also implied by schematic versions of the Sometimes Or Always Argument and of the Sometimes
Argument.
It was shown that the modal arguments for Propositional Necessitism indicate the way to analogous
arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism, and indeed for principle Cˆomp. My own take is that
higher-order contingentists should regard the ﬁrst premises of these arguments as their weakest
premises, just as in the case of the modal arguments.
These premises consist of very weak logical principles. Higher-order contingentists should thus
reject the truth of claims such as the claim that necessarily, for every propertyX , necessarily, something
is an X or everything isn’t. Yet, these claims are supported by unreﬂective common sense. It is no
wonder that they are principles of very weak logics, since they at least have the appearance of truisms.
Arguably, at this point it is best to start focusing on the question what is the correct higher-order
necessitist (higher-order) modal theory, leaving Higher-Order Contingentism behind.
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3.9 Conclusion
The main aim of the present chapter was that of offering a defence of Propositional Necessitism.
Several arguments for this thesis were presented. Since all the arguments presupposed the truth of
Thorough Serious Actualism, a preliminary defence of this thesis was mounted. It was shown how
Salmon’s objection to Thorough Serious Actualism may be rejected. Moreover, a direct argument
for Thorough Serious Actualism was offered. Finally, it was seen that Salmon appears to accept all
the premises of this argument, and so to hold inconsistent commitments. The discussion revealed
the plausibility of the premises of the argument for Thorough Serious Actualism, and the kinds of
reasons supporting them. In particular, the argument is based on an understanding of quantiﬁcation
as higher-order predication.
The arguments for Propositional Necessitism here given were based on an understanding of modal
expressions according to which these stand for properties of propositions. I showed that an alternative
account of modal expressions, based on the notion of truth at a world, does not offer the means to
reject the cogency of some of the arguments for Propositional Necessitism. On the contrary, the
arguments go through unscathed even under this alternative account. It was also shown that a natural
way of amending the account of modal expressions in terms of truth at a world, in such a way as to
reject the cogency of the arguments for Propositional Necessitism, is ultimately based on an erroneous
understanding of modality.
Then, it was shown that the deeper understanding of modality afforded by Kripke semantics
presupposes an understanding of modalities as properties of propositions. Thus, from the standpoint
of propositional contingentists the problematic assumptions of the arguments for Propositional
Necessitism are their ﬁrst premises, and so the truth of these premises must be rejected by propositional
contingentists. Yet, the ﬁrst premises of these arguments are based on principles of propositional
modal logic that are often regarded as constituting very weak commitments. Moreover, eschewing
these very weak principles seems to require abandoning expressive resources for talking about what
might have been that are ordinarily appealed to.
Afterwards, the Classical Account was revisited, given its prima facie incompatibility with Proposi-
tional Necessitism. The incompatibility between the Classical Account and Propositional Necessitism
arises form the fact that, according to the account, propositions are things that are intrinsically and
essentially representational. But this is a problematic commitment of the account, independently of
whether Propositional Necessitism is true. The view that things may represent independently of the
activities of the subjects doing the representing is surely wrong.
A different problem was also addressed, namely, how may propositions have truth-conditions
intrinsically and essentially, and thus independently of the activities of subjects doing the represent-
ing, and yet not be representational. The answer, I have suggested, consists in seeing truth, qua a
property of propositions, as a species of instantiation. Properties are true or false of things and yet
are not representational entities. At most, it is the predicates expressing those properties that are
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representational entities. Similarly, propositions are true or false and yet are not representational
entities. It is sentences that are representational. For a sentence to represent just is for it to have some
proposition as its content. And for a sentence to have the ﬁrst-order property of being true just is for
the proposition that is (contingently) its content to have the higher-order property of being true or
obtaining. For a sentence to be contingently representational just is for it to contingently express a
proposition.
Finally, arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism analogous to the modal arguments for Proposi-
tional Necessitism were presented. It was also shown that schematic versions of the arguments for
Higher-Order Necessitism support a stronger claim, namely, the comprehension principle Cˆomp. The
cogency of the arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism and Cˆomp is supported by considerations
similar to the ones adduced in favour of the cogency of the modal arguments.
Given the defences of Propositional Necessitism and Higher-Order Necessitism just presented,
the question becomes which higher-order necessitist theory is the correct higher-order modal theory.
In chapter 5 it is shown that two of the main candidate higher-order necessitists theories turn out to
be equivalent, despite their prima facie rivalry. The argument for the equivalence between these two
theories appeals to the Synonymy Account of theory equivalence. The aim of the next chapter is to
develop and defend this account.
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4The Synonymy Account of Theory
Equivalence: Noneism and Quineanism
4.1 Introduction
The primary aim of the present chapter is to propose an account of equivalence between theories in
metaphysics, the Synonymy Account, and to defend its adequacy.1 The notion of theory equivalence
being captured is one concerned with what theories say, i.e., concerning ‘the relationship between
theory and world’.2 A subsidiary aim of the chapter is to apply the account to the debate in metaphysics
between noneists, proponents of the claim that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of
the thesis that to exist just is to be some thing.
The Synonymy Account has two components. The ﬁrst component consists in an explication of
theory equivalence as theory synonymy. Roughly, two theories are synonymous just in case i) they assert
of the same propositions that they stand in the same entailment relations, and ii) are committed to the
truth of the same propositions. As shall be seen, the explication to be offered owes much to the formal
work developed in (Kuhn, 1977). The second component consists in some criteria for determining
when two theories are equivalent. These criteria are heavily inﬂuenced by the work developed in
(Lewis, 1969, 1974, 1983), as well as in (Hirsch, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009).
There are at least three reasons why metaphysicians should be interested in theory equivalence and
the Synonymy Account. The ﬁrst reason has to do with recent debates in metametaphysics (see, e.g.,
the papers in (Chalmers et al., 2009)) concerning whether metaphysical disputes are insubstantial,
and, if so, why. Arguably, theory equivalence offers a sufficient reason for a metaphysical dispute to be
insubstantial, at least on one way of understanding insubstantial. If two metaphysical theories turn
out to be equivalent, then the debate as to which one is true is insubstantial. Thus, if the Synonymy
Account of theory equivalence is correct, then it should prove useful to those interested in the debate
concerning the insubstantiality of metaphysical debates.
1The Synonymy Account is expected to be also correct account of equivalence between theories in other areas of inquiry,
but this is not the focus of the present chapter.
2See (van Fraassen, 1980, ch. 4, §4).
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A different reason why accounts of theory equivalence should be of interest to metaphysicians
is that an improved comprehension of theory equivalence promises to afford metaphysicians with a
better understanding of certain debates, and of what is or should be at stake in those debates. As will
be shown, the Synonymy Account delivers the result that it is often more illuminating to understand
what is at stake in certain metaphysical debates, such as the debate between noneists and Quineans, as
concerning whether certain expressive resources are required in order to better describe the world.
Also, the Synonymy Account predicts that certain debates in metaphysics are better construed as
concerning whether certain theories are true and should be accepted, instead of having to do with the
truth of the particular slogans used to provide initial characterisations of theories. By ‘slogans’ what is
meant is the initial description of a certain theory as, for instance, Quinean or noneist. Slogans can
be misleading. For instance, the theses of Quineanism and noneism are, prima facie, contradictory.
Yet, theories initially characterised as noneist may turn out to be equivalent to theories initially
characterised as Quinean (in which case what proponents of a theory mean with these theses is not
what the proponents of the other theory mean with them). Some considerations are offered, in this
and in the next chapter, as to why theorists may end up meaning different things with the slogans
initially used to characterise their theories.
A third reason why metaphysicians should be interested in an account of theory equivalence
concerns progress in metaphysics. A direct way of achieving progress concerns ascertaining the truth
or falsehood of one or another theory. A more indirect way of achieving progress is by ascertaining
the equivalence between certain theories, since the success of a theory typically depends on how well
it fares in comparison with its rivals. By appealing to an account of theory equivalence it is possible
to avoid double counting: in general, the merits and shortcomings of a theory are also merits and
shortcomings of the theories that are equivalent to it, since these theories bear the same relationship
to the world. To put it differently, since equivalent theories require the same of the world to be true,
the choice between equivalent theories is akin to the choice between two sentences requiring the same
of the world in order to be true.
The chapter is structured as follows. In §2 the reception of noneism byQuineans is considered with
the purpose of extracting some desiderata that should be satisﬁed by accounts of theory equivalence.
The Synonymy Account is presented in §3. First an explication of theory equivalence as Theory
Synonymy is offered, as well as explications of related notions.
Then, in §4, an account of what it takes for a translation scheme to be deeply correct is given,
and some principles for determining when this is so are presented. These views are coupled to the
explication of theory equivalence as theory synonymy to extract the Synonymy Account.
In §5 the Synonymy Account is applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans. It is
ﬁrst shown that the account satisﬁes the desiderata laid out in §2. Afterwards, it is shown that the
Synonymy Account affords a better understanding of the dialectic between noneists and Quineans
and can be expected to shed light on other debates in metaphysics.
In §6 some objections to the adequacy of the Synonymy Account are addressed. Finally, in §7
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further applications of the account are pointed out.
Before proceeding I will address a worry as to the relevance of the Synonymy Account. The
worry concerns the relationship between theory equivalence and the two main views on the nature of
theories, namely, the syntactic view and the semantic view. According to the syntactic view a theory
consists in (or is adequately represented by) a set of sentences of some formal language.3 According to
the semantic view a theory consists in nothing but a collection of models, where these are understood
as nonlinguistic entities.4
Given the availability of the syntactic and the semantic views, it might be wondered if there is
any need to provide an account of theory equivalence over and above the relation of being the same
theory that arises from these views. The syntactic view gives rise to an account of theory equivalence
according to which two theories are equivalent just in case they consist in the same set of sentences of
some formal language. The semantic view gives rise to an account of theory equivalence according to
which two theories are equivalent just in case they consist in the same set of models.
According to the ﬁrst account there are no two theories that are both equivalent and (non-trivial)
notational variants of one another.5 However, this is not right. It is not because ‘¬’ is used for negation
instead of ‘∼’ and ‘∧’ is used for conjunction instead of ‘&’ that we thereby happen to have two
non-equivalent theories.
According to the second account there are no two theories that are both equivalent and yet consist
in different collections of models. But consider the collection of models consisting in all partially
ordered sets such that every pair of elements has both a least upper bound and a greatest lower
bound and the collection of models consisting in all algebraic structures that satisfy the commutative,
associative and absorption laws. The models in the ﬁrst class consist in pairs of a domain and a relation
on that domain. Models in the second class consist of n-tuples with at least a domain and the joint and
meet operations on that domain, and so all such models are sequences of three or more elements. Thus,
the two collections of models are different. Yet the theories that correspond to the two collections of
models are equivalent, corresponding to the theory of lattices.
Thus, theory equivalence consists in something over and above the relation of being the same
theory that arises from either the syntactic or the semantic views. Hence, even if one of these views
on the nature of theories is correct, an account of theory equivalence is still required.6 I here offer the
3The received view, put forward by Carnap (1956), Feigl (1970) and Hempel (1965), imposes the stronger constraint
according to which theories contain only theoretical terms, which are connected to observational terms via correspondence
rules. These contain both theoretical and observational terms. Here, our interest is not in the received view but just in the
weaker, syntactic view. For a recent defence of the received view and its history, see (Lutz, 2012).
4Different proponents of the semantic view are van Fraassen (1980), Giere (1988), Suppe (1989) and Suppes (2002).
Some of these theorists take theories to be set-theoretic predicates, whereas others take theories to be collections of state
spaces, and even others allow models to consist of somewhat more concrete entities, such as planets and animals.
5Theory T2 is a notational variant of theory T1 just in case there is a 1− 1 function f from the language of T1 to the
language of T2 such that f maps atomic expressions to like atomic expressions (constants to constants, n-ary predicates
to n-ary predicates, connectives to connectives, quantiﬁers to quantiﬁers, etc.), f is compositional, and {f(ϕ) : ϕ is a
commitment of T1} is the set of commitments of T2. Theory T2 is a trivial notational variant of theory T1 if and only if f is
the identity mapping.
6In effect, (Halvorson, 2012) surveys three accounts of theory equivalence that would ﬁt naturally with the semantic
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Synonymy Account of theory equivalence and argue for its adequacy.
4.2 Noneism, Quineanism and Some Desiderata
Typical examples given by noneists of things that do not exist are ﬁctional entities, possibilia and
mathematical entities.7 That is, noneists hold that every ﬁctional entity, possibile and mathematical
entity is something, even though no ﬁctional entity, possibile and mathematical entity exists. According
to them, Santa Claus, the possible seventh son of Kripke and the number pi are all something, and yet
none of them exists.
Noneism has been found to be unintelligible by many philosophers (e.g., (Lycan, 1979), (van
Inwagen, 1998)). These philosophers, supporters of Quineanism, claim an inability to make sense of
the noneist’s distinction between existence and being something. According to them, to exist just is to
be something, and so the claim that some thing does not exist just is the claim that some thing is not
some thing. Since the claim that some thing is not something is not only false but also absurd, several
Quineans ﬁnd noneism unintelligible.
There are ﬁve aspects concerning how Quineans’ should understand and engage with noneism that
constitute data points for an account of theory equivalence. That is, an account of theory equivalence
should be able to accommodate, explain or predict these aspects. The aim of this section is to introduce
these data points, which are present in the discussion of the reception of noneism by Quineans present
in (Lewis, 1990), (Priest, 2011) and (Woodward, 2013).
The ﬁrst aspect concerns something that has already been mentioned, namely, the fact that
sometimes a theory will be understood as being absurd or unintelligible, and not just as false, by the
proponents of another theory. The second aspect concerns the status of a common social language,
such as English, as the means by which proponents of two theories should interpret each other. In
order to ﬂesh out what is at stake, consider the question whether the noneist should interpret the allist
as meaning with ‘some things do not exist’ the same as what the Quinean means with ‘some things do
not exist’, namely, the meaning of the English sentence ‘some things do not exist’.
As previously mentioned, if Quineans interpret noneists in this way then they will take them
to be advocating a view which is absurd or unintelligible. For this reason, Lewis claims that such
interpretation of noneists is a misinterpretation: ‘to impute contradiction gratuitously is to mistranslate’
(Lewis, 1990, p. 26).
Call two words homonymous, in the context of the present paper, just in case they have the same
spelling and pronunciation (thus, according to the way ‘homonymous’ will be used, homonymous
words may have the same meaning). Say that an interpretation is homonymous just in case any word
or sentence used by a speaker is interpreted by his interlocutor as having the same meaning as an
view and shows the inadequacy of each one of them. For a recent exchange concerning the adequacy of the semantic view,
see also(Glymour, 2013) and (Halvorson, 2013). For a different sort of objection to the adequacy of the semantic view, see
(Azzouni, 2014).
7Noneist frameworks are developed in, e.g., (Routley, 1980) and (Priest, 2005).
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homonymous word or sentence of the interpreter’s language. Lewis draws attention to an aspect of
theorising which reveals that homonymous interpretation based on the assumption that proponents
of different theories share a common language may lead to misinterpretation, even when the two
theorists in fact share a language. This aspect concerns the fact that theorists also entertain views on
the meaning of the expressions of their language and that these views inﬂuence the words they chose
to express their commitments.
If proponents of different theories have different views on the meanings of certain expressions of
their common language, and one of them chooses to express his position by appealing to some of these
expressions, then homonymous interpretation is not guaranteed to lead to correct interpretation. The
reason is that the interlocutor will interpret the speaker according to his own views on the meanings
of the expressions of their common language, and thus the interlocutor will miss out on what is said
by the speaker.
To use one of Lewis’s examples, when Berkeley uses the sentence ‘the tree in the quad exists’ to
report one of his commitments, he should not be understood as claiming that the tree in the quad
exists, unless we believe, as he does, that ‘the tree in the quad’ denotes an idea. The problem of
interpreting Berkeley homonymously is that by doing so one misunderstands Berkeley’s commitments.
Since Berkeley holds that everything is mental, if he were to be interpreted homonymously, then he
would be understood as contradicting himself, holding at the same time that something non-mental
exists (namely, the denotation of ‘the tree in the quad’) and that everything is mental. Since Berkeley
is not contradicting himself he should not be interpreted homonymously, regardless of the fact that he
is stating his view in the common language.
The second data point concerning the reception of noneism by Quineans can thus be captured
by the slogan that homonymous interpretation is not sacrosanct. That is, homonymous interpretation
based on the assumption that proponents of two different theories are speaking in a common language
sometimes leads to misinterpretation, even when the two theorists are in fact speaking in a common
language.
A different reason for thinking that homonymous interpretation is not sacrosanct has to do with
the observation that theories come with their own terms of art. An interpretation of the term ‘ﬁtness’,
as used in biological theory, as meaning the same as ‘ﬁtness’ used in the vernacular would lead to
misinterpretation.
For simplicity, assume that in such cases there are two different homonymous terms here, rather
than one ambiguous term. There are thus two reasons why homonymous interpretation is not sacro-
sanct, even when theorists are in fact speaking in a common language. The ﬁrst reason is that theorists
may have disagreeing views on the meanings of some terms used. The second reason is that some of
the terms employed may be terms of art of the theory. These terms should not be assumed to have the
same meaning as homonymous terms of the vernacular.
The third data point can be captured by the slogan that theories are (sometimes) incommensurable.
Sometimes a theory lacks the conceptual resources to fully interpret a different theory. This point is
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made with respect to the relationship between Quineanism and noneism by both Lewis (1990), a
Quinean, and Priest (2011), a noneist.
Since homonymous interpretation leads to imputing a commitment to an absurdity, Lewis holds
that Quineans should interpret noneists non-homonymously. He suggests that when noneists claim
that Santa Claus, the seventh son of Kripke and the number pi are all something, Quineans should
understand them as claiming that Santa Claus, the seventh son of Kripke and the number pi all exist.
More generally, Lewis holds that Quineans should understand ‘is something’, as used by noneists, as
having the same meaning as ‘exists’ as used by Quineans. Thus, according to him, Quineans should
understand noneists as advocating allism, the position according to which ﬁctional entities, possibilia,
mathematical entities and the like all exist.
Importantly, Lewis holds that interpreting noneists as allists does not suffice to make noneism ( fully)
understandable to Quineans. He argues that (several) Quineans do not have available the linguistic
resources required for understanding the noneist’s use of ‘exists’ since, for instance, Quineans should
not understand ‘exists’ as meaning the same as ‘is present’, nor as ‘is actual’. The reason is that even
when the noneist says that it is exactly the present or actual things that, speaking as they do, exist, he
still takes this to be a substantive claim.
Thus, according to Lewis, Quineans should understand noneists as being committed to there
being a certain distinction between all things, and take them to use ‘exists’ to mark that distinction.
But this does not suffice to make Quineans fully understand the noneist position, since they do not
have available the conceptual resources required to understand the noneists’ use of ‘exists’. That is,
they cannot themselves talk about the distinction between things that is picked out by the noneists’
use of ‘exists’.
Priest explicitly rejects the view that Quineans should interpret the noneists’ ‘is something’ as
meaning the same as what they mean with ‘exists’. Instead, he holds that Quineans should interpret
‘is something’ homonymously. Still, the point that the Quinean theory may just lack the resources
allowing Quineans to fully understand noneists is also made by Priest. Thus, according to him,
‘There is absolutely no reason why, in a dispute between noneists and Quineans, every-
thing said by one side must be translated into terms intelligible to the other. No one
ever suggested that the notions of Special Theory of Relativity need to be translated into
categories that make sense in Newtonian Dynamics (or vice versa); (...). Though there
may be partial overlap, each side may just have to learn a new language game.’ (Priest,
2011, p. 251)
That is, according to Priest, it may just happen that the theory held by some philosophers does
not afford them the resources required to fully understand a different theory. In other words, the
proponents of a theory may lack the resources to fully understand a different theory in terms of the
former theory’s language.
Thus, Lewis and Priest both hold that Quineans lack the expressive resources to fully understand
noneists. One quick remark. It is not meant by this that Lewis and Priest hold that there are expressive
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resources such that, if Quineans had them, then they would be able to fully understand noneists. From
the fact that Quineans do not possess the expressive resources allowing them to fully understand
the noneist theory it does not follow that there are expressive resources such that Quineans do not
possess them and that are such that, if Quineans possessed them, they would be able to understand
the noneist.
In effect, Lewis and Priest differ in this respect. Priest holds that noneists have available more
expressive resources than the ones that are available to the Quinean, whereas Lewis holds that there
are no such extra expressive resources to be had. According to Lewis, the sentences of the noneists’
language that Quineans cannot interpret are uninterpretable tout court. These sentences simply fail to
express a proposition.
The fourth and ﬁfth data points are present in Woodward’s discussion of the relationship between
noneism and allism. Woodward has recently argued that noneism and allism are one and the same
view. He argues in the following way:
‘Now imagine that we rewrite our noneism theory: whereas previously we said that an
object exists, we now say that an object is actually concrete, and where we previously said
that an object is self-identical, we now say that an object exists. No one seriously thinks
that this relabelling exercise has changed anything: all we’ve done is rewritten the theory
in a different way. But our rewritten noneist theory just is allism and our new quantiﬁers
are deﬁned in exactly the same way as Quine’s!’ (Woodward, 2013, p. 191)
What Woodward is alluding to in this passage is the existence of a certain translation from the noneist
vocabulary to the allist vocabulary, proposed by him, where ‘exists’ is translated as ‘actually concrete’
and ‘something’ is translated as ‘exists’. Woodward claims that this translation ‘is guaranteed to always
take us from truths to truths and from falsehoods to falsehoods’ (Woodward, 2013), and takes this to
be evidence for the claim that noneism just is allism.
The present interest is not in Woodward’s claim that noneism is allism. Even though, as shall
be seen, there is indeed a sense in which noneism just is allism, this claim must be qualiﬁed in ways
absent in Woodward’s discussion. Instead, the present interest is in two observations that fall out of
Woodward’s discussion. The ﬁrst is the observation that theories that would appear to be contradictory
if interpreted homonymously are sometimes equivalent. Woodward’s argument, if successful, shows
that noneism and allism are one such pair of theories. Furthermore, even if his argument for the
equivalence of noneism and allism turns out to be unsuccessful, once it is seen that homonymous
interpretation sometimes leads to misinterpretation it can be seen that there can be pairs of equivalent
theories that would appear to be contradictory if homonymously interpreted.
The second data point we take from Woodward’s discussion is his appeal to translations as a
means of showing that ‘there is total overlap between the conceptual resources of the two theories’
(Woodward, 2013, p. 191).
Summing up, the discussion involving the Quinean’s reception of noneism reveals that a good
account of theory individuation …
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1. …should predict the conditions under which it is likely for a theory to be received as absurd by
the proponents of another theory;
2. …should not have homonymous interpretation as a mandatory facet of the interpretation of the
content of one theory by the proponents of another theory, even when the proponents of the
two theories are members of the same linguistic community (broadly speaking);
3. …should allow for cases in which a theory is intelligible to the proponents of another theory
even though the ﬁrst theory cannot be fully understood in terms of the resources afforded by
the second theory;
4. …should explain how theories that would appear to be contradictory if interpreted homonymously
are sometimes equivalent, and offer the means of predicting when this will happen;
5. …should yield conditions under which translations such as the one proposed by Woodward
count in favour of the claim that ‘there is total overlap between the conceptual resources of the
two theories’.
4.3 The Synonymy Account
4.3.1 Formulations of Theories
The synonymy relation is speciﬁed in terms of what will be called a formulation of a theory. A formulation
of a theory T consists in a triple FT = 〈LT , SeqT , ComT 〉, where LT is a language — by ‘language’
is meant, in this context, nothing more than a set of interpreted sentences —, SeqT is a subset of the
set of sequents of LT , and ComT is a subset of LT .
The idea behind a formulation of a theory is that, whatever the ultimate nature of a theory is, a
theory is formulated in a certain language. The set LT is a language in which the theory is formulated.
This set consists in a set of sentences, understood as meaningful strings, and so decomposable into
syntactic strings and their meanings (or so it will be assumed). Moreover, it is a language in the sense
that it is the language of a community, not just in the sense of being a collection of (interpreted)
sentences.
This being said, ‘language’ and ‘sentence’ will sometimes be used in other ways. For instance,
sometimes ‘sentence’ will be used to talk solely of the syntactic strings, their meanings being abstracted
away. And sometimes ‘language’ will be used to speak of sets of such sentences, now understood as
syntactic strings with their meanings being abstracted away. I will rely on context to disambiguate
between these senses of ‘sentence’ and ‘language’.
The setSeqT consists in the set of sequents ofLT that the theory is committed to being entailments.
That is, the set of pairs 〈Γ, ϕ〉, where Γ ⊆ LT and ϕ ∈ LT , such that, according to the proponents of
T , the propositions expressed by Γ entail the proposition expressed by ϕ. I will be calling SeqT the
entailment relation of formulation FT of theory T . I will write Γ (T ϕ whenever 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ SeqT .
Finally, the set ComT is the set of sentences of LT to whose truth theory T is committed. That is,
ComT is the set of sentences of LT that, according to the proponents of T , express true propositions.
108
I will be calling ComT the set of commitments of formulation FT of theory T . In what follows I will
for the most part use ‘theory T ’ instead of ‘theory given by formulation FT ’
Two assumptions will be in place with respect to the commitments and entailment relation of FT .
The ﬁrst assumption is that ComT is the same set as the set of sentences ϕ such that ComT (T ϕ.
The second assumption is that the entailment relation of FT is Tarskian, i.e., that it is reﬂexive, transitive
and monotonic.
Before proceeding, let me note that, as with ‘sentence’, I will be using the word ‘entailment’ to talk
about two different relations, namely, a relation between sentences and a relation between propositions.
I will take a set Γ of sentences to entail a sentence ϕ just in case the propositions expressed by each
γ ∈ Γ jointly entail the proposition expressed by ϕ. And, as with ‘sentence’, context will make clear
which one of these relations is the one under discussion. Not only will it be assumed that entailment,
qua relation between sentences, is Tarskian, it will also be assumed that entailment, qua relation
between propositions, is a Tarskian relation as well.8
For illustration, consider a ﬁrst-order language LFL1 without identity and containing as its only
non-logical expressions the constant a and the unary predicate P . An example of a formulation
of a theory consists in the triple FL1 = 〈LFL1, SeqFL1, ComFL1〉, where SeqFL1 is the set of
all multiple premise/single conclusion sequents in language LFL1 which are classically valid, and
ComFL1 = {ϕ : Pa (FL1 ϕ}.
Let me make some observations concerning theories and their formulations. The proponents of a
theory T may have mistaken views on the meanings of some of the sentences of a language LT . For
instance, there could be proponents of a theory T , formulated in English, that had erroneous views on
the semantics of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. According to them, ‘Hesperus’ would refer to Venus,
whereas ‘Phosphorus’ would refer to Sirius A. On the described scenario, it may be supposed that
ComT contains the sentence ‘Hesperus is a planet’ and also contains the sentence ‘Phosphorus is not
a planet’, even though proponents of T are not contradicting themselves in any way. Rather, they just
have mistaken views on the semantics of English.
For this reason, even if LT is an interpreted language, one must be aware of the fact that the
sentences in ComT might not, according to the proponents of T , express the propositions that they in
fact express. Similarly, proponents of T may take the sentences occurring in the sequents in SeqT to
express different propositions than the ones actually expressed by those sentences. The synonymy
relation will be sensitive to the fact that theorists may have erroneous views on the semantics of the
language in which their theory is formulated.
A second observation concerns the relationship between formulations of theories and theories
themselves. There are two ways in which theories and their formulations come apart. On the one
hand, theories may be formulated in different languages, and so they may have different formulations.
On the other hand, strictly, speaking, a formulation of a theory may also be a formulation of a different
8A relation R on ℘(X) × X is: i) reﬂexive if and only if, if γ ∈ Γ, then 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ R; ii) transitive if and only if, if
〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ R for all ϕ ∈ Γ′ and 〈Γ′, ψ〉 ∈ R, then 〈Γ, ψ〉 ∈ R; iii) monotonic if and only if, if 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ R and Γ ⊆ Γ′,
then 〈Γ′, ϕ〉 ∈ R.
109
theory. For instance, two theories may contain the sentence ‘Phosphorus is a planet’ among their
commitments, but because one theory is committed to Venus being a planet, whereas the other theory
is committed to Sirius A being a planet.
Finally, and in connection to the discussion in the introduction, concerning the semantic view
of theories, note that even formulations of theories appealing to models can be seen as having an
underlying language, entailment relation and commitment set. Suppose that a theory is presented as a
certain subclassX of the classM of models. In such case, a sentence consists in any set belonging to
the powerset ofM , and the language of the theory consists in the powerset ofM (for the present
purposes, to count as a sentence it suffices to be a representation of a way things could have been;
for instance, the language in which the theory is formulated may not even be compositional). The
entailment relation consists in the relation (T such that Γ (T ϕ just in case the intersection of Γ is a
subset of ϕ. Furthermore, the commitment set consists in the class containing all sets of models that
are supersets ofX .9
4.3.2 Theory Synonymy
Roughly, according to the Synonymy Account, two theories are equivalent just in case each has some
formulation such that i) these formulations have the same theoretical structure, a notion made precise
below, and ii) the two theories take the places in this theoretical structure to be occupied by the same
propositions.
The following is a preliminary gloss on the notion of sameness of theoretical structure:
Sameness of theoretical structure (Preliminary Gloss). Theories T1 and T2 have the same theo-
retical structure just in case:
1. T1 and T2 possess the same entailment structure, and
2. the propositions to whose truth T1 is committed and the propositions to whose truth T2 is
committed occupy indiscernible places in their common entailment structure.
If besides possessing the same theoretical structure the occupiers of that structure are the same, then
T1 and T2 are in fact synonymous theories.
4.3.2.1 Entailment Structure
How does one determine the entailment structure of a theory? The following observation will be
helpful later on:
9Arguably, this proposal can also accommodate van Fraassen’s (1980) view, according to which what is asserted by a
theory is that reality can be embedded in some model of a certain set Y of models. Just let ComT consists in all the sets of
models that are supersets of the union of the set Z of sets of models that is such that z belongs to Z if and only if there is
some modelm in Y such that every model in z can be embedded inm.
Also, a more reﬁned account of entailment can be given provided that a relation ∼= between models telling us when two
models are representationally the same — e.g., isomorphism — is available. For each sentence ϕ, let ϕ∼= be that set which,
for each modelm in ϕ, contains the set of all models which bear relation ∼= tom. Then, Γ (T ϕ just in case⋂Γ∼= is a
subset of ϕ∼=, where
⋂
Γ is the intersection of Γ. Yet a different account is possible, provided that a relation ≡ between
sets of models U and V telling us when U and V are representationally the same, is available. Assuming such relation is
available, then Γ ( ϕ just in case⋂Γ ≡ ϕ ∩⋂Γ.
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Commitments of theories. A theory T may claim, roughly, that the proposition expressed by sen-
tence ϕ entails the proposition expressed by sentence ψ while not claiming that the proposition
expressed by ϕ entails the proposition expressed by sentence χ, even though ψ and χ in fact express
the same proposition.
For a rather trivial example, it might be that a = a (T a = a and that a = a 6 (T a = b, despite the
fact that a = a and a = b express, let us assume, the same proposition. Note that this does not mean
that theory T is wrongly committed to the view that a = a and a = b express different propositions.
Also, it does not mean that, according to theory T , the proposition expressed by a = a does not entail
the proposition expressed by a = b. All it shows is that theory T is adopting no commitments with
respect to whether the proposition expressed by a = a entails the proposition expressed by a = b, nor
with respect to whether the propositions expressed by, respectively, a = a and a = b are equivalent.
In general, the fact that ϕ (T ψ even though ϕ 6 (T χ does not show that T is committed to
the view that the proposition expressed by ϕ does not entail the proposition expressed by ψ, nor to
the view that the proposition expressed by ψ is not the same as the proposition expressed by χ. All
it shows is that theory T is not committed to the view that the proposition expressed by ϕ entails
the proposition expressed by ψ, and that theory T is not committed to the view that the proposition
expressed by ψ is the same as the proposition expressed by χ.
For this reason, the previous gloss on the notion of theory synonymy is not correct. What is
asserted by a theory T is not simply that proposition p entails proposition q. Instead, what is asserted is
that the proposition that the proponent of T believes is expressed by sentenceϕ entails the proposition
that the proponent of T believes is expressed by sentence ψ.
Theory T asserts that the proposition that is, according to the proponents of T , expressed by
a = a entails the proposition that is, according to the proponents of T , expressed by a = a. Theory
T expresses no commitments as to whether the proposition that the proponents of T believe to be
expressed by a = a entails the proposition that the proponents of T believe to be expressed by a = b.
I will begin by making precise what is meant with sameness of entailment structure. First, an
incorrect precisiﬁcation is given. By starting this way it is possible to offer extra support for the correct
notion of sameness of theoretical structure, and to gain a deeper understanding of that notion.
One initial thought consists in using sentences to represent what will here be called qua propositions.
Thus, the sentence ϕ can be used to represent the proposition p qua the proposition that is expressed
by ϕ according to proponents of T , and the sentence ψ can be used to represent the proposition q
qua the proposition that is expressed by ψ according to (proponents of) T .
Going along for the moment with this option on how to represent qua propositions, a natural gloss
on the conditions under which the entailment structure of T1 is the same as the entailment structure
of T2 is the following:
Sameness of Entailment Structure (Incorrect). T1 and T2 have the same entailment structure if
and only if there is a bijection f from LT1 to LT2 such that, f(SeqT1) = SeqT2 .
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Here, f(SeqT1) = {f(〈Γ, ϕ〉) : 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ SeqT1}, where f(〈Γ, ϕ〉) = 〈f(Γ), f(ϕ)〉 and
f(Γ) = {f(γ) : γ ∈ Γ}. Thus, f(SeqT1) is to be thought of as a set of sequents in language LT2
which ‘mirrors’ SeqT1 . The reason why f(SeqT1) may be said to ‘mirror’ SeqT1 is that, for each pair
in SeqT1 , there is a ‘mirror pair’ in f(SeqT1). Informally, theories T1 and T2 have the same entailment
structure, according to the present gloss, just in case SeqT2 ‘mirrors’ SeqT1 .
To see why the above gloss on sameness of entailment structure is incorrect, consider theories TI,
TII and TIII. These theories are formulated, respectively in (rudimentary) languages LTI , LTII , LTII ,
where the only sentences of LTI are ⊥, A, B and >, the only sentences of LTII are ⊥, C ,D and >,















For every i ∈ {I, II, III}, let ϕ ≤Ti ψ if and only if there is an arrow mapping ϕ to ψ. Also, say that
ψ ≤Ti Γ if and only if ϕ ≤Ti γ, for every γ ∈ Γ. We deﬁne SeqTi as the set of pairs 〈Γ, ϕ〉 such that,
for every χ ≤Ti Γ: χ ≤Ti ϕ. Thus, for instance A,B (TI ⊥, >, C 6 (TII D, and E,G,> (TIII F .
It should be immediate that there is a bijection f from LTI to LTII such that f(SeqTI) = SeqTII .
Thus, TI and TII count as having the same entailment structure by the above criterion. However, there
is no bijection from LTI/LTII to LTIII . The reason is that these languages have different cardinalities
to begin with.
There is some reason to think that this is the wrong result, and that, instead SeqTI , SeqTII and
SeqTIII all have the same entailment structure. Recall that, so far, the sentences of a theory T are
being used to represent the (qua) propositions expressed by them according to the proponents of T .
This rules out the possibility of identical qua propositions being represented by different sentences.
However, proponents of a theory will want to distinguish between sentences and the propositions
that they express, even if these are qua propositions. That is, proponents of a theory T may take the
proposition expressed by a sentence ϕ to be the same as the proposition expressed by sentence ψ
(independently of what the identity of this proposition happens to be, and independently of whether
ϕ and ψ in fact express the same proposition). In such case, it is wrong to infer that the entailment
structures of T1 and T2 are different solely on the basis that, for instance, the languages of T1 and T2
have different cardinalities.
The previous observation shows that, in general, there is reason to expect that the gloss on sameness
of entailment structure just given will yield the wrong result. Yet, that observation does not, by itself,
constitute a positive reason to think that SeqTIII has the same entailment structure as SeqTI/SeqTII .
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The sameness of theoretical structure between the three theories turns out to be a consequence of the
Propositional Identity Presupposition, to be introduced below. Consider ﬁrst the following hypothesis:
Propositional Identity Hypothesis. Propositions p and q are the same if and only if i) for every set
C of propositions, C entails p if and only if C entails q, and ii) for every set C and proposition
s, C and p entail s if and only if C and q entail s.
Given the Propositional Identity Hypothesis and the assumption that entailment (qua relation between
propositions) is Tarskian, it follows that two propositions are identical just in case each entails the
other.
Thus, the Propositional Identity Hypothesis, together with the assumption that SeqT is Tarskian,
allows an to appeal to the following presupposition:
Propositional Identity Presupposition. For each theory T , ϕ
T
a` ψ only if the proposition ex-
pressed by ϕ according to the proponents of T is the same as the proposition expressed by ψ
according to the proponents of T .
By the Propositional Identity Hypothesis, two propositions are the same if and only if they are
mutually entailing. According to the Propositional Identity Presupposition, if theorists take sentences
S and S′ to express mutually entailing propositions, then, a fortiori, S and S′ express, according to
them, one and the same proposition. They treat the sentences as expressing the same proposition, and
so the sentences express, according to them, the same proposition.
Consider the relations SeqTI (SeqTII) and SeqTIII once more. Despite the fact that there is no
bijection from LTI (LTII) to LTIII , there is a bijection f from the propositions that are, according
to the proponents of TI/TII, expressed by the sentences of LTI (LTII) to the propositions that are,
according to the proponents of TIII, expressed by the sentences of LTIII .
Let f be a function that maps i) the proposition that, according to the proponents of TI, is
expressed by ⊥ to the proposition that is, according to the proponents of TIII, expressed by ⊥, ii)
the proposition that, according to the proponents of TI, is expressed by A to the proposition that,
according to the proponents of TIII, is expressed by E, iii) the proposition that, according to the
proponents of TI, is expressed by B to the proposition that, according to the proponents of TIII, is
expressed by F (i.e., to the proposition that, according to the proponents of TIII, is expressed by G),
and iv) the proposition that, according to the proponents of TI, is expressed by > to the proposition
that, according to the proponents of TIII, is expressed by >. Insofar as it is the case that, for all
sentences ϕ,ψ in the set {⊥, E, F,>}, ϕ )(TIII ψ only if ϕ = ψ, f is a one to one function. And
insofar as F )(TIII G, the function f is also onto, and is thus a bijection.
Furthermore, it should be clear that the propositions that, according to the proponent of TI,
are expressed by the sentences in Γ entail, according to TI, the proposition that, according to the
proponent of TI, is expressed by the sentence ϕ, if and only if the propositions that, according to the
proponent of TIII, are expressed by the sentences in f(Γ) entail, according to TIII, the proposition
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that, according to the proponent of TIII, is expressed by the sentence f(ϕ). Thus, it seems reasonable
to conclude that TI has the same entailment structure as TIII. It is easy to see that a similar function
can be found witnessing the sameness of entailment structure between TII and TIII.
This suggests that the qua propositions that a theory T is about are adequately represented not via
the sentences of LT , but instead via sets of sentences of LT . Let [ϕ])(T be the set of sentences ψ
of LT such that ϕ )(T ψ.10 Then, the qua propositions that T is about can be represented by the
set containing LT /)( = {[ϕ] : ϕ ∈ LT }, the quotient set of LT relative to )(. The entailments
asserted by theory T to obtain between qua propositions can be captured by the entailment relations
asserted by T to obtain between the sets of sentences that, according to the proponent of T , express
those propositions. Let [Γ] = {[γ] : γ ∈ Γ}, and Seq)(T = {〈[Γ], [ϕ]〉 : Γ (T ϕ}. The entailment
relations asserted by theory T to obtain between qua propositions can thus be captured by the relation
Seq)(T .
Consider an example. For each i ∈ {I, II, III}, let [ϕ] ≤ )(Ti [ψ] if and only if ϕ (Ti ψ. The















Figure 4.6: ≤ )(TIII
The diagrams also allow for the representation of the relations Seq)(TI , Seq
)(
TII
and Seq)(TIII . The




are adequate representations of the entailment relations between qua propositions
asserted by, respectively, theories TI, TII and TIII, it should be evident that TI, TII and TIII all have
the same entailment structure.
This observation is made more precise by appealing to the notion of similarity:
Deﬁnition (Similarity.). T1 and T2 are similar, T1∼T2, if and only if there is a bijection f fromLT1/)(
to LT2/)( such that, f(Seq)(T1 ) = Seq)(T2 .
The notion of similarity is already deﬁned in (Kuhn, 1977). The present proposal, not unrelated
to that of Kuhn’s, is to precisify sameness of entailment structure in the following way:
Sameness of Entailment Structure (First Version). T1 and T2 have the same entailment structure
if and only if T1∼T2.
10We will omit T in )(T when confusion is unlikely to arise. Similarly, we omit )(T in [·])(T when confusion is
unlikely to arise.
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Again following Kuhn, let me introduce a notion related to that of similarity, except that this
notion appeals directly to mappings between sentences of LT1 and LT2 :
Deﬁnition (Similarity via f and g.). Let f : LT1 → LT2 and g : LT2 → LT1 . T1 and T2 are similar
via f and g, T1
f,g∼T2 if and only if:
1. For every Γ ⊆ LT1 and every ϕ ∈ LT1 : Γ (T1 ϕ only if f(Γ) (T2 f(ϕ)
2. For every Γ ⊆ LT2 and every ϕ ∈ LT2 : Γ (T2 ϕ only if g(Γ) (T1 g(ϕ);
3. For every ϕ ∈ LT1 : ϕ )(T1 g(f(ϕ));
4. For every ϕ ∈ LT2 : ϕ )(T2 f(g(ϕ)).
By a (small) generalisation of the result reported in (Kuhn, 1977, p. 69), it can be shown that
T1∼T2 if and only if there are functions f and g such that T1f,g∼T2, assuming that both SeqT1 and
SeqT2 are Tarskian.
11 This allows us to provide a second, equivalent explication of sameness of
entailment structure, namely:
Sameness of Entailment Structure (Second Version). T1 and T2 have the same entailment struc-
ture if and only if there are functions f and g such that T1
f,g∼T2.
Consider once more theories TI, TII and TIII. We can easily inspect that TI, TII and TIII are all
similar to each other. Just let the ‘bottom element’ of each one of ≤ )(TI , ≤ )(TII and ≤ )(TIII be mapped
to the bottom element of the other structure, the ‘left element’ be mapped to the ‘left element’, the
‘right element’ to the ‘right element’ and the ‘top element’ to the ‘top element’. Thus, the explication of
sameness of entailment structure just offered successfully counts TI, TII and TIII as having the same
entailment structure.
For examples of theories that are not similar, let LCl=LInt be a propositional language with logical
constants ¬,∨∧,→, and whose only non-logical constant is the propositional letter A. Now, let
SeqCl be the set of valid sequents of classical propositional logic in language LCl and SeqInt be the
set of valid sequents of intuitionist propositional logic in language LInt. Even though there are only
four elements in LCl/)(Cl, namely, the elements of the Lindenbaum algebra on one generator for
classical logic, there are inﬁnitely many elements in LInt/)(Int, the elements of the Lindenbaum
algebra on one generator for intuitionistic logic (i.e., the elements of the Rieger-Nishimura lattice).
Hence, Cl and Int are not similar, and thus do not count as having the same entailment structure.
This is the intuitively right result.
Kuhn (1977, p. 73-79) also characterises a different relation between theories, the relation of
being a fragment:
Deﬁnition (Fragment.). Let f : LT1 → LT2 . T1 is a fragment of T2 via f , T1
f
<T2 if and only if:
11The notion of similarity via f and g is also deﬁned in (Segerberg, 1982, p. 43), where it is called syntactic equivalence
via f and g. Pelletier & Urquhart (2003, p. 263) deﬁne the notion of translational equivalence. Translational equivalence
is quite close to similarity via f and g, except that Pelletier and Urquhart impose the restriction that f and g must be
translation schemes. They obtain a notion also deﬁned in (Kuhn, 1977, p. 80), which is called there simply equivalence via f
and g.
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For every Γ ⊆ LT1 and every ϕ ∈ LT1 : Γ (T1 ϕ if and only if f(Γ) (T2 f(ϕ).
T1 is a fragment of T2, T1<T2, if and only if there is some f such that T1
f
<T2.
I will make use of a relation somewhat more stringent than the relation of being a fragment.
Let (SeqT )+={ϕ ∈ LT : ∀ψ ∈ LT (ϕ (T ψ ⇒ ψ (T ϕ)} and (SeqT )−={ϕ ∈ LT : ∀ψ ∈
LT (ψ (T ϕ ⇒ ϕ (T ψ)}. The sets (SeqT )+ and (SeqT )− represent, respectively, the set of
maximal and the set of minimal propositions according to the entailment ordering.
Then,
Deﬁnition (Stringent Fragment.). Let f : LT1 → LT2 . T1 is a stringent fragment of T2 via f , T1
f<T2,





+) ⊆ (SeqT2)+, and
3. f((SeqT1)
−) ⊆ (SeqT2)−.
T1 is a stringent fragment of T2, T1 < T2 if and only if there is a function f such that T1 f<T2.
In what follows I will use ‘sfragment’ instead of ‘stringent fragment’. In order for a theory to count
as a sfragment of another theory it is not enough for the ﬁrst theory to be a fragment of the second
theory. It is also required that all the minimal and all the maximal elements in the entailment structure
of the ﬁrst theory be mapped to, respectively, minimal and maximal fragments of the second theory.
This requirement concerns the fact that minimal and maximal elements may be understood as
having a special status in a theory, to wit, minimal elements correspond to as propositions which,
according to the theorist, are absurd, and maximal elements as propositions which, according to the
theorist, are trivial.
The notion of a sfragment affords the resources to explicate a different relationship between the
entailment structures of two theories, namely:
Inclusion of Entailment Structure. The entailment structure of T2 includes the entailment
structure of T1 if and only if T1<T2.
Consider again theories TCl and TInt. As noted, it is not the case that these theories are similar.
However, TCl<TInt. That is, TCl is a sfragment of TInt.One of the functions witnessing this fact is
the function f that, for every ϕ ∈ LTCl , maps ϕ to itself. On the other hand, TInt is not a fragment of
TCl, i.e., TInt<TCl. Again, both of these results are intuitively correct.
4.3.2.2 Theoretical Structure
With the characterisation of sameness of entailment structure in place, the explication of sameness
of theoretical structure may now be offered. The relevant deﬁnition is that of solid similarity. Let
Com)(T = {[ϕ] : ϕ ∈ ComT }. Then:
Deﬁnition (Solid Similarity.). T1 and T2 are solidly similar, T1≈T2, if and only if there is a bijection f
from LT1/)( to LT2/)( such that, f(Seq)(T1 ) = Seq)(T2 and f(Com)(T1 ) = Com)(T2 .
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Our proposal is to explicate sameness of theoretical structure in the following way:
Sameness of Theoretical Structure (First Version). T1 and T2 have the same theoretical structure
if and only if T1≈T2.
If suchmapping witnessing the similarity between theories T1 and T2 exists, then the (qua) propositions
to whose truth T1 is committed are indistinguishable from the (qua) propositions to whose truth T2 is
committed vis-à-vis T1 and T2’s common entailment structure.
For some examples, consider once more the theories TI, TII and TIII. Let ComTI = {A,>},
ComTII = {>} and ComTIII = {F,G,>}. By appealing to the previous representations of ≤ )(TI ,
≤ )(TII and≤ )(TIII we can represent the theoretical structures ofTI, TII andTIII, doing so by representing
the sets Com)(TI , Com
)(
TII




















There are two bijections from LTI/)( to LTII/)( witnessing the similarity between TI and
TII, namely, the bijection that maps {A} to {C} and the bijection that maps {A} to {D}. In both
of these cases {A} is mapped to a set that does not belong to Com)(TII , even though {A} belongs
to Com)(TI . This shows that no proposition asserted to be the case by TII occupies a role in TII’s
entailment structure that is indiscernible from the role occupied by the proposition that is expressed
by A, according to the proponent of TI, in TI’s entailment structure. For instance, the proposition
expressed by A entails some other proposition according to TI even though there is no proposition
to whose truth TII is committed which entails, according to TII, some other proposition, since TII is
committed only to the truth of one proposition, namely, the proposition that is expressed by >. Thus,
TI 6≈ TII. Hence, TI and TII do not count as having the same theoretical structure according to the
present criterion.
On the other hand, according to the present proposal, TI and TIII do share the same theoretical
structure. The bijection f from LTI/)( to LTIII/)( witnessing the similarity between TI and TIII
which maps {A} to {F,G} is such that f(Com)(TI ) = Com)(TIII . Intuitively, this is the correct result.
If anything breaks the equivalence between theories TI and TIII, it must be something having to do
with how the proponents of these two theories interpret their respective languages.
Now, where f is any function from LT1 to LT2 , let:
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• T1
fŸ T2 if and only if, ∀ϕ ∈ ComT1∃ψ ∈ ComT2 such that f(ϕ) )(T2 ψ;
One can also deﬁne a notion close to that of solid similarity, except that it appeals directly to
mappings between the sentences of the languages of T1 and T2:12
Deﬁnition (Solid Similarity via f and g.). Let f : LT1 → LT2 and g : LT2 → LT1 . T1 and T2 are
solidly similar via f and g, T1





By appealing to the notion of solid similarity via functions f and g it is possible to explicate
sameness of theoretical structure in an alternative albeit equivalent way:
Sameness of Theoretical Structure (Second Version). T1 and T2 have the same theoretical struc-
ture if and only if there are functions f and g such that: T1
f,g≈T2
Let us return to the preliminary gloss on sameness of theoretical structure, which stated that
T1 and T2 have the same theoretical structure just in case a) T1 and T2 possess the same entailment
structure, and b) the propositions to whose truth T1 is committed and the propositions to whose truth
T2 is committed occupy indiscernible places in their common entailment structure. It has been shown
how to make this talk of sameness of entailment structure and of occupation of indiscernible places in
an entailment structure more precise. Theories T1 and T2 have the same entailment structure just in
case T1∼T2. The proposition expressed by a sentence ϕ to whose truth T1 is committed occupies a
place that is indiscernible from the one occupied by the proposition expressed by a sentence ψ to
12The following proofs establish that T1 and T2 are solidly similar if and only if T1 and T2 are solidly similar via functions
f and g.
Proof. [T1
f,g≈T2 implies T1≈T2] Suppose T1f,g≈T2 and deﬁne h : LT1/)(∪LT2/)(→ LT1 ∪LT2 in such a way that
h([ϕ]) = [f(ϕ)]. Then, h is a bijection witnessing T1∼T2, by a small generalisation of the result shown in (Kuhn, 1977,
pp. 69-70). It will now be shown that i) h(Com)(T1 ) ⊆ Com)(T2 and ii) Com)(T2 ⊆ h(Com)(T1 ).
i) Suppose x ∈ h(Com)(T1 ). Then, x = h([ϕ]), for some ϕ ∈ ComT1 . So, x = [f(ϕ)]. By T1
fŸ T2, there is a
ψ ∈ LT2 such that f(ϕ) )(
T2
ψ ∈ ComT2 . Hence x = h([ϕ]) = [f(ϕ)] ∈ Com)(T2 . So, h(Com)(T1 ) ⊆ Com)(T2 .
ii) Suppose x ∈ Com)(T2 . Then, [x] = [ϕ], for some ϕ ∈ ComT2 . By T2
gŸ T1, there is a ψ ∈ ComT1 such that
g(ϕ) )(
T1
ψ, and thus g(ϕ) ∈ ComT1 . Hence, f(g(ϕ)) ∈ f(ComT1). So, ϕ ∈ f(ComT1), by T1 f,g∼ T2. Therefore,
[ϕ] ∈ [f(ComT1)] = h(Com)(T1 ). Hence, Com)(T2 ⊆ h(Com)(T1 ).
Proof. [T1≈T2 implies T1f,g≈T2] Suppose T1≈T2. Let h be any bijection witnessing T1≈T2. Let ch : LT1/)( ∪
LT2/)(→ LT1 ∪ LT2 be any function such that ch([ϕ]) ∈ [ϕ]. Deﬁne f : LT1 → LT2 and g : LT2 → LT1 in such
way that f(ϕ) = ch(h([ϕ])) and g(ϕ) = ch(h−1([ϕ])). Then, T1
f,g∼T2, by a small generalisation of the result shown in
(Kuhn, 1977, pp. 69-70). It will now be shown that i) T1
fŸ T2 and ii) T2 gŸ T1.
i) Suppose that ϕ ∈ ComT1 . Then, [ϕ] ∈ Com)(T1 . So, h([ϕ]) ∈ h(Com)(T1 ) = Com)(T2 , by T1≈T2, by T1≈T2.
Thus, f(ϕ) = ch(h([ϕ])) ∈ ComT2 . Hence, T1
fŸ T2.
ii) Suppose that ϕ ∈ ComT2 . Then, [ϕ] ∈ Com)(T2 = h(Com)(T1 ), by T1≈T2. So, h−1([ϕ]) ∈ Com)(T1 . Thus,
g(ϕ) = ch(h−1(ϕ)) ∈ ComT1 . Hence, T2
gŸ T1.
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whose truth T2 is committed just in case ϕ ∈ ComT1 , ψ ∈ ComT2 , f(ϕ) = ψ and g(ψ) = ϕ for
some functions f and g witnessing the solid similarity between T1 and T2.
4.3.2.3 Theory Synonymy
Consider the following notions, that of a correct translation scheme and a deeply correct translation
scheme:
Deﬁnition (Correct and Deeply Correct Translation Schemes.).
• A function f from LT1 to LT2 is a correct translation scheme if and only if, for all ϕ ∈ LT1 , ϕ and
f(ϕ) express the same proposition.
• A function f from LT1 to LT2 is a deeply correct translation scheme if and only if, for all ϕ ∈ LT1 , the
proposition that, according to the proponents of T1, is expressed by ϕ is the same as the proposition that,
according to the proponent of T2, is expressed by f(ϕ).
Synonymy between theories is deﬁned as follows:13
Deﬁnition (Theory Synonymy.). T1 and T2 are synonymous via functions f and g, T1
f,g≡T2, if and
only if T1
f,g≈T2 and both f and g are deeply correct translation schemes.
T1 and T2 are synonymous if and only if there are functions f and g such that T1
f,g≡T2.
The main proposal of the present chapter is to explicate theory equivalence via theory synonymy:14
Theory Equivalence is Theory Synonymy. Theories T1 and T2 are equivalent if and only if there
are formulations FT1 of T1 and FT2 of T2 such that FT1≡FT2 .
The reason why theory synonymy is characterised in terms of deeply correct translation schemes rather
than correct translation schemes has to do with Lewis’s observations mentioned in §4.2. As was shown
there, the interpretation of a theory needs to be sensitive to what proponents of a theory intend to
express with the sentences used in their formulation of the theory.15
Consider again theories TI and TIII. In order to determine whether these theories are synonymous
it is not sufficient to consider whether they are solidly similar (and so, whether they have the same
theoretical structure). The reason is that proponents of TI might mean with A something quite
different than what proponents of TIII mean with F andG. In effect, it might be that what proponents
of TI mean with A is that dinosaurs are extinct, whereas what proponents of TIII mean with F and G
is that dinosaurs are not extinct. In such case, even though the two theories have the same theoretical
structure, they are not synonymous, and thus they are not equivalent. Still, if two theories have a
13There is an equivalent formulation of theory synonymy that appeals to bijections witnessing the solid similarity between
T1 and T2. However, the present formulation will suffice for our purposes.
14It will now be relevant to distinguish between theories and their formulations, and so I will do just that.
15In order to accommodate both semantic indeterminacy and epistemic indeterminacy, the notions of a correct and a
deeply correct translation scheme could be generalised, in such a way that sentences express not just one proposition, but
instead sets of propositions. In what follows I remain with the simplifying assumption.
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different entailment structure this already shows that they are not equivalent. There is no need to
consider what their proponents mean with the sentences of their languages.
One of the aims of appealing to solid similarity was that of having a minimally satisfactory necessary
condition for theory equivalence which did not require interpretation of the theory’s language. Even
though there is a sense in which this is indeed the case, note that interpretation is still required at
some level. Interpretation plays a crucial role when determining the entailment relation of each theory.
It is a tacit assumption of our proposal that when, according to a theory T1, Γ entails ϕ and according
to a theory T2,∆ entails ψ, the same is meant with the two occurrences of ‘entails’.
What is entailment? Entailment is here taken to be a Tarskian relation. It is also assumed that
the commitments of a theory are closed under entailment. As a further characterisation, entailment
is taken to be necessarily truth-preserving. If Γ entails ϕ, then necessarily, if all the propositions
expressed by all sentences in Γ are true, so is the proposition expressed by ϕ. In addition, as has been
implicit throughout, entailment is assumed to be a relation that holds between classes of propositions
and propositions. Finally, entailment is assumed to be such that the hypothesis of propositional
identity is true.16 Besides this, I do not have much more to offer by way of characterisation of the
notion. Entailment is a primitive notion of the Synonymy Account of theory equivalence.
Finally, the structural relation of being a stringent fragment via f ,
f<, in conjunction with the
notion of a deeply correct translation, gives rise to the notion of embeddability, which will play a role
later on:
Deﬁnition (Embeddability.). A theory T1 is embeddable in theory T2 just in case there is a deeply correct
translation f such that T1
f<T2.
This concludes the presentation of the ﬁrst component of the Synonymy Account of theory
equivalence, namely the explication of theory equivalence as Theory Synonymy. The second component
of the Synonymy Account consists in some criteria for determining when two translation schemes are
deeply correct. Before turning to those criteria, let me brieﬂy offer an account of what it takes for ϕ
to express proposition p according to the proponents of theory T .
4.3.2.4 According To
One approach to explicating what it is for ϕ to express proposition p in language L according to
agent x is, roughly, by appealing to the idea that x believes that he is conforming to a convention of
truthfulness and trust in L with respect to ϕ by treating ϕ as meaning p. More precisely, consider the
following hypotheses:
CF1: Ordinarily, speakers of L believe p when asserting ϕ;
CF2: Ordinarily, hearers of L that do not yet believe p come to do so when ϕ is asserted to them;
CF3: The members of the community of speakers CL of L believe that CF1 and CF2 hold;
16This is less helpful than one may think, though. Arguably, ‘proposition’ can itself be made precise in different ways.
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CF4: The expectation that CF1 and CF2 will continue to be true gives the members of CL a good
reason to continue to utter ϕ only if they believe p, and a good reason to expect the same of the
other members;
CF5: There is among the members of CL a general preference for them to continue to conform to
regularities CF1 and CF2.
Then, According to agent x, ϕ expresses proposition p in L just in case:
ACF1: Ordinarily, x believes p when asserting ϕ;
ACF2: Ordinarily, if x does not believe p then he comes to do so when ϕ is asserted to him;
ACF3: x believes that CF1 and CF2 hold;
ACF4: The expectation that CF1 and CF2 will continue to be true gives x a good reason to continue to
utter ϕ only if he believes p, and a good reason to expect the same of the other members of CL;
ACF5: x has a general preference for the members of CL to continue to conform to regularities CF1
and CF2.
ACF6: x believes that it is known by the members of CL that CF1-CF5 obtain, and x believes that the
members of CL all know that it is known that CF1-CF5 obtain, etc.
One important remark before turning to criteria for determining the deep correctness of translation
schemes. Even if this is not the correct explication of ‘according to agent x, ϕ expresses proposition p
in L’, it should be clear that there is a distinction between the proposition expressed by a sentence in
a language L and the proposition that the sentence expresses in L according to an agent x. For the
purposes of the Synonymy Account, the latter notion may be left as a primitive of the account.
4.3.3 Deeply Correct Translation Schemes
One difficulty with determining whether theories T1 and T2 are synonymous has to do with the fact
that the information contained in FT1 and FT2 does not, on its own, suffice to determine whether
functions f : LT1 → LT2 and g : LT2 → LT1 are deeply correct translations. Take any sentence ϕ of
LT1 . The problem is that the proposition which, according to the proponents of T1, is the meaning
of ϕ need not be the actual semantic value of ϕ. Similarly, the proposition that is, according to the
proponents of T2, the semantic value of ψ ∈ LT2 need not be the actual semantic value of ψ.
Consider a language L′Ti syntactically just like LTi and such that the semantic value of each of
its sentences ϕ is the proposition which, according to the proponents of Ti, is expressed by the
syntactically identical sentence ϕ of LTi (where i = {1, 2}). The question whether f and g are deeply
correct translations can be substituted by the question whether f ′ : L′T1 → L′T2 and g′ : L′T2 → L′T1
are correct translations.
At this point the problem becomes how to determine whether a translation is correct. One way




Let L1 be a language of a linguistic community C1 and L2 be a language of a linguistic community C2.
Also, let L ≤ L′ if and only if L′ is a superlanguage of L— i.e., a language which includes all the sentences
of L, with the same meanings as the ones those sentences have in L — which is also a language of the
community of speakers of L.
A translation f mapping L1 to L2 is a convention-friendly translation if and only if there could be a
language L such that:
1. L2 ≤ L;
2. There is a correct description of the beliefs, desires and intentions of the members of C1 in L;
3. This description, in conjunction with the translation of L1 given by f , yields a description, in L, of
the linguistic practices of C1 as a community of speakers conforming to a convention of truthfulness
and trust in the used fragment of L1 (where the convention of truthfulness and trust is understood
as characterised in (Lewis, 1983)).17
Lewis (1983, p. 167) offers the following characterisation of what it is for a community to be truthful
and trusting in a language L:
‘To be truthful in L is to act in a certain way: to try never to utter any sentences of L that
are not true in L. Thus, it is to avoid uttering any sentence of L unless one believes it to
be true in L. To be trusting in L is to form beliefs in a certain way: to impute truthfulness
in L to others, and thus to tend to respond to another’s utterances of any sentence of L
by coming to believe that the uttered sentence is true in L.’
Let me illustrate what it is for a translation to be convention-friendly with a simple example.
Suppose that we have a true description, in English, of the beliefs, intentions and desires of the
community of speakers of French. Suppose also that we have a translation of French into English
according to which the sentence ‘le chat est sur le paillasson’ is translated as ‘Paris is located in England’.
Furthermore, suppose that in the large majority of the occasions in which a speaker of French utters
‘le chat est sur le paillasson’, he intends to communicate that the cat is on the mat. In such case the
translation is not convention-friendly. The reason is that the description that we obtain in English is
not one in which the sentence is commonly uttered by speakers of French when they believe that Paris
is located in England. Furthermore, as the example shows, the translation is in fact incorrect.
The following principle offers guidance in determining the correctness of a translation in terms
convention-friendliness:
Convention-Friendliness Principle. If a plausible candidate for being a correct translation scheme
f from L1 to L2 is a convention-friendly translation, and all the other translations from L1 to L2
that are plausible candidates for being correct translations from L1 to L2 are not convention-friendly,
then this fact is an excellent reason to believe that f is a correct translation.
17See also (Lewis, 1969).
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Determining whether a translation is convention-friendly is in part a matter of determining the
beliefs, intentions and desires of the members of the community of speakers of the source language.
Two principles that help in this task are the rationalisation principle and the principle of charity, proposed
in (Lewis, 1974). In a nutshell, according to the rationalisation principle the agent should be represented
as rational, in such a way that the agent’s physical description, as well as the system of beliefs and
desires assigned to him, jointly offer explanations of the agent’s behaviour that conform to the canons
of decision theory. And according to the principle of charity, roughly, we should assign to the agent
those beliefs that we would have had if we had been exposed to the same evidence and training of
the agent, and the same desires that we would have had if we had the agent’s beliefs, training and
history. These are principles to which one can appeal in order to evaluate whether a certain translation
is convention-friendly.18
Let me brieﬂy explain why the notion of convention-friendliness requires that the community of
speakers conforms to a convention of truthfulness and trust only in the used part of L1. Suppose that
a translation is convention-friendly for all of L1. It can nonetheless fail to be a correct translation
because a convention-friendly translation may assign the wrong propositions to some of the sentences
of the unused part of the language. In particular, it will assign the wrong propositions to at least some
of those unused, very long and complicated sentences of the language. The problem is, as Lewis
notes, that if a speaker were to use such strings, then he would not be trusted. Rather, he would be
understood as ‘trying to win a bet or set a record, or feigning madness or raving for real, or doing it to
annoy, or ﬁlibustering, or making an experiment to test the limits of what is humanly possible to say
and mean’ (Lewis, 1992, p. 108). For this reason, there will be no convention of truthfulness and
trust with respect to the unused, very long and complicated sentences of the language. So, in general,
a convention-friendly translation can be expected to be incorrect when deﬁned for the unused and
cumbersome sentences of L1. Members of the community of speakers of L1 would think that those
sentences would not be used truthfully in L1, and so they would not be trusting.19
Also, the Convention-Friendliness principle appeals to a distinction between the plausible and
the implausible convention-friendly translations because there are many different convention-friendly
translations from L1 to L2. Where f is a convention-friendly translation from L1 to L2, any mapping
g from L1 to L2 agreeing with f on the used part of L1 will be a convention-friendly translation.
One way to make precise the notion of a plausible convention-friendly translation would appeal to
naturalness, with some account of what makes a translation more natural than another one. This move
18Lewis (1974) puts these principles at work in a strategy for determining an agent’s beliefs, desires and meanings on the
basis of our complete knowledge of the agent, qua a physical system. No such limited knowledge needs to be assumed for
the present purposes. The principles are here given simply as extra resources available to the task of determining whether a
certain translation is convention-friendly.
19The reason why the Synonymy Account is not committed to the stronger principle according to which a translation is
convention-friendly if and only if it is correct has to do with the different problems that have been identiﬁed in the literature
concerning Lewis’s account of what it is for a community to speak a language in terms of the members of the community
conforming to a convention of truthfulness and trust in the language. These problems have led us to propose a weaker
connection between convention-friendliness and correctness. See (Burge, 1975), (Hawtorne, 1990), (O’Leary-Hawthorne,
1993) and (Kölbel, 1998) for some criticisms of Lewis’s account.
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would be in agreement with what Lewis (1992) says about preferring the straight rather than the bent
grammars generating assignments of semantic values for L1 compatible with there being a convention
of truthfulness and trust in the used part of L1. But there may be other ways. It is perhaps best to
leave the notion of a plausible translation as a primitive, for the present purposes. Inquirers aiming to
establish the equivalence between theories will often have already selected the translation schemes
which they take to be plausible candidates for being correct translation schemes.
Finally, why is it that the fact that a plausible candidate for being a correct translation scheme f
from L1 to L2 is a convention-friendly translation, and all the plausible alternative translations from
L1 to L2 are not convention-friendly, gives only excellent reason for believing that f is correct, instead
of implying that f is correct? The worry here is that there might be no correct translation from L1 to
L2 whatsoever. The existence of one and only one plausible convention-friendly translation f does
not rule out this scenario. Despite this, it is difficult to see what sort of evidence may decide in favour
of there being no correct translation from L1 to L2, rather than f being a correct translation from L1
to L2.
One can expect that it will still be difficult to determine whether a translation is convention-friendly.
It would be desirable to have a simple procedure for determining whether translation schemes are
correct. We propose something close, namely,Hirsch’s rule of thumb, inspired in Hirsch’s (2005; 2007;
2008; 2009) writings on verbal disputes.20 The rule of thumb consists in appealing to judgements
concerning the truth of a particular counterfactual statement. For each pair of theories T1 and T2, the
antecedent of the counterfactual consists in the description of the following counterfactual scenario:
Disjoint Communities Scenario. There are two different communities, CT1 and CT2 . In CT1
theory T1 is acknowledged to be the best theory available, and a vast majority of the members
of CT1 know all the intricacies of T1. In effect, T1 has become a part of the folk theory of CT1
(what is meant with T being a part of the ‘folk theory’ of CT is simply that T is a theory that
is implicit in the everyday thought and action of the members of CT1 , just as it is implicit in
everyday thought and action that people have beliefs). Furthermore, the meanings that the
proponents of T1 take the sentences of LT1 to have are the meanings that these sentences have
in the language of CT1 . In CT2 theory T2 is acknowledged to be the best theory available, and
its intricacies are known by the vast majority of the members of CT2 . In effect, T2 has become
a part of the folk theory of CT2 . Furthermore, the meanings that the proponents of T2 take the
sentences of LT2 to have are the meanings that these sentences have in the language of CT2 .
Also, initially, each of these societies was unaware of the existence of the other. Later on, some
membersmmT2 of CT2 become aware of CT1 , and are given sufficient time to get to know it in
detail.
Let f be a translation from LT1 to LT2 . The counterfactual hypothesis is as follows.
20This does not imply that the disputes which Hirsch takes to be verbal turn out to be disputes between equivalent
theories. It also does not imply that we agree with Hirsch that what he calls ‘common sense ontology’ is the correct ontology.
In this dissertation I remain neutral on these questions.
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Hirschean Counterfactual. If the disjoint communities scenario had obtained, then f would have
been a correct translation of the language of CT1 to the language of CT2 bymmT2 .
Hirsch’s rule of thumb consists in the following claim:
Hirsch’s Rule of Thumb. The Hirschean counterfactual is true if and only if f is a deeply correct
translation scheme from LT1 to LT2 .
As previously mentioned, the question whether a translation scheme is deeply correctmay be substituted
by the question whether a related translation scheme is correct. The focus on communities CT1 and
CT2 and their languages allows us to shift attention from the non-literal use of LT1 and LT2 to the
literal use of the languages of the communities CT1 and CT2 . The reason is that the propositions
that the proponents of T1 and T2 take to be expressed by the sentences of the languages in which
their theory is formulated are the propositions that are literally expressed by the sentences of the
language of the linguistic communities CT1 and CT2 . Furthermore, the fact that, initially, each one of
the communities is unaware of the existence of the other allows for the history of disputes between
the proponents of the two theories not to play a role on how the language of each linguistic community
is best translated.
To mention the obvious, judgements concerning the truth of the counterfactual require some hold
on what would constitute a correct translation. This is a place where the convention-friendliness
principle and Lewis’s principles of rationalisation and charity come into play. These principles offer
some guidance on how to judge the truth of the Hirschean counterfactual. Still, it may turn out to
be easier to judge the truth of the Hirschean counterfactual than to use other means to determine
whether the translation in question is convention-friendly.
4.4 Applying the Synonymy Account
The present section has two aims. The ﬁrst aim is to show that the Synonymy Account satisﬁes the
desiderata listed in §4.2. The second aim is to show how the account affords a nuanced understanding
of the dialectic of the debate between noneists and Quineans. We can expect the same to be applicable
to other debates.
4.4.1 Satisfaction of the Desiderata
According to the ﬁrst of the desiderata laid out in §4.2, an account of theory equivalence should
predict some of the conditions under which it is likely for a theory to be received as absurd by the
proponents of another theory. The Synonymy Account does yield some predictions concerning when
this is likely to happen. Furthermore, these predictions very much agree with the diagnosis as to why
some Quineans have understood noneists as being committed to an absurdity.
It is reasonable to suppose that any theory whose entailment structure is such that there is a
proposition p which entails every proposition q attributes to p the status of being maximally infor-
mative, i.e., of being absurd. Suppose that theories T1 and T2 appear to be formulated in the same
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language (broadly construed), and that T1 is committed to the truth of a sentence whose homonymous
interpretation by the proponents of T2 is a sentence that according to T2, expresses an absurdity. In
such case the proponents of T2 will take T1 to be absurd.
This prediction of the account can be generalised. The account predicts that a sufficient condition
for a theory T1 to be understood as absurd by the proponents of T2 is that the homonymous interpreta-
tion of some of the sentences to whose truth T1 is committed be sentences that entail some element in
(SeqT2)
−, where this is the set of minimal elements according to the ordering of entailment between
qua propositions. The reason is that each sentence in (SeqT2)
− is understood by the proponents of
T2 as expressing an absurdity, insofar as these correspond to minimal elements in this ordering.
As we saw in §2, Quineans appear to have understood noneists as speaking gibberish for precisely
this reason. Noneists are committed to the truth of ‘some things do not exist’, a sentence which
expresses an absurdity according to Quineans. Similar situations may be expected to happen in other
debates.
According to the second desideratum, an account of theory equivalence should not have homony-
mous interpretation as a mandatory facet of the interpretation of the content of one theory by the
proponents of another theory, even when the proponents of the two theories are, broadly speaking,
members of the same linguistic community. As we have seen in §4.3.3, satisfaction of this desideratum
has been written into the Synonymy Account. This requirement underlies the need to appeal to deeply
correct translation schemes, instead of correct translations, in order to determine whether two theories
are synonymous.
The requirement imposed by the third desideratum on an appropriate account of theory equivalence
is that any such account should allow for cases in which a theory is intelligible to the proponents
of another theory even though the ﬁrst theory cannot be fully understood in terms of the resources
afforded by the second theory.
Notably, when talking about intelligibility and understanding in §4.2, it was not speciﬁed what it
takes for a theory to be intelligible by the lights of another theory, nor what it takes for a theory T1 to
be fully understandable in terms of the resources of T2.
The distinctions introduced in §4.3 allow for an explication of full understanding. Full understand-
ing can be cashed out in terms of embedding:
Full Understanding. Theory T1 is fully understandable in terms of the resources of theory T2 just
in case T1 is embeddable in T2.
According to the notion of intelligibility at play here, intelligibility is easy to get. For T1 to be intelligible
by the lights of T2 it is enough that T1 not be understood as an absurd theory by the lights of T2. But it
should be clear that it is possible for a theory to be neither fully understandable nor an absurd theory
from the standpoint of T2. Thus, the third desideratum on an adequate account of theory equivalence
is satisﬁed.
According to the fourth desideratum, an account of theory equivalence should explain how theories
that would appear to be contradictory if interpreted homonymously are sometimes equivalent, and
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offer some means of predicting when this will happen. As has already been remarked, there are cases
in which homonymous interpretation is not the correct interpretation of the theories in question.
Furthermore, it may happen that two theories that would turn out to be contradictory if homonymously
interpreted are such that there are functions f and g establishing the solid similarity between them.
In such case the question arises as to whether functions f and g constitute deeply correct translation
schemes. And we can expect this to be the case sometimes, in which case the theories are in fact
synonymous. Thus, the Synonymy Account explains how it is that theories that would appear to be
contradictory if interpreted homonymously are sometimes equivalent.
Concerning prediction, by coupling the explication of theory equivalence as theory synonymy
with an account of what is required for a translation to be deeply correct, the Synonymy Account has
the resources for generating some predictions concerning the equivalence of theories. In §4.3.3 views
on how to determine whether a translation is deeply correct were presented. Thus, the Synonymy
Account has the resources required for generating predictions concerning the equivalence of theories.
The last of the desiderata previously identiﬁed is one according to which any adequate account
of theory equivalence should be able to yield conditions under which translations such as the one
proposed byWoodward count in favour of the claim that ‘there is total overlap between the conceptual
resources of the two theories’. According to the Synonymy Account some translations of the kind
discussed by Woodward establish sameness of entailment structure, whereas others go beyond this,
establishing sameness of theoretical structure.
Thus, the Synonymy Account takes seriously Woodward’s considerations involving translations.
The existence of such mappings is a necessary condition for two theories to be equivalent. Furthermore,
if such translations are deeply correct, then the theories turn out to be synonymous, and a fortiori
equivalent.
4.4.2 The Synonymy Account and the Noneism vs. Quineanism Dialectic
As shown, the Synonymy Account satisﬁes the desiderata laid out in §4.2. In the remainder of the
section the account is applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans. I begin by spelling out in
some detail simple versions of Noneism and Quineanism, respectively, the theories Non1, and Qui1.
The language of Non1, LNon1 , is a ﬁrst-order modal language with boolean connectives→ and
¬, modal operator 2, quantiﬁer A (the noneist’s neutral general quantiﬁer), the identity sign, =, and
as non-logical constants the predicates E (the predicate of existence), F (the predicate that is satisﬁed
by some thing just in case it is ﬁctional), P (the predicate that is satisﬁed by some thing just in case it
could have existed but actually does not exist)21, andM (the predicate that is satisﬁed by some thing
just in case it is a mathematical entity). The remaining boolean connectives are deﬁned in the usual
way, the same applying to 3. The noneist’s neutral particular quantiﬁer,S, is deﬁned in the following
way: Sv(ϕ) =df ¬Av(¬ϕ). The loaded quantiﬁers are deﬁned in terms of the neutral quantiﬁers as
follows: ∀v(ϕ) =df Av(Ev → ϕ) and ∃v(ϕ) =df Sv(Ev ∧ ϕ). The set LNon1 consists in the set
21Note that ‘actually’ is being used with its rigidiﬁed reading.
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of well-formed formulas of Non1.
The language of Qui1, LQui1 , is a ﬁrst-order modal language with boolean connectives→ and
¬, modal operator 2, quantiﬁer ∀ (the Quinean’s universal quantiﬁer), the identity sign, =, and as
non-logical constants the predicates E (the predicate of existence), F (the predicate that is satisﬁed
by some thing just in case it is ﬁctional), and P the predicate that is satisﬁed by some thing just in
case it could have existed but actually does not exist), andM (the predicate that is satisﬁed by some
thing just in case it is a mathematical entity). The remaining boolean connectives are deﬁned in the
usual way, the same applying to3 and ∃. The set LQui1 consists in the set of well-formed formulas of
Qui1.
The characterisations of theories Non1 and Qui1 to be given make use of the following set of
axioms and inference rules:22
Axioms and Rules ofNon1
(PL) All propositional tautologies.




(=1) v = v.
(=2) v = v′ → (ϕ→ ψ).24
(E−F) Av(Fv → ¬Ev).
(E−P) Av(Pv → ¬Ev).
(E−M) Av(Mv → ¬Ev).
(MP) `Non1 ϕ→ ψ, `Non1 ϕ⇒ `Non1 ψ.
(Nec) `Non1 ϕ⇒ `Non1 2ϕ.
(A2) `Non1 ϕ → ψ ⇒`Non1 ϕ →
Av(ψ).25
Axioms and Rules ofQui1
(PL) All propositional tautologies.




(=1) v = v.
(=2) v = v′ → (ϕ→ ψ).27
(EDef) ∃v′(v = v′)↔ Ev28
(MP) `Qui1 ϕ→ ψ, `Qui1 ϕ⇒ `Qui1 ψ.
(Nec) `Qui1 ϕ⇒ `Qui1 2ϕ.
(∀2) `Qui1 ϕ→ ψ ⇒`Qui1 ϕ→ ∀v(ψ).29
The intended reading of these axioms by, respectively, noneists and Quineans should be clear. Now,
let Γ ` ϕ if and only if there is a ﬁnite set Γ′ such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∧Γ′ ` ϕ, where ∧Γ′ is
any conjunction of all the elements in Γ′. Let SeqNon1 = {〈Γ, ϕ〉 : Γ `Non1 ϕ} and SeqQui1 =
{〈Γ, ϕ〉 : Γ `Qui1 ϕ}. Consider now the following sets of sentences AsNon1 and AsQui1 :
22We could have appealed to a set of models instead. Nothing hangs on this.
23Provided that v is free for v′, where ϕ[v′/v] results from replacing each free occurrence of v in ϕ by v′
24Where ψ differs from ϕ at most in having v′ free at some places where ϕ has v free.
25Provided that v is not free in ϕ.
26Provided that v is free for v′, where ϕ[v′/v] results from replacing each free occurrence of v in ϕ by v′
27Where ψ differs from ϕ at most in having v′ free at some places where ϕ has v free.
28Where v′ is the ﬁrst variable of the alphabet if v is not, and v′ is the second variable of the alphabet otherwise.
29Provided that v is not free in ϕ.
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The elements of AsNon1
(SF) Sv(Fv). (SP) Sv(Pv). (SM) Sv(Mv).
The elements of AsQui1
(∃F) ∃v(Fv). (∃P) ∃v(Pv). (∃M) ∃v(Mv).
Let ComNon1 = {ϕ : AsNon1 (Non1 ϕ} and ComQui1 = {ϕ : AsQui1 (Qui1 ϕ}. The
theories Non1 and Qui1 are characterised as follows: Non1 = 〈LNon1 , SeqNon1 , ComNon1〉 and
Qui1 = 〈LQui1 , SeqQui1 , ComQui1〉.
It is worth pointing out thatSx¬Ex, the statement of noneism (in the mouths of noneists) is one
of the commitments ofNon1. Also, note thatQui1 is an allist theory, being committed to the existence
of ﬁctional entities, possibilia and mathematical objects — that is, ∃x(Ex ∧ Fx), ∃x(Ex ∧ Px) and
∃x(Ex∧Mx) are all commitments ofQui1 — as well as to the claim that everything exists — ∀x(Ex).
4.4.2.1 Noneism, Allism and Expressive Resources
Lewis notes that homonymous interpretation of noneism by Quineans has the effect that Quineans
take noneism to be absurd. In the present case, the kind of interpretation Lewis has in mind is given
by the following function h from LNon1 to LQui1 :
1. h(¬ϕ) is ¬h(ϕ).
2. h(ϕ→ψ) is h(ϕ)→h(ψ).
3. h(2ϕ) is 2h(ϕ).
4. h(Av(ϕ)) is ∀v(h(ϕ)).
5. h(Fv) is Fv.
6. h(Pv) is Pv.
7. h(Mv) isMv.
8. h(Ev) is Ev
9. h(v = v′) is v = v′.
According to the interpretation given by h, noneism, captured in the language of Non1 by the
sentenceSx(¬Ex), is translated as ∃x(¬Ex). WhereasSx(¬Ex) is one of the commitments of
Non1, the sentence ∃x(¬Ex) ofLQui1 is such that, for every formulaϕ ofLQui1 , ∃x(¬Ex) `Qui1 ϕ.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, according to the proponents of Qui1, the sentence ∃x(¬Ex)
expresses an absurdity. Hence, the function h offers an uncharitable interpretation of the proponents
of Non1 by the proponents of Qui1.
One way of capturing Lewis’s suggestion (1990, p. 29) with respect to how Non1 should be
interpreted by the proponents of Qui1 is as the suggestion that the following function f offers an
appropriate interpretation of the sentences of LNon1 in which the noneist’s existence predicate does
not occur:
1. f(¬ϕ) is ¬f(ϕ).
2. f(ϕ→ψ) is
f(ϕ)→f(ψ).
3. f(2ϕ) is 2f(ϕ).
4. f(Av(ϕ)) is ∀v(f(ϕ)).
5. f(Fv) is Fv.
6. f(Pv) is Pv.
7. f(Mv) isMv.
8. f(v = v′) is v = v′.
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Note that, on this interpretation, the sentencesSx(Fx),Sx(Px) andSx(Mx) are translated as,
respectively, ∃x(Fx), ∃x(Px), ∃x(Mx). Furthermore, we have that ∃x(Fx) )(Qui1 ∃x(Fx∧Ex),
∃x(Px) )(Qui1 ∃x(Px∧Ex) and ∃x(Mx) )(Qui1 ∃x(Mx∧Ex). Thus, we get the result that
the proponents of Qui1 would describe the proponents of Non1 as being committed to the existence
of ﬁctional, mathematical and merely possible objects. That is, the function f affords an interpretation
of noneism to Quineans whereby noneists are committed to allism.
There are different interpretive hypotheses available. Since the present purpose is illustration, it
will be assumed that the function f indeed affords a correct interpretation of LNon1 to the proponents
of Qui1. A challenge remains, namely, how should proponents of Qui1 interpretSx(¬Ex).
The interpretation of Non1 that arises from function f does not provide any guidance on how
the proponents of Qui1 should interpret this sentence. Arguably, Lewis’s (and Priest’s) remarks that
Quineans lack the expressive resources allowing them to fully understand noneists are correct as they
apply to theories Non1 and Qui1. That is, arguably, theory Qui1 does not possess the resources
required to provide a correct interpretation ofSx(¬Ex). A fortiori, proponents ofQui1 do not have
available the expressive resources to fully understand Non1. The tools of the Synonymy Account
enable us to state this last claim as the claim that Non1 is not embeddable in Qui1.
Lewis’s remarks in (1990, p. 29) suggest that the proponent of Non1 should interpret the
proponent of Qui1 in agreement with the following function g:
1. g(¬ϕ) is ¬g(ϕ).
2. g(ϕ→ψ) is g(ϕ)→g(ψ).
3. g(2ϕ) is 2g(ϕ).
4. g(∀v(ϕ)) is Av(g(ϕ)).
5. g(Fv) is Fv.
6. g(Pv) is Pv.
7. g(Mv) isMv.
8. g(Ev) is v = v.
9. g(v = v′) is v = v′.
It is easy to see that, under g, Qui1
g<Non1. So, if Lewis’s suggestion is right, then g is a deeply
correct translation and therefore Qui1 is embeddable in Non1.
At least part of the disagreement between the proponents of Non1 and Qui1 becomes clearer
after the previous observations. The proponents of Non1 endorse the view that there are certain
expressive resources — corresponding, for instance, to the proposition expressed bySx¬Ex—, which
are not available in Qui1. The proponents of Qui1 will disagree insofar as they reject the existence of
these extra expressive resources. If, instead, they accept the existence of such expressive resources,
then they must acknowledge that their theory is deﬁcient in ways that Non1 is not, since their own
theory is embeddable in Non1.
Thus, the Synonymy Account offers the resources to better understand the dialectic between
noneists and Quineans. These theorists are ﬁghting about what expressive resources exist and are
required to describe the world. The diagnosis of the disagreement between noneists and Quineans
as a disagreement concerning the truth of ‘some things do not exist’ is thus shallow. On the one
hand, this diagnosis fails to take into consideration the (real) possibility that noneists and Quineans
mean different things by the sentence ‘some things do not exist’. On the other hand, the diagnosis
neglects the fact that one of the main points of disagreement between noneists and Quineans concerns
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the expressive resources required to appropriately describe the world. The Synonymy Account thus
provides tools that enable a more nuanced understanding of the debate between noneists and Quineans.
This point counts in favour of the Synonymy Account.
4.4.2.2 A Different Quinean Theory
Consider now a different Quinean theory, Qui2. This theory is obtained by adding to the language of
Qui1 an extra predicate, C , satisﬁed by some thing just in case it is concrete. Following Linsky & Zalta
(1996) and Williamson (2013), the interest is on a notion of concreteness that is modally ﬂexible, in
the sense that concrete things, such as trees and tables, could have been non-concrete. Thus, this
notion is not intended to be synonymous with ‘abstract’, even though part of what it is to be abstract is
to be non-concrete. Paradigmatic examples of concrete things are trees, tables, Kripke and the planet
Venus. Paradigmatic instances of non-concrete things are Sherlock Holmes, the number 2 and the
merely possible seventh son of Kripke.30
The theory Qui2 is obtained by adding to the axioms of Qui1 the following:
(C−F) ∀v(Fv→¬Cv). (C−P) ∀v(Pv→¬Cv). (C−M) ∀v(Mv→¬Cv).
The inference rules of Qui2 are the same as those of Qui1. In addition, ComQui1 = ComQui2 . The
sets SeqQui2 and ComQui2 are deﬁned as has been done previously, by appealing, respectively, to the
axioms and inference rules of Qui2 and the set AsQui2 .
Let f ′ be a mapping from LNon1 to LQui2 obtained from f by adding the following clause:
f ′(Ev) is Cv.
Also, let g′ be a mapping from LQui2 to LNon1 obtained from g by adding the following clause:
g′(Cv) is Ev.
It should be clear thatNon1
f ′,g′≈ Qui2, even though this does not suffice to establish the synonymy
between Non1 and Qui2. Whether the theories are synonymous depends on whether there are pairs
of deeply correct translations from the language of one theory to that of the other witnessing their
solid similarity. Let me suppose, for the present purposes, that the functions f ′ and g′ are indeed
deeply correct translations. In such caseNon1
f ′,g′≡ Qui2, and so, according to the Synonymy Account,
Non1 and Qui2 are equivalent.
First, note that even if the assumption that f ′ and g′ are deeply correct translations is right, from
this it should not be concluded that noneism just is allism, contra what is suggested in Woodward
(2013). The reason is that the focus here is on particular theories,Non1 andQui2. Even though these
theories turn out to be equivalent under the assumption that f ′ and g′ are deeply correct, this is not
30A different suggestion, given in Woodward (2013), is to 1) treat ‘concrete’ as synonymous with ‘non-abstract’ and 2)
augment the language of the Quinean with predicates intended to stand for concreteness and being actual, with the intended
reading of actual being one according to which the seventh son of Kripke is not actual but could have been.
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the case with respect to theories Non1 and Qui1. As was shown, Qui1 does not even appear to have
the expressive resources enabling their proponents to understand what is claimed by the proponents
of Non1 when they advocate the truth of Sx¬Ex. Yet, Qui1 and Qui2 would typically both be
counted as allist theories. Hence, the claim that Noneism just is Allism requires qualiﬁcation because
some theories that typically count as allist do not even possess the expressive resources to express the
claim of Noneism.
The Synonymy Account reveals that it is often more useful to focus on the truth of theories instead
of focusing on the truth of slogans (such as Noneism, Quineanism and Allism). Suppose that S1
(e.g., Quineanism) is thought to have the drawback of possessing insufficient expressive resources in
comparison to those of theory S2 (say, Noneism). Suppose that S1ers then show how, by appealing to
certain extra primitives, they may avoid the objection that S1 has insufficient expressive resources,
and thus show that S1 is a relevant alternative to S2.
The previous discussion of theories Non1, Qui1 and Qui2 shows that this dialectic is misguided,
and that the Synonymy Account affords the resources to see the ways in which this is so. To begin with,
when noneists argue that allism is not satisfactory on the basis of insufficient expressive resources,
this is best understood as an argument not against allism itself, but instead against a certain theory, or
family of theories, that are committed to allism. In addition, by appealing to extra primitives allists in
effect express their adherence to theories that are different from the ones they started with. Those
theories may in fact be better than the ones they started with, and allists may be right in changing their
minds. But they are different theories nonetheless.
Finally, if the starting theory under consideration is Qui1, the rival noneist theory is Non1, and
the improved theory is Qui2, then the allist will be wrong in claiming that Allism is still a relevant
alternative to Noneism on the basis that Qui2 does not lack expressive resources when compared to
Non1. Given the assumptions presently in play, Qui2 and Non1 are synonymous theories, and so
equivalent by the Synonymy Account. Characterising the two theories,Qui2 andNon1, as alternatives
insofar as one of them is an allist theory whereas the other is a noneist theory is to mischaracterise
the situation. What proponents of Qui2 mean with ‘some things do not exist’ is different from
what proponents of Non1 mean with ‘some things do not exist’. In general, it may happen that by
augmenting the expressive resources of a theory that was proposed as a rival to some other theory
with purportedly more expressive resources, the enriched theory turns out to be equivalent to what
was previously regarded as an alternative theory.
Are Non1 and Qui2 really synonymous theories, and so equivalent? Addressing this question
will illustrate the workings of the Synonymy Account. The Synonymy Account recommends the
use of Hirsch’s rule of thumb. So, consider two societies SocNon1 and SocQui2 . To make the case
rather extreme, imagine that SocNon1 and SocQui2 descend from two different populations of English
speakers that were forced to move to two distinct and far away planets, due to some cataclysmic event.
The two societies SocNon1 and SocQui2 are constituted by the descendants of these two populations.
One of the societies inhabits one of the planets, whereas the other society inhabits the other. Suppose
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that:
1. SocNon1 and SocQui2 developed for ages without having any contact with each other;
2. In each of these planets some event took place that led to the destruction of most of the
knowledge concerning the origins of the society, in such a way that their current members are
all unaware of the fact that they travelled from Earth to their current planet, and that other
inhabitants of Earth had to move to a different planet;
3. TheoryNon1 becomes part of the folk theory of SocNon1 , and that theoryQui2 becomes part
of the folk theory of SocQui2 ;
4. At some point in their histories both societies developed the technological means to send
tripulated missions to space in search of alien life;
5. Members mmQui2 of one of these societies, SocQui2 , manage to travel to the planet where
SocNon1 is based, and to interact with the inhabitants of SocNon1 .
The scenario just described is one corresponding to the antecedent of a Hirschean counterfactual.
According to Hirsch’s rule of thumb, f ′ is a deeply correct translation from LNon1 to LQui2 just in
case, if the scenario described had obtained, then f ′ would have been a correct translation of the
language of SocNon1 bymmQui2 .
To determine whether this is so, the question to be considered is whether f ′ affords an inter-
pretation of the language of SocNon1 whereby the members of this society turn out to conform to a
convention of truthfulness and trust in their language by the lights ofmmQui2 . In the vast majority of
cases in which the inhabitants of Qui2 would assent to sentences such as the sentence ‘some ﬁctional
character, α, does not exist and . . .’,mmQui2 would describe them as believing that the content of
‘there exists a ﬁctional character, α, that is not concrete and . . .’, and as intending to communicate this
content to others. Moreover, this generalises to the different sentences for which f ′ is deﬁned. If this
is correct, and there are no other plausible alternative translations, then it should indeed be concluded
that the Hirschean counterfactual is true.
To make things more dramatic, we can even conceivemmQui2 returning to their planet, publishing
the translation manual, and this translation manual being used by other members of SocQui2 in their
visits to SocNon1 . We can also conceive the possibility of some of these members of SocQui2 at
some point becoming members of SocNon1 , quickly becoming speakers of the language of SocNon1 .
Arguably, all this may be conceived as being the case without the members of SocQui2 and SocNon1
ever questioning the adequacy of the translation manual based in f ′.
If all this is correct, then the Hirschean counterfactual is indeed true about f ′. That is, it is
true that if the scenario described had obtained, then f ′ would have been a correct translation of
the language of SocNon1 bymmQui2 . Furthermore, a symmetric case may also be considered, with
membersmmNon1 of SocNon1 visiting SocQui2 . Symmetric considerations would lead to judge as
true the claim that if this counterfactual scenario had obtained, then g′ would have been a correct
translation of the language of SocQui2 bymmNon1 . By Hirsch’s rule of thumb, f
′ and g′ are deeply
correct translations. Given that Non1 and Qui2 are strongly similar via f ′ and g′, Non1 and Qui2
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are synonymous theories. Finally, given the explication of theory equivalence as theory synonymy,
Non1 and Qui2 are equivalent theories.
Now, it is important to bear in mind that the theories that have been proposed in connection with
the Noneism-Allism debate are more nuanced thanNon1 andQui2. For this reason, I do not want to
give much importance to the fact thatNon1 andQui2 are, arguably, synonymous theories. The aim of
the present discussion has been solely that of offering an example of the application of the Synonymy
Account. The aim was not to deﬁnitely establish the equivalence between Non1 and Qui2.
To conclude, in this section it was shown that the Synonymy Account satisﬁes the desiderata laid
out in §4.2. It was also shown that the account offers tools enabling a deeper understanding of some
debates. On the one hand, the account makes salient the fact that sometimes what is at issue between
rival theories is whether to accept the existence of certain distinctions. On the other hand, it rightly
changes the focus of debates from slogans to theories.
4.5 Objections and Replies
One important charge against the Synonymy Account is that the explication of theory equivalence
as Synonymy overgenerates, in the sense of counting as synonymous theories that are not equivalent.
The objections concern the existence of extra relations between theories that are not taken into
consideration by the Synonymy Account, this being the reason why the account overgenerates. Here
are three such relations:
1. T1 is ideologically more parsimonious than T2. Roughly, theory T1 is ideologically more
parsimonious than theory T2 just in case T1 has fewer primitives (or fewer kinds of primitives)
than T2.31
2. T1 is more fundamental than T2. T1 is more fundamental than T2 just in case the primitive
predicates, operators and remaining expressions ﬁguring in the sentences of ComT1 have as
their meanings/semantic values entities (e.g., properties, relations, propositional functions) that
are more natural than the entities picked out by the primitive predicates, operators and other
expressions ﬁguring in the sentences of ComT2 .
32
3. T1 hasmore explanatory power thanT2. There are several views onwhat makes for explanatory
power. For instance, perhaps T1 and T2 distinguish different sets of sentences, ExpTi , as being
the set of sentences explaining the truth of the remaining sentences to whose truth Ti is
committed. Once this is done, some theorists may take explanation to be given by entailment.
31See (Cowling, 2013) for the distinction between ideological quantitative and ideological qualitative parsimony, as well
as a defence of the claim that ideological qualitative parsimony is an epistemic virtue of theories. Also, see (Quine, 1951) for
the distinction between ontology and ideology, and (Sider, 2011, p. 14) for a discussion of ideological parsimony. An appeal
to ideological parsimony as an epistemic virtue is present in, e.g., Lewis’s (1986) argument for the existence of a plurality of
maximal sums of spatio-temporal interrelated objects and in Sider’s (2013) argument for mereological nihilism.
32Perhaps the requirement should be, instead, that the meanings of the primitive predicates, operators and other
expressions ﬁguring in the sentences of ComT1/LT1 be more natural than the meanings of the primitive predicates,
operators and other expressions ﬁguring in the sentences of ComT2/LT2 . The points to be developed later on are
independent of which of these glosses is the best way of spelling out when one theory is more fundamental than the other.
For a standard defence of the relevance of fundamentality in metaphysical inquiry, see (Sider, 2011).
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That is, ExpTi explains the truth of the sentences in ComTi insofar as the commitments of
Ti are all entailed by ExpTi . Alternatively, explanation may be understood as ‘local’. That is, a
theory may distinguish a set of sequents ExpTi such that 〈Γ, ϕ〉 belongs to ExpTi just in case
the truth of the sentences in Γ explains the truth of ϕ.
A proponent of ideological parsimony (fundamentality/explanatory power) as a criterion for theory
choice advocates that, all things being equal, a more ideologically parsimonious (fundamental/ex-
planatory) theory should be preferred to a less ideologically parsimonious (fundamental/explanatory
theory). Thus, Synonymy appears to provide an insufficient criterion for theory equivalence. Even if
two theories are synonymous, they should not count as equivalent, because they may still differ in
their ideological parsimony (fundamentality/explanatory power).
For each one of these objections there is a straightforward move available. It consists in adding the
extra condition in question to the account of equivalence. For instance, the account could be amended
in such a way that i) theories T1 and T2 are equivalent just in case T1 is as ideologically parsimonious
as T2 and T1 ≡ T2; or ii) T1 and T2 are equivalent just in case T1 and T2 are equally fundamental and
T1 ≡ T2; or iii) T1 and T2 are equivalent just in case T1 and T2 have equal explanatory power and
T1 ≡ T2. Moreover, the overkill move of adding all the extra conditions to the Synonymy Account is
also available.
My view is that there is no need to have these extra constraints ﬁguring in an account of theory
equivalence. The general form of the argument is as follows. Either claims concerning ideological
parsimony, fundamentality and explanation are not reﬂected in a theory’s commitments, or else they
are. If they are not reﬂected in a theory’s commitments, then those claims are not concerned with
the relationship between theory and world. If they are reﬂected in a theory’s commitments, then
theories that differ in how parsimonious/fundamental/explanatorily powerful they are turn out not to
be synonymous.
Considering ﬁrst the case of ideological parsimony. Either parsimony concerns the way in which a
theory says what it says, or it concerns instead what is said by the theory. If the latter, then there is
no need to bring in parsimony considerations for judging whether two theories are equivalent. If the
former, then it is best to keep those considerations outside of the notion of theory equivalence.
Considerations of ideological parsimony may still have an impact on which one of two equivalent
theories are selected. But considerations having to do with the computational complexity of a theory
also have an impact on which of two equivalent theories is selected. Yet, even if two theories have
different computational complexity, they may still be equivalent. At least it is useful to isolate a sense
of equivalence, matching what is said by a theory, whereby a theory’s computational complexity is not
relevant to the question of whether it is equivalent to some other theory. These considerations apply
not only to the case of computational complexity but also to that of parsimony.
Consider now fundamentality. Why should the fact that the meanings of the primitive expressions
of a theory are more natural than those of another theory matter for whether the two theories are
equivalent? It matters either because i) if a theory is more fundamental than the other, then the
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theories say different things, and a fortiori are not equivalent, or ii) if a theory is more fundamental
than the other, then the way in which one of the theories says what is says is different from the way
the other theory says what it says. If i), then there is no need to appeal to fundamentality. Theory
synonymy already distinguishes theories on the basis of what they are committed to. If ii), then
some extra work is required to show why the way a theory says what it says matters for whether it is
equivalent to another theory.
Arguably, the main motivation for the view that the way a theory says what it says, vis à vis its
fundamentality, matters for theory equivalence is as follows. In the case of fundamentality, the way
a theory says what it says matters because the way in which a theory says what it says reveals the
commitments of the theory with respect to what the joints of nature are.33 There is a different way of
spelling out this thought. What is revealed by how fundamental a theory is are the commitments of
the proponents of the theory concerning the joints of nature.
However, this motivation does not justify taking fundamentality as a criterion for theory equiva-
lence. The reason is that theorists will often be neutral on what the joints of nature are. This happens
in several debates in metaphysics. For instance, theorists interested in the question whether necessarily
everything necessarily exists are typically not advocating any views concerning what the joints of
nature are. Similarly, several accounts of causation seem to be neutral on this question. Thus, it is
unreasonable to take these theories as reﬂecting commitments concerning fundamentality.
Of course these theories will enjoy some degree of fundamentality. But any theory will enjoy some
degree of fundamentality. This is just a consequence of the fact that a theory must be put forward in
some language or other, and thus must appeal to expressions which have more or less natural semantic
values. If the theorists were told that their theory would be judged on the matter of fundamentality
(and they found it fair that they needed to have any commitments on this question), they would
reconsider the language that they used to formulate their theory.
Thus, the main motivation for the view that fundamentality, understood as a way a theory says
what it says, is required for theory equivalence is unsuccessful. The conclusion is that if fundamentality
is not reﬂected in the commitments of a theory, it does not play a role in determining whether two
theories are equivalent.
Note that this is not to say that considerations pertaining to fundamentality are not useful for
theory choice. But such considerations are, arguably, best construed as being relevant for deciding
between extensions of theories. For any theory, one can consider its extension to a theory just like the
original one except that it includes explicit commitments to the joint-carving nature of the semantic
values of the expressions occurring in the formulation of the theory. Call this the joint-carving extension
of a theory. Judgements to the effect that one theory is better than the other insofar as it is more
fundamental are best understood as judgements to the effect that the joint-carving extension of the
ﬁrst theory offers a more adequate depiction of the joints of nature when compared to the joint-carving
extension of the second theory.
33Arguably, this is one of the commitments of (Sider, 2011).
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Consider now explanatory power. The case for the irrelevance of explanatory power for judging
whether two theories are equivalent is the same as the case for the irrelevance of fundamentality.
Claims of explanation can be made part of a theory explicitly. If a theorist’s aim is, at least in part,
to put forward explanatory claims, then he can do so directly, adding further sentences to his theory
that reﬂect these claims. It is then possible to assess whether the augmented theory is equivalent to
other theories or not. If explanatory claims are not part of the commitments of a theory, e.g., because
the theory’s proponents wish to remain neutral with respect to this matter, then it is not reasonable
to judge the theory according to this criterion. One does better in judging instead the prospects of
extensions of the theory obtained by adding to the original theory explanatory claims.
So far, the objections to the Synonymy Account that have been discussed were aimed at showing
that the account overgenerates, predicting the equivalence of non-equivalent theories. The ﬁnal
objection that I wish to brieﬂy discuss purports to show that the Synonymy Account undergenerates,
failing to count as equivalent theories that are in fact equivalent. The objection is that the Synonymy
Account undergenerates, since it counts as inequivalent theories that are empirically equivalent.
I do not have much to say by way of addressing this objection. Methodologically, it is desirable to
have a means of classifying theories relative to a relation between theories more stringent than just
empirical equivalence since, for instance, theories that differ on their mathematical commitments
may still count as empirically equivalent. Furthermore, in this chapter the focus has been on an
account of equivalence applicable to metaphysical theories. Insofar as, arguably, many metaphysical
theories are trivially empirically equivalent, since they are not concerned with empirical matters, all
such theories would count as being equivalent tout court. But whether metaphysical theories should
count as equivalent just because they are not concerned with empirical matters is a highly contentious
matter. For instance, mathematical theories should not count as equivalent just because they are not
concerned with empirical matters. Thus, with respect to whether metaphysical theories not concerned
with empirical matters should count as equivalent, I take the burden of proof to be with the objector.
4.6 Some Further Applications
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 contain the bulk of the defence of the Synonymy Account. Here, some possible
applications for the account are considered.
4.6.1 Relationships between Conceptions of Logical Space
Rayo (2013, ch. 2) offers a picture of scientiﬁc inquiry whereby inquiry can be seen as divided into
three stages. The ﬁrst stage consists in the choice of a language suited for certain theoretical purposes,
whereas the second stage consists in the formulation of a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical
space — a conception of logical space —, where this is understood as an hypothesis concerning the
space of metaphysical possibilities. Say that a ‘just is’-statement is a statement of the form xto be a ϕ
just is to be a ψy. Rayo holds that a conception of logical space is determined as a function of the set
of ‘just is’-statements that are held to be true by the theorist. Finally, the last stage of inquiry consists
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in narrowing down the possibilities in a conception of logical space that are live possibilities for being
the actual world.
This picture of scientiﬁc inquiry perforce attaches importance to the relationship between concep-
tions of logical space. If scientiﬁc inquiry requires a conception of logical space, and conceptions of
logical space are determined in function of the language of theorists, it is crucial to have the means to
say when two theories have ‘equivalent’, or using Rayo’s terminology, isomorphic conceptions of logical
space. After all, it would make no sense to take two theories to have unrelated conceptions of logical
space just because they are formulated in different languages. Besides discussion of some examples,
no account of when logical spaces are isomorphic is offered by Rayo.
The Synonymy Account offers the tools required to make better sense of isomorphism between
logical spaces. Arguably, conceptions of logical space are adequately equated with pairs 〈LT , SeqT 〉.
Once this assumption is in place, conceptions of logical space turn out to be isomorphic just in case
they are similar via deeply correct translation functions f and g. Rayo discusses one other relation
between conceptions of logical space, namely the relation that holds between two conceptions of
logical spaces when the ﬁrst is more restricted than the second. This relation can be captured by the
relation that holds between two conceptions of logical space just in case the ﬁrst is embeddable in the
second.
Thus, theorists sympathetic to Rayo’s picture can avail themselves of the resources of the Synonymy
Account in order to get a better hold on how to conceive of conceptions of logical space and of the
relationships between these.
4.6.2 Metaphysically Necessary Theories
According to a coarse-grained conception of content (Stalnaker, 1984) the content of a proposition
consists in nothing but a set of metaphysically possible worlds. Even though the Synonymy Account
does not presuppose a coarse-grained account of content, it is compatible with it. One of the difficulties
facing the proponents of a coarse-grained conception of content concerns the status of theories which,
if true, are necessarily so. All metaphysically necessary theories turn out to have the same content,
even though this is implausible.
The Synonymy Account gives proponents of coarse-grained content the tools to distinguish
between metaphysically necessary theories (as well as between metaphysically impossible theories).
By taking into consideration a theory’s entailment structure, metaphysically necessary theories may
be distinguished, since two metaphysically necessary theories may have radically different entailment
structures. Furthermore, even if the commitments of both theories turn out to be necessarily true, it
may still happen that one or both theories, if adequate, would require the existence of propositions or
relations between propositions that do not in fact exist or do not in fact obtain. Thus, proponents
of coarse-grained content should be sympathetic to the extra theoretical resources offered by the
Synonymy Account.
Furthermore, the Synonymy Account offers proponents of the coarse-grained conception with a
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picture of the role of metaphysical necessary theories which is, arguably, more attractive than most
pictures currently available. The picture that emerges from the Synonymy Account is one in which the
main role of metaphysically necessary theories is that of serving as hypothesis concerning the conceptual
resources required for describing the world. In effect, one of the main roles of several sentences
expressing necessarily true propositions lies in the relationships between contingent propositions that
they encapsulate. To give just one example, according to the resulting picture one of the main roles of
the commitment to the truth of the sentence ‘necessarily, John is a man only if John is an animal’ is that
of encapsulating the fact that, according to the proponents of the theory, the proposition expressed by
‘John is a man’ entails the proposition expressed by ‘John is an animal’. Such commitments impose
constraints on the theoretical structure of theories.
Before proceeding, let me remark once more that the Synonymy Account is not committed to a
coarse-grained conception of content. However, it is hospitable to those who endorse such an account.
4.7 Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter has been that of offering an account of theory equivalence, one applicable
to theories in metaphysics. I began by isolating some desiderata that, arguably, any correct account
of theory equivalence must satisfy. Afterwards, the Synonymy Account was presented. First, an
explication of theory equivalence as Synonymy was offered. Then, some principles for determining
whether a given translation scheme is deeply correct were proposed.
In §4.4 it was argued that the account satisﬁes the desiderata on accounts of equivalence previously
laid out. It was also shown that the Synonymy Account has the tools to offer a nuanced understanding
of the dialectic between noneists and Quineans (tools that can be expected to apply to other debates
in metaphysics). Some objections to the account were considered in §4.5. All of them were found to
be unsuccessful.
Finally, two further applications of the account were singled out. It should be clear by now that
there are many more. The next chapter is dedicated to one such application, namely, showing that




Contingentism and Theory Equivalence
5.1 Introduction
Consider a language containing only the propositional connectives, modal and actuality operators,
ﬁrst- and higher-order quantiﬁers, and identity. What is the true and most comprehensive theory
formulated in this language? What is the correct theory of higher-order quantiﬁcation, modality,
identity and their interaction? The thesis of Higher-Order Necessitism was defended in chapter 2
and, more forcefully, in chapter 3. This leaves two main candidate theories, namely,Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism (Williamson, 2013, chs. 5-7) and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism (Plantinga,
1976).
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism are, prima facie,
mutually inconsistent theories. Yet, it is shown in this chapter that their equivalence is a consequence
of the Synonymy Account of theory equivalence, developed and defended in chapter 4. It is also
shown how to make sense of the equivalence between the two theories, given their apparent mutual
inconsistency.
The equivalence between Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Con-
tingentism is a signiﬁcant result in a number of ways. To begin with, the equivalence between the
two theories affords a greater understanding of the present state of the debate concerning what is
the correct higher-order modal logic, avoiding double-counting of theories. This ultimately leads to
progress, insofar as it enables theorists to zoom in on the competing candidate higher-order modal
theories.
Relatedly, given the defence of Higher-Order Necessitism offered in the previous chapters,
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism are, arguably, the most
plausible higher-order modal theories available. If they are indeed equivalent, then we have managed
to zoom in on just one theory (up to theory equivalence).
In addition, the equivalence between Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Mod-
erate Contingentism reveals that debates between proponents of the two theories are insubstantial, or
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merely verbal. This is so at least insofar as those debates are concerned with the truth of the theories,
since one theory is true if and only if the other is. Later in the paper attention will be brought to the
mere verbality of the dispute between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism, by noting
the striking similarity between that dispute and a typical example of a merely verbal dispute.
The results established in this chapter also promise to be useful in two other respects. The
synonymy between the two theories is established by appealing to certain mappings between their
language. These mappings provide a systematic way to go from entailments inMC to entailments in
TN , and vice-versa.
The mappings also make it possible to map arguments for and against one theory to arguments
for and against the other. The merits and shortcomings of the target arguments may reveal the need
to reassess the merits and shortcomings of the source arguments. For instance, suppose that an
argument A1, thought to cause problems to theory T1, is mapped to an argument A2 against T2, and
that argument A2 presupposes a certain conception of properties that turns out to be unattractive,
given how the notion of property is understood by proponents of T2. If this is so, then it may turn out
that argument A1 presupposes a certain conception of individuals that turns out to be unattractive,
given how the notion of individual is understood by the proponents of T1. One reason why this
unattractive presupposition of A1 might not have been noticed from the start is that proponents of T1
and advocates of A1 might have been conﬂating different notions of individual.
Finally, I want to brieﬂy say how the claims defended in this chapter relate to those defended in
Bennett’s ‘Proxy Actualism’ (2006). One of the aims of Bennett’s paper is to argue that there are
certain structural similarities between Linsky and Zalta’s theory and Plantinga’s (if Bennett is correct,
then those structural similarities are exhibited by Linsky and Zalta’s, Williamson’s and Plantinga’s
theories, as remarked in (Nelson & Zalta, 2009)). The other aim is to argue that none of the theories
is actualist.
The second aim is unrelated to the aims of the present paper. The issue of whether these theories
are actualist is not addressed here. As to the structural similarities between Linsky and Zalta’s,
Williamson’s and Plantinga’s theories, the present paper advances a claim that is much bolder than
Bennett’s. It is not just that Williamson’s and Plantinga’s theories are structurally similar. They are
equivalent, and so count for one vis-à-vis the relationship between theories and the world.
The chapter begins with the presentation of Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism. First an overview of the theories is given. Afterwards, detailed formulations
of the theories are offered.
The case for the equivalence between the two theories is developed in §5.3. First translations
between the languages of the two theories are offered. The solid similarity between the two theories
via these translations is established in an appendix to the chapter. The main result of the section is that
the translations offered are deeply correct. Since these translations witness the solid similarity between
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, the two theories are
synonymous. Therefore, they are equivalent, on the assumption that synonymy implies equivalence
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(an assumption defended in chapter 4). Two other results are established in the section. The ﬁrst
is that the homonymous translation between the theories is not deeply correct. The second is that
the dispute between proponents of Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism and Plantingan Moderate
Contingentism turns out to have the features of typical merely verbal disputes.
In §5.4 three issues related to equivalence between the two theories are tackled. The ﬁrst consists
in making sense of the equivalence between the two theories. How can it be that proponents of,
respectively, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism turn out
to differ with respect to the meaning of some of the expressions of their common language, while at
the same time taking themselves not to disagree on their meaning? It is suggested that the explanation
for this phenomenon is no different from the one to be offered for more mundane cases of merely
verbal disputes.
The second issue concerns how to interpret a certain result concerning the relationship between
the model-theories offered for Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough
Necessitism. Suppose that the theories are recast in disjoint languages. Then, models forWilliamsonian
Thorough Necessitism may be extended, thus becoming models of both theories. Similarly, models
for Moderate Contingentism may be augmented, thus becoming models of both theories. The result
is that such extension does not lead to the same class of models. In light of this result, there is the
temptation to think that the theories are not equivalent after all. Contra the objection, it is shown that,
on the contrary, if the theories are equivalent, then this mismatch between the two classes of models is
only to be expected.
The third issue concerns translation of reasons. The mappings witnessing the synonymy between
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism enable arguments
for one theory to be translated into arguments for the other. They also enable objections to one
theory to be translated into objections to the other theory. Such mappings may thus be used either to
support both theories, or to reject them. It will be shown how one of the objections to Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism is translated to an objection to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, and one of
the objections to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism is translated to an objection to Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism.
5.2 Moderate Contingentism and Thorough Necessitism
5.2.1 Overview of the Theories
PlantinganModerate Contingentism andWilliamsonian Thorough Necessitism will both be formulated
in a higher-order modal language very much like the language ML@P deﬁned in §1.3.1.
1 The main
difference is that the language considered will have only two constants, namely, ‘=’ and ‘c〈e〉’. Given
that the higher-order modal theories are intended as general theories concerning the interaction
1Plantinga does not formulate his theory in terms of higher-order quantiﬁcation. Yet, clearly, Plantinga’s views can
be reformulated by appealing to higher-order resources, and so I will be doing just that, since the present focus is on
higher-order modal theories.
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between quantiﬁcation and modality, there is no need to consider principles involving constants. The
reason why the language will, nonetheless, contain the constant ‘c〈e〉’ is that its interpretation, the
property of being concrete, turns out to play an important role in the classic necessitist theories, as
shall be shown. I will be calling this language ML@cP .
One aspect common to the necessitist theories put forward by LZ (i.e, Linsky and Zalta) and
Williamson, and Plantinga’s moderately contingentist theory, is that they all have the resources enabling
actualist accounts of possible worlds’ semantics for ﬁrst-order modal languages (namely, the Literal
and the Haecceities Accounts, introduced in §2.2). Brieﬂy, on the face of it, possible worlds’ semantics
for ﬁrst-order modal languages implies, in conjunction with the assumption that there could have been
things that actually are nothing, the thesis of Possibilism (according to which something is actually
nothing).
To see why this is so, suppose that the following is true:
(1) There could have been something such that actually it is nothing.
For instance, there could have been a seventh son of Kripke, despite the fact that actually, nothing is
nor could have been a seventh son of Kripke. According to possible worlds’ semantics for ﬁrst-order
modal languages, (1) is true if and only if there is a possible world that has in its domain an individual
that does not belong to the domain of the actual world. Since the individuals in the domain of the
actual world are those that are actually something, it follows that there is something that is actually
nothing, (e.g., the seventh son of Kripke). That is, it follows that Possibilism is true.
Some theorists ﬁnd Possibilism problematic, being friendly to Actualism instead. Actualism may
be seen as justiﬁed by the conjunction of two claims. The ﬁrst is the claim that actually, p if and only if
p is true at a particular world, the actual world, i.e., the world that turns out to be realised. The second
is the claim that p is true at the actual world if and only if it is the case that p simpliciter. From the
conjunction of both claims it follows that:
(2) Actually p if and only if it is the case that p.
So, since everything is such that it is the case that it is something, it follows from (2) that everything is
such that actually it is something.2
Linsky and Zalta’s andWilliamson’s theories have the resources required for an actualist account of
possible world’s semantics for ﬁrst-order modal languages insofar as their theories are both committed
to the truth of Necessitism. Since necessarily, everything is necessarily something, it follows that
necessarily, everything is actually something. But the claim that necessarily, everything is actually
something is equivalent to the claim that it is not the case that there could have been some thing that is
actually nothing. In effect, LZ’s and Williamson’s theories are committed to the falsehood of (1). This
2Note that the view is not that necessarily, p if and only if actually, p. It is a notorious feature of the logic of actuality that
it is contingent that p if and only if actually p. Supposing that things could have been different in that p is not the case but
could have been, it is possible that p, even though, it is not possible that actually p. So, it is possible that p and that it is not
the case that actually p. This argument for Actualism was presented in §1.1.
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commitment enables them to block the route from possible worlds’ semantics for ﬁrst-order modal
languages to Possibilism.
Since Linsky and Zalta’s and Williamson’s theories are committed to the falsehood of (1), this
means that both theories are somewhat opposed common sense. After all, (1) does appear to be true.
As I shall show, both theories have the resources to reject the truth of (1) and yet acknowledge that
there is some grain of truth in (1), doing so by appealing to the view that some things, such as the
possible seventh son of Kripke, are contingently nonconcrete.
But let me ﬁrst turn to the actualist account of possible worlds’ semantics afforded by Plantinga’s
theory. Plantinga’s actualist account of possible worlds’ semantics turns out to be consistent with the
truth of the claim that there could have been something that actually is nothing. Of course, something
has got to give. In order to accomplish this the account of possible worlds’ semantics offered by
Plantinga is nonstandard in that, according to it, the elements of the domains of possible worlds are
not individuals, but instead properties.
According to the nonstandard account of possible worlds’ semantics proposed by Plantinga (the
Haecceities Account, introduced 2.2.3) instead of individuals the domains of possible worlds have as
their elements haecceities. The elements of the domain of each possible world w are those hacceities
such that it is true at w that they have the property of being instantiated. On this understanding of
variable-domains possible worlds’ semantics, the claim that it is possible that something is the seventh
son of Kripke and is actually nothing is true just in case there is a possible world w and haecceityH
such that it is true at w thatH is coinstantiated with the property of being a seventh son of Kripke,
and it is not true at the actual world thatH is coinstantiated with the property of being self-identical.3
More generally, (1) is true if and only if the following claim is true:
(3) There is a possible worldw and haecceityH such that it is true atw thatH is coinstantiated with
the property of being self-identical, and it is not true at the actual world thatH is coinstantiated
with the property of being self-identical.
Since the truth of (3) is consistent with Actualism, Plantinga’s theory has the resources to offer an
3Note thatH does not (actually) have the property of being coinstantiated with the property of being a seventh son of
Kripke. Otherwise, there would be some individual that is a seventh son of Kripke, since if a property is coinstantiated,
then there is something that instantiates it.
Equivalently, it is not true at the actual world thatH has the property of being coinstantiated with the property of being a
seventh son of Kripke. Instead, according to the example in the text what is true ofH is that there is some possible world w
such that it is true at w thatH is coinstantiated with the property being a seventh son of Kripke.
From the fact that it is true at some possible world w thatH is coinstantiated with the property of being a seventh son of
Kripke it follows that there is some possible world w such that i) it is true at w thatH is instantiated and ii) it is true at
w that there is some individual x that instantiatesH . But it does not follow that (it is true at the actual world that)H is
coinstantiated with the property of being a seventh son of Kripke, and so it does not follows that (it is true at the actual
world that) there is something that instantiatesH . Likewise, for instance, from the fact that there is some possible world w
such that it is true at w that Obama is the president of France it does not follow that (it is true at the actual world that)
Obama is the president of France.
Also, even thoughH has the property of being such that it is true at w that it is coinstantiated, it does not follow that
there is some individual x that has the property of being such that it is true at w that x instantiates H . Likewise, even
though Kripke has the property of being such that it is true at w that he has a seventh son, it does not follow that there is
some individual that has the property of being such that it is true at w that it is Kripke’s seventh son.
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actualist account of possible worlds’ semantics for ﬁrst-order modal languages consistent with the
truth of (1).
Plantinga’s nonstandard account of possible worlds’ semantics requires an abundant conception
of haecceities, one on which the following claim is true:
(4) Necessarily, every individual is such that its haecceity is (actually) something.
The reason is that, otherwise, there would not be enough haecceities to populate the domains of
all possible worlds. This claim, in conjunction with the thesis that necessarily, every property is
necessarily something (a thesis also endorsed by Plantinga) implies that:
(5) Necessarily, every individual is such that its haecceity is necessarily something.
Claim (5) is itself a consequence of the conjunction of Higher-Order Necessitism with an abundantist
conception of higher-order entities. Roughly, according to this conception:
Thorough Abundantism. For any pairing of worlds w with classes of n-tuples of entities, of types
t1, . . . tn, that are all something at w, there is a relation whose extension at each world corre-
sponds to the class of n-tuples of entities paired with that world.4
Thorough Abundantism will be one of the commitments of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.
Thorough Abundantism together with Higher-Order Necessitism implies every instance of the
following comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic:
Comp. ∃y〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . ∀xntn(yx1 . . . xn ↔ ϕ)
The variables x1, . . . , xn may all be free in ϕ, but the variable y may not. The result of preﬁxing Comp
with any number of universal quantiﬁers and necessity operators, in any order, is also an instance of
Comp.
Brieﬂy, note that Comp has Higher-Order Necessitism as one of its instances. For each sequence
t1, . . . , tn of types, the following is an instance of Comp:
(6) ∃y〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . xntn(yx1 . . . xn ↔ z〈t1,...,tn〉x1 . . . xn)
So, the result of preﬁxing (6) with ‘2∀z〈t1,...,tn〉2’ is also an instance of Comp, for each sequence
t1, . . . , tn of types:
(7) 2∀z〈t1,...,tn〉2∃z〈t1,...,tn〉2∀x1t1 . . . xntn(yx1 . . . xn ↔ z〈t1,...,tn〉x1 . . . xn)
4This formulation of Thorough Abundantism is but a rough sketch of the intended thesis. One reason is that there
are some grounds for thinking that if there was such a pairing between worlds and classes of n-tuples of entities, then
whatever could have been something would actually be something. Arguably, the claim that whatever could have been
something is actually something is a consequence of the not unreasonable claims that i) there is such pairing only if all the
things being paired are actually something, and ii) all classes of actual or possible entities are actually something only if all
their elements are actually something. Such complications of formulation are unproblematic in the present setting. The
model-theoretic formulations of Moderate Contingentism and Thorough Necessitism will ensure that both theories are
committed to Thorough Abundantism, in the intended sense, without this commitment implying, on its own, a commitment
to the view that necessarily, every thing is actually something.
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Since, identity between higher-order entities is here being used as shorthand for necessary coexten-
siveness, as mentioned in §1.3.2, (7) is just a statement of Higher-Order Necessitism. Thus, Comp
implies Higher-Order Necessitism.5
Williamson (2013, ch. 6) argues for Necessitism on the basis of Comp, and offers a defence of
Comp. Brieﬂy, one of Williamson’s arguments from Comp to Necessitism is as follows. Say that a
property is the anti-haecceity of an individual just in case it is the property of being distinct from that
individual, and that it is an anti-haecceity just in case it is possible that it is the anti-haecceity of an
individual. Comp implies that it is necessary that every haecceity is necessarily something, and that it
is necessary that the anti-haecceity of every individual is necessarily something.6 Williamson argues
that haecceities and anti-haecceities ontologically depend on the individuals that they could have been
haecceities and anti-haecceities of.
According to Williamson, the relationship between an individual and the properties that are,
respectively, its haecceity and anti-haecceity is particularly intimate. An individual’s haecceity could
not have been something while the individual that it is possibly an haecceity of was nothing. Similarly,
an individual’s anti-haecceity could not have been something while the individual of which it is
possibly an anti-haecceity was nothing. So, assuming the ontological dependence of haecceities and
anti-haecceities on the things that they are haecceities of, if it is necessary that every individual is
such that its haecceity, and anti-haecceity, are necessarily something, then it is necessary that every
individual is such that it is necessarily something.
Thorough contingentists such as Adams (1981), Fine (1977) and Stalnaker (2012) also endorse
5Comp is the comprehension principle equivalent to Cˆomp argued for in §3.8.
6Note that the following are instances of Comp:
(i) ∃y〈e〉2∀ze(yz ↔ (xe = z)).
(ii) ∃y〈e〉2∀ze(yz ↔ (xe 6= z)).
By preﬁxing both formulas with 2∀xe2 one obtains the statements that it is necessary that every haecceity is necessarily
something, and that it is necessary that every anti-haecceity is necessarily something:
(iii) 2∀xe2∃y〈e〉2∀ze(yz ↔ (xe = z)).
(iv) 2∀xe2∃y〈e〉2∀ze(yz ↔ (xe 6= z)).
LetHx〈e〉 := 3∃ye2∀ze(xz ↔ z = y) and Ax〈e〉 := 3∃ye2∀ze(xz ↔ z 6= y). The following formulae are formal
renderings of the claims that, necessarily, every haecceity is necessarily something, and that necessarily, every anti-haecceity
is necessarily something:
(v) 2∀x〈e〉2(Hx→ ∃u〈e〉(x = u)
(vi) 2∀x〈e〉2(Ax→ ∃u〈e〉(x = u)
From (iii) it follows that (v) in the logic neutral S5 presented in §1.6. Roughly, supposeM,w, g[x/f ] (S5n Hx〈e〉 for
some f ∈ D〈e〉(w). Then, there is w′ ∈W and d ∈ De(w′) such thatM,w′, g[x/f, y/d] (S5n 2∀ze(xz ↔ z = y).
Assume also thatM,w, g (S5n (iii). Then,M,w′, g[x/f, y/d] (S5n 2∃r〈e〉2∀ze(rz ↔ z = y).
In such case,M,w′, g[x/f, y/d] (S5n 2∃r〈e〉2∀ze(xz ↔ rz). That is,M,w′, g[x/f, y/d] (S5n 2∃r〈e〉(x = r).
Hence,M,w, g (S5n (v). A similar argument establishes that (vi) follows from (iv) in neutral S5.
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the view that haecceities and anti-haecceities ontologically depend on the individuals that they are
haecceities and anti-haecceities of. Whereas they take this fact as evidence for the claim that there
could have been higher-order entities — e.g., haecceities and anti-haecceities — that are actually nothing,
Williamson takes the ontological dependence of haecceities and anti-haecceities on the individuals that
they are haecceities of as evidence for Necessitism. One of Williamson’s reasons for such commitment
is that he has independent grounds for endorsing the truth of Comp. According to him, principles at
least as strong as Comp are required for the general applicability of some logical and mathematical
claims formulated in higher-order modal languages.7
This suffices to show that Comp plays an important role in Williamson’s defence of Necessitism
and, a fortiori, also in his defence of Thorough Necessitism. As previously mentioned, Thorough
Abundantism, together with Higher-Order Necessitism, implies the truth of every instance of Comp.
In effect, Williamson adopts a commitment not only to Comp, but also to Thorough Abundantism.
Thorough Abundantism will thus be a commitment not only of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism
but also of Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism.
Let me now turn to a different commitment of both theories, namely, Thorough Serious Actualism.
On Williamson’s theory, Thorough Serious Actualism comes out as trivially true. After all, according
to it, no possible thing — individual or higher-order entity — could have been nothing. Plantinga’s
theory is also committed to the truth of Thorough Serious Actualism. Suppose that there could have
been something that could have had a property and yet be nothing. According to Plantinga’s theory this
is equivalent to there being an haecceity that could have been coinstantiated with some property, while
not being instantiated. That is, in order for Plantinga’s theory to be consistent with the negation of
Thorough Serious Actualism, it cannot be that if properties h and g are coinstantiated, then property h
is instantiated and property g is instantiated, which would border the inconsistent. The commitment
to Thorough Serious Actualism is thus an important tenet of Plantinga’s theory, and will accordingly
also be a commitment of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.
Finally, as previously mentioned, Necessitism is opposed to common sense. For instance, it does
seem that Obama and the Eiffel Tower could both have been nothing. Necessitists such as Linsky &
Zalta (1994) and Williamson (2013) accommodate the common sense thought that some individuals
could have been nothing by adopting the view that concreteness is not an essential property. Even
though it is not true, according to them, that Obama could have been nothing, nor that the Eiffel
Tower could have been nothing, it is true, according to them, that Obama and the Eiffel Tower could
have been nonconcrete. Obama would have been nonconcrete in those circumstances in which his
parents had not met, and the Eiffel Tower would have been nonconcrete in those circumstances in
which its actual designers did not design it. In general, whenever it would appear that a thing x could
have been nothing, what is true according to necessitists is that x could have been nonconcrete.
Note that necessitists do not take the claim that x is nonconcrete to imply that x is abstract. Their
view is that there are things that are neither nonconcrete nor abstract. These are what others would
7Williamson’s argument for Comp is considered in more detail in §A.5.
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call mere possibilia — things like the seventh son of Kripke and the being resulting from the union of
Sperm and Ovum, where Sperm is a sperm, Ovum is an egg, and Sperm and Ovum have not actually
united. Things such as the seventh son of Kripke and the being resulting from the union of Sperm
and Ovum are not abstract. These are unlike things such as directions and numbers, paradigmatic
cases of abstract entities.
Concreteness thus plays an important role in the necessitist theories that have been offered. It
enables them to account for the grain of truth in the common sense judgements that things such
as Obama and the Eiffel Tower could have been nothing. This allows for the disagreement with
common sense to be less radical than it would otherwise be. The mistaken views that Obama and the
Eiffel Tower could have been nothing arise from a failure to realise that some things could have been
nonconcrete.
So, even though Necessitists like LZ and Williamson are not committed to Contingentism, they
are committed to a claim which, according to them, captures the grain of truth in Contingentism,
namely:
Accidental Concretism. There could have been some concrete individual that could have been
nonconcrete.
Insofar as Accidental Concretism offers necessitists the resources to harmonise their theories with
common sense, it will also be a commitment of Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism.
Contingentists, on the other hand, have no reason to endorse Accidental Concretism. They side
with common sense in thinking that Obama and the Eiffel Tower could have been nothing, and so have
no place for the contingently nonconcrete. According to them, what is true is not that Obama, and the
Eiffel Tower, could have been something nonconcrete, but rather that they could have been nothing.
Thus, Accidental Concretism will not be a commitment of Plantigan Moderate Contingentism. Instead,
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism is committed to Essential Concretism, the negation of Accidental
Concretism:
Essential Concretism. Necessarily, every concrete individual is necessarily such that if it is some-
thing, then it is concrete.
The following list sums up the commitments of PlantinganModerate Contingentism andWilliamso-
nian Thorough Necessitism identiﬁed so far:
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Higher-Order Necessitism X X
Thorough Actualism X X
Thorough Abundantism X X






Detailed formulations of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Neces-
sitism will now be offered.
5.2.2 Formulations ofPlantinganModerateContingentismandWilliamsonianThor-
ough Necessitism
The formulations of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism
consist in the triples
MC = 〈LMC , SeqMC , ComMC〉 and TN = 〈LTN , SeqTN , ComTN 〉.
Both theories are formulated in languageML@cT . That is,LMC = LTN = ML
@c
T . The characterisation
of the remaining elements ofMC and TN appeals to the notion of a generic inhabited model structure.
Deﬁnition (Generic Inhabited Model Structure). A generic inhabited model structure is any S5-neutral
model structure (deﬁned in §1.6) such thatD is as follows:
1. De(w) = d(w);
2. D〈t1,...,tn〉(w) = {f ∈ (P(
⋃
w∈W




W : ∀w ∈ W (f(w) ⊆
Dt1(w)× . . .×Dtn(w))}.
For simplicity, let me use ‘Dt’ as shorthand for
⋃
w∈W
Dt(w), for each type t. For each type t,Dt(w)
represents the domain of entities of type t that are something at world w. Note that the restriction
to functions f such that ∀w ∈W (f(w) ⊆ Dt1(w)× . . .×Dtn(w)) ensures that every instance of
Thorough Serious Actualism is satisﬁed by every model over every generic inhabited model structure.
Note also that the deﬁnition just given ensures that Dt(w) = Dt(w′), for every w,w′ ∈ W and
t 6= e, and so the satisfaction of Higher-Order Necessitism. The fact thatD〈t1,...,tn〉(w) is not just a
proper subset of {f ∈ P(Dt1 × . . .×Dtn)W : ∀w ∈W (f(w) ⊆ Dt1(w)× . . .×Dtn(w))}, but
instead identical to it, enables both theories to count as thoroughly abundantist theories. The facts that
Dt(w) = Dt(w
′) and {f ∈ P(Dt1 × . . .×Dtn)W : ∀w ∈W (f(w) ⊆ Dt1(w)× . . .×Dtn(w))}
together ensure the satisfaction of every instance of Comp.
For a quick example, consider a generic inhabited model structure 〈W,, R, d,D〉, such that
W = {1, 2},  = 1, d(1) = {i1} and d(2) = {i2}. That is, according to this generic inhabited
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model structure, there are two possible worlds, 1 and 2, 1 is the actual world, and only one individual
is something at each world: i1 is something at world 1 and i2 is something at world 2.
As to higher-order domains, consider the domain of properties of individuals of each world
w, D〈e〉(w). Note that P(De) = P(
⋃
w∈W
D(w)) = {∅, {i1}, {i2}, {i1, i2}}. The deﬁnition of
higher-order domains given above ensures that D〈e〉(1) = D〈e〉(2) = {f ∈ P(De)W : ∀w ∈
W (f(w) ⊆ De(w))} = {fI , fII , fIII , fIV }, where fI(1) = fI(2) = ∅, fII(1) = {i1} and
fII(2) = ∅, fIII(1) = ∅ and fIII(2) = {i2}, and fIV (1) = {i1} and fIV (2) = {i2}. That is, the
domain of properties of each world has four properties: property fI , which is instantiated by nothing
at both, property fII , which instantiated by i1 at world 1 and by nothing at world 2, property fIII ,
instantiated by nothing at world 1 and by i2 at world 2, and property fIV , instantiated by i1 at world
1 and i2 at world 2. Note that there is no property that is, for instance, instantiated by both i1 and i2
at world 1. This is in full agreement with Thorough Serious Actualism, since i2 is nothing at world 1,
and so it has no properties at such world.
Let me now turn to generic models:
Deﬁnition (Generic Model). A generic model is any S5-neutral model based on a generic inhabited
model structure whose valuation function is restricted to the language ML@cP .
The functionV al is deﬁned as in §1.6. A formulaϕ is true in a genericmodelM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉,
M,w, g (
G
ϕ, if and only if V algw(ϕ) = {∅}. This means that the following holds:




t1 . . . s
n
tn iff 〈V alg(s1), . . . , V alg(sn)〉 ∈ V alg(s0)(w), where for each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), sit is either a constant or a variable of type t;
2. M,w, g (
G
¬ϕ iffM,w, g 6 (
G
ϕ;
3. M,w, g (
G
ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,w, g (
G
ϕ andM,w, g (
G
ψ;
4. M,w, g (
G
2ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W :M,w′, g (
G
ϕ;
5. M,w, g (
G
@ϕ iffM,, g (
G
ϕ;
6. M,w, g (
G
∀vtϕ iff ∀f ∈ Dt(w) :M,w, g[v/f ] (
G
ϕ.
Presently, the interest is in two subclasses of generic models, MC-models and TN -models.
Starting withMC-models, these are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition (MC-Model). AMC-model is a generic model 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 such that:
1. There are w,w′ ∈W such that d(w) 6= d(w′);
2. d(w) = V (c〈e〉)(w) ∪ {d ∈ De : ∀w′ ∈W (d 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w′))}.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that everyMC-model satisﬁes Contingentism. The second condition
ensures that everyMC-model satisﬁes Essential Concretism.
TN -models are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition (TN -Model). A TN -model is a generic model 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 such that:
1. For every w,w′ ∈W : d(w) = d(w′);
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2. Some d ∈ De is such that there are w,w′ ∈W such that d ∈ V (c〈e〉)(w) and d 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w′).
WhenM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 is aMC-model, w ∈W and g is a variable-assignment ofM , I
will useM,w, g (
MC
ϕ instead ofM,w, g (
G
ϕ, and whenM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 is a TN -model,
w ∈ W and g is a variable-assignment of M , I will use M,w, g (
TN
ϕ instead of M,w, g (
G
ϕ.
Also, I will use Γ (
MC
ϕ to say that there is noMC-modelM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, w ∈ W and
variable-assignment g such thatM,w, g (
MC
γ for all γ ∈ Γ andM,w, g 6 (
MC
ϕ, and I will use Γ (
TN
ϕ
to say that there is no TN -modelM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, w ∈ W and variable-assignment g of
M such thatM,w, g (
TN
γ for all γ ∈ Γ andM,w, g 6 (
TN
ϕ. Also, say that  (
MC
ϕ if and only if
M,, g (
MC
ϕ for everyMC-modelM and variable-assignment g ofM , and that (
TN
ϕ if and only
ifM,, g (
TN
ϕ for every TN -modelM and variable-assignment g ofM .
The formulationsMC and TN can now be fully speciﬁed. The set SeqMC consists in the set
of sequents 〈Γ, ϕ〉 — where Γ is a set of closed formulae of LMC and ϕ is a closed formula of LMC
— such that Γ (
MC
ϕ, and the set SeqTN consists in the set of sequents 〈Γ, ϕ〉 — where Γ is a set of
closed formulae of LTN and ϕ is a closed formula of LTN — such that Γ (
TN
ϕ. Moreover, ComMC
consists in the set of closed formulae ϕ such that  (
MC
ϕ, and ComTN consists in the set of closed
formulae ϕ such that  (
TN
ϕ. I will now turn to the argument for the equivalence between the two
theories.
5.3 Equivalence
In what follows the functions (·)TN : LMC → LTN and (·)MC : LTN → LMC are presented.
These mappings will be called, respectively, the TN -mapping and the MC-mapping. It will be
argued that the TN - and theMC-mappings are deeply correct. The solid similarity via the TN - and
MC-mappings is established in the appendix. Together, these facts establish the synonymy ofMC
and TN , and so the equivalence between Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism.
5.3.1 The TN- andMC-Mappings
Let me begin by deﬁning some predicates that will play a role later on. Say that an individual xe is
chunky〈e〉 just in case xe is abstract or concrete. That is,
Ch〈e〉(xe) := cxe ∨2(¬cxe).
Moreover, say that a higher-order entity y〈t1,...,tn〉 is chunky〈〈t1,...,tn〉〉 if and only if, necessarily,if
z1, . . . , zn fall under it, then z1 is chunkyt1 , and . . ., and z
n is chunkytn . That is,
Ch〈〈t1,...tn〉〉(y〈t1,...tn〉) := 2∀z1t1 . . . ∀zntn(yz1 . . . zn → (Cht1(z1) ∧ . . . ∧ Chtn(zn))).




• (si)TN = si, if si is a variable or c〈e〉;
• (si)TN = v〈e,e〉, if si is=〈e,e〉, where v〈e,e〉 is the ﬁrst variable of type 〈e, e〉 distinct from
sj , for all j < i.
Then:
(a) If there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. si is =〈e,e〉, then let (s0〈t1,...tn〉s1t1 . . . sntn)TN =
∃v〈e,e〉(2∀ue∀ze(vuz ↔ u = z ∧ (Ch(u) ∧ Ch(v))) ∧ (s0)TN (s1)TN . . . (sn)TN )
(b) Otherwise, let (s0〈t1,...,tn〉s
1
t1 . . . s
n
tn)
TN = (s0)TN (s1)TN . . . (sn)TN ;
2. (¬ϕ)TN = ¬(ϕ)TN ;
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)TN = (ϕ)TN ∧ (ψ)TN ;
4. (2ϕ)TN = 2(ϕ)TN ;
5. (@ϕ)TN = @(ϕ)TN ;
6. (∃vtϕ)TN = ∃vt(Ch(vt) ∧ (ϕ)TN ).
Let me assume for the present purposes that, according to Plantingans, Noman is a merely possible
individual. Since Noman is a merely possible individual, and Plantingans are committed to Thorough
Serious Actualism, they will endorse the truth of
(8) It is not the case that Noman is self-identical.
If the TN -mapping turns out to be a deeply correct translation, then, according to clause 1., the
proposition that is, according to Plantingans, expressed by (8), is the same as the proposition that is,
according to Williamsonians, expressed by (9):
(9) It is not the case that Noman is both self-identical and chunky.
Note that Williamsonians accept the truth of the proposition expressed by (9), since Noman is not
(actually) concrete, and thus he is not chunky. So, if the TN -mapping turns out to be a deeply correct
translation, then the Plantingans’ commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by (8) is not
inconsistent with the commitments of Williamsonians.
Similarly, if the TN -mapping turns out to be a deeply correct translation, then the proposition
that is, according to Plantingans, expressed by (10)
(10) It is not the case that Noman is something
is the same proposition as the one that is, according to Williamsonians, expressed by (11)
(11) It is not the case that Noman is something chunky.
Plantingans endorse the proposition that, according to them, is expressed by (10), even though they
do not endorse the proposition that, according to them, is expressed by (11). And Williamsonians
endorse the proposition that, according to them, is expressed by (11), even though they do not endorse
the proposition that, according to them, is expressed by (10). So, if the TN -mapping turns out to be
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a deeply correct translation, then in endorsing the truth of the proposition that, according to them, is
expressed by (10), Plantingans turn out to be in agreement with Williamsonians.
This means that, if the TN -mapping turns out to be a deeply correct translation, then Williamso-
nians should understand the moderate contingentists’ quantiﬁed claims as being restricted to the
realm of the chunky. Let me now turn to theMC-mapping, starting with a few abbreviations and
deﬁnitions.
One of the notions required in the formulation of theMC-mapping consists in the property that
the haecceity of an individual has just in case the individual of which it is an haecceity is concrete. To
properly formulate an expression standing for such property, one ﬁrst requirement is a formula stating
that a property is the haecceity of an individual. The following formula states that y〈e〉 is an haecceity
of individual xe:
2∀ze(yz ↔ z = x).






This formula states that y is the haecceity of something concrete.
The mapping also appeals to the relation in which haecceities stand when they are identical. The
following formula states that y and z are haecceities and are identical:
3∃xe(H(y, x)) ∧3∃xe(H(z, x)) ∧ y =〈〈e〉,〈e〉〉 z)
This formula is abbreviated as
y m z.
Besides the above abbreviations, theMC-mapping appeals to the following function pi having as
its domain and range the set of types:
pi(e) = 〈e〉
pi(〈t1, . . . , tn〉) = 〈pi(t1), . . . , pi(tn)〉
The function pi maps e, the type of individuals, to the type 〈e〉 of properties of individuals. It maps
the type 〈e, 〈e〉〉 of relations between individuals and properties of individuals to the type 〈〈e〉, 〈〈e〉〉〉
of relations between properties of individuals and properties of properties of individuals, etc.
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Finally, theMC-mapping appeals to what I will call the property of being a proxy〈pi(t)〉, for each
type t. When t = e, the property of being a proxy consists in the property of being an haecceity. As








2∀y1pi(t1) . . . ∀ynpi(tn)xy1 . . . yn → (Pr〈pi(t1)〉(y1) ∧ . . . ∧ Pr〈pi(tn)〉(yn))
TheMC-mapping is deﬁned as follows:
MC-Mapping
1. Let
• (si)MC = vpi(t), if s
i is the variable vt;
• (si)MC = v〈〈e〉〉, if si is c〈e〉, where v〈〈e〉〉 is the ﬁrst variable of type 〈〈e〉〉 distinct from
(sj)MC , for all j < i.
• (si)MC = v′〈〈e〉,〈e〉〉, if s
i is =〈e,e〉, where v〈〈e〉,〈e〉〉 is the ﬁrst variable of type 〈〈e〉, 〈e〉〉
distinct from (sj)MC , for all j < i.
Then:
(a) If there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. si is c〈e〉 and no j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that sj is=〈e,e〉, then
let (s0〈t1,...tn〉s
1
t1 . . . s
n
tn)
MC = ∃v〈〈e〉〉(2∀ue(vu↔ c〈〈e〉〉u)∧(s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC)
(b) If there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. si is =〈e,e〉 and no j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that sj is
c〈e〉, then let (s0〈t1,...tn〉s
1
t1 . . . s
n
tn)
MC = ∃v′〈〈e〉,〈e〉〉(2∀u〈e〉∀z〈e〉(v′uz ↔ u m z) ∧
(s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC)
(c) If there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. si is =〈e,e〉 and a j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that sj is
c〈e〉, then let (s0〈t1,...tn〉s
1
t1 . . . s
n
tn)
MC = ∃v〈〈e〉〉∃v′〈〈e〉,〈e〉〉(2∀u〈e〉(vu ↔ c〈〈e〉〉u) ∧2∀u〈e〉∀z〈e〉(v′uz ↔ u m z) ∧ (s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC)
(d) If there are no i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that si is =〈e,e〉 and sj is c〈e〉, then
let (s0〈t1,...tn〉s
1
t1 . . . s
n
tn)
MC = (s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC
2. (¬ϕ)MC = ¬(ϕ)MC ;
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)MC = (ϕ)MC ∧ (ψ)MC ;
4. (2ϕ)MC = 2(ϕ)MC ;
5. (@ϕ)MC = @(ϕ)MC ;
6. (∃vtϕ)MC = ∃vpi(t)(Pr(vpi(t)) ∧ (ϕ)MC).
155
The idea behind theMC-mapping is that whenWilliamsonians make claims which, according to them,
are about what they call individuals, those claims express the same propositions as claims made by
Plantigans which, according to them, are about haecceities. Similarly, if theMC-mapping is a deeply
correct translation then claims which, according to Williamsonians, are about properties of individuals,
express the same propositions as claims which, according to Plantingans, are about properties of
properties of individuals. And so on.
To give just one example, consider sentence (12):
(12) It is possible that something is neither necessarily nonconcrete nor essentially concrete.
The truth of sentence (12) is a commitment of Thorough Necessitism. In effect, it is a consequence of
Accidental Concretism. The negation of sentence (12) is a commitment of Moderate Contingentism,
and so it would appear that Plantingans are opposed to the truth of (12). If theMC-mapping is a
deeply correct translation, then the proposition that, according to Williamsonians, is expressed by
(12) is the same as the proposition that, according to Plantingans, is expressed by (13):
(13) It is possible that some haecceity is not instantiated by something concrete, and is not instan-
tiated by something necessarily nonconcrete.
The important observation is that Plantingans happen to be committed to the truth of (13). Since
Plantingans accept the truth of Contingentism, while simultaneously endorsing the view that necessarily,
every haecceity is necessarily something, they accept the truth of the sentence that it is possible that
some haecceity is not instantiated. So, they accept the view that it is possible that some haecceity is
not instantiated by something concrete, and is not instantiated by something necessarily nonconcrete.
That is, Plantingans accept (13).
5.3.2 Deeply Correct Translation Schemes
The solid similarity between MC and TN via the TN - and MC-mappings is established in the
appendix. These mappings provide a systematic way to go from entailments inMC to entailments
in TN , and vice-versa. Moreover, the TN - andMC-mappings turn out to be deeply correct. Thus,
MC and TN are synonymous. A fortiori, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism are equivalent, assuming that synonymy implies equivalence (a thesis defended
in chapter 4). The case for the deep correctness of the TN -mapping is now presented. It is easy to
see how a similar case for the deep correctness of theMC-mapping would proceed, and so I will not
go through it here.
Let (·)id, the id-mapping, be the function mapping each formula ϕ of MLc@P to itself. Also, let
‘SMC ’ be shorthand for ‘the proposition that is expressed by sentence S according to the proponents
of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism’, and ‘STN ’ be shorthand for ‘the proposition that is expressed
by S according to the proponents of TN ’.
First an argument will be formulated addressing those committed to the deep correctness of the
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id-mapping. From the standpoint of such theorists, Plantingans and Williamsonians do not differ on
what they take the sentences of their common language to mean, and so they are not at the risk of
talking past each other. It will be shown that the deep correctness of the id-mapping implies, given
assumptions that are uncontroversial in the present dialectic, the deep correctness of the TN -mapping.
So, the TN -mapping is deeply correct on the assumption that the id-mapping is.
Suppose that the id-mapping is deeply correct. Recall the following presupposition of the Syn-
onymy Account, presented in §4.3.2.3:
Propositional Identity Presupposition. For each theory T , ϕ )(
T
ψ only if ϕT = ψT , for every
ϕ,ψ in LT .
Justiﬁcation for the Propositional Identity Presupposition comes from the Propositional Identity
Hypothesis, mentioned in §4.3.2.3. According to this hypothesis, two propositions are the same if and
only if they are mutually entailing. If theorists take sentences S and S′ to express mutually entailing
propositions, then, a fortiori, S and S′ express, according to them, one and the same proposition.
The truth of the Propositional Identity Presupposition is presupposed by the Synonymy Account.
It offers the means to give an account of sameness of entailment structure that does not take two
theories to have different entailment structures just on the basis of the fact that their languages have
different cardinalities. This is precluded because, according to the Presupposition, the mutually
entailing sentences of a theory are taken to express the same proposition according to the proponents
of the theory. So, the cardinality of a language is not relevant for sameness of entailment structure.
Since the Propositional Identity Presupposition is presupposed by the Synonymy Account, its
assumption is, in this context, dialectically unproblematic. After all, the present case for the equivalence
between Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism is already
premised on the assumption that the Synonymy Account appropriately explicates equivalence between
theories.
Consider now the following fact aboutMC :
Fixidity. ϕ )(
MC
(ϕ)TN , for all ϕ ∈ LMC .
Say that a mapping f from a language L to itself L is expressively adequate relative to theory T
just in case f(ϕ)T = ϕT , for all sentences ϕ of L. In conjunction with the Propositional Identity
Presupposition, Fixidity implies the expressive adequacy of the TN -mapping relative toMC :8:
Expressive Adequacy of the TN -Mapping Relative toMC. ϕMC = (ϕ)TNMC , for every ϕ ∈
ML@cP .
Consider, for instance, the following sentences:
(14) Something could have been nothing.
8Here and throughout, ‘(S)fT ’ is shorthand for ‘the proposition that is expressed by sentence (S)
f according to the
proponents of either Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, if T =MC or Williamsonian Higher-Order Necessitism, if
T = TN .
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(15) Something chunky could have failed to be chunky.
(16) There could have been something that could have been nothing.
(17) There could have been something chunky that could have failed to be chunky.





(17). Moreover, it follows from the expressive adequacy of the TN -mapping relative
toMC that (14)MC = (15)MC and (16)MC = (17)MC .
Let Ch = {(ϕ)TN : ϕ ∈ MLc@P } and (·)id|Ch, the chunky restriction (of the id-mapping), be
the restriction of the id-mapping to the set Ch. Roughly, the domain of the chunky restriction is the
domain of sentences about the chunky, i.e., the domain of sentences whose quantiﬁcation is restricted
to the realm of the abstract or concrete. Certainly, the id-mapping is deeply correct only if the chunky
restriction is, that is, only if (ϕ)TNMC = (ϕ)
TN
TN .
The assumption that the chunky restriction is deeply correct, in conjunction with the expressive
adequacy of theMC-mapping relative toMC , implies thatϕMC = (ϕ)TNTN , i.e., that theTN -mapping
is a deeply correct translation scheme. So, the deep correctness of the id-mapping implies, in
conjunction with the expressive adequacy of the TN -mapping relative toMC , that the TN -mapping
is a deeply correct translation scheme. It is easy to see how a similar argument for the deep correctness
of theMC-mapping should proceed. Since both mappings are deeply correct, it follows thatMC
and TN are synonymous, and thus equivalent.
So, those sympathetic to the view that Plantingans and Williamsonians are not talking past each
other should accept the deep correctness of the TN -mapping. The reason is that, as shown, the deep
correctness of the id-mapping implies the deep correctness of the TN -mapping.
In §5.3.3 it is argued that the id-mapping is not deeply correct. So, even if the argument just
offered is dialectically fruitful, it does not establish the deep correctness of the TN -mapping from
the standpoint adopted in the chapter.
Since the deep correctness of the chunky restriction already implies (in conjunction with Fixidity
and the Propositional Identity Presupposition) that the TN -mapping is deeply correct, a case for the
deep correctness of the TN -mapping need only rely on the assumption that the chunky restriction is
deeply correct. In what follows it will be argued that the chunky restriction is indeed deeply correct,
and so that the TN -mapping is itself deeply correct.
I think the intuition is already that the chunky restriction is deeply correct. But at this point it
is helpful to resort to the procedure for determining whether a translation scheme is deeply correct
described in §4.3.3, in particular, whether the relevant Hirschean Counterfactual is true.
Consider a counterfactual scenario CS in which there was a cataclysmic event on Earth forcing
humans to abandon the planet and colonise other regions of space. Two communities of English
speakers departed in different spaceships to two planets distant from each other, PMC and PTN .
These planets are just like Earth, not only in external appearance but also in the chemical compounds
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that are present in them, and their appearance. For instance, water is H2O in both planets, and is the
thing that runs in rivers, is drinkable, etc. Both communities turned out to thrive in their new homes.
The community in PMC developed into community CMC , whereas the community in PTN developed
into the community CTN . The language LCT of each community CT is such that the proposition that
is, according to the proponents of each theory (formulated via) T , expressed by ϕ, is the same as the
proposition expressed by the sentence ϕ in the language of CT . Also, there is in these communities
no mismatch between the proposition that typical speakers take ϕ to express and the proposition that
is indeed expressed by ϕ. To make this reasonable each theory (formulated via) T is assumed to be
part of the folk theory of the corresponding linguistic community CT . One other characteristic of CS
is that each community ignores the existence of the other community, and each community ignores its
Earthly origin.
Suppose that some membersmmTN of CTN eventually discover, in their space explorations, the
planet PMC . The members ofmmTN are able to observe and interact with CMC during long periods
of time, being exposed to a great number of such interactions. I think that the intuition is that if the
members ofmmTN were to offer a theory accounting for the beliefs, desires, intentions and actions
of CMC , alongside with a description of the meanings of LCMC , they would not go wrong in taking
each sentence (ϕ)TN to have the same meaning in LCMC and in LCTN . IfmmTN were to offer an
account of what is the language in which CMC are conforming to a convention of truthfulness and
trust, they would not go wrong in pairing each sentence (ϕ)TN with the meaning of (ϕ)TN in LCTN .
For instance, note that there is no divergence on what each community would take to be witnesses
for the truth of claims such as (15). Both communities would point to Obama as a witness for the
truth of this claim. And none of these communities would take a merely possible physical compound
as a witness for the truth of (15), even though both communities would take a merely possible physical
compound as a witness for the truth of (17). They would not only agree on what witnesses (15), they
would also present similar behaviour, given that they had similar beliefs. Thus, the chunky restriction
would be a correct translation if CS had obtained. So, the chunky restriction is a deeply correct
translation.
Since the chunky restriction is a deeply correct translation, then the TN -mapping is itself deeply
correct, since the TN -mapping is expressively adequate relative toMC . A similar argument would
apply to the case of theMC-mapping. Since the TN - andMC-mappings are deeply correct and
these mappings witness the solid similarity between MC and TN , it follows that MC and TN
are synonymous. Therefore, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough
Necessitism are equivalent.
5.3.3 Deep Incorrectness
Even though the chunky restriction is deeply correct, the id-mapping is not. Suppose, absurdly,
that this mapping were deeply correct. In such case ϕMC = ϕTN . Moreover, from the expressive
adequacy of the TN -mapping relative to MC it would have followed that (ϕ)TNMC = ϕMC . So,
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(ϕ)TNMC = ϕTN . It would have followed again from the assumption that the identity mapping is deeply
correct that (ϕ)TNMC = (ϕ)
TN
TN . Hence, it would have followed from the expressive adequacy of the
TN -mapping relative toMC and the assumption that the identity mapping is deeply correct that the
TN -mapping is expressively adequate relative to TN :
Expressive Adequacy of the TN -mapping relative to TN . ϕTN = (ϕ)TNTN , for everyϕ ∈ ML@cP .
This would have been so despite the fact that it is not the case that ϕ )(
TN
(ϕ)TN for every sentence
ϕ of ML@cP . As it turns out, the TN -mapping is not, after all, expressively adequate relative to TN .
Consider the following sentence:
(18) There could have been something that was nothing.
Note that ((16))TN = (17). So, (16)TN = (17)TN , by the expressive adequacy of the TN -mapping
relative to TN . Moreover, (16) )(
TN
(18), and so by the Propositional Identity Presupposition it
follows that:
Collapse. (16)TN = (17)TN = (18)TN
Since (17) ∈ ComTN , (17)TN is one of the commitments ofWilliamsonians. Hence, by Collapse,
(18)TN is one of the commitments of Williamsonians. But not only is it the case that (18) )(
TN
ϕ, for
every ϕ ∈ ML@cP , (18)TN expresses an absurd proposition, in the sense that it entails every proposition
whatsoever, and so a proposition that it is irrational to believe in.
Thus, Collapse implies that Williamsonians are committed to an absurd proposition, and so are,
in this sense, irrational. But to so interpret Thorough Necessitists is to interpret them as failing to
conform to the Rationalisation Principle mentioned in §4.3.3. Therefore, it is to misinterpret them, in
particular because their commitment to (17)TN is one done upon reﬂection. They do not mean an
absurd proposition with (17).
Also, (17) ∈ ComMC , and so (17)MC is one of the commitments of Plantingans. From the
assumption that the identity mapping is deeply correct it follows that (17)MC = (18)TN , and so that
Plantingans are also committed to an absurdity. This leads to interpreting Plantingans as failing to
conform to the Principle of Rationality, and thus to misinterpretation.
One route for explaining away apparent attributions of irrationality is not available in the present
case. Apparent attributions of irrationality are often explained away by distinguishing between the
proposition that is the literal meaning of a sentence and the proposition that speakers believe is the
meaning of the sentence. For instance, if Tom believes that ‘bought’ means bought and ‘purchased’
means killed, then Tom is not being irrational when he asserts that ‘Dick bought a horse’ and he rejects
an assertion of ‘Dick purchased a horse’. But such approach is unavailable, since the present interest is
not in what sentences like (17) in fact mean (in English), but rather on what they mean according to
Williamsonians and Plantingans.
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Collapse and the expressive adequacy of the TN -mapping relative to TN are consequences of
i) the Propositional Identity Presupposition, ii) Fixidity, and iii) the assumption that the identity
mapping is deeply correct. The Propositional Identity Presupposition is part of the Synonymy Account
package, and Fixidity is a theorem aboutMC . The only assumption left is thus the assumption that
the identity mapping is deeply correct. Therefore, this assumption must go.
There are a myriad of related considerations telling against the expressive adequacy of the
TN -mapping relative to TN , and so against the deep correctness of the identity mapping. For
instance, if CS had obtained, then mmTN would certainly go wrong in taking (17) as meaning in
LCMC what (18) means in LCTN . Hence, the TN -mapping is not expressively adequate relative to
TN , and the identity mapping is deeply incorrect.
5.3.4 A Typical Case of a Merely Verbal Dispute
Chalmers (2011, p. 515) offers the following example, extracted from William James, of a typical
merely verbal dispute:
‘A man walks rapidly around a tree, while a squirrel moves on the tree trunk. Both face
the tree at all times, but the tree stays between them. A group of people are arguing over
the question: Does the man go round the squirrel or not?’
James (1907, p. 25) solves the problem by distinguishing different senses of ‘going round’, as seems
correct:
‘If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west,
and then to the north of him again, obviously the man goes round him, for he occupies
these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being ﬁrst in from of him,
then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and ﬁnally in front again, it is
quite obvious that the man fails to go round him. . . .Make the distinction and there is
no occasion for any further dispute.’
The situation described by James is very similar to the one faced by Plantingans and Williamsonians.
The group of people in James’s dispute agree that the sentence ‘the man passes from the north of the
squirrel to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again’ is true,
and that the sentence ‘the man is ﬁrst in front of the squirrel, then on the right of him, then behind
him, then on his left, and ﬁnally in front again’ is false. Moreover, they agree on the status of these
sentences while meaning the same with them. They take themselves to be disagreeing because what
one of the parties means with ‘the man goes round the squirrel’ is the same as what both parties mean
with ‘the man passes from the north of the squirrel to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and
then to the north of him again’, whereas what the other party means with ‘the man goes round the
squirrel’ is the same as what both parties mean with ‘the man is ﬁrst in front of the squirrel, then on
the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and ﬁnally in front again’.
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Similarly, Plantingans and Williamsonians agree that the sentence ‘there could have been some
chunky things that could have failed to be chunky’ is true, and that the sentence ‘there could have
been some haecceities that could have failed to be something’ is false. Moreover, they agree on
these sentences while meaning the same with them. They take themselves to be disagreeing because
Plantingans take ‘there could have been some thing that could have been nothing’ to express the same
proposition as the sentence ‘there could have been some chunky things that could have failed to be
chunky’, whereas Williamsonians take ‘there could have been some thing that could have been nothing’
to have the same meaning as the sentence ‘there could have been some haecceity that could have been
nothing’.
The situation with Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism
thus turns out to be that of a typical merely verbal dispute. As in the case described by James, there is a
fragment F of their common language such that: i) proponents of both theories agree on the meaning
of each of the sentences in F ; ii) each of the remaining sentences of the language means, according to
the proponents of each theory, the same as some sentence in F ; iii) proponents of both theories agree
on which sentences in F are true, and which are false. Let Pr = {(ϕ)MC : ϕ ∈ ML@cP }. In the case
ofMC and TN , the fragment F consists in the union of the sets Ch with Pr.
In general, there need not be such a fragment for two theories to be synonymous. Even if two
theories are formulated in a common vocabulary, it may be that their proponents agree on the meaning
of no sentence. And, of course, equivalent theories may be formulated in different vocabularies.
5.4 Loose Ends
In this section some issues directly connected to the claim that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism
and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent will be considered. The ﬁrst of these issues
may be seen as a form of incredulous stare. How can it be that the theories are equivalent, if their
proponents act as though they are disagreeing, and believe to be doing so? Surely, Plantingan Moderate
Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are not equivalent in such case.
I think that the appropriate reply to the incredulous stare consists in offering an explanation of how
it can be that the theories are equivalent even if their proponents act as though they are disagreeing, and
take themselves to be disagreeing. One such explanation is offered, appealing to the idea that speakers
of a language presume to be coordinating on the meanings of its sentences until something crashes,
since this presumption secures, for the most part, quick, fruitful and successful communication.
The second issue concerns a certain model-theoretic result that may lead one to the suspicion that
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are not equivalent
after all. Contra this suggestion, I argue that the model-theoretic result should be expected if the two
theories are equivalent, and so cannot be used to argue against their equivalence.
Finally, I offer an application of the fact thatMC and TN are synonymous via the TN - and
MC-mappings, namely, theMC-mapping is used to translate an objection to Williamsonian Higher-
Order Necessitism into an objection to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, and the TN -mapping is
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used to translate an objection to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism into an objection to Williamso-
nian Thorough Necessitism.
5.4.1 Making Sense of the Equivalence
Despite the above case for the equivalence between PlantinganModerate Contingentism andWilliamso-
nian Thorough Necessitism, some will feel unpersuaded. What is still missing is, I think, an explanation
of how it can be that these theories, which purport to be rivals, turn out to be equivalent. Such expla-
nation needs to account for how it can be that proponents of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism
and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism turn out to differ with respect to the meaning of some of
the expressions of ML@cP , and why it is that they think that they do not disagree on their meaning. In
what follows I will propose one explanation for how this may happen.
One misguided objection is that theorists mean the same with the expressions of ML@cP because
they are all competent speakers of English, and in the end the meaning of the expressions of ML@cP is
that of their English analogues.
A problem with this objection is that the logical constants are technical terms, even if they are
not usually seen as such. Logical constants do not have the same meaning as their natural language
analogues. For instance, the natural language ‘if . . ., then . . .’ does not mean the same as the material
conditional, even if typical ﬁrst year logic exercises require students to translate sentences containing
the natural language expression in terms of the material conditional. Those using logical constants
should be regarded as already going beyond the resources available in English (when students are told
that learning logic is like learning a new language, this is no accident. In part, this is exactly what is
going on). The expressions of ML@cP are thus terms of art ofMC and TN . It is a mistake to think that
what proponents of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism
mean with them is the meaning of their English analogues. In particular, note that, in general, English
does not possess higher-order resources, contrary to ML@cP .
Even conceding, for the present purposes, that the meaning of the expressions of ML@cP is that of
their English analogues, and that proponents of PlantinganModerate Contingentism andWilliamsonian
Thorough Necessitism are competent speakers of English, there is another problem with the objection.
The objection assumes that competence in English is sufficient for the theorists to mean the same
thing. But recall the dispute mentioned by James. Even if the parties in that dispute are all competent
speakers of English, they still happen to be involved in a verbal dispute.
Why is this? One explanation as to why this is so is that the meaning of ‘going round’ is under-
speciﬁed. The word can be used to mean what one of the parties mean with it, and it may also be
used to mean what the other party means with it. Even if the meaning of the word turns out not to
be underspeciﬁed, the way its meaning depends on use, and so what it means, may still be (at least
currently) inaccessible to competent speakers of English. Speakers use the expression according to
what they take it to mean. Since what it means is inaccessible to them, it is natural that their views on
what it means will diverge.
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The observation that logical constants are technical terms falls short of explaining why proponents
ofMC and TN mean different things with them, and why they think that they don’t. It is undeniable
that proponents of MC and TN intend to coordinate on the use of the expressions of ML@cP ,
regardless of whether these are logical terms or not.
The explanation as to why they have differing views on the meanings of some of the expressions of
ML@cP is, I think, similar to the one given for the case of ‘going round’. Even if the expressions of ML
@c
P
are technical terms, it is unreasonable to think that their meanings are both completely speciﬁed and
fully accessible to their users. Since the meanings of natural language are either incompletely speciﬁed
or not fully accessible to their users, it is unreasonable to expect anything different to happen with the
expressions of ML@cP . That Plantingans and Williamsonians differ slightly on what the meanings of
some of the expressions of ML@cP are, according to them, is only to be expected.
Why should Plantingans and Williamsonians then think that they agree on the meanings of all
the expressions of ML@cP ? Plantingans and Williamsonians intend to be speaking the same language,
and they use the expressions of ML@cP in mostly the same way. So, it is reasonable to think that they
are speaking the same language (which I do think they are). In general, speakers and interlocutors
presume that interlocutors and speakers that are members of their linguistic community (of a language
L) and purport to be speaking in L in some communicative exchange mean the same thing with the
expressions being used. This presumption secures, quick, fruitful and successful communication, for
the most part. Interlocutors do not spend their time interrupting speakers, and speakers do not spend
their time asking their interlocutors if they understand what they mean.
It is not that this presumption is completely justiﬁed. But, for the most part, what differences
there are in what is meant with the expressions used in some linguistic interaction turns out to make
little difference for the success of that interaction. Does it matter which of the two alternatives is
really meant with ‘going round’ if the man managed to both 1) pass from the north of the squirrel to
the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, and 2) be ﬁrst in
front of the squirrel, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and ﬁnally in front
again? It doesn’t. Thus, it is only natural for the presumption that speakers and interlocutors mean the
same thing with their sentences and subsentential expressions to be in place in the debate between
Plantingans and Williamsonians.
To conclude, Plantingans and Williamsonians do well in presuming that they mean the same thing
with the different expressions of their languages, and that their theories are inconsistent. For the most
part, the presumption that speakers and interlocutors mean the same thing with the sentences of their
common language secures quick, fruitful and successful communication. But this does not mean that
they in fact mean the same thing with the different expressions of their language, and it does not mean
that their theories are inconsistent. On the contrary, it has been shown that the theories are, after all,
equivalent.
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5.4.2 Model-Theoretic Mismatch and Quantiﬁer Variance
Take the language ML@cP and make two copies of it,MC −ML@cP and TN −ML@cP . The two copies
are just like ML@cP except that each expression of T −ML@cP is superscripted with T . For instance,
MC
∀ is the universal quantiﬁer ofMC −ML@cP and
TN
∀ is the universal quantiﬁer of TN −ML@cP .
Let
T
ϕ signal that ϕ is a formula of T −ML@cP .
Let the TN∗-mapping be a mapping just like the TN -mapping, except that it goes from language
MC −ML@cP to language TN −ML@cP . Similarly, let theMC∗-mapping be a mapping just like the
MC-mapping, except that it goes from language TN −ML@cP to languageMC −ML@cP
For each TN -modelM , interpret TN −ML@cP as the language ML@cP would be interpreted inM .
Let me call each domain of type t of world w the domain of
TN
∀ vt at world w. Deﬁne the domain of
MC
∀ ve at a world w as the subset of the domain of
TN
∀ ve at world w whose members are the elements
of
TN
∀ ve that are either concrete or necessarily nonconcrete at w. Let the value of MC= at a world w
consist in the set of pairs of elements in the domain of entities of type e ofM that are either concrete
or necessarily nonconcrete at w. Finally, deﬁne the domain of
MC
∀ vt at a world w, for all t 6= e, as in
general models (on the basis of the domain of
MC
∀ ve).




if and only ifM,w (
TN
MC
ϕ . The upshot is that each TN -model
may thus be seen also as aMC-model. In particular,M satisﬁes the commitments of both TN (as
expected) andMC . I will call any TN -modelM expanded in this way an TN +MC-model.
For eachMC-modelM , interpretMC −ML@cP as the language ML@cP would be interpreted in
M . Let me call each domain of type t of world w the domain of
MC
∀ vt at world w. Deﬁne the domain
of
TN
∀ ve at world w as the subset of the domain of
MC
∀ v〈e〉 at world w whose members are possibly
haecceities of something. Let the value of
TN
= at a world w consist in the set of all pairs 〈o, o〉 of
elements o in the domain of
TN
∀ ve ofM . Deﬁne the domain of
TN
∀ vt at a world w, for all t 6= e, as in
general models (on the basis of the domain of
TN
∀ ve). Finally, deﬁne the value of TNc at a world w as
the set of haecceities in the domain of
MC
∀ v〈e〉 that are had by some entity of type e that is concrete at
world w.




if and only ifM,w (
MC
TN
ϕ . The upshot is that eachMC-model
may thus be seen also as a TN -model. In particular,M satisﬁes the commitments of bothMC (as
expected) and TN . I will call anyMC-modelM expanded in this way anMC + TN -model.
Roughly, each TN +MC-model depicts both one way that modal reality might be according to
Williamsonians and how that reality may be redescribed according to how Plantingans interpret ML@cP .
Similarly, eachMC + TN -model depicts both one way that modal reality might be according to
Plantingans and how that reality may be redescribed according to howWilliamsonians interpret ML@cP .
Since Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent,
the two classes of models should be the same, right?
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Well, they aren’t. One quick way to see this is by appealing to the following facts:
Mismatch.
1. The domain of
TN
∀ ve at world w of anyMC + TN -model consists of functions from worlds
to sets of things in the domain of
MC
∀ ve at world w (roughly, representing haecceities);
2. The domain of
TN
∀ ve at world w of TN +MC-models does not consist of functions from
worlds to sets of things in the domain of
MC
∀ ve at world w.
One may be tempted to see Mismatch as showing that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are not equivalent. Plantingans must think of the individuals
that Williamsonians talk about as properties of individuals. But Williamsonians are not talking about
properties of individuals. Hence, the two theories are not equivalent. The MC-mapping thus
misrepresentsWilliamsonians as speaking about properties of individuals instead of individuals.
Mismatch shows no such thing. The TN - and MC-mappings are deeply correct only if the
quantiﬁers of the two theories have different meanings. That is, the TN - andMC-mappings preserve
meaning only if there is quantiﬁer variance, in the sense that the quantiﬁers of the two theories may
have different meanings, even if they are intended to be unrestricted.
The models of each theory reﬂect how that theory understands ‘individual’ and the relationship
between what they call ‘individuals’ and ‘higher-order entities’. Since Plantingans and Williamsonians
take the universal and existential quantiﬁers to have different meanings, they also take ‘individual’
and ‘higher-order entity’ to have different meanings. So, to say that theMC-mapping misrepresents
Williamsonians as speaking about properties of individuals instead of individuals is to equivocate on
‘individual’.
What Williamsonians express in terms of their understanding of the ﬁrst order quantiﬁers is
expressed by Plantingans in terms of how Plantingans understand the second-order quantiﬁers (over
haecceities). So, Mismatch does not show that the theories are not equivalent. It shows what was
already clear. Plantingans andWilliamsonians appeal to expressions with different meanings to describe
the same reality. Moreover, Mismatch reminds us that the language of the metatheory is itself not
neutral.
Now, a different objection to the claim that TN - andMC- are deeply correct translation schemes
is simply that their deep correctness requires quantiﬁer variance. This is thought to be an objec-
tion because, according to the objector, quantiﬁer variance is false, the reason being that quantiﬁer
expressions pick the joint-carving candidate meanings.
This objection is successful only if there is only one candidate meaning for each quantiﬁer
expression. But there does not seem to be convincing justiﬁcation for the claim that there is only one
candidate meaning for each of the quantiﬁer expressions. Hence, the objection is not successful.
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5.4.3 Translation of Reasons
Given the synonymy betweenMC and TN , arguments for, respectively, Plantingan Moderate Contin-
gentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism can be translated to arguments for the other theory,
and arguments against each of these theories can be translated to arguments against the other. Before
concluding,MC- and TN -mappings will be used to translate, respectively, an objection to Williamso-
nian Thorough Necessitism to an objection to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and an objection
to Plantingan Moderate Contigentism to an objection to Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism.
SinceMC and TN are synonymous via the TN - andMC-mappings, these translated objections
may be used to argue either that the original objections were not compelling after all or that the
equivalent theory should be rejected as well, depending on one’s persuasion. The question how the
translated objections offered should be responded to is, however, outside of the scope of the chapter.
Consider the following claims:
Supervenience. All possible things are such that if they are distinguishable by some general modal
property, then they are distinguishable by some general nonmodal property.
• Example: If Ganges is distinguishable fromMount Everest because Ganges has the property
of being a possible river, whereas Mount Everest does not have that property, then they
are also distinguishable with respect to their nonmodal properties, say, because Ganges
has the property of being a river, whereas Mount Everest does not have the property of
being a river.
General Possibilities. There could have been contingently chunky things x and y such that: nec-
essarily, x has the general modal property of possibly being an F if it is something, and it is
impossible for y to have the general modal property of possibly being an F , for some general
property F .
• Example: Necessarily, if Ganges had been something, then it would have had the property
of possibly being a river, whereas Mount Everest could not have had the property of
possibly being a river.
General Nonmodal Indiscernibility. There could not have been any things x and y such that x and
y would have been distinguishable by some nonmodal general property in those circumstances
in which they fail to be chunky.
• Example: No nonmodal general property can distinguish between Ganges and Mount
Everest in circumstances in which they are not chunky. Neither Ganges andMount Everest
is a river, nor a mountain, etc. in those circumstances, neither of them is abstract, nor
concrete.
The objection to Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism under consideration is that Supervenience,
General Possibilities andGeneral Nonmodal Indiscernibility (independently plausible theses, according
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to the objectors) together imply the falsehood of Necessitism. I will call this objection toWilliamsonian
Thorough Necessitism the supervenience objection.
To see why these three theses imply the falsehood of Necessitism, assume that the river Ganges,
Mount Everest and the general modal property of possibly being a river witness the truth of General
Possibilities. That is: i) Ganges and Mount Everest are possible things that could have failed to have
been chunky, ii) necessarily, Ganges has the property of being possibly a river if it is something, and iii)
it is impossible for Mount Everest to have the property of possibly being a river. Let w be a possible
world in which Ganges fails to be chunky, and w′ be a possible world in which Mount Everest fails to
be chunky.
By General Nonmodal Indiscernibility it follows that if w and w′ had obtained, then, for every
general nonmodal property F , Ganges has F at w if and only if Mount Everest has F at w′. By
Supervenience it follows that, for every general modal property F , Ganges has F at w if and only if
Mount Everest has F at w′. So, Ganges has the property of possibly being a river at w if and only
if Mount Everest has the property of possibly being a river at w′. Since Mount Everest could not
have had the property of possibly being a river, it follows that Ganges does not have the property of
possibly being a river at w.
Since Ganges does not have the property of possibly being a river at w, it follows that Ganges is
nothing at w. But Ganges could have been something. So there could have been something that could
have been nothing. That is, Necessitism is false. A fortiori, Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism is
false.
TheMC-translations of the premises of the supervenience objection are the following:
Translation of Supervenience. All possible haecceities are such that if they are distinguishable by
some general modal property, then they are distinguishable by some general nonmodal property.
• Example: If Ganges’s haecceity is distinguishable from Mount Everest because Ganges’s
haecceity has the property of possibly being instantiated by a river, whereas Mount
Everest’s haecceity does not have that property, then they are also distinguishable with
respect to their nonmodal properties, say, because Ganges’s haecceity has the property of
being instantiated by a river, whereas Mount Everest does not have the property of being
instantiated by a river.
Translation of General Possibilities. There could have been contingently instantiated haecceities
x and y such that: necessarily, x has the general modal property of possibly being an F if it is
something, and it is impossible for y to have the general modal property of possibly being an F ,
for some general property F .
• Example: Necessarily, if Ganges’s haecceity had been instantiated, then it would have had
the property of possibly being instantiated by a river, whereas Mount Everest’s haecceity
could not have had the property of possibly being instantiated by a river.
Translation of General Nonmodal Indiscernibility. There could not have been any haecceities x
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and y such that x and y would have been discernible by some nonmodal general property in
those circumstances in which they fail to be instantiated by something.
• Example: No nonmodal general property can distinguish between Ganges’s haecceity and
Mount Everest’s haecceity in circumstances in which they are instantiated by nothing.
Neither Ganges’s haecceity and Mount Everest’s haecceity is instantiated by a river, nor
by a mountain, etc. in those circumstances.
Assume that Ganges’s haecceity, Mount Everest’s haecceity and the general modal property of
possibly being instantiated by a river witness the truth of the Translation of General Possibilities.
That is: i) Ganges’s haecceity and Mount Everest’s haecceity are possible haecceities that could have
failed to have been instantiated, ii) necessarily, Ganges’s haecceity has the property of being possibly
instantiated by a river if it is something, and iii) it is impossible for the haecceity of Mount Everest
to have the property of possibly being instantiated by a river. Let w be a possible world in which
Ganges’s haecceity fails to be instantiated by something, and w′ be a possible world in which Mount
Everest’s haecceity fails to be instantiated by something.
By Translation of General Nonmodal Indiscernibility it follows that if w and w′ had obtained,
then, for every general nonmodal property F , Ganges’s haecceity has F at w if and only if Mount
Everest’s haecceity has F at w′. By Translation of Supervenience it follows that, for every general
modal property F , Ganges’s haecceity has F at w if and only if Mount Everest’s haecceity has F at
w′. So, Ganges’s haecceity has the property of possibly being instantiated by a river at w if and only
if Mount Everest’s haecceity has the property of possibly being instantiated by a river at w′. Since
Mount Everest’s haecceity could not have had the property of possibly being instantiated by a river, it
follows that Ganges’s haecceity does not have the property of possibly being instantiated by a river at
w.
Since Ganges’s haecceity does not have the property of possibly being instantiated by a river at w,
it follows that Ganges’s haecceity is nothing at w. But Ganges’s haecceity could have been something.
So there could have been some haecceity that could have been nothing. That is, Plantingan Moderate
Contingentism is false. So, the translation of the supervenience objection constitutes an objection to
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.
Let me now turn to the translation of an objection to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism to an
objection to Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism.
Say that a property P is explanatorily dependent on xx just in case P ’s application conditions are
speciﬁable solely in terms of some of the xx and qualitative properties, and if none of the xx had
been something, then P ’s application conditions would not have been speciﬁable solely in terms of
individuals and qualitative properties. Also say that xx are contingent just in case it is possible that
none of them is something. The explanatory dependence objection appeals to the following assumptions:
Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities. Necessarily, if P is a nonqualitative property, then
necessarily, P is something if and only if P ’s application conditions are speciﬁable solely in
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terms of individuals and qualitative properties.
Contingency of the Basis. There could have been nonqualitative properties P explanatorily depen-
dent on some contingent xx.
The idea behind the Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities may be explained by appealing to
an example. What guarantees that the haecceity of Tweedledum picks him, rather than Tweedledee,
who is qualitatively indiscernible from Tweedledum, in circumstances in which both Tweedledee and
Tweedledum are nothing? Nothing seems to guarantee it. So Tweedledum’s haecceity is not chunky in
circumstances in which both he and Tweedledee are nothing.
Assume that Obama’s haecceity and the human beings that are actually something witness the
truth of Contingency of the Basis. That is, assume that Obama’s haecceity is a nonqualitative property
explanatorily dependent on the actual human beings, and that it is possible that none of the actual
human beings is something. From Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities it follows that Obama’s
haecceity is something, and that it could have been nothing. But then, there could have been some
property that could have been nothing, and so Plantingan Moderate Contingentism is false.
To put it differently, according to the Explanatory Dependence objection nonqualitative properties,
such as the property of being Obama, ontologically depend on the being of some xx, since their
application conditions have to be explained partly in terms of xx. But xx could have been nothing. So,
properties such as the property of being Obama could have been nothing. This contradicts Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism.
Say that a property P is chunkily explanatorily dependent on chunky xx just in case P ’s application
conditions are speciﬁable solely in terms of xx and chunky qualitative properties, and if none of the
xx had been chunky, then P ’s application conditions would not have been speciﬁable solely in terms
of chunky individuals and chunky qualitative properties. Also say that xx are contingently chunky just
in case it is possible that none of them is chunky.
The TN -translations of the premises of the supervenience objection are the following:
Translation of Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities. Necessarily, if P is a nonqualitative
chunky property, then necessarily, P is something (and chunky — since every property is
necessarily chunky, this turns out to be a redundant predication of chunkyness) if and only
if P ’s application conditions are speciﬁable solely in terms of chunky individuals and chunky
qualitative properties.
Translation of Contingency of the Basis. There could have been nonqualitative chunky properties
P chunkily explanatorily dependent on some contingently chunky xx.
Let the chunky haecceity of x be the property of being both x and chunky. The idea behind the
Translation of Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities may be explained by appealing to an
example. What guarantees that the chunky haecceity of Tweedledum picks his chunkyness, rather than
Tweedledee’s, who is qualitatively indiscernible from Tweedledum, in circumstances in which both
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Tweedledee and Tweedlsedum are not chunky? Nothing seems to guarantee it. So, Tweedledum’s
chunky haecceity is not chunky in circumstances in which both he and Tweedledum are not chunky.
Assume that Obama’s chunky haecceity and the human beings that are actually chunky witness
the truth of Translation of Contingency of the Basis. That is, assume that Obama’s chunky haecceity
is a chunky nonqualitative property chunkily explanatorily dependent on the chunky actual human
beings, and that it is possible that none of the actual human beings is chunky. From Translation of
Fundamentality of Individuals and Qualities it follows that Obama’s chunky haecceity is something,
since it is explanatorily dependent on chunky xx, and that it could have failed to have been something,
since xx could have failed to have been chunky. But then, there could have been a chunky property that
could have failed to have been something. But this contradicts Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism.
According to Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism no property could have failed to have been
something.
To put it differently, according to the translation of the Explanatory Dependence objection chunky
nonqualitative properties, such as the property of being Obama and chunky, ontologically depend on
the chunkyness of xx, since their application conditions have to be explained partly in terms of the
chunkyness of xx. But it could have been that none of the xx was chunky. So, properties such as the
property of being both Obama and chunky could have been nothing. This contradicts Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism.
5.5 The Correct Higher-Order Modal Theory
What is the correct higher-order modal theory? Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamso-
nian Thorough Necessitism are, at most, sound theories. Even if they are true, they leave questions
open, such as the question how many individuals and propositions there are.
Are Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism sound? First,
note that two important commitments of these theories have not been defended in the dissertation,
namely, the commitment to Thorough Abundantism and the commitment to the propositional modal
logic S5.
In §3.8 an argument for the comprehension principle Cˆomp was offered. This comprehension
principle does not imply Thorough Abundantism (not even in conjunction with Higher-Order Neces-
sitism), even though Higher-Order Necessitism and Thorough Abundantism together imply Cˆomp.
According to principle Cˆomp for any condition ϕ there necessarily is a relation that necessarily, obtains
between x1, . . . xn if and only if ϕ. Arguably, the truth of Cˆomp indicates the truth of Thorough
Abundantism. It is because the necessitation of Thorough Abundantism is true that for any condition
ϕ there necessarily is a relation that necessarily, obtains between x1, . . . xn if and only if ϕ.
More would have to be said by way of offering a robust defence of Thorough Abundantism. The
soundness of the propositional modal logic S5 will also not be argued for here. As already mentioned
in fn. 2 (in ch. 2), arguably, the soundness of S5 is accepted by most metaphysicians (clearly, those
committed to the soundness of S5 face the challenge of offering a satisfactory reply to objections such
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as the one presented in §3.5.3). In this section I want to address a different worry with the claim that
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are sound.
One may think that the theories cannot both be true, since one contains the negation of the
other. After all, Contingentism is the negation of Necessitism, independently of whether Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent. There are two
ways of understanding the claim that a theory is true. According to one of these, ‘truth’ applies to
theories themselves, whereas according to the other ‘truth’ applies to formulations of theories. On the
ﬁrst understanding, two theories may both be true even if they are formulated in the same language
and one of them is committed to the truth of sentence ϕ whereas the other is committed to the truth
of ¬ϕ. What is required is that the proponents of the theories mean different things with ϕ. But this
is precisely what is going on with Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough
Necessitism.
What if ‘true’ is understood as applying to the formulationsMC and TN themselves? Which
of these formulations is true? There are two salient options in such case. Either the language of the
theories is underspeciﬁed, or else Plantingans and Williamsonians do not have complete access to the
meanings of all the expressions of their common language.
If the language is underspeciﬁed, then the notion of truth, for sentences, makes sense only relative
to a speciﬁcation. Arguably,MC is true under one speciﬁcation, and TN is true under the other.
Compare with the typical case of a verbal dispute presented in §5.3.4. Under one speciﬁcation, the
sentence ‘the man is going round the squirrel’ is true. Under the other speciﬁcation, the sentence ‘the
man is going round the squirrel’ is false.
If it is a matter of not having a complete access to the meanings of all the expressions of their
common language, then at least one ofMC and FN is false, perhaps both. Compare again with the
the typical case of a verbal dispute presented in §5.3.4. It might be that none of the options identiﬁed
by James captures the meaning of ‘going round’, and that the sentence ‘the man is going round the
squirrel’ is simply false.
Notwithstanding, the issue does not seem terribly important. We understand what the parties
involved in the dispute described by James mean, given James’s distinction between the different
senses of ‘going round’, and what both parties say is true. That should be enough. Otherwise, the
interest shifts from what was going on between the man and squirrel to the semantics of English.
Similarly, the question which ofMC or TN is true, if any, does not seem terribly important. We
understand what Plantingans and Williamsonians mean, given that each sentence of their common
language means the same, according to them, to a sentence in the set Ch ∪ Pr (mentioned in 5.3.4).
Moreover, arguably, the restriction of their commitments to the set Ch ∪ Pr are all true (assuming
the truth of Thorough Abundantism and that S5 is a sound propositional modal logic).
Why think that the commitments ofMC and TN are all true once restricted to the set Ch∪Pr?
Surely, it is true that there could have been something chunky that could have failed to have been
chunky. Aren’t the Eiffel Tower, Obama, Ganges, Mount Everest, etc. examples of such things? And
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certainly it is true, given the truth of Higher-Order Necessitism, that necessarily, every haecceity is
necessarily something.
But ‘there could have been something chunky that could have failed to have been chunky’ just means
the same as Contingentism according to Plantingans, and ‘necessarily, every haecceity is necessarily
something’ just means the same as Necessitism according to Williamsonians. Besides Thorough
Abundantism and S5, these were the remaining problematic commitments of Plantingan Moderate
Contingentism andWilliamsonian Thorough Necessitism, given the theses defended in the dissertation.
So, the restriction of the commitments of each theory to the set Ch ∪ Pr is sound. That is all that is
worth knowing. Otherwise the interest shifts from metaphysics to semantics.
5.6 Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter was to show that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism are equivalent, on the assumption that the Synonymy Account of theory
equivalence is correct. I began by offering an overview of the two theories, highlighting their main
commitments. Afterwards, the formulations MC and TN of, respectively, Plantingan Moderate
Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism were presented.
In §5.3, theMC- and TN -mappings were speciﬁed. It was argued that these mappings are deeply
correct. Firstly, it was shown that those committed to the view that Plantingans and Williamsonians
mean the same with the sentences of their language are committed to the deep correctness of the
MC- and TN -mappings, given the assumption that the Synonymy Account is true. Afterwards, it
was shown that even those who reject that Plantingans and Williamsonians mean the same with the
sentences of their language are committed to the deep correctness ofMC- and TN -mappings. The
case for this last claim relied on showing that speciﬁc restrictions of their mappings are deeply correct,
and that this result suffices for the deep correctness of the unrestricted mappings. In the appendix it
is shown that the mappings witness the solid similarity between formulationsMC and TN . Thus,
MC and TN are synonymous. Therefore, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism are equivalent.
It was also argued in §5.3 that the identity mapping is not deeply correct. If it were deeply correct,
then sentences that are clearly used by the proponents of these theories to mean different things
would all mean the same according to the proponents of the theories. The section concluded with
the presentation of the similarities between the dialectic between Plantingans and Williamsonians
and the dialectic of typical verbal disputes. This is no surprise. The dispute between Plantingans and
Williamsonians is indeed merely verbal.
Two putative objections to the claim that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism are equivalent were addressed in §5.4. The ﬁrst objection consisted in a form
of incredulous stare. The objection is based on the fact that it seems incredible that two theories are
equivalent when their proponents, rational agents and competent speakers of their language, believe
otherwise and act as such. In reply to the objection, an explanation was offered of how it can be that
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two theories are equivalent when their proponents, rational agents and competent speakers of their
language, believe otherwise and act as such. According to the explanation, such situations are to be
expected given what it takes to speak a language and to build theories that are likely to go beyond the
conventions of that language.
According to the second objection considered in §5.4, a certain model-theoretic result, Mismatch,
counts against the equivalence between Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism. It was argued that Mismatch shows no such thing. On the contrary, Mismatch
is an expected result under the assumption that the theories are equivalent.
In §5.4, it was shown that, given the synonymy between formulationsMC and FN via the FN -
andMC-mappings, these mappings enable objections to Plantingan Moderate Contingentism to be
translated into objections toWilliamsonian Thorough Necessitism, and vice-versa, with examples being
given. Given that, as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism
and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are, arguably, the best candidate theories available, the
hope is that by appealing to the FN - andMC-mappings it can be shown that at least some of the
objections to each theory are not as convincing after all.
Finally, in §5.5 the question what is the correct higher-order modal logic was once more addressed.
It was ﬁrst noted that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism
are at most sound. Then, it was pointed out that there are commitments of Plantingan Moderate Con-
tingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism that have not been defended in the dissertation.
Yet, given the theses defended in the dissertation, these commitments do not seem implausible.
Then, one worry was addressed, namely, that the theories cannot both be true (and thus, sound),
since one of them is committed to the truth of a sentence ϕ, whereas the other is committed to the
truth of the sentence ¬ϕ. It was shown that this does not undermine the truth of both theories. If
‘truth’ is understood as applying to theories, then what is important is what is meant by ϕ. Since
proponents of these theories mean different things by ϕ, both theories may still be true.
Moreover, it was shown that if ‘truth’ is understood as applying to formulations of theories, then
the commitments of each theory belonging to the fragment Ch ∪ Pr may both be true. Indeed, given
the theses defended in the dissertation, they are.
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5.7 Appendix
I will begin by presenting functions convertingMC-models into TN -models, and vice-versa, and con-
verting variable-assignments ofMC-models into variable-assignments of TN -models, and vice-versa.
I will then appeal to these functions in order to prove the solid similarity ofMC and TN .
Deﬁnition (FromMC-Models to TN -Models). LetM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 be anyMC-model.
The function (·)TN mapsM to the following model
(M)TN = 〈(W )TN , ()TN , (R)TN , (d)TN (D)TN , (V )TN 〉, where:
1. (W )TN =W ;
2. ()TN = ;
3. (R)TN = R;
4. ∀w ∈ (W )TN : (d)TN (w) = ⋃
w∈W
d(w);
5. (V )TN (c〈e〉) = V (c〈e〉);
6. (V )TN (=) = {〈o, o〉 : o ∈ ⋃
w∈W
d(w)}
For each MC-model M , (V al)TN is the valuation function of the model (M)TN assigning val-
ues to expressions relative to both variable-assignments and worlds (as deﬁned in 1.6). Moreover,
(V al)TN,g(ϕ) is the function mapping each world w ∈ (W )TN to (V al)TN,gw (ϕ), the value assigned
to ϕ relative to variable-assignment g and world w by the function (V al)TN .
Note that (d)TN (w) = (d)TN (w′) for every w,w′ ∈ (W )TN . Moreover, note that there is
a o ∈ De, w,w′ ∈ W such that o ∈ d(w) and o 6∈ d(w′). Thus, there is a o ∈ De such that
o ∈ V (c)(w) and o 6∈ V (c)(w′), for some w,w′ ∈ W . Hence, there is a o ∈ (d)TNe such that
o ∈ (V )TN (c)(w) and o 6∈ (V )TN (c)(w′), for some w,w′ ∈ (W )TN . Thus, for eachMC-model
M , (M)TN is indeed an TN -model.
The function from TN -models toMC-models is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition (From TN -Models toMC-Models). LetM = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉 be any TN -model.
The function (·)MC mapsM to the following model
(M)MC = 〈(W )MC , ()MC , (R)MC , (d)MC , (D)MC , (V )MC〉, where:
1. (W )MC =W ;
2. ()MC = ;
3. (R)MC = R;
4. ∀w ∈W : (d)MC(w) = {o ∈ De : d ∈ V (c)(w) or ∀w ∈W (o 6∈ V (c)(w))};
5. (V )MC(c) = V (c);
6. (V )MC(=)(w) = {〈o, o〉 : o ∈ (d)MC(w)}
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For each TN -model M , (V al)MC is the valuation function of the model (M)MC assigning
values to expressions relative to both variable-assignments and worlds (as deﬁned in 1.6). Moreover,
(V al)MC,g(ϕ) is the function mapping each worldw ∈ (W )MC to (V al)MC,gw (ϕ), the value assigned
to ϕ relative to variable-assignment g and world w by the function (V al)MC .
Note that TN -models M are such that there are worlds w,w′ ∈ W and o ∈ De such that
o ∈ V (c)(w) and o 6∈ V (c)(w′). But then, by the deﬁnition of (d)MC , there will be worlds
w,w′ ∈ (W )MC and o ∈ (d)MC(w) such that d 6∈ (d)MC(w′). So, for each TN -model M ,
(M)MC is indeed anMC-model.
Besides havingMC-models being mapped to TN -models, variable-assignments ofMC-models
M are also mapped by a function (·)TN to variable-assignments of (M)TN , and variable-assignments
of TN -modelsM are mapped by a function (·)MC to variable-assignments of (M)MC .
Where g is any variable-assignment of aMC-modelM , the deﬁnition of the variable-assignment
(g)TN of (M)TN is straightforward:
Deﬁnition (FromMC-variable-assignments to TN -variable-assignments). (g)TN = g
The deﬁnition of (g)MC , requires an appeal to a function, Proxy(·), mapping, for each type t,
an element ofDt to its proxy in (Dpi(t))
MC . The Proxy(·) function works as follows:
Deﬁnition (Proxy Function).
1. If o ∈ De, then Proxy(o) = f ∈ Dpi(e) such that, for all w ∈W :
• If o ∈ V (c)(w) or ∀w′ ∈W : o 6∈ V (c)(w′), then f(w) = {o};
• Otherwise, f(w) = ∅.
2. If o ∈ D〈t1,...,tn〉, then Proxy(o) = f ∈ Dpi(〈t1,...,tn〉) such that, for all w ∈W :
• f(w) = {〈Proxy(o1), . . . , P roxy(on)〉 : 〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ o(w)}
With the deﬁnition of the Proxy(·) function in place, the function mapping each variable-assignment
g of a TN -modelM , to a variable-assignment (g)MC of (M)MC is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition (From TN -variable-assignments toMC-variable-assignments).
1. (g)MC((vt)MC) = Proxy(g(vt));
2. Otherwise:
• (g)MC(vt) = g(vt), if t = e;
• (g)MC(vt) = f ∈ Dt such that ∀w ∈ W : f(w) = ∅, if t 6= e and vt 6= (v′t′)MC , for
some variable v′t′ .
The following two theorems play an important role in the proof thatMC and TN are solidly
similar via (·)TN and (·)MC :
Theorem 1. For each ϕ ∈ LMC , and each MC-model M = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, w ∈ W and
variable-assignment g ofM : M,w, g (
MC




Theorem 2. For each ϕ ∈ LTN , and each TN -model M = 〈W,, R, d,D, V 〉, w ∈ W and
variable-assignment g ofM : M,w, g (
TN
ϕ iff (M)MC , w, (g)MC (
MC
(ϕ)MC .
Lemma 1. For every type t, for every o ∈ Dt(w) : (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt).
Proof of Lemma 1.
The proof is by induction on the set of types. For the case where t = e, note that, by the deﬁnition
of aMC-model, every o ∈ De(w) is such that o ∈ V (c)(w) or ∀w′ ∈ W : o 6∈ V (c)(w′). So, by
the deﬁnition of (M)TN , every o ∈ De(w) is such that o ∈ (V )TN (c)(w) or ∀w′ ∈ (W )TN : o 6∈
(V )TN (c)(w′). Hence, for every o ∈ De(w) : (M)TN , w, (g)TN [ve/o] (
TN
Ch(ve).
For the case where t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, every o ∈ Dt(w) is such that, for every 〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ o(w):
o1 ∈ Dt1 and . . . and on ∈ Dtn . So, by the induction hypothesis, (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vti/oi] (
TN
Ch(vti).
Hence, (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt).
Lemma 2. For everyMC-modelM , type t, w ∈W , variable-assignment g ofM and o ∈ (D)TNt (w):
if (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt), then o ∈ Dt(w).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 is established by induction on t. For the case where t = e, note that
(M)TN , w, (g)TN [ve/o] (
TN
Ch(ve) only if o ∈ (V )TN (c〈e〉)(w), or
∀w′ ∈ (W )TN : o 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w).
Since (V )TN (c〈e〉) = V (c〈e〉), it follows that (M)TN , w, (g)TN [ve/o] (
TN
Ch(ve) only if o ∈ V (c〈e〉)(w)
or ∀w′ ∈ W : o 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w). By assumption, o ∈ (D)TNe (w). So, by the deﬁnition of (D)TNe ,
o ∈ ⋃
w∈W
d(w). Since d(w) = V (c〈e〉)(w) ∪ {o ∈
⋃
w∈W
d(w) : ∀w′ ∈ W (o 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w′))}, it
follows that o ∈ d(w) = De(w).
As to the case where t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, suppose that (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt). Suppose
also that 〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ o(w′) for an arbitraryw′ ∈W . Then, (M)TN , w′, (g)TN [vti/oi] (
TN
Ch(vti),
by the deﬁnition of Ch(vti). By the induction hypothesis, o
i ∈ Dti(w′), for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
But then, o ∈ Dt(w), by the deﬁnition ofDt(w). This proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof is by induction. The interesting cases are those where (i) ϕ is atomic and (ii) ϕ is of the
form ∃vt(ψ), and so these are the ones proved here. LetM be anMC-model. The proofs of these
cases go as follows:
(i) ϕ = s0s1 . . . sn.
Since (V )TN (c) = V (c〈e〉), (g)TN = g, and (g)TN [v/V (=)](v) = V (=), we have that
(V al)TN,(g)
TN [v/V (=)]((si)TN ) = V alg(si) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
So,
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(M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
(s0s1 . . . sn)TN iff (M)TN , w, (g)TN [v/V (=)] (
TN
(s0)TN (s1)TN . . . (sn)TN
iff 〈(V al)TN,(g)TN [v/V (=)](s1), . . . , (V al)TN,(g)TN [v/V (=)](sn)〉
∈ (V al)TN,(g)TN [v/V (=)]w (s0)
iff 〈V alg(s1), . . . , V alg(sn)〉 ∈ V algw(s0)
iffM,w, g (
MC
s0s1 . . . sn
(ii) ϕ = ∃vt(ψ).
Note that if o ∈ Dt and g is a variable-assignment of aMC-modelM , then g[vt/o] is also a
variable-assignment ofM . Moreover, since (g)TN = g, for every variable-assignment g ofM , the
following holds:
Fact: (g)TN [vt/o] = (g[vt/o])TN .
We thus have that
(M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
(∃vt(ψ))TN iff (M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
∃vt(Ch(vt) ∧ (ψ)TN )
iff ∃o ∈ (D)TNt s.t. (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt) ∧ (ψ)TN
iff ∃o ∈ (D)TNt (w) : (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
Ch(vt) and
(M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
(ψ)TN
iff ∃o ∈ Dt(w) : (M)TN , w, (g)TN [vt/o] (
TN
(ψ)TN
(by Lemmas 1 and 2)




iff ∃o ∈ Dt(w) :M,w, g[vt/o] (
MC
ψ




This establishes case (ii): ϕ = ∃vtψ. As mentioned, the proofs of the remaining cases are
straightforward, and are thus omitted.
Lemma 3. For all types t, TN -modelsM and o ∈ Dt : Proxy(o) ∈ (D)MCpi(t) .
Proof of Lemma 3.
The proof is by induction on t. For the base case, Proxy(o) = f such that f(w) = {o} for all w
such that o ∈ V (c〈e〉)(w) or o 6∈ V (c〈e〉)(w′) for all w′ ∈ W , and f(w) = ∅ otherwise. Given
the deﬁnition of (D)MC , it follows that Proxy(o) = f such that f(w) = {o} for all w such that
d ∈ (D)MC(w) and f(w) = ∅ otherwise.
Suppose that Proxy(oi) ∈ (D)MCpi(ti), for all i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n and oi ∈ Dti . I will show that
Proxy(o) ∈ (D)MCpi(t) , for an arbitrary o ∈ Dt, where t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉. Proxy(o) = f such that
f(w) = {〈Proxy(o1), . . . , P roxy(on)〉 : 〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ o(w)}. But then, by the deﬁnition of
(D)MCpi(t) , Proxy(o) ∈ (D)MCpi(t) .
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Lemma 4. ∀o ∈ Dt : (M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/Proxy(o)] (
MC
Pr(vpi(t)).
Proof of Lemma 4.
The proof is again by induction on t. For the case where t = e, note that Proxy(o) = f ∈ (D)MCpi(e)
s.t. f(w) = {o} if o ∈ (D)MCe and f(w) = ∅ otherwise. Now,
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(e)/Proxy(o)] (
MC
Pr(vpi(t)) iff
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(e)/Proxy(o)] (
MC
3∃ye2∀ze(vpi(e)ye ↔ y = z) iff
there is some o′ ∈ (D)MCe s.t. for all w ∈W :
Proxy(o)(w) = {o′} if o′ ∈ (D)MCe (w) and Proxy(o)(w) = ∅ otherwise.
Since o is clearly such a o′, it follows that (M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(e)/Proxy(o)] (
MC
Pr(vpi(t)) .
For the case where t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, note that, by the induction hypothesis:
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(ti)/Proxy(o
i)] (
MC
Pr(vpi(ti)) for all o
i ∈ Dti and i s. t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now, Proxy(o)(w) = {〈Proxy(o1), . . . , P roxy(on)〉 : 〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ o(w)}. So,
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/Proxy(o)] (
MC




But this means that
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/Proxy(o)] (
MC
Pr(vpi(t)).
Lemma 5. For eachMC-modelM , let fMc be a function with domainW and such that:
fMc (w) = {h ∈ D〈e〉 :M,w, g[v〈e〉/h] (
MC
∃ye(2∀ze(v〈e〉z ↔ z = y) ∧ c〈e〉)y}
Then, for any TN -modelM ,
Proxy(V (c〈e〉)) = f
(M)MC
c .
Proof of Lemma 5.
h ∈ Proxy(V (c〈e〉))(w) iff
∃o ∈ De(w) s.t. o ∈ V (c)(w) and h = Proxy(o) iff
∃o ∈ (D)MCe (w) s.t. o ∈ (V )MC(c)(w) and
∀w ∈ (W )MC s.t. either o ∈ V (c)(w) or ∀w′(o 6∈ V (c)(w′)) : h(w) = {o}, and otherwise,
h(w) = ∅ iff
∃o ∈ (D)MCe (w) s.t. o ∈ (V )MC(c)(w) and
∀w ∈ (W )MC s.t. o ∈ (D)MCe (w) : h(w) = {o}, and otherwise h(w) = ∅.
iff h ∈ f (M)MCc (w).
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Lemma 6. For eachMC-modelM , let fM= be a function with domainW and such that:
fM= (w) = {〈h, h′〉 : h, h′ ∈ D〈e〉 and
M,w, g[x〈e〉/h, y〈e〉/h′] (
MC
3∃ze(2∀ue(xu↔ u = z)) ∧3∃ze(2∀ue(yu↔ u =
z)) ∧ ∃z〈e〉2∀ue(xu↔ zu) ∧2∀ue(xu↔ yu)}
Then, for any TN -modelM , Proxy(V (=〈e,e〉)) = f
(M)MC
= .
Proof of Lemma 6.
〈h, h′〉 ∈ Proxy(V (=))(w) iff ∃o, o′ ∈ De(w) s.t.∀w ∈ (W )MC : o ∈ (D)MCe (w) only if
h(w) = {o} and
o′ ∈ (D)MCe (w) only if h′(w) = {o′}, and ∀w s.t. o 6∈ (D)MCe (w) :
h(w) = ∅ and ∀w s.t. o′ 6∈ (D)MCe (w) : h′(w) = ∅ and o = o′ iff
∃o, o′ ∈ (D)MCe s.t. ∀w ∈ (W )MC :o ∈ (D)MCe (w) only if h(w) = {o} and
o′ ∈ (D)MCe (w) only if h′(w) = {o′}, and ∀w s.t. o 6∈ (D)MCe (w):
h(w) = ∅ and ∀w s.t. o′ 6∈ (D)MCe (w) : h′(w) = ∅ and h = h′
iff 〈h, h′〉 ∈ f (M)MC= .
Lemma 7. For all TN -models M and all h ∈ (D)MCpi(t) such that (M)MC , w, g[vpi(t)/h] (
MC
Pr(v)
there is an o ∈ Dt such that h = Proxy(o).
Proof of Lemma 7.
The lemma is established by induction on t. For the case when t = e, suppose that
(M)MC , w, g[vpi(e)/h] (
MC
Pr(v).
Then, there is o ∈ (D)MCe such that h(w) = {o} for all w such that o ∈ (D)MCe (w) and for all w′
such that o 6∈ (D)MCe (w′): h(w′) = ∅. So, h = Proxy(o). By the deﬁnition of (D)MCe , o ∈ De.
As to the case when t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, suppose that (M)MC , w, g[vpi(t)/h] (
MC
Pr(v). By the
deﬁnition of Pr(vt), it follows that, for each w ∈W and all sequences 〈h1, . . . , hn〉 ∈ h(w):
(M)MC , w, g[vipi(ti)/h
i] (
MC
Pr(vi), for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
So, by the induction hypothesis, there is an oi ∈ Dti such that hi = Proxy(oi). Now, let o be a
function with domainW and such that o(w) = {〈o1, . . . , on〉 : 〈Proxy(o1), . . . , P roxy(on)〉 ∈
h(w)}. Clearly, o ∈ Dt. Moreover, Proxy(o) = h. So, if (M)MC , w, g[vpi(t)/h] (
MC
Pr(v) then
there is an o ∈ Dt such that h = Proxy(o). This establishes the lemma.
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Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof is by induction. The interesting cases are those where (i) ϕ is atomic and (ii) ϕ is of the
form ∃vt(ψ), and so these are the ones proved here. LetM be a TN -model. The proofs of these
cases go as follows:
(i) ϕ = s0s1 . . . sn.







c = Proxy(V (c)) and f
(M)MC
= = Proxy(V (=)) (by Lemmas 5 and 6),




= ] = (g′)MC for some variable-assignment g′ ofM just
like g except that g′(v〈e〉) = V (c) and g′(v′〈e,e〉) = V (=).
Now, note that:
(M)MC , w, (g)MC (
MC
(s0s1 . . . sn)MC iff (M)MC , w, (g′)MC (
MC
(s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC .
Thus, to establish the base case it suffices to show that:
(M)MC , w, (g′)MC (
MC
(s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC if and only ifM,w, g (
MC
s0s1 . . . sn
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n), let (si)∗ = si if si is a variable, (si)∗ = v〈e〉 if si is c〈e〉 and (si)∗ = v〈e,e〉 if
si is =〈e,e〉:
(M)MC , w, (g′)MC (
MC
(s0)MC(s1)MC . . . (sn)MC
iff 〈(g′)MC((s1)MC), . . . , (g′)MC((sn)MC)〉 ∈ (g′)MC((s0)MC)(w)
iff 〈Proxy(g′((s1)∗)), . . . , P roxy(g′((sn)∗))〉 ∈ Proxy(g′((s0)∗))(w)
iff 〈g′((s1)∗), . . . , g′((sn)∗)〉 ∈ g′((s0)∗)(w)
iffM,w, g′ (
TN
(s0)∗(s1)∗ . . . (sn)∗
iffM,w, g (
TN
s0s1 . . . sn
This completes the proof of the base case.
(ii) ϕ = ∃vtψ. The proof goes as follows:
(M)MC , w, (g)MC (
MC
(∃vtψ)MC
iff (M)MC , w, (g)MC (
MC
∃vpi(t)(Pr(vpi(t)) ∧ (ψ)MC)
iff there is a h ∈ (D)MCpi(t) s.t.(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/h] (
MC
Pr(vpi(t)) and
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/h] (
MC
(ψ)MC
iff there is o ∈ Dt such that Proxy(o) = h and
(M)MC , w, (g)MC [vpi(t)/h] (
MC
(ψ)MC
(by Lemmas 3, 4 and 7)
iff there is o ∈ Dt such that Proxy(o) = h and
(M)MC , w, (g′)MC (
MC
(ψ)MC , where g′ = g[vt/o]








This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Besides Theorems 1 and 2, the proof of the solid similarity via (·)TN and (·)MC ofMC and TN
to be presented in this appendix appeals to the following lemma:
Lemma 8. For allMC-modelsM : M = ((M)TN )MC . For all TN -modelsM : M = ((M)MC)TN .
The proof of Lemma 8 is straightforward and thus I shall omit it.
The ingredients required to establish the solid similarity ofMC and TN via (·)MC and (·)TN
are all in place. Let me now establish the required lemmas:
Lemma 9. Γ (
MC
ϕ if and only if (Γ)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN .




ϕ. SupposeM,w, g (
TN
(γ)TN , for all γ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 8, it follows that
((M)MC)TN , w, g (
TN
(γ)TN , for all γ ∈ Γ.
Moreover, since all (γ)TN ∈ (Γ)TN are closed formulae, ((M)MC)TN , w, (g′)TN (
TN
(γ)TN for
some variable-assignment g′ of (M)MC . But then, by Theorem 1, it follows that (M)MC , w, g′ (
MC
γ,
for each γ ∈ Γ.
From the assumption that Γ (
MC
ϕ it follows that (M)MC , w, g′ (
MC
ϕ. Thus, again by Theo-
rem 1, it follows that ((M)MC)TN , w, (g′)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN . And since (ϕ)TN is a closed formula, it
follows that ((M)MC)TN , w, g (
TN









(ϕ)TN . SupposeM,w, g (
MC
γ, for all γ ∈ Γ. By Theorem 1, it follows that
(M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
(γ)TN , for all (γ)TN ∈ (Γ)TN .
From the assumption that (Γ)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN , it follows that (M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN . Finally,
again by Theorem 1, it follows thatM,w, g (
MC
ϕ. Hence, Γ (
MC
ϕ.
Lemma 10. Γ (
TN
ϕ if and only if (Γ)MC (
MC
(ϕ)MC .
The proof of Lemma 10 proceeds in a fashion analogous to the proof of Lemma 9, appealing to





Proof of Lemma 11.
M,w, g (
MC
ϕ iff (M)TN , w, (g)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN , by Theorem 1 iff ((M)TN )MC , w, ((g)TN )MC (
MC
((ϕ)TN )MC ,
by Theorem 2 iffM,w, ((g)TN )MC (
MC
((ϕ)TN )MC by Lemma 8 iffM,w, g (
MC
((ϕ)TN )MC , since




The proof of Lemma 12 proceeds in a fashion analogous to the proof of Lemma 11, and will thus
be omitted.
Corollary 1. MC and TN are similar via (·)MC and (·)TN
Corollary 1 is a straightforward consequence of Lemmas 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Lemma 13. MC
(·)TNŸ TN .
Proof of Lemma 13. Suppose ϕ ∈ ComMC . LetM ′ be an arbitrary TN -model and g′ be an arbi-
trary variable-assignment ofM ′. Since ϕ ∈ ComMC , it follows that (M ′)MC ,, g′′ (
MC
ϕ, for every
variable-assignment g′′ of (M ′)MC . So, by Theorem 1, it follows that ((M ′)MC)TN ,, (g′′)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN .
From Lemma 8 it follows from this thatM ′,, (g′′)TN (
TN
(ϕ)TN . And since (ϕ)TN is closed, it
follows thatM ′,, g′ (
TN
(ϕ)TN . Hence, (ϕ)TN ∈ ComTN . Moreover, (ϕ)TN)(
TN
(ϕ)TN . Hence,
there is a ψ ∈ ComTN , namely, (ϕ)TN , such that (ϕ)TN)(
TN
ψ, for every ϕ ∈ ComMC .
Lemma 14. TN
(·)MCŸ MC .
The proof of Lemma 14 proceeds as that of 13, appealing to theorem 2 and lemma 8, and is thus
omitted.
Finally, we get to the desired result:
Corollary 2. MC and TN are solidly similar via (·)MC and (·)TN .




Mathematics and the natural sciences make extensive use of quantiﬁcational resources. Arguably, such
use does not stop at the ﬁrst-order.1 Also, ordinary thinking is inherently modal, as is thinking in the
sciences.
There is some consensus towards classical ﬁrst-order logic as the correct theory of ﬁrst-order
quantiﬁcation, and there is some consensus towards S5 as the correct theory of metaphysical necessity.
Matters are murkier with respect to the correct higher-order theory. If there is any consensus, this is
where it stops. What is the correct theory of ﬁrst-order modal logic is up for grabs, and things are
even murkier in the territory of higher-order modal logic. This is an unfortunate state of affairs.
The main question addressed in this dissertation was what is the correct higher-order modal logic.
Two starting presuppositions were the following:
1. Thorough Actualism is true. Every entity whatsoever, of any type, is actually something.
2. Higher-order quantiﬁcation is legitimate even if it has no adequate compositional semantic
speciﬁable in English.
In chapter 1 it was shown that Thorough Actualism ﬁts neatly with the Kripke-Stalnaker conception
of possible worlds as ways things could have been, and thus as properties or states of the world. No
defence of this conception of possible worlds was offered. Themain aimwas to show the reasonableness
of the presupposition. A brief defence of the legitimacy of higher-order quantiﬁcation was offered
also in chapter 1, even though a more robust defence of the legitimacy of such resources would require
a lengthier treatment. The main aim of the defence offered there was again to show the reasonableness
of the presupposition.
In chapter 2 it was shown that the Propositional Functions Account of the semantics of ﬁrst-order
modal languages is incompatible with typical thoroughly contingentist higher-order modal theories
committed to Thorough Serious Actualism. These theories reject the necessary being of haecceities
and of attributions of being, whereas the Propositional Functions Account together with Thorough
Serious Actualism implies the necessary being of both haecceities and attributions of being.
1See, e.g., (Shapiro, 1991) for a defence of the indispensability of second-order languages in codifying several mathematical
concepts and describing mathematical structures. Mundy (1987) offers a defence of the view that a second-order theory of
quantity is superior to ﬁrst-order theories of quantity .
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Imagine a chemical theory C that requires rejection of the different biological theories on offer,
without offering the means to see how to get to a substitute theory. For instance, it may be that the
different biological theories on offer require that some proteins have shapes that they cannot have
according to C . Does this mean that the rival theories are preferable to C? It all depends on the
remaining merits and shortcomings of C in comparison with its rivals. All other things being equal,
C ’s rivals are preferable.
This is the situation with those thoroughly contingentist theories committed to Thorough Serious
Actualism that reject either i) the necessary being of haecceities or ii) the necessary being of attributions
of being. These theories are inconsistent not only with the Propositional Functions Account but also
with the classic accounts of the semantics of ﬁrst-order modal languages, namely, the Literal Account
and the Haecceities Account. Thus, all things being equal, their rivals are preferable.
Thorough contingentists may retort that not all things are equal. Considerations of a different
nature favour the truth of their theories. In chapter 3 the truth of Higher-Order Necessitism was
directly argued for. First, a defence of Thorough Serious Actualism was offered. Thorough Serious
Actualism is thus a commitment of the correct higher-order modal theory. This already excludes
thoroughly contingentist proposals such as the one offered in (Fine, 1977). The bulk of the chapter was
dedicated to a defence of Propositional Necessitism. After the presentation of the defence of Proposi-
tional Necessitism, arguments for Higher-Order Necessitism analogous to those for Propositional
Necessitism were offered. Schematic versions of the premises of the arguments for Higher-Order
Necessitism turn out to imply the truth of an even stronger principle, namely, the comprehension
principle Cˆomp.
The correct higher-order modal theory is thus committed to Thorough Serious Actualism, Higher-
Order Necessitism, and the even stronger principle Cˆomp. Two main theories have all these principles
as their commitments, namely, Williamson’s Thorough Necessitism and Plantinga’s Moderate Contin-
gentism. Structural similarities between these two theories were already noted in (Bennett, 2006).
Given the structural similarities between the theories, could they be equivalent? If so, there is no
point in starting the usual comparative evaluation of the theories. The theories require the same of
the world in order to be true. One is true if and only if the other is.
To adequately address the question whether the theories are equivalent, some account of what
it takes for theories to be equivalent was required. I have found the existing accounts of theory
equivalence to be unsatisfactory. At the risk of overgeneralising, the problem is that they are only
concerned with the structural features of theories (or, more appropriately, of formulations of theories),
not with what theories say about the world.
For instance, judging theories to be similar on the grounds that they consists in the same set of
sentences, or the same set of models, or are notational variants, or even on the basis of their similarity
or solid similarity, ignores the obvious point that theorists may use syntactically indistinguishable
sentences to say radically different things. The structural similarity between theories is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for their equivalence.
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Going beyond the structural similarity between theories thus requires doing some philosophy of
language, as one may put it. The question that needs to be addressed is what is required from the
translations between the languages of the two theories, over and above the constraints stemming from
sameness of theoretical structure. Theories are formulated in terms of representational resources, and
what is represented via those resources depends on the theorists and what they intends to represent
with them.
In chapter 4 an account of theory equivalence was proposed that considered not only what
it takes for theories to be structurally similar, but also what is required of translations witnessing
their structurally similarity, with respect to meaning preservation, for the theories to be equivalent.
Moreover, the account also proposed some procedures for determining when those meaning-related
desiderata are satisﬁed.
The thesis that theory equivalence is theory synonymy seems just right. For a notion of equivalence
concerned with the relationship between theories and the world, what is required is, from a structural
point of view, that the theories have the same entailment structure and that the commitments of each
theory occupy the same places in that structure. Besides sameness of theoretical structure, theories
must also satisfy a material condition to be equivalent. To wit, there must be mappings between
the languages in which the theories are formulated witnessing the sameness of structure of the two
theories. This is what it takes for theories to be synonymous.
The defence of the thesis that theory equivalence is theory synonymy pursued a quasi-scientiﬁc
method. First, desiderata on theory equivalence were extracted from the literature on the dialectic
between noneists and Quineans. Surprisingly, there is much convergence in this literature on points
concerned with the relationship between theories, even if the theorists involved turn out to disagree
on the question whether noneism just is allism.
After the presentation of the Synonymy Account, the thesis that theory equivalence just is theory
synonymy was subjected to scrutiny. First, it was shown that the account ﬁts into the data points
previously extracted from the debate between noneists and Quineans. That is, it was shown that
theory synonymy satisﬁes the different desiderata previously identiﬁed. Afterwards, consequences of
the account were extracted, by applying it again to the debate between noneists and Quineans. The
account was shown to offer a nuanced understanding of that debate. It reveals that part of the dispute
between noneists and allists concerns expressive resources. It also shifts the attention from slogans to
the theories falling under those slogans.
Finally, objections were considered to the effect that theory synonymy overgenerates for failing to
distinguish between theories differing in i) ideological parsimony; ii) fundamentality; iii) explanatory
power. The structure of the reply to these objections consisted in a dilemma. If these features have
to do with the relationship between theory and world, then theories differing with respect to these
features will also differ in their commitments. If features i)-iii) do not have to do with relationship
between theories and the world, having to do instead with properties of the representational devices
chosen to formulate the theory, then the fact that the theories differ with respect to them is irrelevant
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to the question whether the theories are equivalent.
Equipped with the Synonymy Account of theory equivalence, the question whether Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism is equivalent to Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism was addressed in
chapter 5. As a preliminary result, it was shown that the synonymy betweenMC and TN is a conse-
quence of the assumption that proponents of Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian
Thorough Necessitism mean the same with the syntactically identical sentences ofLMC andLTN . The
reason is that the homonymous translation witnesses the sameness of theoretical structure between
MC and TN . Therefore, if Plantingans and Williamsonians are not talking past each other, then
Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent, on
the assumption that theory equivalence is theory synonymy. Yet, it was argued that the homonymous
translation is deeply incorrect. The case for the equivalence between Plantingan Moderate Contin-
gentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism developed in chapter 5 relied on showing that it
is very reasonable to think that a certain restriction of the homonymous translation is deeply correct,
even if the homonymous translation turns out to be deeply incorrect. Since this restriction of the
homonymous translation also witnesses the sameness of theoretical structure betweenMC and TN ,
it follows thatMC and TN are synonymous. Therefore, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent, on the assumption that theory equivalence is
theory synonymy.
How can it be that the theories are equivalent, given that their proponents believe that they are
not? The explanation was seen to lie in the default assumption by speakers and interlocutors that
they agree on the meanings of the sentences used in their linguistic interactions, given that those are
sentences of a language believed by them to be a common language. This default assumption often
leads to quick, fruitful and successful communication, even though it is occasionally false. The illusion
of disagreement between Plantingans and Williamsonians is thus explained by their presumption that
they mean the same with syntactically identical sentences. For this reason they take the two theories
to be contradictory, and so inequivalent, despite the fact that, on this occasion, the presumption of
agreement in meaning is false.
Finally, it was argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough
Necessitism are both true, given the assumptions that i) S5 is sound for metaphysical modality (as
many theorists take it to be) and ii) Thorough Abundantism is true (an assumption abductively justiﬁed
by the truth of every instance of Cˆomp). With the result that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and
Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are equivalent and true theories, progress has been achieved.
On the one hand, the fact that the theories are equivalent reveals that there is no need to address
the question which one is preferable vis-à-vis its relationship with the world. Since the theories are
equivalent, they require the same of the world in order to be true. On the other hand, since Plantingan
Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are true and substantive theories,





Strongly Millian First- and
Second-Order Modal Logics
A.1 Introduction
Classical ﬁrst-order logic is widely regarded as being the correct logical system for ﬁrst-order languages
when ‘∀’ is interpreted as having the same meaning as ‘everything,’ and classical second-order logic is
regarded as being at least informally sound.1 Similarly, the modal logic S5 is widely regarded as being
the correct system for the languages of propositional modal logic when ‘2’ is interpreted as standing
for metaphysical necessity.2
However, the system that results from combining classical ﬁrst-order logic and the propositional
modal logic S5 in the most natural way contains as theorems formulae that, when interpreted, corre-
spond to intuitively false claims. Call this system LPC=S5.3 For instance, LPC=S5 contains as
theorems every instance of the following schema, known as the Barcan Formula:4
(BF) 3∃x(ϕ)→ ∃x(3ϕ).
One instance of (BF) is the formula
3∃x(Skx)→ ∃x(3Skx).
When interpreted, this formula states that if there could have been something that was a son of Kripke,
then, there is something that could have been a son of Kripke. Since there could have been something
that was a son of Kripke, it follows that there is something that could have been a son of Kripke. But,
arguably, there is nothing that could have been a son of Kripke.5
1We here refer to the deductive systems of second-order logic, not to the class of formulae that are satisﬁed by every
standard model.
2Thus, Williamson (2013, p. 44) states that ‘(...) most metaphysicians accept S5 as the propositional modal logic of
metaphysical modality (...)’. Still, the propositional modal logic S5 is not universally accepted by metaphysicians. See, e.g.,
(Salmon, 1989).
3The system LPC=S5 is described, for instance, in (Williamson, 1998), from where its name has been taken.
4See (Barcan, 1946) for a ﬁrst study of this principle.
5For a defence of the view that there is something that could have been a son of Kripke, see (Linsky & Zalta, 1994),
(Williamson, 2013, ch. 1).
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Other problematic theorems of the system LPC=S5 are every instance of the following schema,
known as the Converse Barcan Formula,
(CBF) ∃x(3ϕ)→ 3∃x(ϕ),
as well as the formula
(NNE) 2∀x(2∃y(x = y)).
Formula (NNE) has as its content the implausible thesis that necessarily everything necessarily exists
(strictly, speaking, the content of this formula is the thesis that necessarily, everything is necessarily
something — in the present paper, being something and existing are treated as equivalent). One of
the main problems with (CBF) is that one of its instances, in conjunction with the uncontroversial
principle that necessarily everything is something, implies the following unnecessitated version of
(NNE),
(NE) ∀x(2∃y(x = y)).
This formula states that everything necessarily exists. Prima facie, this is false. Kripke would have
failed to exist if his parents had never met.
Similarly, the system that results from combining classical second-order logic and the modal
logic S5 contains as theorems formulae that, when interpreted, correspond to theses whose truth
is somewhat doubtful. Call this system SPC=S5.6 For instance, SPC=S5 contains as theorems
every instance of the following schema (a second-order version of (BF)):
(BFM) 3∃X(ϕ)→ ∃X(3ϕ).
One instance of (BFM) is the formula
3∃X(∃x(Skx ∧2∀y(Xy ↔ x = y)))→ ∃X(3∃x(Skx ∧2∀y(Xy ↔ x = y))).
When interpreted, this formula states (informally) that if there could have been a property X and
an individual x such that x was a son of Kripke and X was the property of being x, then there is
a property X such that there could have been an x such that x was a son of Kripke and X is the
property of being x. But even though it is plausible to think that there could have been such a property
X , the (actual) existence ofX is controversial. It is often assumed that any property Y which is such
that there could have been a y such that Y is the property of being y ontologically depends on the
existence of y.7 Thus, arguably, propertyX ontologically depends on the existence of x. Since x does
not exist, propertyX also does not exist. Therefore, (SBF) has at least one false instance.8
6A description of a higher-order modal system having the system SPC=S5 as a subsystem can be found in (Gallin,
1975, ch. 3, pp. 71-74). The axioms of the SPC=S5 are the instances, in a second-order modal language (i.e., a language
whose types are restricted to e and, for every n, the n-ary sequence composed of e), of the schemata presented in (Gallin,
1975, pp. 73-74).
7Or at least ontologically depends on the existence of everything on which y ontologically depends y. The point made
in the main text would still be available with this qualiﬁcation in place.
8Adams (1981), Fine (1985) and Stalnaker (2012) all challenge the existence of propertyX . In general, these authors
reject the claim that every instance of the schema (BFM) is true.
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As in the ﬁrst-order case, other problematic theorems of SPC=S5 are every instance of the
second-order version of the Converse Barcan Formula, the schema
(CBFM) ∃X(3ϕ)→ 3∃X(ϕ),
as well as the formula
(NNEM) 2∀X(2∃Y (2∀x(Xx↔ Y x))).
If it is assumed that properties are the same if necessarily coextensive, then this formula states that
necessarily every property necessarily exists. Even without this assumption, the formula still states
the controversial thesis that necessarily, for every property X , necessarily there is some property
that is necessarily coextensive with X . One of the problems with (CBFM) is that it implies, in
conjunction with the plausible principle that necessarily, for every property there is some property
that is necessarily coextensive with it, the following unnecessitated version of (NNEM),
∀X(2∃Y (2∀x(Xx↔ Y x))).
But, arguably, it is not the case that necessarily there is some property that is necessarily coextensive
with the property of being Kripke.
Call conservative any quantiﬁed modal logic that does not contain the controversial consequences
of the systems LPC=S5 and SPC=S5. Most of the conservative ﬁrst-order modal logics that have
been proposed are either devised solely for languages without individual constants (the paradigmatic
example of such a system being the one proposed in (Kripke, 1963)), or else fail to capture the fact
that the theorems of classical ﬁrst-order logic are all actually true (some systems of this kind are the
systemG presented in (Menzel, 1991, pp. 360-363) and the systems put forward in, respectively,
(Hughes & Cresswell, 1996, pp. 366-367) and (Stalnaker, 1994)). As to conservative second-order
modal logics, to my knowledge these have only been given model-theoretic presentations, and in any
case these logics fail to capture the fact that the theorems of classical second-order logical are all true
in the actual world.9
A common feature of these conservative ﬁrst-order modal systems is their treatment of individual
constants on the model of Millian proper names. Recall the thesis ofMillianism in the philosophy of
language, according to which every proper name of English possesses a referent, and its referent is the
proper name’s sole contribution to the determination of the truth-conditions of every sentence in
9Some conservative systems of ﬁrst-order modal logic do capture the actual truth of the theorems of classical ﬁrst-order
logic. Some examples are the system A described in (Menzel, 1991) and the systems described in (Stephanou, 2005). In
general, I am sympathetic to the way individual constants are treated in these logics, taking as values (in a model) only
entities in the domain of the actual world. In effect, the logics in question are appropriately called strongly Millian, given
the terminology used in this chapter. However, the way these systems are presented seems to presuppose a particular take
on the question whether logical truths are necessary, requiring a negative answer to the question. In contrast, some of the
Millian logics presented here accommodate in a single system the views that i) logical truths are necessary and ii) the truths
of quantiﬁed modal logic are true in the actual world. Unsurprisingly, this is done by the addition of an actuality operator
to the language. In any case, the most important contribution of the present paper lies in the Millian logics it offers for
second-order modal languages.
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which it occurs. Independently of whether Millianism is true, say that a proper name isMillian just
in case it possesses a referent and its sole contribution to the determination of the truth-conditions
of any sentence in which it occurs consists in its referent. Then, the thesis of Millianism may be
equivalently formulated as the thesis that every proper name of English is a Millian proper name.
The model-theoretic semantics of these alternative systems is such that the value of each individual
constant a (in a modelM) is some possible individual, and the contribution made by a to the value
of any complex expression in which a occurs consists solely in a’s value (inM). Thus, individual
constants are treated, in each model, as if they were Millian proper names, and each model provides a
representation of that which is, according to the Millian, the semantics of proper names of English. A
consequence of such treatment of individual constants is that the logics in question shed some light
on the logic of Millian proper names (for instance, on the relationship between Millian proper names
and quantiﬁcation).
Say that a proper name is strongly Millian just in case it is a Millian proper name and its referent
(actually) exists. Strong Millianism is the view that every proper name of English is a strongly Millian
proper name. As we shall see in the next section, it is not implausible to think that Millianism implies
Strong Millianism.10 In this paper ﬁrst-order modal systems treating individual constants on the model
of strongly Millian proper names are presented. For this reason, the logical systems characterised here
will be called strongly Millian systems of ﬁrst-order modal logic. Strongly Millian ﬁrst-order modal
systems shed some light on the logic of strongly Millian proper names (for instance, on the relationship
between strongly Millian proper names and quantiﬁcation). It will be shown that all the theorems of
classical ﬁrst-order logic (or the result of preﬁxing them with an actuality operator) are theorems of
the strongly Millian ﬁrst-order modal systems to be proposed. Furthermore, these systems count the
schemata (BF) and (CBF) as invalid, and do not have (NNE) as a theorem (nor do they have (NE)
as a theorem).
The common conservative alternatives to SPC=S5 assign to predicates intensions that need not
belong to the domain of the actual world. In contrast, the second-order modal systems presented here
assign to predicates only intensions in the domain of the actual world. By analogy with the ﬁrst-order
case, these systems may be called strongly Millian systems of second-order modal logic. It is shown that
all the theorems of classical second-order logic (or their actualisations) are theorems of the strongly
Millian systems of second-order modal logic here proposed. Furthermore, these systems count the
schemata (BFM) and (CBFM) as invalid, and do not have (NNEM) as a theorem.
The main aim of the present paper is thus to present sound and complete strongly Millian ﬁrst-
and second-order modal logics which enjoy the following attractive features: 1) are conservative; 2)
capture a special feature of classical quantiﬁed logic, to wit, that its theorems are all true in the actual
world.
The reason why several conservative alternatives to LPC=S5 and SPC=S5 fail to capture
10No commitment will be adopted with respect to the truth or falsehood of Millianism (i.e., no commitment will be
made with respect to the truth of the claim that every proper name of English is a Millian proper name). A fortiori, no
commitment to strong Millianism is adopted.
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the actual truth of the theorems of ﬁrst-order logic is, from the perspective here adopted, that their
treatment of individual constants and predicates is too liberal, allowing the denotation of some
individual constants and predicates to consist in merely possible entities.
The paper is divided in two parts. In the ﬁrst part of the paper (§A.2-§A.4) several strongly
Millian ﬁrst- and second-order modal logics are presented. In §A.2 the notions of validity that the
strongly Millian logics to be presented aim to capture are introduced, and certain metaphysical and
semantic presuppositions of these logics are spelled out. The language, model-theoretic semantics
and deductive systems of strongly Millian logics are presented in §A.3. In §4 it is shown that strongly
Millian logics have as theorems all the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic, or all their actualisations,
and thus that these logics capture the fact that the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic are all actually
true. It is also noted that the schemata (BF), (CBF), (BFM), and (CBFM) are not valid in these
logics, and that they do not have the formulae (NNE) and (NNEM) as theorems.
In the second part (§A.5-§A.7) a selection of issues concerning the logics presented are discussed.
In §A.5, strongly Millian second-order modal logics are applied to an argument in the metaphysics of
modality, presented in (Williamson, 2013, ch. 6), purporting to show that the strongest reasonable
second-order modal logic has (NNEM) as one of its theorems. It is shown how the opponent of
(NNEM) may resist the argument by appealing to the strength of strongly Millian second-order modal
logics. The similarities between strongly Millian logics and two other proposals in the literature are
discussed in some detail in §A.6. Finally, the question whether strongly Millian logics are really
second-order is addressed in §A.7. It is shown that this question has different answers depending
on one’s target conception of properties, and that Millian logics are in fact second-order logics given
some popular conceptions of properties.
A.2 Orientation
A.2.1 General Validity and Real-World Validity
General validity and real-world validity are two properties of arguments. An argument with premises Γ
and conclusion ϕ is generally valid if and only if, for every (admissible) interpretation of the argument’s
non-logical expressions, it is impossible for the premises of the argument to be true and for the
conclusion to be false, independently of how many possibilities there are, and how much variation
between possible existents there is. An argument is real-world valid if and only if, for every (admissible)
interpretation of the argument’s non-logical expressions, it is not actually the case that the premises of
the argument are true and the conclusion is false, independently of how many possibilities there are
and how much variation between possible existents there is.11
11The use of ‘actually’, in the present formulation of real-world validity, is one where this expression is not context-
dependent, referring to the actual world, i.e., the world that obtains. For different conceptions of logical consequence, see
(Shapiro, 1998). General validity is akin to Shapiro’s preferred conception of logical consequence in that paper. According
to that conception, ‘Φ is a logical consequence of Γ if Φ holds in all possibilities under every interpretation of the nonlogical
terminology in which Γ holds’ (Shapiro, 1998, p. 148). The possibility in question here seems to be of a logical nature
instead of a metaphysical nature. But see (Shapiro, 1998, p. 147ff.). A conception of logical consequence somewhat akin to
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General validity and real-world validity encapsulate a certain neutrality. For instance, on the
intended reading of real-world validity and general validity, whether certain arguments have these
properties is something which does not depend on whether there is only one or instead many possible
worlds. Similarly, whether certain arguments are generally valid or real-world valid is something which
depends neither on the number of individuals that exist at each possible world, nor on whether the
same or different individuals may be found in different worlds.
Logics which enjoy this kind of neutrality can be theoretically useful. They are useful to theorists
who have no commitment to any particular answer to the aforementioned questions. They are also
useful to theorists committed to certain answers when these theorists are involved in projects which
require them not to beg any of the relevant questions. Importantly, the claim that logics which capture
the generally valid or real-world valid arguments are useful should not be confused with the claim
that it is only logics fulﬁlling these desiderata that are correct. Here I remain neutral both on whether
the correct notion of validity is captured by general validity or by real-world validity, and on whether
there are many equally correct conceptions of validity.12
The strongly Millian logics to be presented (as well as their ‘weak’ counterparts) all aim to capture
either general-validity or real-world validity. Thus, the logics proposed encapsulate the kind of
neutrality present in the notions of general validity and real-world validity. This is not to say that the
logics contain no substantial presuppositions. They do, as will now be shown.
A.2.2 Presuppositions
There are certain aspects in which the logics being offered are not neutral. A ﬁrst aspect concerns a
metaphysical doctrine known in the literature as Serious Actualism or the Being Constraint.13 According
to this doctrine, it is impossible for there to be individuals such that it is possible for them to stand in
some relation without being something. Serious Actualism, as almost every philosophical thesis, has
been disputed. Nonetheless, the principle seems quite plausible.
The assumption of Serious Actualism has an interesting consequence. Suppose that Millianism
is true. Given the assumption of Serious Actualism (and the assumption that reference is a genuine
relation), it follows that the referent of every proper name actually exists. That is, given the plausible
assumption that Serious Actualism is true, Millianism implies Strong Millianism, as mentioned in
§A.1. According to the intended interpretation of individual constants and n-ary predicate letters (of
the target languages), these are all strongly Millian expressions (as this notion is characterised in §A.1).
Concerning the range of the second-order quantiﬁers, it is assumed that these do not range over
real-world validity, also discussed by Shapiro, is the following: Φ is a logical consequence of Γ if and only if ‘The truth of
the members of Γ guarantees the truth of Φ’ in virtue of the meanings of a special collection of the terms, the ‘ “logical
constants” ’ (Shapiro, 1998, p. 132).
12See (Hanson, 2006) and (Nelson & Zalta, 2010) for a somewhat recent debate over which of general validity and
real-world validity is the correct notion of validity. I also remain neutral on what is intended reading of ‘correct’. However, it
is shown that the fact that the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic are all true can be successfully captured by appealing to
both general validity and real-world validity. Thus, none of these notions is more appropriate than the other when the goal
is that of capturing this feature of the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic in the setting of a quantiﬁed modal language.
13See (Plantinga, 1983, p. 11) and (Williamson, 2013, p. 148-149).
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extensional entities such as sets or classes. Instead, they are taken as ranging over entities whose
identity criterion is given by necessary coextensiveness. This does not imply a rejection of relations
with other identity conditions, but it presupposes that there are entities which are identical if and
only if they are necessarily coextensive. More will be said on the intended range of the second-order
quantiﬁers in §A.7.
Given the assumption that the identity criteria for n-ary relations consists in their necessary
coextensiveness, identity statements between relations and statements concerning the existence of
relations can be formulated without appealing to an extra logical constant having as its intended
interpretation the relation of identity between n-ary relations. Let τn and τ
′n be n-ary second-order
terms, and v1, . . . , vn be the ﬁrst n-ary sequence of individual variables such that there is no 0 ≤
i ≤ n such that vi occurs in neither τn nor τ ′n. The expression τn ≡ τ ′n abbreviates the formula
2∀v1 . . . ∀vn(τnv1 . . . vn ↔ τ ′nv1 . . . vn).
The statement that the n-ary relation that is the semantic value of τn is something can be captured
by the formula ∃V n(V n ≡ τn), where V n is the ﬁrst n-ary second-order variable distinct from τn.
Let Eτn abbreviate such statement.
Finally, the following formula states that the semantic values of τn and τ
′n are the same n-ary
relation: Eτn ∧ (τn ≡ τ ′n). We use τn = τ ′n to abbreviate this formula.
Some of the languages to be adopted contain an operator, λ which, given a formula ϕ, produces
the complex predicate λv1, . . . vn(ϕ). According to the intended interpretation of this expression, it
denotes the relation that obtains between v1, . . . vn if and only if ϕ. For instance, where P stands
for the property of being a philosopher and G stands for the property of being Greek, λx(Px ∧Gx)
stands for the property of being a Greek philosopher.
A different presupposition of the strongly Millian logics proposed has to do with the general
validity (and, a fortiori, real-world validity) of all ‘instances’ of a principle concerning the circumstances
in which the semantic value of a complex predicate exists. In order to introduce this principle it is
helpful to begin with some abbreviations and deﬁnitions.
Let Et abbreviate the formula ∃v(v = t), which states the existence of the individual which
is the semantic value of t (where t is an individual variable or constant and v is the ﬁrst individual
variable different from t). Also, suppose ϕ is a formula which contains as individual terms only the
terms t1, . . . , tj , for some j ∈ N0 and as n-ary second-order terms only the terms τn1 , . . . , τnmn









Now, consider the following schema:
(CComp) Eϕ→ Eλv1 . . . vn(ϕ).
Intuitively, what (CComp) states is that if the referents of all terms occurring in ϕ all exist, then there
is that n-ary relation that necessarily holds of v1, . . . , vn if and only if ϕ.
14The empty conjunction is taken to consist in the formula ∀X0(X0 → X0); any other tautologous formula would do
the required job.
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Let a @2∀2-closure of a formula ϕ be any closed formula resulting from preﬁxing ϕ with any
sequence of @, 2, ∀v (for any individual variable v) and ∀V n (for any n-ary second-order variable
V n and n ∈ N0), in any order. The presupposition is that every @2∀2-closure of every instance of
(CComp) is generally valid. The truth of every @2∀2-closure of every instance of (CComp) may be
seen as a consequence of the following two assumptions:
1. For every ψ, the semantic value of ψ is a function of the semantic values of its component
expressions in such a way that necessarily, if the semantic values of all of ψ’s component
expressions exist, then the semantic value of ψ itself exists;
2. Necessarily, if the semantic value of ψ exists, then the semantic value of λv1 . . . vn(ψ) exists.
From these two assumptions it follows that, for every ψ, necessarily, if the semantic values of all
of ψ’s component expressions exist, then the semantic value of ψ itself exists (assuming that the
semantic values of the logical constants all necessarily exist). Much more would be required in order
to provide an adequate defence of these assumptions, such as a detailed study of the semantics of
complex predication. This is outside the scope of the present paper.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the stance on open formulae that will be adopted. The semantics
of open formulas is a delicate issue. Our decision has been to adopt a neutral stance on it. For this
reason no open formula will occur as an axiom or theorem of the strongly Millian logics offered (nor
of their weak counterparts, also presented here).15
A.3 Strongly Millian Quantiﬁed Modal Logics
A.3.1 Languages
The language PL contains ‘¬’ and ‘∧’ as logical constants, and P 00 , P 01 , P 02 . . . , as 0-ary predicate
letters. Formulas are constructed in the usual manner. The constants ‘∨’, ‘→’ and ‘↔’ are deﬁned as
expected. PL2 is the language that results from adding the logical constant ‘2’ to PL (with ‘3’ being
deﬁned in the usual manner), and PL@2 results from adding ‘@’ to PL2.
The languageFL contains the ﬁrst-order variablesx1, x2, . . ., the individual constants s0, s1, s2, . . .,




2 , . . .. The logical constants of the
language are those of PL, as well as ‘∀’ (‘∃’ is deﬁned in the usual manner) and ‘=’. By adding ‘2’ to
FL one obtains the language FL2, and by adding ‘@’ to FL one obtains the language FL@2.





2 , . . .. The languages SL2 and SL@2 are obtained in the expected manner.
Finally, by adding the variable-binding operator λ to FL one obtains the language FLλ, and by
adding λ to FL@2 one obtains the language FL@2λ. Similarly for language SL. Given a formula ϕ,
λv1 . . . vn(ϕ) is an n-ary complex predicate. When n = 0 the result is λ(ϕ), a well-formed 0-ary
complex predicate.
15Some discussion on the semantics of open formulae is pursued in section A.6 as a way of contrasting strongly Millian
logics with related proposals in the literature.
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Given a language L, Const(L) is the set of individual constants of L, V ar(L) is the set of
individual variables of L, and Terms(L) = Const(L) ∪ V ar(L). Furthermore, Predn(L) is the
set of n-ary predicates of L, for each n ∈ N0, Pred(L) =
⋃
n∈N0 Pred
n(L), and CPredn(L) is
the set of n-ary complex predicates of L, for each n ∈ N0. The set SV arn(L) is the set of n-ary








Finally, Form(L) is the set of formulas of L and CForm(L) is the set of closed formulas of L.
The following metalinguistic variables are used: ‘a’, ‘a′’,. . . range over Const(L); ‘ζn’, ‘ζ ′n’, . . .
range over Predn(L), for each n ∈ N0; ‘ v’, v′, . . . range over V ar(L); ‘ V n’, V ′n, . . . range
over SV arn(L), for each n ∈ N0; ‘t’, ‘t′’, . . . range over Terms(L); ‘τn’, ‘τ ′n’, . . . range over
STermsn(L); ‘ϕ’, ‘γ’, ‘ψ’ and ‘χ’ range over Form(L); ‘Γ’, ‘Γ′’, ‘θ’ range over subsets of Form(L).
Sometimes ‘ϕ’, ‘γ’, ‘ψ’ and ‘χ’ are also used as metalinguistic variables ranging over the set comprising
all formulas, terms and second-order terms of L.
The formal languages being offered will be used with the presumption that their logical expressions
are meaningful, and that their non-logical expressions, if used meaningfully, have certain semantic
properties. The intended meaning of ¬ and ∧ is their customary, boolean, meaning. The logical
constant ∀ is intended to express unrestricted universal quantiﬁcation,= expresses the identity relation
(between individuals) and 2 is intended to express metaphysical necessity. As advertised, individual
constants are understood as strongly Millian expressions. The same stance is taken towards n-ary
predicate letters. Whereas individual constants refer to individuals, n-ary predicate letters refer to
n-ary relations.
The connective @ is understood as standing for an actuality operator. There are two salient
readings of this operator, namely, a context-dependent reading and a context-independent reading.
Both readings can be elucidated by appealing to talk of contexts and possible worlds. Brieﬂy, according
to the context-dependent reading, a formula of the form@ϕ is true at a context c and possible world u if
and only if ϕ is true at c andwc, the possible world of context c. According to the context-independent
reading of this operator, @ϕ is true at a context c and possible world u if and only if ϕ is true at c and
α, where α is a context-independent expression that refers to this world, i.e, α refers to the world
which, according to some possible worlds’ theorists, is adequately described as the maximal way things
are.
In order to distinguish these two readings, consider the following sentence: ‘If Plato had been
Aristotle’s disciple, then an utterance of the sentence “actually, Plato was Aristotle’s disciple,” with the
sentence being used with its current meaning, would then have been true.’
If ‘actually,’ as mentioned in the sentence, is understood as a context-dependent expression, then
the sentence is true. However, if the relevant reading is the context-independent one, then the sentence
is false. The reason is that even if the sentence ‘actually, Plato was Aristotle’s disciple’ had been used




According to the stance on the model-theoretic semantics for a language adopted here a language’s
model-theoretic semantics is a model of the (real) semantics for that language.16 Thus, the aim of the
model-theoretic semantics proposed here is to represent several aspects of the (real) semantics of the
target languages. The representational signiﬁcance of several aspects of the model-theoretic semantics
offered are noted during their presentation.
I begin by deﬁning the notions of a inhabited model structure and of a inhabited second-order
model structure.
Deﬁnition 1 (Inhabited Model Structures).
• An inhabited model structure is a triple 〈W,d, α〉, where α ∈W , and d is a function with domain
W which assigns to every w ∈W a set, and which is such that ⋃
w∈W
d(w) 6= ∅.
• Let 〈W,d, α〉 be any inhabited model structure. Then, 〈W,d,D, α〉 is an inhabited second-order
model structure, where:
– D is a function with domain N0 and mapping each n ∈ N0 to a functionD(n) with domain
W and such that, for every w ∈W ,D(n)(w) ⊆ F (n), where:
* F (n) is the set of all functions f with domain W and such that, for each w ∈ W ,
f(w) ⊆ (d(w))n.
Unsurprisingly, the setW represents the class of all metaphysically possible worlds, α represents
the actual world, d is a function which maps each w ∈W to a set that represents the domain of all
individuals that exist in the possible world represented by w, andD is a function which maps each
natural number n and w ∈W to a set that represents the domain of all n-ary relations that exist in w.
For each function f ∈ D(n)(w) (for each n ∈ N0 andw ∈W ), the set f(w′) of n-ary sequences
of elements in d(w′) (for each w′ ∈ W ) represents the set of sequences of individuals that would
have been in the relation represented by f if the possible world represented by w′ had obtained.
The fact that each function f inD(n)(w) hasW as its domain is also representationally signiﬁcant.
Since the present interest is on relations understood to be identical if and only if they are necessarily
coextensive, taking the elements of each setD(n)(w) to be functions withW as their domain is the
natural option.
Finally, the fact that for each f ∈ D(n)(w), f(w′) ⊆ (d(w′))n is itself representationally
signiﬁcant. It represents the assumption that necessarily, standing in some relation requires existence.
Thus, there is no sequence in f(w′) containing elements which are not in d(w′), since otherwise the
sequence would (wrongly) represent the putative fact that if the world represented by w′ had obtained,
then the relation represented by f would have obtained between some individuals that would not then
exist (i.e., would not exist in the world represented by w′).
We are now in a position to deﬁne the class of weaklyMillian models.
16This picture of model-theoretic semantics is endorsed in, for instance, (Shapiro, 1991, p. 6).
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Deﬁnition 2 (Weakly Millian Models (W-Models)). Where 〈W,d,D, α〉 is an inhabited second-order
model structure,M = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉 is a weakly Millian model, aW-model, based on 〈W,d,D, α〉
for language L, where V is a function with domain Const(L) ∪ Pred(L) such that:
1. for every individual constant a of L, V (a) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
d(w);
2. for every n-ary predicate ζn of L, V (ζn) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
D(n)(w).17
The setW is deﬁned as follows: W = {M :M is aW-model}.
The usual notions of a variable-assignment and variable-assignment variant are now deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 3 (Variable Assignments ofW-models). A variable-assignment g of aW-modelM based on
an inhabited second-order model structure 〈W,d,D, α〉 is any function with domain V ar(L)∪SV ar(L)
and such that:
1. for every individual constant v, g(v) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
d(w);
2. for every n-ary second-order variable V n, g(V n) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
D(n)(w);
Deﬁnition 4 (Variable-Assignment Variant). Let g be a variable-assignment. The function g[V/o] is
a function just like g except that it assigns the object o to the variable V ∈ V ar(L) ∪ SV ar(L) if the
variable V is in the domain of g. Otherwise, g[V/o] = g.
The set As(M) is the set of variable-assignments of modelM . The value in aW-modelM of a
term or formula relative to w ∈W and g ∈ As(M) is deﬁned thus:
Deﬁnition 5 (Value of a term or formula).
1. If ϕ = a ∈ Const(L), then V gM,w(a) = V (a);
2. If ϕ = ζn ∈ Predn(L), then V gM,w(ζn) = V (ζn)(w);
3. If ϕ = v ∈ V ar(L), then V gM,w(v) = g(v);
4. If ϕ = τnt1 . . . tn, then V
g
M,w(ϕ) = {〈〉 : 〈V gM,w(t1), . . . , V gM,w(tn)〉 ∈ V gM,w(τn)};18
5. If ϕ = ¬ψ, then V gM,w(ϕ) = {〈〉} − V gM,w(ψ);
6. If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ, then V gM,w(ϕ) = V gM,w(ψ) ∩ V gM,w(χ);
7. If ϕ = 2ψ, then V gM,w(ϕ) = ⋂
w∈W
V gM,w(ψ);
8. If ϕ = @ψ, then V gM,w(ϕ) = V
g
M,α(ψ);






10. If ϕ = λv1 . . . vn(ψ), then V
g
M,w(ϕ) = {〈o1, . . . , on〉 : V g[v1/o1]...[vn/on]M,w (ψ) = {〈〉}};
11. If ϕ is an n-ary predicate variable V n, then V gM,w(ϕ) = g(V
n)(w)
17One could also deﬁne the usual notion of a model 〈W,d, α, V 〉 for L based on an inhabited structure 〈W,d, α〉 by
taking V to be a function such that: i) for every individual constant a of L, V (a) ∈ ⋃
w∈W
d(w), and, ii) to every n-ary
predicate ζn of L, V (ζn) is a function with domainW and such that, for every w ∈W , V (ζn)(w) ⊆ (d(w))n. It will be
simpler to appeal to just one notion of a model in what follows, even though it is easy to see how one can recover models
based on inhabited model structures from models based on second-order inhabited model structures.
18Note that here the convention has been followed of equating 〈〉, the empty sequence, with the empty set.
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Given the deﬁnition of value of ϕ in M relative to g ∈ As(M) and world w ∈ W , V gM (ϕ) is that
function f with domainW such that, for every w ∈W f(w) = V gM,w(ϕ).
We now deﬁne stronglyMillian models in terms of weakly Millian models:
Deﬁnition 6 (Strongly Millian Models (S-models)). A S-model is anyW-model such that:
1. for every individual constant a, V (a) ∈ d(α).
2. for n ∈ N0 and n-ary predicate ζn, V (ζn) ∈ D(n)(α).
The set S is deﬁned as follows: S = {M :M is a S-model}.
The fact that V (a) ∈ d(α) represents the fact that the individual constant a is being treated as a
strongly Millian expression, since the valuation function assigns to a an entity which belongs to the set
d(α), a set which represents the domain of individuals that exist in the actual world. Similarly, the fact
that V (ζn) ∈ D(n)(α) represents the fact that the n-ary predicate letter ζn has as its denotation an
n-ary relation that exists in the actual world, sinceD(n)(α) represents the domain of n-ary relations
that exist in the actual world. Each strongly Millian model is understood as a model of an admissible
interpretation of the non-logical expressions of the languages in question.
Now, say that an individual constant is free in ϕ if and only if it occurs in ϕ. Similarly for n-ary
predicate letters, for any natural number n. Consider the following clause:
13. If ϕ = λv1 . . . vn(ψ), then,
• for every w ∈W , if for everym ∈ N0, individual term t andm-ary term τm, if
– t is a variable or individual constant free in ϕ only if V gM (t) ∈ d(w), and
– ζm is a m-ary second-order variable or predicate letter free in ϕ only if V gM (ζ
m) ∈
D(m)(w),
then, V gM (ϕ) ∈ D(n)(w).
• If no individual constants, predicate letters and variables are free in ϕ, then V gM (ϕ) ∈ D(n)(w).
One can narrow the class of weak and strong Millian models by considering only those that satisfy
clause 13:
Deﬁnition 7 (WC- and SC-models). AWC-model (SC-model) is aW-model (S-model) whose valuation
function satisﬁes clause 13. WC = {M :M is aWC-model}, and SC = {M :M is a SC-model}.
The usual model-theoretic notions of truth in a model, validity in a model, satisﬁability and validity
are now deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 8 (Truth in aModel, Validity In aModel, Satisﬁability, Validity). LetI ∈ {W,WC,S,SC},
M ∈ I, L be any of the languages previously deﬁned, ϕ ∈ Form(L) and Γ ⊆ Form(L). Then:
• ϕ is generally true inM iff ∀w ∈W, g ∈ As(M), V gM,w(ϕ) = {〈〉}.
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• 〈Γ, ϕ〉 is IG-valid inM , Γ (MIG ϕ, iff ∀w ∈ W, g ∈ As(M): ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,w(γ) = {〈〉}) only if
V gM,w(ϕ) = {〈〉}.
• 〈Γ, ϕ〉 isIG-valid, Γ (IG ϕ, iff for allI-modelsM : Γ (MIG ϕ;
• ϕ isIG-valid, (IG ϕ, if and only if ∅ (IG ϕ
• Γ isIG-satisﬁable iff ∃I-modelM ,w ∈W and g ∈ As(M) ofM s. t. ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,w(γ) = {〈〉}).
• 〈Γ, ϕ〉 isIR-valid inM , Γ (MIR ϕ, if and only if ∀g ∈ As(M): ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}) only if
V gM,α(ϕ) = {〈〉}.
• 〈Γ, ϕ〉 isIR-valid, Γ (IR ϕ, iff for allI-modelsM : Γ (MIR ϕ.
• ϕ isIR-valid, (IR ϕ, if and only if ∅ (IR ϕ
• Γ isIR-satisﬁable iff ∃I-modelM and g ∈ As(M) s. t. ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}).
As is hopefully clear, the notions ofIG- andIR-validity are themselves models of the notions
of, respectively, general validity and real-world validity.
A.3.3 Deductive Systems
For each of the systems I to be discussed, ϕ is a theorem of the system, `I ϕ, if and only if, for
some n ∈ N, there is an n-sequence of formulas 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 such that ϕn = ϕ and either ϕi is an
axiom ofI or ϕi follows from previous formulas in the sequence by one of the rules of inference of
I, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n ∈ N. An argument having as premises the elements in Γ and conclusion ϕ is
deductively valid inI, Γ `I ϕ if and only if there is a ﬁnite Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that `I
∧
Γ′ → ϕ, where∧
Γ′ is any conjunction of the formulae in Γ′.
Now, deﬁne a 2-closure of a formula ϕ as a closed formula obtained by preﬁxing any (ﬁnite,
perhaps of length 0) string of ‘2’ to ϕ. The notion of a @-closure is deﬁned similary. Deﬁne a
∀-closure of ϕ as a closed formula obtained by preﬁxing any (ﬁnite) string of ‘∀v’ (for any variable
v ∈ V ar(L)), in any order, to ϕ, and a ∀2-closure of ϕ as a closed formula obtained by preﬁxing any
(ﬁnite) string of ‘∀v’ (for any v ∈ V ar(L)) and ‘∀V n’ (for any variable V n ∈ SV ar(L), n ∈ N0),
in any order, to ϕ. Similarly, deﬁne a @2-closure of a formula ϕ as a closed formula obtained by
preﬁxing any (ﬁnite) string of ‘2’ and ‘@’. Besides these notions, we will also make use of the notions
of a @∀-closure, @∀2-closure, a @2∀-closure, and a @2∀2-closure. These are deﬁned as expected.




(PL) All propositional tautologies










(∀1) ∀v(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀vϕ→ ∀vψ)
(∀2) ϕ→ ∀vϕ19
(∀E) Et→ (∀vϕ→ ϕvt )20
(3E) 3Et
(SA) τnt1 . . . tn → Eti
(∀=) ∀v(v = v)
(2=) t = t′ → 2(Et→ t = t′)
(Ind) t = t′ → (ϕ→ ϕ′)21
(∀@) @∀vϕ↔ @∀v@ϕ
[FSOL]
(S∀1) ∀V n(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀V nϕ→ ∀V nψ)
(S∀2) ϕ→ ∀V nϕ22
(S∀E) Eτn → (∀V nϕ→ ϕV nτn )
(S3E) 3Eζn
(SSA) τn1 = τ
n
2 → Eτni , i ∈ {1, 2}
(S∀=) ∀V n(V n = V n)
(S2=) τn = τ ′n → 2(Eτn → τn = τ ′n)
(SInd) τn = τ
′n → (ϕ→ ϕ′)23
(S∀@) @∀V nϕ↔ @∀V n@ϕ
Other Schemata
(CComp) Eϕ→ Eλv1 . . . vn(ϕ).
(G=) @(t = t).
(SG=) @(ζn = ζ
′n)
(R@) @ϕ→ ϕ
(R=) t = t
(SR=) ζn = ζ
′n
(EAb) λv1 . . . vn(ϕ)t1 . . . tn ↔ (ϕv1t1 . . .vntn ∧ Et1 ∧ . . . ∧ Etn).
Inference rule
(MP) `I ϕ→ ψ, `I ϕ⇒ `I ψ.
The rule (MP) is the only inference rule of all the systems to be presented in this section.
The theorems of the system S5 for PL2 consist in the smallest set containing every 2-closure
of every instance of every schema of [S5] and closed under (MP).24 The system S5A for PL@2,
presented in, e.g., (Davies & Humberstone, 1980), is obtained by augmenting the axioms of S5A
with every 2-closure of every instance of every schema in [Act]. Menzel’s (1991, §4) systemG for
FL2 is obtained by taking as an axiom any 2∀-closure of any instance of the schemas in [S5] and
[FFML] (except for the schema (∀@), since FL2 does not contain an actuality operator).25 By
adding any ∀-closure of (R=) to system G, one obtains the system A for FL2, also proposed in
19Where v is not free in ϕ.
20Provided that v is free for t in ϕ.
21Where ϕ′ is just like ϕ except that t′ replaces one or more (free) occurrences of t in ϕ.
22Where V n is not free in ϕ.
23Where ϕ′ is just like ϕ except that τ
′n replaces one or more (free) occurrences of τn in ϕ.
24Note that in this presentation of S5, the system does not contain the rule of necessitation. Necessitation is an admissible
rule of the system. This result is proved by an easy induction on the length of a derivation. The proof relies on the fact that
the 2-closure of an axiom is itself an axiom, and that every instance of (K) is an axiom.
25With the difference that no open formulas are theorems of the system just presented. This will be a feature of all the
systems to be presented.
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(Menzel, 1991, §4).26 The set of theorems ofG is the set ofWG-valid formulas of FL2, and the set
of theorems ofA is the set of SR-valid formulas of FL2.27
The analogues ofG andA for the case of second-order languages are now deﬁned. These are,
respectively, the systemsWGSL2 and SRSL2 . The names of these systems indicate their relationship
to the different sets of arguments distinguished model-theoretically in A.3.2, as well as the kind of
language for which the systems are given. Thus, the systemWGSL2 has as theorems precisely the set
ofWG-valid arguments (composed only of closed formulas) of SL2, and the system SRSL2 has as
theorems the set of SR-valid arguments (composed only of closed formulas) of language SL2.28 The
names of the remaining deductive systems to be presented in this section follow the same recipe.
Deﬁnition9 (Axioms ofWGSL2). Every2∀2-closure of every instance (inSL2) of [S5]∪[FFOL]∪
[FSOL] (except for the schema (∀@), since SL2 does not contain @).29
Deﬁnition 10 (Axioms ofSRSL2). Every2∀2-closure of every instance of [S5]∪[FFOL]∪[FSOL]
(except for the schema (∀@), since SL2 does not contain @). Every ∀2-closure of every instance in SL2
of (R=) and (SR=).
Given the system of nomenclatures just used, Menzel’s deductive system A is the same as the
system SRFL2 , andG is just the systemWGFL2 . Furthermore, we have that:
• WGFL2 =WRFL2 = SGFL2 (= G); • WGSL2 =WRSL2 = SGSL2 .
In effect, for any Γ ⊆ Form(FL2) and ϕ ∈ Form(FL2): Γ (WG ϕ⇔ Γ (WR ϕ⇔ Γ (SG ϕ.
That is, the notions of WG-validity, WR-validity and SG-validity all turn out to be extensionally
equivalent when the language in question is FL2.
However, by enriching the language with an actuality operator the extensional equivalence between
these three model-theoretic notions is broken. Thus,
I =WG I =WR I = SG I = SR
(I a = a × × × X
(I @(a = a) × × X X
(I @P → P × X × X
In what follows strongly Millian logics capturing the notions of general and real-world validity are
presented. Since the extensional equivalence between the notions ofWG-validity,WR-validity and
SG-validity is broken once an actuality operator is added to quantiﬁed modal languages, all the strongly
Millian quantiﬁed modal logics to be presented in the remaining of this section are formulated for
languages containing an actuality operator. The weakly Millian analogues of these logics are presented
in §A.9.1 of the appendix.
26Except that the systemA, likeG, also has open formulas as theorems.
27The proof can be found in (Menzel, 1991, §4).
28The completeness proof given in the appendix can easily be adapted to establish this fact.
29Reference to the language in the presentation of the remaining systems is omitted, since the target language can be
extracted from the name of the system.
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Deﬁnition 11 (Axioms of SGFL@2). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5] ∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every closed instance of (G=).
Deﬁnition 12 (Axioms of SRFL@2). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5] ∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every @∀-closure of every instance of both (R@) and (R=).
Deﬁnition 13 (Axioms of SGFL@2λ ). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every closed instance of (G=). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of
(EAb).
Deﬁnition 14 (Axioms of SRFL@2λ). Every@2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5]∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every @2∀-closure of every instance of (EAb). Every @∀-closure of every instance
of both (R@) and (R=).
Deﬁnition 15 (Axioms of SGSL@2). Every @∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5] ∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every closed instance of (G=) and (SG=).
Deﬁnition 16 (Axioms of SRSL@2). Every@2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5]∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every @∀2-closure of every instance (R@), (R=) and (SR =).
Deﬁnition 17 (Axioms of SGSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5]∪ [Act]∪ [FFOL]∪ [FSOL]. Every closed instance of (G=) and (SG=). Every@2∀2-closure
of every instance of (EAb).
Deﬁnition 18 (Axioms of SRSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every @∀2-closure of every instance (R@), (R=) and (SR =).
Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of (EAb).
Deﬁnition 19 (Axioms of SGCSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5]∪ [Act]∪ [FFOL]∪ [FSOL]. Every closed instance of (G=) and (SG=). Every@2∀2-closure
of every instance in L of (EAb). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of (CComp).
Deﬁnition 20 (Axioms of SRCSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every @∀2-closure of every instance (R@), (R=) and (SR =).
Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of (EAb). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of (CComp).
For any −G-system I necessitation is an admissible rule.30 That is, for every formula ϕ, `I
ϕ⇒`I 2ϕ.31 This is the desired result, since −G-systems purport to capture the notion of general
validity, and generally valid formulas are necessary. However, universal generalisation is not, in
general, admissible. In SG-systemsI formulated for languages with an actuality operator there are
formulas ϕ such that, for every individual constant a, `I ϕva, even though 6`I ∀vϕ. For instance, for
30By a −G-system we mean any of the systemsWGL, SGL,WGCL, SGCL, with L replaced by the appropriate
language.
31See footnote 24 for a sketch of the proof.
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every individual constant a, `SGFL@2 @Ea, even though it is also the case that 6`SGFL@2 ∀x@Ex.
Similarly, in SG-systems for second-order modal languages (with @) there are formulas ϕ such that
`I ϕV nζn for every n-ary predicate ζn, even though 6`I ∀V nϕV
n
ζn . For instance, for every n-ary
predicate letter ζn, `SL@2 @Eζn, even though 6`SGSL@2 ∀V
n@EV n.
Despite the fact that the rule of universal generalisation is not admissible in all −G-systems, a
related rule is. According to this rule, if ϕva is a theorem, then @∀vϕ is a theorem. Call this rule
‘actual generalisation’. Similarly, in −G-systems for second-order modal languages (with @), if ϕV nζn is
a theorem, then @∀V nϕ is a theorem.32 For instance, not only is it the case that `I @Ea for every
SG-systemI, it is also the case that `I @∀v@Ev.
As expected, the rule of necessitation is not admissible in −R-systems. For instance, for every
−R-system I, `I @P → P , even though 6`I 2(@P → P ). Furthermore, the following is also
an interesting counterexample to necessitation, namely, `I Ea, even though 6`I 2Ea. Insofar as
−R-systems purport to capture the notion of real-world validity, the non-admissibility of the rule of
necessitation should be expected: real-world validity does not require necessary truth. However, uni-
versal generalisation and actual generalisation are both admissible rules in every one of the−R-systems
presented here.
A.3.4 Soundness and Completeness
We are now in a position to state the relevant result concerning the logics just presented. Let L be any
one of FL2, FL@2, FL@2λ, SL2, SL@2, SL@2λ. Also, letM ∈ {W,S}, Γ ⊆ Form(L), and
ϕ ∈ Form(L). Then:33
Theorem 3 (Soundness and Completeness of Weak and Strong Millian Logics). For every closed set
of formulae Γ of L and closed formula ϕ of L:
Γ (MG ϕ iff Γ `MGL ϕ
Γ (MGC ϕ iff Γ `MGCSL@2λ ϕ
Γ (MR ϕ iff Γ `MRL ϕ
Γ (MRC ϕ iff Γ `MRCSL@2λ ϕ
In the appendix we prove that Γ (SRC ϕ iff Γ `SRCSL@2λ ϕ. The remaining proofs are quite similar,
and simpler.
This concludes the presentation of strongly Millian logics. In the next section it is shown that
every theorem of classical quantiﬁed logic, or every formula that results from preﬁxing each theorem
of classical quantiﬁed logic with @, is a theorem of the strongly Millian logics just characterised. It is
also shown that strongly Millian logics are conservative, in the sense of §A.1.
32This can be proved by induction on the length of a derivation. The tricky cases are the base cases involving axioms
(@=) and (S@=) (for the case of SG-systems). But @∀v(v = v), for each variable v, is an axiom of every −G-system,
from which@∀v@(v = v) follows, by an instance of (∀@) and an application of (MP). Similarly,@∀V n(V n = V n), for
each variable V n, is an axiom of every −G-system, from which @∀V n@(V n = V n) follows, by an instance of (S∀@)
and an application of (MP).
33These results also hold for the weak analogues — presented in the appendix — of the strongly Millian logics characterised
in this section.
207
A.4 Strongly Millian Logics: ‘Classical’ and Conservative
I will begin by deﬁning the notions of a classical inhabited model structure and a classical inhabited
second-order model structure.34
Deﬁnition 21 (Classical Inhabited Structure).
• A classical inhabited model structure is an inhabited model structure in whichW = {α};
• A classical inhabited second-order model structure is an inhabited second-order model structure in
whichW = {α};
Deﬁnition 22 (Classical Models (Cl-models)). A Cl-modelM is any S-modelM based on a classical
inhabited second-order model structure.
Later on call classical models will be called Henkin models, even though, traditionally, Henkin
models do not possess the elementsW and α. Finally, ClC-models are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 23 (ClC-models). A ClC-model M is any SC-model M based on a classical inhabited
second-order model structure.
Deﬁnition 24 (Truth in a Model, Validity In a Model, Satisﬁability, Validity). LetM ∈ I, where
I ∈ {Cl,ClC}, L be any of the languages FL, FLλ, SL, SLλ. Also, let ϕ ∈ Form(L) and
Γ ⊆ Form(L). Then:
• 〈Γ, ϕ〉 isI-valid, Γ (I ϕ, if and only if for allI-modelsM , g ∈ As(M): ∀γ ∈ Γ V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}
only if V gM,α(ϕ) = {〈〉};
• ϕ isI-valid, (I ϕ, if and only if ∅ (I ϕ;
• Γ isI-satisﬁable iff ∃I-modelM , and g ∈ As(M) ofM s. t. ∀γ ∈ Γ V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}.
We are now in a position to deﬁne the deductive systems of classical ﬁrst- and second-order logic.
Consider the following sets of schemata, and inference rules:
[FOL]
(PL) Every propositional tautology
(∀0) ∀vϕ→ ϕva35
(∀1) ∀v(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀vϕ→ ∀vψ)
(∀2) ϕ→ ∀vϕ36
(=I) a = a
(Ind) a = a′ → (ϕ→ ϕ′)37
[SOL]
34A slightly different presentation of the model-theory is given here, to highlight its continuity with the model-theory of
strongly Millian logics.
35Where t is free for v in ϕ, and ϕva results from replacing every free occurrence of v in ϕ by a.
36Where v is not free in ϕ.
37Where ϕ is an atomic formula and ϕ′ is just like ϕ except that a′ replaces one or more occurrences of a in ϕ.
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(S∀0) ∀V nϕ→ ϕV nτn 38
(S∀1) ∀V n(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀V nϕ→ ∀V nψ)
(S∀2) ϕ→ ∀V nϕ39
Other Schemata
(Ab) λv1 . . . vn(ϕ)a1, . . . , an ↔ ϕv1a1 . . .vnan .
Inference Rules
(MP) `I ϕ→ ψ,`I ϕ⇒`I
ψ
(UG) `I ϕva ⇒`I ∀vϕ
(SUG) `I ϕV nζn ⇒`I ∀V nϕ
The different systems of classical quantiﬁed logic are characterised thus:
Deﬁnition 25 (Axioms and Inference Rules ofClFL). Any closed formula of FL that is an instance
of any schema in [FOL] is an axiom ofClFL. The inference rules ofClFL are (MP) and (UG).
Deﬁnition 26 (Axioms and Inference Rules ofClFLλ). Any closed formula ofFLλ that is an instance
of any schema in [FOL], or is an instance of (Ab) is an axiom ofClFLλ . The inference rules ofClFLλ
are (MP) and (UG).
Deﬁnition 27 (Axioms and Inference Rules ofClSL). Any closed formula of SL that is an instance
of any schema in [FOL] or is an instance of [SOL] is an axiom ofClSL. The inference rules ofClSL
are (MP), (UG) and (SUG).
Deﬁnition 28 (Axioms and Inference Rules ofClSLλ). Any closed formula of SLλ that is an instance
of any schema in [FOL] ∪ [SOL] or is an instance of (Ab) is an axiom ofClSLλ . The inference rules
ofClSLλ are (MP), (UG) and (SUG).
Where Γ is any subset of closed formulas and ϕ is any formula (of the relevant language), the
following obtains:
Γ `ClFL ϕ⇔ Γ (Cl ϕ;
Γ `ClFLλ ϕ⇔ Γ (Cl ϕ;
Γ `ClSL ϕ⇔ Γ (Cl ϕ;
Γ `ClSLλ ϕ⇔ Γ (ClC ϕ.
The relevant results connecting strongly Millian logics and classical quantiﬁed logic may now be
presented.
Theorem 4. Let @Γ = {@ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. Then:
(i) ∀Γ ⊆ Form(FL), ϕ ∈ Form(FL): Γ `ClFL ϕ⇔ @Γ `SGFL@2 @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRFL@2 ϕ;
(ii) ∀Γ ⊆ Form(FLλ),ϕ ∈ Form(FLλ): Γ `ClFLλ ϕ⇔ @Γ `SGFL@2λ @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRFL@2λ
ϕ;
(iii) ∀Γ ⊆ Form(SL), ϕ ∈ Form(SL): Γ `ClSL ϕ⇔ @Γ `SGSL@2 @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRSL@2 ϕ;
38Where τn is free for V n in ϕ, and ϕV
n
τn results from replacing every free occurrence of V
n in ϕ by τn.
39Where V n is not free in ϕ.
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(iv) ∀Γ ⊆ Form(SLλ), ϕ ∈ Form(SLλ): Γ `ClSLλ ϕ⇔ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRCSL@2λ
ϕ.
In the appendix a proof of item (iv) of theorem 4 is offered.
The strongly Millian logics here proposed are all conservative. This result follows from the fact
that SRCSL@2λ is conservative, since this is the strongest of the strongly Millian logics that have been
presented.
The conservativeness of SRCSL@2λ is established by appealing to theorem 3 and presenting a
SC-modelM = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉 of which all of the following claims hold:
Counter (BF) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(3∃x(@¬Ex)) = {〈〉} and V gM,α(∃x(3@¬Ex)) = ∅;
Counter (CBF) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(∃x(3¬Ex)) = {〈〉} and V gM,α(3∃x(¬Ex)) = ∅;
Counter (NNE) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(2∀x(2Ex)) = ∅;
Counter (BFM) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(3∃X(@¬EX)) = {〈〉} and V gM,α(∃X3(@¬EX)) =
∅;
Counter (CBFM) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(∃X(3¬EX)) = {〈〉} and V gM,α(3∃X(¬EX)) = ∅;
Counter (NNEM) ∃g ∈ As(M) s. t. V gM,α(2∀X(2EX)) = ∅;
A SC-model satisfying all of the above claims is now presented. In the appendix it is shown that
the model offered indeed satisﬁes all of these claims, and that it is indeed a SC-model.
LetW = {1, 2, 3}, d be a function with domainW and such that ∀w ∈W : d(w) = {0w}. Let
Π be the set of all permutations pi ofW ∪ ⋃
w∈W
d(w) such that:
• pi|W is a permutation ofW
• pi| ⋃
w∈W




• ∀w ∈W (d(pi(w)) = {pi(o) : o ∈ d(w))}.
For eachn ∈ N0, if d = 〈o1, . . . on〉 ∈ (
⋃
w∈W
d(w))n andpi ∈ Π, then, letpi(d) = 〈pi(o1), . . . , pi(on)〉.
Also, for each n ∈ N0, if f ∈ F (n), then let pi(f) be that function with domainW and such that,
for every w ∈ W , pi(f)(pi(w)) = pi(f(w)).40 Finally, let Πw = {pi ∈ Π : pi(w) = w and ∀o ∈
d(w)(pi(o) = o)}.
The relevant model M = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉 is now deﬁned. The sets W and d are the ones
previously deﬁned, and α = 1. Furthermore:
• ∀n ∈ N0 : D(n)(w) = {f ∈ F (n) : ∀pi ∈ Πw(pi(f) = f)};
• ∀a ∈ Const(SL@2λ) : V (a) = 01;
• ∀ζn ∈ Predn(SL@2λ)∀w ∈W : V (ζn)(w) = (d(w))n
Since M satisﬁes all of Counter (BF), Counter (CBF), Counter (NNE), Counter (BFM),
Counter (CBFM) and Counter (NNEM), andM is a SC-model, the logic SRCSL@2λ is conservative,
by theorem 3.
40Recall that F (n) is the set of all functions f with domainW and such that, for each w ∈W , f(w) ⊆ (d(w))n.
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A fortiori, all the strongly Millian logics presented here are conservative. Combining these two
results, it is seen that the strongly Millian logics presented here are conservative and capture the actual
truth of the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic.
What should be concluded with respect to conservative systems of classical quantiﬁed modal logic
which fail to sanction several theorems of classical logic? On the model-theoretic side, these systems
do not treat individual constants as strongly Millian expressions. The reason is that the model-theoretic
treatment given to individual constants is such that the valuation function of some models assigns to
some of these expressions elements that do not belong to the domain of the actual world. However,
this fact may not be that signiﬁcant. If the quantiﬁed modal language lacks an actuality operator, and
the target notion of validity is that of general validity, then there is no way of capturing the fact that
the theorems of classical logic are all true in the actual world, even if individual constants are only
assigned to elements in d(α).
In any case, the fact that all theorems of classical logic are true in the actual world is captured by
the strongly Millian logics offered. An interesting feature of these logics is that the actual truth of the
theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic can be captured without appealing to real-world validity (even
though, as shown, it can be captured by appealing to real-world validity). Their actual truth can also
be captured by appealing to general validity, as long as the expressive resources of the language are
augmented (in particular, this can be done once the actuality operator @ is added to the language, as
shown here). Thus, the desire to have a conservative and yet ‘classical’ quantiﬁed modal logic should
not immediately lead to views such as the view that logical truths are not necessary, or the view that
the ‘correct’ conception of validity is that of real-world validity. Even theorists who hold that every
logical truth is necessary have a ‘classical’ quantiﬁed modal logic available to them (in the scope of an
actuality operator).
This concludes the ﬁrst part of the paper. The second part has three aims: i) to show a possible
application of strongly Millian logics for second-order modal languages to a current debate in the
metaphysics of modality, ii) to compare strongly Millian logics to two other proposals in the literature,
and iii) to address the question whether the strongly Millian logics for second-order modal languages
that have been proposed are really second-order.
A.5 Comprehension Principles for Second-Order Modal Logic
Necessitism is the thesis that necessarily every individual necessarily exists, a thesis captured by
formula (NNE). Contingentism, the contradictory of necessitism, is the thesis that there could have
been some individuals that could have failed to exist. Despite the controversial status of necessitism,
the thesis has been recently defended by Linsky & Zalta (1994, 1996) and Williamson (1998,
2013). Necessitism and contingentism have higher-order analogues. Higher-order necessitism and
higher-order contingentism are, respectively, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity
necessarily exists, and the thesis that there could have been some higher-order entity that could have
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failed to exist.41
A recent defence of higher-order necessitism is given in (Williamson, 2013, ch. 6). The defence is
based on an argument for the weaker thesis that necessarily every property necessarily exists, regimented
by formula (NNEM). Williamson’s argument for (NNEM) is considered in the present section. The
main goal of what follows is that of showing that by appealing to strongly Millian second-order modal
logics higher-order contingentists can avail themselves of extra resources for rejecting the cogency of
Williamson’s argument for (NNEM).
Let a2∀2-closure of a formula ϕ be a closed formula resulting from preﬁxing ϕ with any sequence
of2, ∀v (for any individual variable v) and ∀V n (for any n-ary second-order variable V n and n ∈ N0),
in any order, to ϕ. Consider the following comprehension principle for second-order modal logic:
(CompM) ∃X2∀x(Xx↔ ϕ).
The variableX is not free in ϕ, and every2∀2-closure of any instance of (CompM) is itself an instance
of (CompM).
Note that the formula (NNEM), repeated below,
(NNEM) 2∀X(2∃Y (2∀x(Xx↔ Y x))), i.e., 2∀X(2EX),
is an instance of (CompM). One of the premises of Williamson’s defence of the truth of (NNEM)
is precisely the fact that (NNEM) is one of the instances of (CompM). Williamson argues that the
addition, to a modal and second-order deductive system friendly to opponents of (NNEM), of any
set of (natural and sufficiently general) comprehension principles weaker than (CompM) results in a
system that is ‘too weak for reasonable logical and mathematical purposes’ (Williamson, 2013, p. 288).
He thus takes the strength of (CompM) as providing abductive reason to accept the truth of every
one of (CompM)’s instances. A fortiori, the strength of (CompM) gives abductive reason to accept
the truth of (NNEM).
Even thoughWilliamson does not give an explicit characterisation of the deductive system friendly
to the opponents of (NNEM) that he has in mind, it is reasonable to assume that this system is
some subsystem of the deductive systemWGFL2 , if attention is restricted to formulas without free
occurrences of variables. The reason is that the class of models singled out in (Williamson, 2013, p.
278) seems to be the class ofW-models.42 Let me thus focus on the systemWGFL2 .
The strongest set of comprehension principles friendly to the higher-order contingentist considered
by Williamson is the set comprising the following two principles:
(CompMC) Eϕ→ ∃X2∀x(Xx↔ ϕ).
41In the present context, higher-order entities are n-ary relations, (for each natural number n), relations between n-ary
relations, relations between n-ary relations and individuals, relations between individuals and relations that hold between
n-ary relations and individuals, and so on.
42Williamson only explicitly deﬁnes the function yielding, for each w ∈W , the ‘domain of properties’ in w. However,
he does say that ‘We can ignore higher-order types and polyadic relations since extending the models to them is a routine
exercise’ (Williamson, 2013, p. 278). The extension of the models to polyadic relations would yield the class ofW-models.
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Here,X is not free in ϕ and every 2∀2-closure of any instance of (CompMC) is itself an instance of
(CompMC)
(Comp−M) ∃X∀x(Xx↔ ϕ).
Here,X is not free in ϕ and every 2∀2-closure of any instance of (Comp−M) is itself an instance of
(Comp−M).
Williamson argues that not even the addition of this set of comprehension principles to the
deductive systemWGFL2 results in a system sufficiently strong for the purposes of theoretical
inquiry. According to him, the resulting deductive system is not sufficiently strong for the application
of certain general assumptions made in the context of what he calls ‘second-order modal mathematics’.
Williamson shows this by considering an exemplary assumption made in the context of second-
order modal mathematics. Say that y is a modal upper bound of propertyX , under ordering ≤, if and
only if necessarily, for every x, if x hasX , then it could have been the case that x ≤ y. That is, y is a
‘modal upper bound’ of propertyX , under ordering ≤, if and only if 2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y).
Also, say that y is a modal least upper bound of propertyX under ordering ≤ if and only if i) y is a
modal upper bound of X under ≤, and ii) necessarily, for every z, if z is a modal upper bound of
X under ≤, then it could have been the case that y ≤ z. That is, y is a modal least upper bound of
propertyX under ordering≤ if and only if 2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y)∧2∀z(2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ z)→
3y ≤ z))). Consider the assumption that necessarily, for every propertyX , ifX could have had a
modal upper bound under ≤, thenX could have had a modal least upper bound under ≤, captured
by the following formula:43
(MCP) 2∀X(3∃y2∀x(Xx → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(Xx → 3x ≤ y) ∧ 2∀z(2∀x(Xx →
3x ≤ z)→ 3y ≤ z))).
Williamson argues thus:
‘Now the assumption [(MCP)] serves its intended purpose only if it can be properly
applied. More speciﬁcally, from [(MCP)] we must be able to derive any instance of
[(MCPi)], by plugging in the formula [ϕ] in place of Xx (where ϕ may contain x but not
y or z free):
(MCPi) 3∃y2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) ∧ 2∀z(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ z) →
3y ≤ z)), where y and z do not occur free in ϕ.
But in general to derive [(MCPi)] from [(MCP)] we need something like (CompM), to
provide a property over which the second-order quantiﬁer ranges necessarily coextensive
with [ϕ]. Indeed, we need something like the full modal closure of (CompM) to derive
[(MCPi)] from [(MCP)] in modal contexts for all parameters. We could have reached
43Following Williamson, ‘it does not matter whether u ≤ v stands for an atomic formula or a complex one’ (Williamson,
2013, p. 286). It may just abbreviate a formula in which the variables, x, y, and x, z, respectively, occur free.
213
the same conclusion by considering many other ways of applying second-order modal
mathematics. But what guarantee has the contingentist that there even could be a property
necessarily coextensive with [ϕ]? For example, the parameters in [ϕ] may not be all
compossible; informally, it may be impossible for all the relevant objects to be together
(Williamson, 2013, p. 287).’
Two requirements on the strength of a set of comprehension principles, relative to a deductive
systemD, are alluded to in this passage. The ﬁrst is the requirement that any instance of (MCPi) be
derivable, inD, from the set of premises containing (MCP) and all instances of all the comprehension
principles in S. Call this requirement the applicability requirement. The second requirement is
connected to Williamson’s talk of ‘modal contexts’. One way to spell out the requirement is as the
requirement that any 2∀2-closure of the following schema, (MCP−MCPi) be derivable, inD from
the set of all instances of all the comprehension principles in S:
(MCP−MCPi) 2∀X(3∃y2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3∃y(2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y)∧2∀z(2∀x(Xx→
3x ≤ z)→ 3y ≤ z)))→
→ 3∃y2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) ∧ 2∀z(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ z) →
3y ≤ z)), where y and z do not occur free in ϕ.
The appeal to 2∀2-closures accommodates both the ‘modal contexts’ mentioned by Williamson and
his use of free variables, which are banned in the present context. Call this second requirement the
modal applicability requirement.
As shown in the appendix of (Williamson, 2013, ch. 6), the applicability and modal applicability
requirements are not satisﬁed, relative to the deductive systemWGFL2 , by the set comprising the
comprehension principles (CompMC) and (Comp
−
M). Williamson concludes from this fact that the
opponent of (NNEM) does not have available a set of natural and sufficiently general comprehension
principles yielding a reasonable deductive system strong enough for the practice of second-order
modal mathematics. As he puts it, replacing (CompM) with (CompMC) and (Comp
−
M) ‘prevents
second-order logic from adequately serving the logical and mathematical purposes for which we need
it’ (Williamson, 2013, p. 288).
Williamson takes this fact as providing abductive reason to accept the truth of every instance of
(CompM) and, a fortiori, of (NNEM). Since similar arguments can be run for analogues of (CompM)
of every type, the weakness of the comprehension principles available to the higher-order contingentist
constitutes abductive reason to accept the truth of higher-order necessitism.
Strongly Millian second-order modal logics offer the higher-order contingentist extra resources for
resisting Williamson’s abductive argument. One strategy available to the higher-order contingentist
involves establishing the following two claims:
(A) There are natural and reasonable deductive systems stronger thanWGFL2 which are friendly
to the higher-order contingentist and furthermore satisfy the applicability requirement (or an
actualised version of it).
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(B) We have no good reason to accept the truth of every2∀2-closure of every instance of (MCP−MCPi).
If true, (A) shows that the fact that the applicability requirement is not satisﬁed by the system
WGFL2 does not provide evidence for the view that higher-order contingentists do not have available
second-order modal logics that are both strong and reasonable. However, by itself, (A) does not suffice
to block Williamson’s argument. If one grants the truth of every 2∀2-closure of (MCP−MCPi),
then the higher-order contingentist incurs the burden of ﬁnding a reasonable deductive system of
second-order modal logic friendly to higher-order contingentists and which has every 2∀2-closure
of every instance of (MCP−MCPi) as a theorem. Thus, either higher-order contingentists offer
such a deductive system, or else they must reject the truth of every 2∀2-closure of every instance of
(MCP−MCPi).
There are strongly Millian logics which satisfy the applicability requirement (or a requirement quite
close to it) and yet fail to satisfy the modal applicability requirement. Given the availability of these
logics, the option of rejecting the truth of every 2∀2-closure of (MCP−MCPi) seems promising.
We thus focus on the strategy for replying to Williamson which involves establishing claims (A) and
(B).
Consider ﬁrst the following lemma:
Lemma 15. For any formula ϕ whose only free variable is, at most, V n, and any formula ψ whose only
free variables are, at most, v1, . . . , vn:44
(i) (CompMC), 2∀V nϕ `SGSL@2λ @ϕV nλv1...vn(ψ);
(ii) (CompMC), 2∀V nϕ `SRSL@2λ ϕV nλv1...vn(ψ).
The following corollary shows that once the assumption that individual variables and n-ary predicate
letters are Millian expressions is taken seriously a result close to the applicability requirement is
available to the opponent of NNEM.
Corollary 3. For any formula ϕ whose free variables are at most x:
(i) (CompMC), (MCP) `SGSL@2λ @(3∃y2∀x(λx(ϕ)x→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3∃y(2∀x(λx(ϕ)x→3x ≤ y) ∧2∀z(2∀x(λx(ϕ)x→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3y ≤ z)));
(ii) (CompMC), (MCP) `SRSL@2λ 3∃y2∀x(λx(ϕ)x → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(λx(ϕ)x →3x ≤ y) ∧2∀z(2∀x(λx(ϕ)x→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3y ≤ z)).
Corollary 3 is an instance of lemma 15. From corollary 3 (by appealing to schema (EAb)) it follows
that:
Corollary 4. For any formula ϕ whose free variables are at most x:
(i) (CompMC), (MCP) `SGSL@2λ @(3∃y2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤
y) ∧2∀z(2∀x(ϕ→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3y ≤ z)));
44Recall that the systems SGSL@2λ and SRSL@2λ contain no formulae with free variables as theorems. Item (i) of
Lemma 15 is proved by appealing to axioms (2@2), (@K), (S∀E), (Eab), (A=) and (SA=). Item (ii) of Lemma 15 is
proved by appealing to axioms (2@2), (@K), (S∀E), (Eab), (R=), (SR=) and (R@).
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(ii) (CompMC), (MCP) `SRSL@2λ 3∃y2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤
y) ∧2∀z(2∀x(ϕ→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3y ≤ z)).
Arguably, corollaries 3 and 4 show that the applicability requirement is met by the comprehension
principle (CompMC) with respect to the logics SGSL@2λ and SRSL@2λ . These results establish
claim (A).
The modal applicability requirement is not satisﬁed by the set whose comprehension principles
are (CompMC) and (Comp
−
M). That is, it is not the case that all2∀2-closures of (MCP−MCPi) are




45 Thus, an appropriate reply to Williamson’s argument for (CompM)
requires more than just the appeal to the deductive strength of the strongly Millian logics SGSL@2λ
and SRSL@2λ . That is, a successful reply to Williamson’s abductive argument for (NNEM) based on
the strength of the strongly Millian logics SGSL@2λ and SRSL@2λ requires establishing claim (B).
Williamson offers no consideration in favour of the truth of every 2∀2-closure of every instance
of (MCP−MCPi). Arguably, this makes Williamson’s argument less than satisfactory. The reason is
that the most natural defence of the claim that every2∀2-closure of every instance of (MCP−MCPi)
is true is unavailable to him.
To see this, note that the natural reason for supporting the truth of every 2∀2-closure of every
instance of (MCP−MCPi) consists in pointing out that all of these formulae are also 2∀2-closures
of instances of a more general schema, namely, the following:
(2S∀0) 2∀Xϕ→ ϕ
The problem, in the present context, with such a defence of the claim that every 2∀2-closure of every
instance of (MCP−MCPi) is true is that higher-order contingentists simply reject the truth of every
2∀2-closure of every instance of (2S∀0).
For instance, higher-order contingentists reject the truth of the following formula:
2∀Y2(2∀X(∃Z(2∀x(Xx↔ Zx))→ (∃Z(2∀x(Y x↔ Zx)))).
To see why, note that a straightforward consequence of this formula in the minimal higher-order
contingentist deductive systemWGSL2 consists in the formula
2∀Y2∃Z(2∀x(Y x↔ Zx)))).
This formula is just (NNEM) (up to substitution of bound variables). Thus, higher-order contingentists
simply reject the claim that every2∀2-closure of every instance of (2S∀0) is true. A fortiori, a defence
of the truth of every 2∀2-closure of every instance of (MCP−MCPi) that appeals to (2S∀0) is
unavailable to Williamson, for such defence would be question-begging.
Note also that corollary 4 has as a consequence that every (closed) instance of (MCP−MCPi) is
a theorem of the deductive system SRSL@2λ , and that every instance of the following schema is a
theorem of both SGSL@2λ and SRSL@2λ :
45This can be shown by slightly adapting the countermodel provided in the appendix of (Williamson, 2013, ch. 6).
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(MCP−@MCPi) 2∀X(3∃y2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y)→ 3∃y(2∀x(Xx→ 3x ≤ y)∧2∀z(2∀x(Xx→
3x ≤ z)→ 3y ≤ z)))→
@(3∃y2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) → 3∃y(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ y) ∧ 2∀z(2∀x(ϕ → 3x ≤ z) →
3y ≤ z))), where y and z do not occur free in ϕ.
Thus, the higher-order contingentist may adopt the option of taking any intuition that apparently
supports the truth of every2∀2-closure of every instance of (MCP−MCPi) as an intuition supporting,
at most, the actual truth of every instance of (MCP−MCPi).46
Despite these considerations in favour of the higher-order contingentist, it must be noted that
the absence of any example of a 2∀2-closure of an instance of (MCP−MCPi) which should be
regarded as false by the lights of the higher-order contingentist might be regarded as providing sufficient
abductive support for the truth of every 2∀2-closure of an instance of (MCP−MCPi) — and, a
fortiori, of (NNEM).
We will not go further into the matter here. Hopefully, the present discussion suffices to show
how higher-order contingentists may avail themselves of strongly Millian logics in order to offer a
reply to Williamson’s abductive argument for the truth of (NNEM). The upshot is that by appealing
to strongly Millian second-order modal logics higher-order contingentists avail themselves of extra
resources for rejecting the cogency of Williamson’s argument for (NNEM). If the line of reply to
Williamson’s argument suggested in this section turns out to be successful, then there is reason to
think that some strongly Millian modal logics available to higher-order contingentists are not only
reasonable but also sufficiently strong second-order modal logics.
A.6 Other Proposals
There are at least two proposals in the literature that share some similarities with strongly Millian
logics. One of these is Kaplan’s proposal on how classical ﬁrst-order logic can be recovered once
a ‘context-sensitive’ interpretation is given to free variables (Kaplan, 1989). The other proposal is
Menzel’s (1991) logicA, a logic reﬂecting certain of Prior’s intuitions motivating his logicQ, albeit
with a different notion of possibility. I will brieﬂy compare strongly Millian logics with these two
proposals.
The logicA has already been presented in §A.3.3. The main motivation behind this system is also
one of the main motivations of the strongly Millian logics proposed, namely, to capture the fact that
the theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic are all true in the actual world. In effect, we noted in §A.3.3
thatA is appropriately regarded as a strongly Millian logic, namely, the logic SRFL2 .
The logicA purports to capture the notion of real-world validity. One of the things I have tried
to do here has been to show that the special feature of classical quantiﬁed logic captured byA can
also be captured by appealing to a property of arguments other than real-world validity. As shown in
46This strategy is not unlike the strategy appealed to by necessitists when faced with the claim that our intuitions support
the view that individuals like Michael Jordan exist contingently. Necessitists point out that those intuitions may be seen as
supporting instead the weaker thesis that individuals like Michael Jordan are contingently concrete.
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§A.4, the (arguably) more common notion of general validity is also able to capture the actual truth
of every theorem of classical quantiﬁed logic, as long as a (context-insensitive) actuality operator is
present in the language. Besides this point, the notorious difference between the strongly Millian
logics offered here and Menzel’s logicA concerns the logics’ underlying languages, with languages
with an actuality operator and second-order modal languages (with and without a λ operator) also
being considered here.
Thus, the present paper can be seen as extending Menzel’s insight of treating individual constants
as strongly Millian expressions to the case of n-ary predicates, and showing that the fact that the
theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic are all true in the actual world can be captured by appealing not
only to the notion of real-world validity, but also to the notion of general validity. The relationship
between strongly Millian logics and Kaplan’s proposal concerning the logic of free variables will now
be considered.
Brieﬂy, Kaplan’s account of the semantics of context-sensitive expressions requires a notion of
truth relativised both to contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation. Formally, the role of contexts
of use in Kaplan’s account of the semantics of context-sensitive expressions is that of providing
parameters required for the determination of the content of these expressions and the sentences
containing them. Those contents are then true relative to some circumstances of evaluation, and
false relative to others. Kaplan remarks that, given this formal understanding of a context of use,
variable-assignments may be understood as parameters provided by context. They are required in
order for the content of formulas containing occurrences of free variables to be determined. On this
way of understanding the semantics of free-variables, the variable-assignment of a context assigns to
each variable an individual in the domain of the possible world of the context.47
For each context of use there is a circumstance of evaluation that is the circumstance of evaluation
of that context of use. For the present purposes, let a circumstance of evaluation consist just in a
possible world. Intuitively, the possible world of a context is the possible world in which the sentence
would be used if used in that context. Given this feature of contexts of use, from the doubly-relativised
conception of truth it is possible to extract a conception of truth relativised solely to contexts of use.
A formula is true relative to a context of use c if and only if it is true relative to c and possible world
wc, the possible world of context c. Equivalently, a formula is true relative to a context of use c if and
only if the content it expresses relative to c is true relative to possible world wc.
Kaplan offers a conception of validity which appeals to truth in a context of use. According to this
conception, an argument with premises Γ and conclusion ϕ is Kaplan-valid if and only if there is no
context of use such that all premises in Γ are true in that context of use and ϕ is false in that context
of use. Call this conception ‘Kaplan-validity’. Kaplan-validity is intended to capture a special feature
of arguments. The Kaplan-valid arguments are those arguments which cannot be used in a context c
without it being the case that the conclusion is true (relative to c and wc) if all of the premises are
47As pointed out in (Kaplan, 1989, p. 592), for bound occurrences of variables the role of variable-assignments is not
that of providing a parameter required for the determination of the content of sub-formulas in which the variables occur.
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true (relative to c and wc).
The context-sensitive understanding of the semantics of free variables previously sketched has as a
consequence that any instance of the schema ∀vϕ→ ϕvv′ is Kaplan-valid, even though it is not the case
that every instance of the schema 2(∀vϕ→ ϕvv′) is Kaplan-valid.48 In effect, once Kaplan-validity is
assumed, the quantiﬁed logic for free variables is classical, even though, in the scope of a necessity
operator, the quantiﬁed logic is free.49
This reveals a structural similarity between strongly Millian logics and the logic resulting from
the adoption of Kaplan-validity and of the context-sensitive understanding of the semantics of free
variables proposed by Kaplan. The logic of individual constants is classical in any SR system. More
generally, the logic of individual constants is classical, in any strongly Millian logic, when the formulas
of the language are in the scope of the actuality operator, @. However, as in the case of free variables,
in the scope of a necessity operator the quantiﬁed logic is free also in the case of strongly Millian
logics.
Consider another ‘actuality’ operator, A, understood according to its context-dependent reading.
That is, it is assumed that the meaning of the operator A is such that a formula of the form Aϕ is true
at a context c and possible world w if and only if ϕ is true at c and wc, the possible world of context c.
Note that a formula ϕ is Kaplan-valid if and only if Aϕ is Kaplan-valid, with the quantiﬁed logic of
free variables being free for any formula ϕ of FL and SL in the scope of the operator A.
Despite the structural similarities between strongly Millian logics and the logic of free variables
resulting from the adoption of Kaplan’s semantic proposal, the logic for a language whose semantics
for free variables is the one proposed by Kaplan and which takes individual constants to be strongly
Millian expressions is not perforce one in which classical quantiﬁed logic is preserved in the scope of
@. And similarly for the operator A.
For an example, consider the notion of Kaplan-validity. Let a be any individual constant, under-
stood as a strongly Millian expression, and v any individual variable. Suppose that it is possible that no
actually existing thing exists (with ‘actually’ being understood here in its context-independent sense),
even though some other thing does, and let wc∗ be a counterfactual possible world witnessing this
possibility statement, for some context c∗. Then, even though AEv is Kaplan-valid, for any individual
variable v, AEa is not. To see that AEa is not Kaplan-valid, note that AEa is true at context of use
c∗ if and only if Ea is true at c∗ and wc∗ , if and only if the referent of a exists in the world wc∗ . Since
a is a strongly Millian expression, the referent of a is some actually existing individual (with ‘actually’
being understood here in its context-independent sense). But then, the referent of a does not exist in
wc∗ , and thus Ea is false with respect to c∗ and wc∗ . Similarly, @Ev is not Kaplan-valid. To see this,
note that @Ev is true at c∗ if and only if @Ev is true at c∗ and wc∗ , if and only if Ev is true at c∗
and the actual possible world, α, if and only if the variable-assignment of context c∗ assigns to v an
48Assuming that Kaplan-validity is neutral with respect to whether the same or different individuals may be found in
different possible worlds. As Kaplan notes, this neutrality is absent in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives. The formula2∀x2Ex is logically valid in the Logic of Demonstratives.
49Kaplan (1989, p. 594) reports that this fact has been pointed out to him by Harry Deutsch.
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individual that exists in α. But the variable assignment of c∗ assigns to v an individual that exists in
wc∗ and, by hypothesis, no actual individual exists in wc∗ . Hence, the formula @Ev is not true at c∗.
Thus, the schemas AEt and @Et both have some instances which are not Kaplan-valid, where t may
be replaced by any individual constant or variable.
A similar point can be made by appealing to a different notion of validity, independent validity,
where a formula ϕ is independently valid if and only if ϕ is true relative to every context of use and
every circumstance of evaluation. Even though, for every individual constant a, the formula @Ea is
independently valid and, for any individual variable v, the formula AEv is independently valid, we
also have that the formulaAEa is not independently valid, and the formula@Ev is not independently
valid.50. Therefore, the logic of individual terms is classical neither under the scope of @ nor under
the scope of A when the notion of validity in question is independent validity.
The upshot is that, despite the structural similarities between Kaplan’s proposal and strongly
Millian logics, these proposals are in fact different, and may lead, depending on one’s target conception
of validity, to classical quantiﬁed logic to be recovered neither under the scope of @ nor under the
scope of A.
A.7 Second-Order?
Before concluding, I want to address a possible worry concerning the strongly Millian logics for
second-order languages that have been proposed. In a nutshell, the worry is that these are not really
second-order.
Some philosophers hold that there are arguments formulated in SL which are really valid, even
though they are not valid in every Henkin model. Equivalently, some philosophers hold that there are
arguments formulated in SL which are really valid, even though they are not valid in every Cl-model.
A simple example is the argument whose premise is the statement that there are at least two things,
and whose conclusion is the statement that there are at least four non-coextensive properties.
For the present purposes, I will focus on the conception of validity as general validity, spelled out
in subsection A.2.1. Let an absolutist be a philosopher who holds that there are arguments formulated
in second-order languages that are generally valid, despite the fact that they are not valid in every
Cl-model, and a relativist be a philosopher who holds that every generally valid argument is valid in
every Cl-model for that language.
The reason why absolutists reject the claim that all generally valid arguments are valid in every
50Take any context of use c and possible world w. The formula AEv is true at c and w just in case the formula Ev is
true at c and cw . But the variable-assignment of context c assigns to the variable v an individual that exists at wc (i.e., at the
possible world of c). Hence, Ev is true relative c and wc, and thus AEv is true relative to c and w, for any c and w. That
is, AEv is independently valid.
Now, take any context of use c and world w. @Ea is true relative to c and w if and only if Ea is true relative to c and α,
if and only if the referent of a exists in α. But, for every a, the referent of a exists in α, given the assumption that a is a
strongly Millian expression. Hence, @Ea is independently valid.
Finally, the context c∗ previously mentioned can also be used to show that some instances of AEa and @Ev are not
independently valid
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Henkin model has to do with the fact that, according to them, certain Henkin models fail to adequately
represent the relationship between the range of the ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers. In particular,
absolutists hold that the relationship between the set d(α) and the setD(n)(α) (for each n ∈ N0) does
not always adequately represent the relationship between the class of all individuals and the class of all
n-ary relations. For the present purposes, let me focus on the sets d(α) andD(1)(α). Absolutists hold
the following thesis about the relationship between the range of ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers:
Abundantism For every subclass of the class of all individuals there is a property that is instantiated
by all and only the elements in that subclass.
Models M ∈ Cl in which the deﬁnition of value relative to a variable-assignment g is such that
V gM,α(∀V ϕ) = {〈〉} if and only if, for every element f in (P(d(α))){α}, V g[V/f ]M,α (ϕ) = {〈〉} are
in agreement with the thesis of Abundantism, whereas the remaining models in Cl are not. Thus,
absolutists take any Cl-model in whichD(1)(α) 6= (P(d(α))){α} to be a model which inadequately
represents the relationship between the range of the ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers.
One way to put the matter is that, from the standpoint of absolutists, Cl-models in which it
is the case that D(1)(α) 6= (P(d(α))){α} fail to capture the fact that ∀V is intended to express
(unrestricted) universal quantiﬁcation over properties, even though models with this feature would be
appropriate if, instead of unrestricted universal quantiﬁcation, ∀V was intended to express restricted
universal quantiﬁcation over properties. In the present context, this means that absolutists hold that
certain Henkin models invalidating certain arguments do not represent possibilities in which the
premises of the argument are true and the conclusion is false, since they fail to depict the correct
relationship between the ranges of the ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers.
Following Shapiro (1991), say that a Cl-model is full just in case, for every n ∈ N0,D(α)(n) =
(P(d(α))n){α}. The considerations presented above lead absolutists to hold that only full Henkin
models adequately represent the relationship between the ranges of the ﬁrst- and second-order
quantiﬁers. Since there are some arguments valid in every full Henkin model that are invalid in some
Henkin models, absolutists thereby hold that some generally valid arguments are invalid in some
Henkin models.
Abundantism also favours the view that the strongly Millian logics for second-order modal lan-
guages proposed here fail to capture the class of generally valid arguments formulated in those languages.
Let us focus on S-models. For every w ∈W , let
D∗(n)(w) = {g : g(w) ⊆ (d(w))n & ∀w′ s. t. w′ 6= w & w′ ∈W (g(w′) = ∅)}.
A minimal requirement for a S-model to appropriately represent the truth of Abundantism seems to
be thatD∗(n)(α) ⊆ D(n)(α). Furthermore, it is plausible to think that proponents of Abundantism
also adhere to its necessitation. Call this thesis Necessitated Abundantism. A minimal requirement for
a S-model to appropriately represent the truth of Necessitated Abundantism seems to be that, for
every w ∈W ,D∗(n)(w) ⊆ D(n)(w).
221
Now, there are S-models which do not even satisfy the constraint that D∗(n)(α) ⊆ D(n)(α).
Theorists committed to Abundantism will hold that these S-models fail to appropriately represent
the relationship between the ranges of the ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers.51 A fortiori, theorists
committed to Necessitated Abundantism will hold also hold that S-models fail to appropriately
represent the relationship between the ranges of the ﬁrst- and second-order quantiﬁers.
Let a weakly full S-model be a S-model such thatD∗(n)(α) ⊆ D(n)(α), and a full S-model be a
S-model such that, for each w ∈W ,D∗(n)(w) ⊆ D(n)(w). Some arguments 〈Γ, ϕ〉 are SG-valid
in every weakly full S-model even though there are S-models in which 〈Γ, ϕ〉 is SG-invalid, and
some arguments 〈Γ, ϕ〉 are SG-valid in every full S-model even though there are S-models in which
〈Γ, ϕ〉 is SG-invalid. Hence, proponents of Abundantism should hold that there are generally valid
arguments which are SG-invalid. Similarly, proponents of Necessitated Abundantism should hold
that there are generally valid arguments that are SG-invalid. Given that one of the aims of strongly
Millian logics is that of capturing the notions of general validity and real-world validity, these seem
bad news, requiring a reappraisal of Abundantism and Necessitated Abundantism. Since Necessitated
Abundantism implies Abundantism, in what follows I will focus solely on the thesis of Abundantism.
By showing that there are good reasons for rejecting Abundantism (given certain conceptions of
properties) it is shown, a fortiori, that there are good reasons to reject Necessitated Abundantism
(given those conceptions of properties).
Shapiro, the main advocate of the legitimacy of the notion of validity extensionally captured by
validity in every full Henkin model, commits himself to the truth of Abundantism only given an
extensional understanding of ‘property’ as what he calls a ‘logical set’. He takes the notion of a logical
set to be akin to an indexical notion: given a universe of discourse, a logical set is any subclass of
this universe.52 Clearly, Abundantism is true if properties are understood as logical sets. However,
in the present paper the focus is on properties understood as entities which, in general, could have
been instantiated by individuals other than the ones actually instantiating them. Hence, the fact that
Abundantism is true if properties are understood as logical sets does not show that Millian logics do
not capture the notion of general validity. Even though Absolutists typically intended the second-order
quantiﬁers of second-order logic to range over logical sets, the second-order quantiﬁers of strongly
Millian logics are not intended to range over logical sets.
This shows that the typical reason for supporting Abundantism put forward by Absolutists does
not constitute a reason for rejecting the claim that every generally valid argument is SG-valid, since
the second-order quantiﬁers of Millian logics are not intended to range over entities whose criterion
of individuation is extensional. But it does not show that other conceptions of properties, ones where
properties are not extensionally conceived, aren’t themselves committed to the truth of Abundantism,
51To give a simple example, letM = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉, whereW = {1}, α = 1, d(α) = {a}. For each n, let fn be
a function with domain W and such that fn(α) = (d(α))n. Let D(n)(α) = {fn}. Also, let f∅ be a function with
domain W and mapping α to the empty set. We have that f∅ ∈ D∗(1)(α), even though f∅ 6∈ D(1)(α). But then,
D∗(1)(α) 6⊆ D(1)(α).
52See (Shapiro, 1991, pp. vii, 18-22 and 63-64).
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in which case there are generally valid arguments which are not SG-valid.
But there are several sparse conceptions of properties which, arguably, are not committed to the
truth of Abundantism. For instance, a popular conception of properties takes these to be individuated
by their nomological roles. Call this conception of properties the nomological conception of properties.
Arguably, there are subclasses of individuals for which there is no nomological property instantiated by
all and only the elements of the class, where a nomological property is a property whose individuation
criterion is given by its nomological role. This means that Abundantism is false if understood as
concerning properties individuated according to the nomological conception.
Recall that one of the presuppositions of the present paper is that the second-order quantiﬁers
range over properties whose criterion of individuation is given by necessary coextensiveness. It is
unclear whether there could have been two properties with different nomological roles which were
nevertheless necessarily coextensive (arguably, there could not have been two properties which were
not necessarily coextensive but that nevertheless had the same modal proﬁle). If there could have been
two such properties, then the fact that Abundantism is false if understood as concerning properties
individuated according to their nomological role might seem not to be of importance to the present
paper.
However, even if it is conceded that there could have been two properties with different nomo-
logical roles which were nevertheless necessarily coextensive, the fact that Abundantism is false
according to the nomological conception is still revealing. The reason is that even on the nomological
conception it is still the case that properties have modal proﬁles. One of the options for the range of
the second-order quantiﬁers is to take them as ranging over modal proﬁles of nomological properties.
This option is pursued in what follows.
It is reasonable to think that modal proﬁles of nomological properties are ontologically dependent
on nomological properties, in the sense that necessarily, a modal proﬁle of a nomological property
exists if and only if there is a nomological property with that modal proﬁle. It has been shown that
there is at least a subclassX of individuals for which there is no nomological property instantiated by
all and only the elements of the class. Therefore, given the ontological dependence of modal proﬁles of
nomological properties on nomological properties, there is no modal proﬁle of a nomological property
which hasX as its extension in the actual world. Hence, Abundantism is false given the assumption
that the range of second-order quantiﬁers consist in modal proﬁles of nomological properties.
It also seems plausible to assume that there is no necessary connection between the range of the
ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers and domain of nomological properties. Hence, arguably, if the range of the
second-order quantiﬁers is assumed to consist in modal proﬁles of nomological relations, then general
validity and SG-validity will extensionally coincide.
This point generalises. So long as the second-order quantiﬁers are understood as ranging over
modal proﬁles of properties conceived in such a way that there is no necessary connection between the
range of the ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers and the domain of properties, it is reasonable to assume that general
validity and SG-validity will extensionally coincide. This is yet another instance of the neutrality of
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strongly Millian logics. These logics may be used to reason about modal proﬁles of properties under
different conceptions of properties, as long as those conceptions do not imply a necessary connection
between the range of the ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers and the domain of properties.
Finally, it is relevant to point out that there is no effective deductive system whose theorems are
all and only those formulas that are SG-valid in every weakly full S-model (for the same reason that
there is no effective sound and complete deductive system for second-order logic with full Henkin
models).53 Thus, just as absolutists should be interested in the deductive systemClSL — sinceClSL
enables them to reason about logical sets with the guarantee that they will not be inferring falsehoods
from truths —, even proponents of Abundantism should be interested in strongly Millian logics,
despite the fact that they are not really second-order according to them. Strongly Millian logics still
afford Abundantists with deductive systems which can be used for reasoning about modal proﬁles
with the guarantee that no falsehoods will be inferred from true premises.
A.8 Conclusion
In this paper complete strongly Millian ﬁrst- and second-order modal logics have been presented.
Some of their presuppositions were made salient, and it was shown that they capture a special feature
of classical ﬁrst- and second-order logic, to wit, that the result of preﬁxing any classical theorem
with an actuality operator is a theorem of these logics. Insofar as the Millian logics proposed capture
the notions of real-world validity and general validity for their underlying languages, the result of
preﬁxing any theorem of classical quantiﬁed logic with an actuality operator yields a generally valid
and real-world valid formula. This result holds even if a neutral stance with respect to questions such
as whether necessarily everything necessarily exists is maintained, since as shown, the strongly Millian
logics proposed are all conservative, in the sense discussed in §A.1.
In the second part of the paper a possible application of strongly Millian second-order modal logics
to the debate between higher-order contingentists and higher-order necessitists was presented. It was
shown that strongly Millian logics promise to provide higher-order contingentists with the resources
required to reject an argument for higher-order necessitism recently put forward by Williamson.
The logics were also compared to other proposals in the literature. It was seen that even though
Kaplan’s understanding of the behaviour of free variables is structurally similar to the strongly Millian
stance adopted here, the logic of a language containing both strongly Millian expressions and a
context-sensitive treatment of free variables is not guaranteed to capture the specialness of classical
quantiﬁed logic. In particular, it was shown that the result of preﬁxing some theorems of classical
quantiﬁed logic with A does not yield a Kaplan-valid formula, nor an independently valid formula,
and similarly for the result of preﬁxing some theorems of classical quantiﬁed logic with @.
Finally, a worry to the effect that strongly Millian logics are not really second-order was addressed.
The crux of the worry was identiﬁed as having to do with the question whether strongly Millian
53Similarly, and for the same reason, there is no effective deductive system whose theorems are all and only those formulas
that are SG-valid in every full S-model.
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second-order logics capture the notion of general validity. It was shown that whether this is so depends
on the conception of properties in which one is interested, and that for some conceptions of properties
there is good reason to think that strongly Millian logics do capture the notion of general validity.
A.9 Appendix
A.9.1 Weakly Millian Logics
The ‘weakly correlates’ of the strongly Millian deductive systems characterised in §A.3.3 are now
presented. The only rule of inference of all of these systems is (MP):
Deﬁnition 29 (Axioms of WGFL@2). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL].
Deﬁnition 30 (Axioms of WRFL@2). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every @∀-closure of every instance of (R@).
Deﬁnition 31 (Axioms ofWGFL@2λ ). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every @2∀-closure of every instance of (EAb).
Deﬁnition 32 (Axioms of WRFL@2λ). Every @2∀-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL]. Every @2∀-closure of every instance of (EAb). Every @∀-closure of every
instance of (R@).
Deﬁnition 33 (Axioms ofWGSL@2). Every @∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in [S5] ∪
[Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL].
Deﬁnition 34 (Axioms of WRSL@2). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every @∀2-closure of every instance (R@).
Deﬁnition 35 (Axioms ofWGSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5] ∪ [Act] ∪ [FFOL] ∪ [FSOL]. Every @2∀2-closure of every instance in L of (EAb).
Deﬁnition 36 (Axioms ofWRSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5]∪[Act]∪[FFOL]∪[FSOL]. Every@∀2-closure of every instance of (R@). Every@2∀2-closure
of every instance of (EAb).
Deﬁnition 37 (Axioms ofWGCSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5]∪ [Act]∪ [FFOL]∪ [FSOL]. Every@2∀2-closure of every instance of (EAb) and of(CComp).
Deﬁnition 38 (Axioms ofWRCSL@2λ). Every @2∀2-closure of every instance of every schema in
[S5]∪ [Act]∪ [FFOL]∪ [FSOL]. Every@∀2-closure of every instance (R@). Every@2∀2-closure
of every instance of (EAb) and of (CComp).
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A.9.2 Strongly Millian logics: ‘Classical’
I now turn to the proof of item (iv) of theorem 4, i.e., that Γ `ClSLλ ϕ ⇔ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ ⇔
Γ `SRCSL@2λ ϕ. It is shown that Γ `ClSLλ ϕ ⇔ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ and @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ ⇔
Γ `SRCSL@2λ ϕ is now offered. Item (iv) of theorem 4 follows straightforwardly from these two
proofs.
Proof. (Γ `ClSLλ ϕ⇔ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ). First, it is shown that i)Γ `ClSLλ ϕ⇒ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ
@ϕ.
Afterwards, it is shown that ii) @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇒ Γ `ClSLλ ϕ.
Proof of i):
Suppose@Γ 6`SGCSL@2λ @ϕ. By theorem 3, we have that@Γ 6 (SGC @ϕ. Hence, there is a S
C-model
M = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉 and g ∈ As(M) s. t. ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,w(@γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,w(@ϕ) = ∅.
Thus, ∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,α(ϕ) = ∅. Let
M |{α}= 〈{α}, d|{α}, D|{α}, α, V |{α}〉
where, ∀n ∈ N0, D|{α}(n)(α) = {f |{α}: f ∈ D(n)(α)}, ∀a ∈ Const(SLλ), V |{α}(a) = V (a),
and ∀ζ ∈ Predn(SLλ), V |{α}(ζ) = V (ζ)|{α}.












M,α(ϕ), since no free variables occur
in ϕ, nor in any γ ∈ Γ.
Thus, ∃g′ ∈ As(M |{α}) s. t. ∀γ ∈ Γ(V g
′
M,α(γ) = {〈〉}), and V g
′
M |{α}(ϕ) = ∅.
It remains to show that M |{α} is a ClC-model. It suffices to show that ∀g ∈ As(M |{α}),
∀ψ ∈ Form(SLλ): V gM |{α}(λv1 . . . vn(ψ)) ∈ D|{α}(n)(α).
Note that ∀g ∈ As(M |{α}): ∀t ∈ Terms(SLλ)(V gM (t) ∈ d(α)) and ∀ζ ∈ Predn(SLλ) ∪
SV arn(SLλ)(V gM (τn) ∈ D(n)(α)). We have that∀g ∈ As(M |{α}): ∀t ∈ Terms(SLλ)(V gM (t) ∈
d(α)) and∀ζ ∈ Predn(SLλ)∪SV arn(SLλ)(V gM (ζ) ∈ D(n)(α)). Therefore, ∀g ∈ As(M |{α}), ∀ψ ∈
Form(SLλ) : V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ψ)) ∈ D(n)(α), sinceM is a SC-model. But then, by the deﬁnition
ofD|{α}, and the fact that
∀g ∈ As(M |{α})∀ψ ∈ Form(SLλ)(V gM,α(λv1 . . . vn(ψ)) = V gM |{α},α(λv1 . . . vn(ψ))),
it follows that:
∀g ∈ As(M |{α}),∀ψ ∈ Form(SLλ) : V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ψ))|{α}= V gM |{α}(λv1 . . . vn(ψ)) ∈ D|{α}(n)(α).
Therefore,M |{α} is in fact a ClC-model. A fortiori, Γ 6 (ClC ϕ. But then, by the completeness of
ClSLλ , we have that Γ 6`ClSLλ ϕ.
Hence, by contraposition, we get that Γ `ClSLλ ϕ⇒ @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ.
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Proof of i):
Γ 6`ClSLλ ϕ⇔ Γ 6 (ClC ϕ (By the completeness of systemClSLλ)
⇔ ∃M = 〈W,d,D, α, V 〉 ∈ ClC, ∃g ∈ As(M)(∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,α(ϕ) = ∅)
⇒ ∃M ∈ SC, ∃g ∈ As(M)(∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(@γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,α(@ϕ) = ∅)
⇒ ∃M ∈ SC, ∃g ∈ As(M)∃w ∈W (∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,w(@γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,w(@ϕ) = ∅)
⇒ @Γ 6 (SGC @ϕ
⇒ @Γ 6`SGCSL@2λ @ϕ (Theorem 3)
Therefore, @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇒ Γ `ClSLλ ϕ.
Proof. (@Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRCSL@2λ ϕ)
@Γ 6`SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇔ Γ 6 (SGC ϕ (Theorem 3)
⇔ ∃M ∈ ClC, ∃w ∈W (∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,w(@γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,w(@ϕ) = ∅)
⇔ ∃M ∈ ClC, ∃w ∈W (∀γ ∈ Γ(V gM,α(γ) = {〈〉}) and V gM,α(ϕ) = ∅)
⇔ Γ 6 (SRC ϕ
⇔ Γ 6`SRCSL@2λ ϕ (Theorem 3)
Thus, @Γ `SGCSL@2λ @ϕ⇔ Γ `SRCSL@2λ ϕ
A.9.3 Strongly Millian Logics: Conservative
Let me now turn to the results concerning the modelM characterised in page 210.
Clearly, all of Counter (BF), Counter (CBF), Counter (NNE) are satisﬁed by M . Thus, it
remains to show that Counter (BFM), Counter (CBFM), Counter (NNEM) are all satisﬁed byM ,
and thatM is indeed a SC-model.
I will begin by showing thatM satisﬁes Counter (BFM), Counter (CBFM) and Counter (NNEM).
Consider the functions f01 , f02 ∈ F (1), deﬁned as follows:
• f01(1) = {01}, f01(2) = f01(3) = ∅;
• f02(1) = f02(3) = ∅, f02(2) = {02};
Note that ∀pi ∈ Π1 : pi(f01) = f01 , and ∀pi ∈ Π2 : pi(f02) = f02 . Thus, f01 ∈ D(1)(1), and
f02 ∈ D(1)(2).
It is now shown that ∃pi ∈ Π2 such that pi(f01) 6∈ D(1)(2), and thus M satisﬁes Counter
(CBFM), and that ∃pi ∈ Π1 such that pi(f02) 6∈ D(1)(1), and thusM satisﬁes Counter (BFM).





02(3)) = pi1(∅) = ∅ 6= f02(w2) = {02}.
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01(3)) = pi2(∅) = ∅ 6= f01(w1) = {01}.
Hence, pi(f01) 6= f01 , and therefore f01 6∈ D(1)(2). This result is not only sufficient to show that
M satisﬁes Counter (BFM) and Counter (CBFM), it also shows thatM satisﬁes Counter (NNEM).
It remains to show thatM is in fact a SC-model. Clearly,M is a S-model. To see this, note that
i) o1 ∈ d(α), and thus, for every a ∈ Const(L), V (a) ∈ d(α); and ii) for every w ∈ W , pi ∈ Πw,
n-ary predicate letter ζn, pi(V (ζn)) = V (ζn), and thus V (ζn) ∈ D(n)(α).
Hence, to prove thatM is a SC-model it suffices to show thatM obeys condition 13. spelled out
in page 202. For every w ∈ W , pi ∈ Πw, let pi(g)(x) = pi(g(x)), for every variable-assignment g.
Our proof thatM obeys condition 13. spelled out in page 202 relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 16. For everyw ∈W , pi ∈ Πw,ϕ ∈ Terms(SL@2λ)∪STerms(SL@2λ)∪Form(SL@2λ),
n ∈ N0, a ∈ Const(SL@2λ) and ζn ∪ Predn(SL@2λ):
if a occurs in ϕ, then V (a) ∈ d(w), and if ζn occurs in ϕ, then V (ζn) ∈ D(n)(w) only if:
pi(V gM (ϕ)) = V
pi(g)
M (ϕ)).
Let us suppose that Lemma 16 has been established. Assume that for every t ∈ Terms(SL@2λ),
τn ∈ Predn(SL@2λ) ∪ SV arn(SL@2λ): if a occurs in ϕ, then V gM (t) ∈ d(w), and if τn occurs
in ϕ, then V gM (τ
n) ∈ D(n)(w). We have that
pi(V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))) = V
pi(g)
M (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))).
But now, let v be any individual variable free in λv1 . . . vn(ψ). Then, pi(g)(v) = pi(V
g
M (v)) =
V gM (v) (since V
g
M (v) ∈ d(w)). Furthermore, V gM (v) = g(v). That is, pi(g) and g agree in all of the
individual variables free in λv1 . . . vn(ψ). By similar reasoning the same conclusion is reached for any
n-ary second-order variable free in λv1 . . . vn(ψ). But then pi(g) and g agree in their assignments to
all the free variables in λv1 . . . vn(ψ). Therefore,
V
pi(g)
M (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))) = V
g
M (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))).
Hence,
pi(V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))) = V
g
M (λv1 . . . vn(ϕ))).
Thus, if Lemma 16 holds, then condition 13. is satisﬁed, and a fortioriM is a SRC-model.
I will thus proceed to prove Lemma 16. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. Suppose
that for every n ∈ N0: for every a ∈ Const(SL@2λ), ζn ∪ Predn(SL@2λ): if a occurs in ϕ, then
V (a) ∈ d(w), and if ζn occurs in ϕ, then V (ζn) ∈ D(n)(w).
Proof.
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1. If ϕ is an individual constant a, then V (a) ∈ d(w). Therefore, pi(V (a)) = V (a). Thus,
V
pi(g)
M (a) = V (a) = V
g
M (a) = pi(V
g
M (a)). Similarly for every n-ary predicate letter;
2. If ϕ is an individual variable v, then V pi(g)M (v) = pi(g)(v) = pi(g(v)) = pi(V
g
M (v)).
3. If ϕ is of the form τnt1 . . . tn, then
〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ 〈V pi(g)M (t1), . . . , V pi(g)M (tn)〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (τn)(pi(w))
⇔ 〈pi(V gM (t1)), . . . , pi(V gM (tn))〉 ∈ pi(V gM (τn))(pi(w))(I.H.)
⇔ pi(〈V gM (t1), . . . , V gM (tn)〉) ∈ pi(V gM (τn))(pi(w))
⇔ pi(〈V gM (t1), . . . , V gM (tn)〉) ∈ pi(V gM (τn)(w))
⇔ 〈V gM (t1), . . . , V gM (tn)〉 ∈ V gM (τn)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (ϕ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
4. If ϕ is of the form ¬ψ, then:
〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ 〈〉 6∈ V pi(g)M (ψ)(pi(w))
⇔ 〈〉 6∈ pi(V gM (ψ))(pi(w))(I.H.)
⇔ 〈〉 6∈ pi(V gM (ψ)(w))
⇔ 〈〉 6∈ V gM (ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (¬ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
The case where ϕ is of the form ψ ∧ χ proceeds similarly.
5. If ϕ is of the form @ψ, then:
〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ψ)(α)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ψ))(pi(α))(I.H.)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ψ)(α))
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (ψ)(α)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (@ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
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6. If ϕ is of the form 2ψ, then:
〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ψ)(w′)
⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ψ))(w′)(I.H.)
⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ψ)(w′))
⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : 〈〉 ∈ V gM (ψ)(w′)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (2ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
7. If ϕ is of the form ∀vψ, then:
〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ ∀o ∈ d(pi(w)) : 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)[v/o]M (ψ)(pi(w))
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(w) : 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)[v/pi(o)]M (ψ)(pi(w))
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(w) : 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g[v/o])M (ψ)(pi(w))
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(w) : 〈〉 ∈ pi(V g[v/o]M (ψ))(pi(w))(I.H.)
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(w) : 〈〉 ∈ pi(V g[v/o]M (ψ)(w))
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(w) : 〈〉 ∈ V g[v/o]M (ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ V gM (∀vψ)(w)
⇔ 〈〉 ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
The case where ϕ is of the form ∀V nψ proceeds similarly.
8. If ϕ is of the form λv1 . . . vn(ψ), then:
〈o1, . . . on〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ 〈o1, . . . on〉 ∈ (d(pi(w)))n
and 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g)[v1/o1...vn/on]M (ψ)(pi(w))
Let pi(o′i) = oi, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We have that:
〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ V pi(g)M (ϕ)(pi(w))⇔ 〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉 ∈ (d(w))n
and 〈〉 ∈ V pi(g[v1/o′1...vn/o′n])M (ψ)(pi(w))
⇔ 〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉 ∈ (d(w))n
and 〈〉 ∈ pi(V g[v1/o′1...vn/o′n]M (ψ))(pi(w))(I.H.)
⇔ 〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉 ∈ (d(w))n
and 〈〉 ∈ pi(V g[v1/o′1...vn/o′n]M (ψ)(w))
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⇔ 〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉 ∈ (d(w))n
and 〈〉 ∈ V g[v1/o′1...vn/o′n]M (ψ)(w)
⇔ 〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉 ∈ V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ψ))(w)
⇔ pi(〈o′1, . . . , o′n〉) ∈ pi(V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ψ))(w))
⇔ 〈pi(o′1), . . . , pi(o′n)〉) ∈ pi(V gM (λv1 . . . vn(ψ))(pi(w))
⇔ 〈o1, . . . , on〉) ∈ pi(V gM (ϕ))(pi(w))
This concludes the proof.
A.9.4 Completeness
In what follows completeness is proved for the more general cases discussed, namely, those involving
the deductive systems SGCSL@2λ and SRCSL@2λ . I begin by stating several lemmas about the deductive
systemWGCSL@2λ . These lemmas will be used in the proofs to be given later on.
Lemma 17.
(i) `WGCSL@2λ ϕ⇒`WGCSL@2λ 2ϕ (2I)
(ii) `WGCSL@2λ ϕ⇒`WGCSL@2λ @ϕ (@I)
(iii) `WGCSL@2λ ϕ
v






(i) `WGCSL@2λ (@ϕ ∧@ψ)→ @(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(ii) `WGCSL@2λ @@ϕ↔ @ϕ
(iii) `WGCSL@2λ @(@ϕ→ ϕ)
Lemma 19.
(i) `WGCSL@2λ ∀vEv
(ii) Γ `WGCSL@2λ ϕ
v




(iv) Γ `WGCSL@2λ ϕ
V n
τn ⇒ Γ `WGCSL@2λ
∀V nϕ55
The proofs of lemmas 17, 18 and 19 are trivial, and thus omitted.
The deductive systems SGCSL@2λ and SRCSL@2λ are now proved to be complete with respect to,
respectively, SGC-validity and SRC-validity, for arguments composed of closed formulae. The proof
of soundness is established by an induction on the length of a derivation, as usual. The proof of
soundness is omitted: the present focus will be on establishing its converse.
Appealing to the usual Henkin method, it is shown that every SGCSL@2λ-consistent set of formulas
is SGC-satisﬁable, and that every SRCSL@2λ-consistent set of formulas is SRC-satisﬁable. Let I ∈
54Where v does not occur in Γ
55Where τn does not occur in Γ.
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{‘SGCSL@2λ ’, ‘SRCSL@2λ ’}, unless noted otherwise. Also, let I = SGC, if I = SGCSL@2λ , and
I = SRC, if I = SRCSL@2λ . It will be shown how, given any I-consistent set Γ of sentences of
SL@2λ, a sequence U of sets of sentences Uj of SL@2λ can be constructed containing information
directly relevant for the construction of anMC-modelM I-satisfying Γ.
As expected, to each Uj in sequence U will correspond an element wj ∈W in the model. Each
set Uj will contain information determining the ‘individuals and n-ary relations that exist inwj ’ as well
as which formulas of L are true at wj . Roughly, a formula belongs to Uj if and only if it is true at wj .
The set Γ is guaranteed to beI-satisﬁed by some world ofW owing to the fact that the sequence U
is constructed in such a way that one of the sets of formulae in the sequence, the set Uk, is a superset
of Γ. Thus, every formula in Γ is true in wk, the element ofW corresponding to Uk.
The presence of axiomswith a distinctively ‘actualistic’ ﬂavour (namely, the instances of the schemas
(G=) and (SG=) of axiom system SGCSL@2λ , and the instances of the schemas (R=), (SR=) and
(R@) of axiom system SRCSL@2λ) requires that an element ofU be selected for containing information
that is distinctively concerned with the actual world. In the construction to be provided, this element
will consist in the set U0. Thus, the set U0 will be a superset of the set containing every instance of
(R=), (SR=), and (R@).
The distinguished world of the modelM that will be extracted from the sequence U will satisfy,
relative toM , every instance of (R=), (SR=) and (R@). The difference between SGC-satisfaction
and SRC-satisfaction is reﬂected on the relationship between the sets Uk and U0. Consideration of
the notion of SRC-satisfaction requires that k = 0, since the elements in Γ must all be true in the
designated world of the model. On the other hand, SGC-satisfaction requires that k 6= 0, since some
sets of formulas are SGC-satisﬁable, even though they are not true in any designated world of any
SC-model (an example is given by the set {@P,¬P}).
The methods used in the proof are similar to those in (Hodes, 1984) and (Menzel, 1991), which
are themselves similar to those used in (Gallin, 1975) and (Fine, 1980).56 In particular the present
proof will follow closely the proof in (Menzel, 1991, pp. 364-370). The reader will be directed to
aspects of that proof at several stages.
I begin by laying out some useful deﬁnitions. Let L be any language, Γ ⊆ Form(L) and I be
any deductive system.
Deﬁnition 39. Γ isI-consistent if and only if there is no formula ϕ such that Γ `I ϕ and Γ `I ¬ϕ.
Deﬁnition 40. Γ is maximal if and only if, for every formula ϕ of L, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
Deﬁnition 41. Γ is ∃1-complete if and only if, for every formula ϕ of L, ∃vϕ ∈ Γ if and only if Ea,
ϕva ∈ Γ, for some individual constant a.
Deﬁnition 42. Γ is ∃2-complete if and only if, for every formula ϕ of L, ∃V nϕ ∈ Γ if and only if Eζn,
ϕV
n
ζn ∈ Γ, for some n-ary predicate letter ζn.
56A different completeness proof, for a different axiomatisation of a system similar to SRFL@2 , can be found in
(Stephanou, 2005).
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Deﬁnition 43. An ω-sequence S = 〈S0, S1, . . .〉 of sets of formulas of language L isI-consistent just
in case the set {3∧Γi : i < ω and Γi is a ﬁnite subset of Si} isI-consistent.
Let S[i, {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}] be the result of replacing Si in S with Si ∪ {ϕ1 . . . , ϕn}. Where n = 1,
S[i, ϕ] is written instead of S[i, {ϕ}].
Deﬁnition 44. Let j < ω and ϕ ∈ Form(L). ϕ is I-consistentj with S if and only if S[j, ϕ] is
I-consistent.
Deﬁnition 45. An ω-sequence S is 3-complete if and only if, for any j < ω, 3ϕ ∈ Uj iff ∃k < ω
such that ϕ ∈ Uk.
Deﬁnition 46. An ω-sequence S is @-complete if and only if, for any j < ω, @ϕ ∈ Uj iff ϕ ∈ U0.
Let ‘G’ and ‘R’ abbreviate, respectively, ‘SGCSL@2λ ’ and ‘SRCSL@2λ ’. LetΓI ⊆ Form(SL@2λ)
be anyI-consistent set,Const′ be a countable set of new individual constants, Pred′n be a countable
set of new n-ary predicate letters, for every n ∈ N0, and L′ be SL@2λ + Const′ +⋃n∈N(Pred′n).
Let ξ = {〈j, ϕ〉i}i<ω be an enumeration of all pairs 〈j, ϕ〉, where j < ω and ϕ ∈ Form(L′), ordi
be the ﬁrst element in the ith pair in ξ, and ϕi be the second element in the ith pair in ξ. Also, let
ESet = {Ea : a ∈ Const(L)} and @Set = {@ϕ → ϕ : ϕ is a closed formula ∈ L′}. Now, for
each n ∈ N, let SESetn = {Eζn : ζn ∈ Predn(L)}, and SESet = ⋃n∈N SESETn. For each
i < ω, two ω-sequences of sets UG,ij and U
R,i
j of formulae of L
′ are deﬁned, where j < ω. UG,00 =
ESet∪SESet∪@Set,UG,01 = ΓG, andUG,0j = ∅, for j > 1. UR,00 = ESet∪SESet∪@Set∪ΓR,
and UR,0j = ∅, for j > 0. UI,i+1 is now deﬁned. If ϕi is notWGCSL@2λ-consistentordi with UI,i,
then UI,i+1 = UI,i and if ϕi isWGCSL@2λ-consistentordi with UI,i, then:
1. If ϕi is of the form ∃vψ, then UI,i+1 = UI,i[ordi, {ϕi, ψva, Ea}], where a is a variable from
Const′ present at most in @Set;
2. If ϕi is of the form ∃V nψ, then UI,i+1 = UI,i[ordi, {ϕi, ψV nζn , Eζn}], where ζn is a n-ary
predicate letter from Pred
′n present at most in @Set;
3. If ϕ is of the form 3ψ, then UI,i+1 = U i[ordi, ϕi][n, ψ], where n is the least ordinal > 0
such that UI,in = ∅.
4. If ϕi is of neither of the above forms, then UI,i+1 = UI,i[ordi, ϕi].





I = 〈UI0 , UI1 , . . .〉. The following lemmas will be
relevant later on:
Lemma 20. If θ = {3∧Γk : k < ω}, where each Γk is a ﬁnite subset of Form(L′), then, if θ∪{ϕ}
isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent, so is θ ∪ {3ϕ}.
Proof. See (Menzel, 1991, p. 365). The proof relies on item (i) of Lemma 17 and on the axiom-
schemata (PL), (K) and (5).
Lemma 21. For every i < ω, UI,i isWGCSL@2λ-consistent.
233
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. For the base case, consider ﬁrst the case where I = G.
Suppose, for reductio, that UG,0 isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. This means that the set
{3∧ θ : θ is a ﬁnite subset of ESet ∪ SESet ∪@Set} ∪ {3∧ θ : θ is a ﬁnite subset of ΓG}
isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. From this it follows that there are ﬁnite sets θ0 ⊆ UG,00 and θ1 ⊆ UG,01
such that {3∧ θ0,3∧ θ1} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. Let Z = {@ϕ : ϕ ∈ UG,00 }. We have that
Z ∪ ΓG is G-consistent, since all elements of Z are theorems of G.
To see this, take any ϕ ∈ Z . We have that ϕ = @Ea for some individual constant a, or
ϕ = @Eζn for an n-ary predicate letter ζn, or ϕ = @(@ϕ → ϕ). If ϕ = @Ea, then ϕ follows
from (G=), (SA) and (@K). If ϕ = @Eζn, then ϕ follows from (SG=), (SSA) and (@K). If
ϕ = @(@ϕ→ ϕ), then ϕ follows by item (iii) of Lemma 18. Since Z ∪ΓG is SGCSL@2λ-consistent,
it is alsoWGCSL@2λ-consistent, sinceWGCSL@2λ is a subsystem of SGCSL@2λ .
Now,Z∪ΓG `WGCSL@2λ @ϕ, for everyϕ ∈ θ0. Thus,Z∪Γ
G `WGCSL@2λ
∧{@ϕ : ϕ ∈ θ0}.
Furthermore, since `WGCSL@2λ (@ψ ∧@χ)→ @(ψ ∧ χ) for every ϕ and ψ (lemma 18), it follows
that Z ∪ ΓG `WGCSL@2λ @
∧
θ0. In addition, `WGCSL@2λ @ϕ → 3ϕ, for every ϕ (by axiom
(2@2)). Thus, Z ∪ ΓG `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧
θ0. Note also that Z ∪ ΓG `WGCSL@2λ
∧
θ1, since
θ1 ⊆ ΓG. Furthermore, `WGCSL@2λ ϕ → 3ϕ, for every ϕ (by (PL) and (2@2)). Hence,
Z ∪ ΓG `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧
θ1. But this means that Z ∪ ΓG `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧
θ0 ∧3∧ θ1. Since
Z ∪ ΓG isWGCSL@2λ-consistent, {3∧ θ0,3∧ θ1} must beWGCSL@2λ-consistent as well .
Thus, UG,0 isWGCSL@2λ-consistent.
Consider now the case whereI = R. Suppose, for reductio, thatUR,0 isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent.
It follows from this that there is a ﬁnite set θ ⊆ UR,00 such that {3∧ θ} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent.
Since ΓR is SRCSL@2λ-consistent, ΓR∪ESet∪SESet∪@Set is SRCSL@2λ-consistent, since ev-
ery element ofESet∪∪SESet∪@Set is an axiom ofSRCSL@2λ . Thus,ΓR∪ESet∪SESet∪@Set
is alsoWGCSL@2λ-consistent, sinceWGCSL@2λ is a subsystem of SRCSL@2λ . Now, ΓR ∪ESet∪
SESet ∪ @Set `WGCSL@2λ
∧
θ, since θ ⊆ ΓR ∪ ESet ∪ SESet ∪ @Set. Thus, ΓR ∪ ESet ∪
SESet ∪@Set `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧
θ. But this means that {3∧ θ} isWGCSL@2λ-consistent .
Hence, UR,0 isWGCSL@2λ-consistent.
The proof of the induction cases goes exactly as in (Menzel, 1991, pp. 366-367 ), except for
the induction cases where ϕ isWGCSL@2λ-consistentj with UI,i and ϕ = ∃vψ, and where ϕ is
WGCSL@2λ-consistentj with UI,i and ϕ = ∃V nψ. Here only the ﬁrst case is considered. The proof
of the remaining case is exactly the same, except that it appeals to the second-order variants of the
theorems appealed in the case where ϕ = ∃vψ.
So, let ϕ = ∃vψ and assume ϕ isWGCSL@2λ-consistentj with UI,i. Suppose, for reductio,
that UI,i+1 is notWGCSL@2λ-consistent. This means that there are ﬁnite Γk ⊆ U
I,i+1
k such that
{3∧Γk : k < ω} is notWGCSL@2λ-consistent.
Consider ﬁrst the case where 0 6= j. Let ∆ = {3∧Γk : 0 < k < ω, k 6= j}, Γ′j =
Γj −{∃vψ, ψva, Ea}, Γ′0 = Γ0−{@ϕ→ ϕ : a occurs in ϕ}. We have that the set∆∪ {3(∧Γ′j ∧
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∃vψ ∧ ψva ∧ Ea)} ∪ {3∧Γ0} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. So,
∆ `WGCSL@2λ ¬(3
∧
Γ0 ∧3(∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ ∧ ψva ∧ Ea)).
So∆ `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧
Γ0 → ¬3(∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ ∧ ψva ∧ Ea).
So∆ `WGCSL@2λ 3
∧










Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ)→ (Ea→ ¬ψva)).

































We have that `WGCSL@2λ @(@ϕ → ϕ), by Lemma 18. Hence, for every χ in which a occurs,∧
Γ′′0 `WGCSL@2λ @(@χ→ χ). Now, for any set θ, let @θ = {@ϕ : ϕ ∈ θ}. Thus, for every ﬁnite


















Γ′0 ∧ θ) (axiom (2@2)).
So 3∧Γ′′0 `WGCSL@2λ 3(∧Γ′0 ∧ θ) (axioms (PL), (K) and Lemma 17).
Hence, 3∧Γ′′0 `WGCSL@2λ 3∧Γ0. Therefore:
∆,3∧Γ′′0 `WGCSL@2λ (∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ)→ (Ea→ ¬ψva).
So∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ Ea→ ¬ψva .
So∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ ∀v(Ev → ¬ψ) (Lemma 19 (ii) — a occurs in no
premise).
So∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ ∀vEv → ∀v¬ψ (axiom (∀1)).
So∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ ∀v¬ψ.
So∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ ¬∃vψ,
And∆,3∧Γ′′0,∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ ∃vψ.
Thus,∆∪ {3∧Γ′′0} ∪ {∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. By Lemma 20,∆∪ {3∧Γ′′0} ∪
{3(∧Γ′j ∧ ∃vψ)} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. But this contradicts theWGCSL@2λ-consistencyj of
∃vψ with UI,i (note that Γ′′0 ⊆ UI,i0 ) .
Consider now the case where j = 0. Let Γa0 = {@ϕ→ ϕ : @ϕ→ ϕ ∈ Γ0 and a occurs in ϕ},





















Γa0 ∧ ∃vψ)→ (Ea→ ¬ψva).





Γa0 → @(∃vψ → (@Ea→ @¬ψva))).
Furthermore, for every element γ ∈ Γa0 , `WGCSL@2λ @γ. Thus, `WGCSL@2λ @
∧
















Γ′0,@∃vψ `WGCSL@2λ @∀v@Ev → @∀v@¬ψ.































Thus,∆,Γ′′0,∃vψ isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent. By lemma 6,∆,3(Γ′′0∧∃vψ) isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent.
This contradicts theWGCSL@2λ-inconsistentyj of ∃vψ with UI,i (note that Γ′′0 ⊆ U
I,i
0 ).
Hence, UI,i[ordi, {ϕi, ψvv′ , Ev′}] isWGCSL@2λ-consistent. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 22. UI isWGCSL@2λ-consistent.
Proof. Follows from the fact that proofs are ﬁnite and Lemma 21.
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Lemma 23. If ϕ isWGCSL@2λ-consistentj with U , then ϕ ∈ Uj .
Proof. See (Menzel, 1991, p. 367).
Lemma 24. For every j < ω, UIj is maximal.
Proof. See (Menzel, 1991, p. 368).
Lemma 25. For every j < ω, UIj is ∃1-complete and ∃2-complete.
Proof. I here focus only on the case of ∃2-completeness. The left-to-right direction (if ∃V nϕ ∈ UIj ,
then Eζn, ϕV
n
ζn ∈ UIj ) follows directly from the deﬁnition of UIj . For the right-to-left direction,
suppose thatEζn,ϕV
n
ζn ∈ UIj . Suppose also, for reductio, that ∃V nϕ 6∈ UIj . By Lemma 24, it follows
that¬∃V nϕ ∈ UIj . Consider the set θ = {¬∃V nϕ,Eζn, ϕV
n
ζn }. SinceUI isWGCSL@2λ-consistent,
{3∧ θ} isWGCSL@2λ-consistent, the reason being that θ ⊆ UIj . But we have that:
`WGCSL@2λ ¬∃V




















ζn ). This means that {3∧ θ} isWGCSL@2λ-inconsistent .
Hence, ∃V nϕ ∈ UIj .
Lemma 26. UI is 3-complete.
Proof. See (Menzel, 1991, p. 368).
Lemma 27. UI is @-complete.
Proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ UI0 , and, for reductio, that there is j < ω, @ϕ 6∈ UIj . Consider the sets
Γ0 = {ϕ,@¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ} and Γj = {¬@ϕ}. Clearly, Γ0 ⊆ UI0 . Furthermore, Γj ⊆ UIj , since UIj is
maximal (by Lemma 24), and thus either @ϕ ∈ UIj or ¬@ϕ ∈ UIj . But:
Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ @¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ.
So Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ ϕ→ @ϕ (axiom (@¬)).
Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ ϕ.
So Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ @ϕ.
So Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ 2@ϕ (axiom (2@1)).
So 3∧Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ 32@ϕ (axiom (K)).




So Γj `WGCSL@2λ ¬2@ϕ (axiom (T)).
So 3∧Γj `WGCSL@2λ 3¬2@ϕ (axiom (K)).
So 3∧Γj `WGCSL@2λ ¬2@ϕ (Axioms (K), (T) and (5)).
But, this contradicts theWGCSL@2λ-consistency of U , contrary to lemma 22 .
Thus, ϕ ∈ UI0 ⇒ @ϕ ∈ UIj , for every j < ω.
For the left-to-right direction, suppose that there is j < ω such that @ϕ ∈ UIj , even though
ϕ 6∈ UI0 . Let Γ0 = {@ϕ→ ϕ,¬ϕ} and Γj = {@ϕ}. Then:
Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ ¬@ϕ.
So 3∧Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ 3¬@ϕ (axiom (K)).
So 3∧Γ0 `WGCSL@2λ ¬2@ϕ.
So Γj `WGCSL@2λ @ϕ.
So Γj `WGCSL@2λ 2@ϕ (axiom (2@1).
So 3∧Γj `WGCSL@2λ 32@ϕ (axiom (K)).
So 3∧Γj `WGCSL@2λ 2@ϕ (axiom (5)).
So 3∧Γ0,3∧Γj `WGCSL@2λ 2@ϕ ∧ ¬2@ϕ.
But this contradicts the WGCSL@2λ-consistency of UI, since Γ0 is a ﬁnite subset of UI0 (again,
¬ϕ ∈ UI0 by lemma 24) and Γj is a ﬁnite subset of UI0 . Thus, @ϕ ∈ UIj ⇒ ϕ ∈ UIj .
For each individual constant a of L′, let [a]I = {a′ : for some j < ω, a = a′ ∈ UIj }. Also, for
each n-ary predicate letter ζn of L′, let [ζn]I be a function with domain {UIj : j < ω} and such that,
for each j < ω, [ζn]I(UIj ) = {〈[a1]1, . . . , [an]n〉 : ζna1 . . . an ∈ UIj }. The canonicalWC-model
forWGCSL@2λ ,MI = 〈WI, dI, DI, αI, V I〉, for ΓI is now deﬁned.
Let WI = {UIj : j < ω}, dI(UIj ) = {[a]I : Ea ∈ UIj }, DI(n)(UIj ) = {[ζn] : Eζn ∈
UIj }, αI = UI0 . For every individual constant a of L′, V I(a) = [a]I, and for every n-ary predicate
ζn of L′, V I(ζn) = [ζn]I. The functionDI is that function mapping each n ∈ N0 and Uj ∈WI
toDI(n)(UIj ) = {[ζn]I : Eζn ∈ UIj }.
Lemma 28. MI is aWC-model for L′. Furthermore, for every closed formula ϕ of L′, g ∈ As(M):
V I,g
MI,UIj
(ϕ) = {〈〉} ⇔ ϕ ∈ UIj .
Proof. Clearly, αI ∈ WI. Consider now the valuation function V I. By axiom (3E), for every
individual constant a of L′ there is a j < ω such that Ea ∈ UIj . Thus,
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V I(a) = [a]I ∈ {[a′]I : Ea′ ∈ UIj } ⊆
⋃
j<ω




Similarly for any n-ary predicate letter ζn of L′, V I(ζn) ∈ DI(n)(UIj ), for some j < ω, by axiom
(S3E). The fact thatDI(n)(UIj ) ⊆ F (n), for each j < ω and n ∈ N0, follows from axiom (SA).
Consider the following function σ, whose domain consists in the set of pairs 〈Uj , ϕ〉 such that
Uj ∈WI and ϕ is a closed term or a closed formula of L′:
1. If ϕ ∈ Const(L′), then σUIj (ϕ) = [ϕ]
2. If ϕ is a closed n-ary (simple or complex) predicate of L′, then σUIj (ϕ) = {〈[a1]1, . . . , [an]n〉 :
ϕa1 . . . an ∈ UIj }
3. If ϕ is a closed formula of L′, then σUIj (ϕ) = {〈〉} if and only if ϕ ∈ U
I
j .
For each variable v ∈ V ar(L′), each g ∈ As(MI) is such that g(v) = [a]I, for some a ∈
Const(L′). Similarly, g(V n) = [ζn]I, for some n-ary predicate letter ζn ∈ Pred′n(L′). So, for
each formula or term ϕ of L′ having as free individual variables exactly the variables v1, . . . , vn and as
free n-ary second-order variables exactly the variables V n1 , . . . , V
n
mn , wheremn ∈ N0, let (ϕ)g be
the closed formula or term that results from substituting each vi for a chosen individual constant a for
which g(vi) = [a]I, and each V ni for a chosen n-ary predicate letter ζ
n for which g(V ni ) = [ζ
n]I.
Call the sequence of chosen individual constants and n-ary predicate letters a representing sequence
for ϕ and g.57
This is well deﬁned, in the sense that the value of σUIj ((ϕ
g)) does not depend on the chosen
representing sequence. That is, let ϕ[α] be the result of uniformly replacing the variables in ϕ by
the constants and predicate letters in the representing sequence α for ϕ and g. Let β be any other
representing sequence for ϕ and g. We have that σw(ϕ[α]) = σw(ϕ[β]) for every closed formula or
closed term ϕ. The proof of this fact appeals to (Ind) and (SInd).
It is now shown that, for every w ∈ WI, variable-assignment g ∈ As(MI) and every term or







(ϕ) consists in the value of ϕ inM relative to UIj and g (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5).
It is clear that V g
MI,UIj
(ϕ) = σUIj
((ϕ)g) when ϕ is an individual constant, an n-ary predicate




((ϕ)g) when ϕ is of the forms @ψ, ∀vψ and λv1 . . . vn(ψ). The proofs of the
remaining cases are analogous.
57The expression ‘representing sequence’ is taken from (Gallin, 1975, p. 35).
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• ϕ = @ψ.
V g
MI,UIj







g)) = {〈〉} (I.H.)
⇔ (ψ)g ∈ UI0
⇔ @(ψ)g ∈ UIj (Lemma 27)
⇔ (@ψ)g ∈ UIj
⇔ σUIj ((ψ)
g) = {〈〉}
• ϕ = ∀vψ.
V g
MI,UIj
(ϕ) = {〈〉} ⇔ V g
MI,UIj
(∀vψ) = {〈〉}
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(UIj ) : V g[v/o]MI,UIj (ψ) = {〈〉}
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(UIj ) : σUIj ((ψ
g[v/o])) = {〈〉} (I.H.)
⇔ ∀o ∈ d(UIj ) : (ψ)g[v/o] ∈ UIj
⇔ ∀a ∈ Const(L′) s.t. Ea ∈ UIj : (ψ)g[v/[a]
I] ∈ UIj
⇔ (∀vψ)g ∈ UIj (Lemma 25)
⇔ σUIj ((∀vψ)
g) = {〈〉}
• ϕ = λv1, . . . , vn(ψ).
V g
MI,UIj
(ϕ) = V g
MI,UIj
(λv1, . . . , vn(ψ))
= {〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ (d(UIj ))n : V g[v1/o1...vn/on]MI,UIj (ψ) = {〈〉}}
= {〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ (d(UIj ))n : σUIj (ψ)
g[v1/o1...vn/on] = {〈〉}} (I.H.)
= {〈o1, . . . , on〉 ∈ (d(UIj ))n : (ψ)g[v1/o1...vn/on] ∈ UIj }





n ] ∈ UIj }
= {〈[a1]I1 , . . . , [an]In 〉 : λv1 . . . vn(ψ))ga1 . . . an ∈ UIj } (axiom (EAb))
= σUIj
((λv1 . . . vn(ψ))
g)




((ϕ)g). Since (ϕ)g = ϕ when ϕ is closed, we have that,
for every closed formula ϕ of L′, g ∈ As(M): V I,g
MI,UIj
(ϕ) = {〈〉} ⇔ ϕ ∈ UIj .
In order to show thatMI is aWC-model it remains to prove that condition 13. stated on page
202 is satisﬁed. The proof is as follows:
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Suppose ϕ = λv1 . . . vn(ψ), χ1, . . . , χn are all the parameters free in ϕ, and that, for every
i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and arbitrary j < ω, V g
MI
(χi) ∈ dI(UIj ), if χi is an individual con-
stant or variable, and that V g
MI
(χi) ∈ DI(m)(UIj ), if χi is an m-ary predicate letter or m-ary
second-order variable. To prove: V g
MI
(ϕ) ∈ DI(n)(UIj ). We have that V gMI(χi) = σUIk ((χi)
g),
for any k < ω, and thus that E(χi)g ∈ UIj if χi is an individual constant or variable, and
that E(χi)g ∈ UIj if χi is a m-ary predicate letter or predicate variable. Thus, by (CComp),
E(λv1 . . . vn(ψ))
g ∈ UIj . Furthermore, by ∃2-completeness, we have that there is a n-ary predicate
letter ζn such that Eζn ∈ UIj and 2∀v′1 . . . v′n(ζnv′1 . . . v′n ↔ (λv1 . . . vn(ψ))gv′1 . . . v′n) ∈ UIj .
But this implies that σUIj (ζ
n) = σUIj
((λv1 . . . vn(ψ))
g), and that σUIj (ζ
n) ∈ DI(n)(UIj ). But
σUIj
((λv1 . . . vn(ψ))
g) = V g
MI
(λv1 . . . vn(ψ)), as previously shown. Thus, V
g
MI
(ϕ) ∈ DI(n)(UIj ).
The case where ϕ has no parameters is similar, and is thus omitted.
Thus,MI is aWC-model. This concludes the proof.
Now, letMI = 〈WI, dI, DI, αI,VI〉, where VI is the result of restricting the valuation
function V I ofMI to the individual constants and n-ary predicate letters of SL@2λ.
Lemma 29. MI is an SC-model for SL@2λ.
Proof. Since for every individual constant a of SL@2λ, Ea ∈ UI0 , we have that VI(a) ∈ d(αI).
Similarly, VI(ζn) ∈ D(n)(αI), for every n-ary predicate letter ζn ∈ Predn(SL@2λ). Furthermore,
the result of restricting the function V I,g
MI,UIj
to language SL@2λ is a valuation function that assigns
to each formula or term ϕ of SL@2λ a value V I,gMI,UIj (ϕ) in such a way as to satisfy conditions 1. to
13. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 30.
There is a variable assignment g such that, for every ϕ ∈ ΓG, VG,gMG,UG1 (ϕ) = {〈〉}.
There is a variable-assignment g such that, for every ϕ ∈ ΓR, VR,gMR,UR0 (ϕ) = {〈〉}.
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 28, since every element of ΓG belongs to UG1 ,
by construction of UG, and every element of ΓR belongs to UR0 , by construction of U
R.
Since ΓI is an arbitraryI-consistent set of closed formulae of SL@2λ, it follows that:
Lemma 31. EveryI-consistent set of closed formulae Γ of SL@2λ isI-satisﬁable.
The completeness of the systems SGCSL@2λ and SRCSL@2λ follows from the previous lemma:
Theorem 5 (Completeness of SGCSL@2λ and SRCSL@2λ). For every Γ ⊆ Form(SL@2λ) such that
every γ ∈ Γ is a closed formula, for every closed formula ϕ ∈ Form(SL@2λ): Γ (I ϕ⇒ Γ `I ϕ.
The proofs of the completeness of the other strongly Millian logics presented here are similar to
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